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	England and Wales High Court (King's Bench Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (King's Bench Division) Decisions >> Awodiya & Ors v Ministry of Justice [2025] EWHC 49 (KB) (24 March 2025) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/KB/2025/49.html Cite as: [2025] EWHC 49 (KB)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION

		Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LL Heard on 15th November 2024
		Judgment Given On 24th March 2025

This judgment was handed down by the Judge by circulation to parties' representatives by email and release to the National Archives. The date and time for hand-down is deemed to be 14.00 on 24^th March 2025

1. This case with claim number QB-2017-006084 comprises two cases formerly with the claim numbers HQ17X02606 and HQ17X02956 respectively. HQ17X02606 is a claim brought by Mr. and Mrs. Awodiya and their three children against the Ministry of Justice. HQ17X02956 is a claim brought by Mrs. Awodiya alone against the Ministry of Justice. From time to time I shall refer to Mr. and Mrs. Awodiya as the Claimants. The Claimants' children have no discrete claim of their own against the Defendant^[1]
2. I have three applications before me. The first application is the Defendant's application dated 17^th October 2017 in HQ17X02606 seeking an order that the claim be struck out under CPR r.3.4(2) for breach of CPR Part 16, or on the basis that there are no reasonable grounds for bringing the claim. In the alternative, the Defendant seeks summary judgment.^[2]
3. The second application is an application by the Defendant dated 11^th January 2018 in HQ17X02606 and HQ17X02956 seeking an order that the claims be struck out under CPR r.3.4(2) or that the Defendant be granted summary judgment.
4. The third application is an application by Mr. and Mrs Awodiya issued on 10^th June 2023 for summary judgment against the Defendant in the two claims.
5. Mr. and Mrs Awodiya each made oral submissions before me. I am grateful for these submissions as they gave me a clearer picture of their positions. I am also grateful for the written and oral submissions of Mr. Colin Thomann KC who appeared on behalf of the Defendant.
6. At the end of the hearing before me, it appeared that that Claimants had not received a hearing bundle which included Sections G and H of the hearing bundle provided to me.^[3] I indicated that I was willing to receive any written submissions from the Claimants in relation to those sections. Mr. Awodiya asked for 14 days in which to provide the submissions and I agreed. The Claimants did provide written submissions on the 29^th November 2024. However, these submissions went well beyond dealing with the missing sections and dealt with the merits of the applications. I have decided to take these further submissions into account.
7. The Claimants lodged a hearing bundle (373 pages) of their own on the morning of the hearing. There was no explanation as to why the bundle was lodged so late.
8. In support of the Defendant's applications, I have witness statements by Ms Kate Roche of the GLD dated 17^th October 2017 and 11^th January 2018 respectively. Despite directions which have been given, I do not have witness statements by the Claimants in response to the Defendant's applications. The Claimants provided a witness statement dated the 9^th July 2023 in support of their summary judgment application.
9. These two claims HQ17X02606 and HQ17X02956 have never been formally consolidated. I believe that when claims in the Queen's Bench Division were re-numbered these two claims were erroneously given the same QB number. However, as long ago as the 22^nd March 2018, I directed that the Defendant's applications be heard together; that the hearing listed before Master Thornett on 30^th April 2018, with a time estimate of 3 hours, be vacated; and that the hearing of the said applications was to be before me (unless otherwise directed) with a time estimate of 1 day. I further directed that the Claimants do file and serve any witness statements upon which they wished to rely in response to the Defendant's applications by 4.00pm 26th April 2018. I directed that the parties were to discuss listing and submit a completed Private Room Appointment form setting out their dates of availability, up to 31st July 2018, within 14 days of receipt of the order.^[4]

Delay

10. It is deeply unsatisfactory that the Defendant's applications were not dealt with in 2018 – or well before 2024. I have not heard any satisfactory explanation for the delay from the parties. Mr. Awodiya told me that he had made enquiries with court staff about listing and was told that I had retired and that the case had not yet been re-assigned to another Master. I retired in October 2020. I daresay that the pandemic caused difficulties with court administration and listing but even taking that into account the applications should have been heard well before now.
11. The Claimants state within their application that they complained about the failure to progress their case or list the applications on 25^th October 2022. They assert that following the Defendant's instruction, the King's Bench refused to respond or process their complaint. The Claimants state:

"… It is the Claimant's reasonable submission that the defendant's malicious plan is to use the 6 years case life span to "clear out" our High Court case and prevent access to justice while concealing the atrocities of Leeds City Council, West Yorkshire Police, NHS Leeds and Meanwood Group Practice…"

"… It is the Claimants' reasonable submission that the defendant, Ministry of Justice, in anticipation of the 6 years case clear out (July 2023), in connivance with Leeds City Council and others is deeply involved in preplanned retaliatory actions: To kidnap, ruin frauds by way of unlawfully freezing monetary assets, employment sabotage frauds, incarceration and mental health frauds, Parental Obliteration and Welfare Damage against the Awodiya children."

12. There is no evidence that the Defendant instructed staff of the King's Bench Division to refuse to respond or process the Claimants' complaint. The Claimants refer to the "6 years case life span" and "the 6 years case clear out" but there are no such concepts. There is no evidence of the Defendant conniving with any other party as alleged or at all. For reasons which will become apparent, the Defendant does not have to resort to connivance with others in order to defeat the Claimants' claims.
13. To be clear, I shall deal with the applications on their merits regardless of when the claims and applications were issued.
14. I should add that at the outset that the Claimants sought to have their application listed before a High Court Judge. Soole J., released the application to the assigned Master. The application was referred to Master Eastman. On Master Eastman's instructions, King's Bench Masters' Listing wrote to the parties on 1^st September 2023 stating that Master Eastman requested an update on what, if any, progress had been made in the case. Should no progress have been made, Master Eastman requested that the applicant submit a completed Masters' Appointment form so that a hearing may be listed. A copy of the letter, the sealed application form, and Masters' Appointment form were sent to the parties. I am unsure about when the Masters' Appointment forms were sent to the court.
15. In any event, the applications came before Deputy Master Grimshaw on the 25^th June 2024. He adjourned the hearing and directed, inter alia, that the Claimants do by 24^th July 2024 provide the Defendant's solicitors with any documentation the Claimants rely upon in support of their application, including a witness statement from each Claimant; any documentation in response to the Defendant's application. He then gave listing directions which resulted in the hearing coming before me.^[5]

The Claims

Claim No. HQ17X02606

16. By a claim form issued on the 21^st July 2017, the Claimants seeks £2 million in damages and under the brief details of claim states that the Claimants are pursuing claims in: personal injury, racial discrimination, victimisation, breach of human rights, breach of data protection, forgery and misfeasance in public office.
17. The Particulars of Claim run to 109 paragraphs. They are in narrative form and fail to comply with CPR r.16.4 which requires that particulars of claim must include "a concise statement of the facts on which the claimant relies".
18. It is clear from the Particulars of Claim that the wrongs claimed are alleged to have been committed by judges and court staff at the Leeds Combined Court Centre in the handling of two previous civil claims brought by Mr. and Mrs Awodiya; namely, Claim No. C70YJ523 and Claim No. C44YM405. The Claimants contend that the Defendant is vicariously liable for the actions of the judges and the Leeds County Court.
19. Claim No. C70YJ523 was issued on the 28^th January 2016 against the Leeds City Council; the NHS Litigation Authority; and the Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police seeking damages of £120,348. Claim No. C44YM405 was issued in June 2016 against six individuals who worked for the defendants in the proceeding claim, seeking damages of £230,000.
20. Claim No. C70YJ523 was initially listed for a three day trial at the Leeds Combined Court Centre in December 2016. The trial was vacated by order of District Judge Geddes dated 5^th October 2016. The Claimants complained about the vacation of the trial. The Claimants alleged that District Judge Geddes was biased on the basis that that she had previously been instructed by Leeds City Council when she was at the Bar. In the present proceedings, the Claimants allege that the vacation of the trial was wrongful and deprived them of a hearing in breach of Article 6. I do not see how the vacation of the trial could be said to be wrongful (or beyond the discretion of the district judge) given that the defendants in those proceedings had applied to strike out the claims.
21. On the 24^th January 2017, District Judge Shepherd granted the defendants applications in Claim No. C70YJ523 and struck out the claim in its entirety. The Claimants complain that the judge could not have had time to read their 589 page bundle; that the judge should not have refused an adjournment; that the judge behaved improperly by smiling at the defendants' counsel; that the judge shouted at the Claimants; that the judge acted with bias and malice.
22. The Claimants allege that after leaving the hearing room, they were called "fucking black bastards" by the court security guard who was wearing a G4S uniform. The Claimants state that their attempts to report the incident to the court manager were blocked by court staff. The Claimants contend that the Defendant is vicariously liable for the security guard's misconduct.
23. In about September 2017, Mr. Awodiya issued judicial review proceedings in the Administrative Court against the Leeds County Court and the Ministry of Justice in respect of the decisions of the judges and other officials at the Leeds County Court in Claim No. C70YJ523. He alleged that there was improper collusion between judges and defendants to that claim and sought an order to quash the striking out of the claim. On the 17^th September 2017, Dinah Rose QC (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge) made an order directing that Mr. Awodiya do serve the judicial review claim and accompanying documents on the defendants.
24. Mr. Awodiya's application for judicial review in relation to Claim No. C70YJ523 came before Mr. Justice Fraser on the 7^th November 2017. By this time Mr. Awodiya had applied to set aside the said order of Dinah Rose QC. Fraser J, dismissed the application to set aside order of Dinah Rose QC on the basis that it was a case management decision which was perfectly properly made. The fact that her practice had previously brought her (inevitably) into contact with the Ministry of Justice was held to be "of no materiality whatsoever". Permission to bring judicial review was refused and the application was stated to be totally without merit. Fraser J adopted the reasons given by Holgate J in his order dated 20^th June 2017 in C44YM405 – see below.
25. Fraser J further ordered that the Claimant was to be provided with a copy of the hearing of 24^th January 2017 at public expense so that any complaint to the relevant authorities could be properly dealt with. No such transcript has been obtained by the Claimants.
26. The Claimants allege that they have been the subject of racial discrimination by Geddes DJ and Shepherd DDJ and court staff in that they (of black African ethnicity) were treated less favourably than the defendants who were represented by people who were white.
27. In November 2016, Claim No. C44YM405 was transferred from CCMCC to the Leeds County Court by DJ Geddes. It is alleged that the transfer was unlawful and amounted to a breach of the Data Protection Act 1998 and that it is further evidence of bias by DJ Geddes towards the employers of the defendants.
28. On 31^st January 2017 Mr. Awodiya alleges that he received six acknowledgments of services which must have been forged.
29. On the 24^th March 2017, Mr. Awodiya applied to transfer the claim to the High Court given, inter alia, the racial discrimination by DJ Shepherd and court staff and the forging of court documents by court staff and DJ Shepherd and DJ Geddes "in a bid to offer protection for the defendants and to effectively sabotage the entirety of the claimant's claim contrary to Forgery & Counterfeiting Act 1981 Section 1 &3." By order dated 10^th April 2017, the transfer application was dismissed as being totally without merit.
30. By order of DJ Shepherd dated 8^th March 2017, Mr. Awodiya was directed to file certificates of service in relation to the first, second, third and sixth defendant by 24^th March 2017. An application by the fourth and fifth defendants to strike out the claim was listed for hearing on 7^th June 2017. Mr. Awodiya failed to file the certificates and on 18^th May 2017 DJ Shepherd made an order requiring certificates of service to be filed or the claim would be struck out. The case was listed for consideration of striking out on the fourth and fifth defendants' application on 7^th June 2017.
31. Mr. Awodiya did not attend the hearing but sought to adjourn the hearing (through Mrs. Awodiya, I believe) on the grounds of ill health. The application to adjourn was refused and the claim was struck out.
32. Mr. Awodiya issued judicial review proceedings in the Administrative Court in relation to Claim No. C44YM405. The documents came before Mr. Justice Holgate and by order dated 20^th June 2017, he refused the application for urgent relief and refused permission to apply for judicial review. The application for judicial review was considered to be totally without merit.
33. Holgate J gave extensive reasons. He stated that the medical certificate in support of the application to adjourn was wholly inadequate and did not refer to symptoms of PTSD. He noted that although Mrs. Awodiya's statement added that Mr. Awodiya was unable to concentrate properly, on 3^rd June 2017 Mr. Awodiya produced an SFG of about 30 pages in support of the judicial review application.
34. Holgate J made the point that judicial review is an exceptional and very restricted remedy of last resort so far as proceedings in the County Court are concerned and that there was no basis for judicial review to be invoked where an appeal process was available and there is no evidence of it having been used. There was no evidence of a decision by an appellate judge containing an error of law which is appropriate to be dealt with by judicial review. Holgate J further held that there was no arguable basis for Mr. Awodiya to bring a claim against the Ministry of Justice to deal with matters. Holgate J was plainly satisfied that the County Court had jurisdiction.^[6]

Claim No. HQ17X02956

35. By a claim form issued on 15^th August 2017, Mrs. Awodiya seeks £200,000 in damages for direct discrimination on the grounds of race and for breach of Article 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
36. The Particulars of Claim also claim damages for injury to feelings and misfeasance in public office. Again, it is clear that the wrongs claimed are alleged to have been committed by judges and court staff at the Leeds Combined Court Centre in the handling of a civil claim brought by Mrs. Awodiya; namely, Claim No. C10YM735. Mrs. Awodiya contends that the Defendant is vicariously liable for the actions of the judges and the Leeds County Court.
37. As far as Claim No. C10YM735 is concerned, by order dated 16^th January 2017, Deputy District Judge Myers struck out the claim. Mrs. Awodiya alleges that this decision was tainted by bias and constitutes misfeasance in public office.
38. Mrs. Awodiya applied for permission to appeal the order of 16^th January 2017. Permission to appeal was refused by HHJ Saffman on paper on 26^th January 2017. Mrs. Awodiya alleges that this was an error of judgment and tainted by bias.
39. On 15^th February 2017, HHJ Gosnell struck out Mrs. Awodiya's application to set aside the order of DDJ Myers as being totally without merit. The learned judge made the point that Mrs. Awodiya was not entitled to apply to strike out or set aside an order which was made at a hearing at which she was present.
40. On the 19^th April 2017, HHJ Gosnell refused Mrs. Awodiya' application for permission to appeal at an oral hearing. Accordingly, Mrs. Awodiya exhausted her statutory right to appeal.
41. Mrs. Awodiya issued judicial review proceedings in the Administrative Court against the Leeds County Court and the Ministry of Justice. She sought to judicially review the decision of DDJ Myers dated 16^th January 2017. On the 26^th October 2017, the application and documents came before Mr. Darryl Allen QC (sitting as a High Court Judge). He refused permission to apply for judicial review. He stated that judicial review against the decision of a County Court lies only where there are exceptional circumstances, such as an absolute lack of jurisdiction or fundamental denial of a fair hearing or circumstances where the judicial process itself has been denied, frustrated or corrupted. The learned judge held that Mrs Awodiya had not demonstrated lack of jurisdiction in respect of DDJ Myers, HHJ Saffman or HHJ Gosnell; and that Mrs. Awodiya had not identified any act by DDJ Myers which could be said to be truly exceptional, a fundamental denial of a fair hearing or denial, frustration or corruption of the judicial process. The judge further held that Mrs. Awodiya's allegations against DJ Geddes were without merit as "(a) it is almost inevitable that following appointment a Judge may have to hear a case in which one of the parties had instructed the Judge prior to appointment; that in itself could not give rise to an inference of actual or apparent bias; and (b) there is no evidence whatsoever that DJ Geddes contributed to or influenced the decision of DDJ Myers in any way."
42. Mr. Darryl Allen QC went on to state:

"[Mrs. Awodiya's] allegations of systemic direct racial discrimination, breach of her human rights, misfeasance in public office and personal injury are such that no judge could be expected to accept them on the simple assertion of the Claimant. On that basis they are doomed to failure."

The Submissions and conclusions in the present cases

Claims relating to the judges.

43. In so far as far as the claims relate to the alleged misconduct by various judges, the Defendant submits that the claims cannot proceed given the principle of judicial immunity. The principle is well-established. Persons exercising judicial functions have a special immunity from suit: they are exempt from any personal civil liability for anything said or done by them in their judicial capacity.
44. In the Court of Appeal in Sirros v Moore [1975] QB 118. Denning LJ observed:

Ever since the year 1613, if not before, it has been accepted in our law that no action is maintainable against a judge for anything said or done by him in the exercise of a jurisdiction which belongs to him. The words which he speaks are protected by an absolute privilege. The orders which he gives, and the sentence which he imposes, cannot be made the subject of civil proceedings against him. No matter that he was under some gross error or ignorance or was activated by envy, hatred and malice, and all uncharitableness, he is not liable to an action. The remedy of the party aggrieved is to appeal to a Court of Appeal or to apply for habeas corpus or a writ of error or certiorari, or take some such step to reverse his ruling. (My emphasis).

45. The Defendant further relies on Section 2(5) of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 which excludes proceedings against the Crown "in respect of anything done or omitted to be done by any person while discharging or purporting to discharge any responsibilities of a judicial nature vested in him, or any responsibilities which he has in connection with the execution of judicial process". It follows that no vicarious liability attaches itself to the Crown for torts that may be committed by judges.
46. The Claimants contend that the Defendant is vicariously liable for the wrongs of the judges. I reject that contention which cannot stand given the principle of judicial immunity and given the clear terms of Section 2(5) of the 1947 Act. The Defendant can have no vicarious liability for wrongs committed by judges when the judges themselves have no liability. The Defendant has no direct or vicarious liability for the wrongs committed by judges given Section 2(5).
47. Mrs. Awodiya submitted that the Defendants must have liability given the overriding objective which is to deal with cases justly. The overriding objective is of no assistance to the Claimants in this context. The overriding objective contained in Part 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules is at the heart of the Rules – but, as CPR r.1.1(1) states, the Rules are a procedural code with the overriding objective of enabling the court to deal with cases justly and at proportionate cost. The overriding objective cannot be used to sidestep the substantive law and the effect of a statute.
48. Mrs. Awodiya submitted that judges must be accountable somehow and that the Defendant must control the judges. With respect, judges are accountable. Their decisions are subject to the appeal regime.^[7] In exceptional circumstances, the decision of a judge may be the subject of judicial review when rights of appeal have been exhausted. As far as judicial misconduct is concerned, judges may be the subject a complaint to the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office.^[8]
49. Quite apart from the principle of judicial immunity and Section 2(5) of the 1947 Act, although there is much assertion of wrongdoing by the Claimants, there is no actual evidence of racial discrimination or bias or impropriety by any judge. The allegations of forgery are unparticularised and without any foundation. The alleged misfeasance in public office (relating to a judicial decision upheld on appeal) is also hopeless. There are no sufficient particulars of breach of the Data Protection Act and no loss alleged as a result of any breach.
50. The Claimants have pleaded their cases at length and there are assertions of racial discrimination and bias. Despite this, there is no evidence of wrongdoing by any judge.
51. The Claimants have had the opportunity to appeal decisions made against them. They have taken judicial review proceedings although these were doomed to failure.

The Human Rights Act

52. The Claimants rely on Sections 6-8 of the Human Rights Act 1998. The Claimants state that their claim is:

"…for acts of judicial office holders that were seriously impugned with underlying malicious racial hatred, actual or imputed bias and preconceived ideologies which caused detriment to the Awodiya family."

53. By Section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act ("HRA") it is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right. For this purpose, "public authority" includes a court or tribunal: see subsection (3)(a).
54. By section 7(1) of the HRA, a person who claims that a public authority has acted (or proposes to act) in a way which is made unlawful by section 6(1) may (a) bring proceedings against the authority under the Act in the appropriate court or tribunal, or (b) rely on the Convention right or rights concerned in any legal proceedings, provided that he is (or would be) a victim of the unlawful act.
55. That is the statutory position. However, there are no sufficient particulars of breach of the HRA and no evidence that the Leeds County Court acted in a way which is unlawful by section 6(1) of the HRA. Again, we have much assertion by the Claimants but there is no evidence whatsoever of any judge treating the Claimants less favourably on the grounds of their race. There is no evidence of bias.

The G4S Security Guard

56. Without making any finding of fact, for the purposes of the applications before me, I assume that the security guard did use the racist words alleged against the Claimants. Such words would have been distressing to the Claimants and are totally unacceptable. The security guard was wearing a G4S uniform and was employed by that organisation.
57. The key question is whether or not the Defendants are liable for the misconduct of the security guard. The Claimants contend that the Defendant is vicariously liable. The Claimants put it as follows in their written submissions:

"G4S was employed by Leeds Combined Court to manage its premises and during the course of their employment, G4S under the directions of DJ Shepherd proceeded to unlawfully remove the Claimants from the court room, during this time the G4S staffs uttered vulgar comments which racially discriminated the Claimants by calling them "fucking black bastards".

58. I accept that the security guard as acting in the course of his employment. However, he was employed by G4S not by the Leeds Combined Court or by the Defendant. G4S were engaged to manage the premises but they would not have been engaged as employees but as independent contractors. There is no vicarious liability for the wrongs of an independent contractor. Accordingly, the Defendant cannot be liable for the alleged misconduct of the security guard.
59. The Claimants rely on the cases of Cox v Ministry of Justice [2016] UKSC 10; [2016] 2 WLR 806; Mohamud v WM Morrison Supermarkets plc [2016] UKSC 11; [2016] 2 WLR 821; Lloyd v Grace Smith & Co [1912] AC 716; and Lister v Helsey Hall Ltd [2002] 1 AC 215; [2001] 2 WLR 1311 HL in support of their submission that the Defendant is vicariously liable.
60. I do not find these cases to be of assistance in the present case.
61. In Cox the Supreme Court considered the approach to be adopted in deciding whether a relationship other than one of employment can give rise to vicarious liability. It was held that the Ministry of Justice was vicariously liable for injury caused by a negligent act of a prisoner undertaking paid kitchen work.^[9]
62. The Supreme Court stated that vicarious liability in tort was imposed on a defendant in respect of the act or omission of another because of his relationship with the tortfeasor and the connection between that relationship and the act or omission in question; that a relationship could give rise to vicarious liability even in the absence of a contract of employment; that the essential factors were that the tort was committed as a result of activity being undertaken by the tortfeasor on behalf of the defendant, that that activity was integral to the defendant's business activities and that the defendant by employing the tortfeasor to carry out the activity had created the risk of the tort being committed by the tortfeasor.
63. Although the prisoner was not engaged under a contract of employment the relationship was akin to one of employment and the prisoner's activity was done on behalf of the Ministry of Justice. The prisoner was working as an integral part of the operation of the prison and for its benefit.
64. In the present case there was no employment contract between the security guard and the Defendant and there was no relationship between them which could be described as akin to employment. The activity undertaken by the G4S security guard was done on behalf of G4S not on behalf of the Defendant.
65. In Mohamud the employer of a petrol kiosk attendant who had subjected a customer to an unprovoked assault was liable for his actions. The issue in that case was whether or not the attendant was acting in the course of his employment. There was no dispute that he was employed by the defendant. In Lister it was held that a warden's tortious acts in sexually abusing children in his care were so closely connected with his employment as to warrant the imposition of vicarious liability on his employer, Again, there was no dispute that the warden was employed by the defendant.
66. In Lloyd it was held that a principal is liable for the fraud of his agent acting within the scope of his authority, whether the fraud is committed for the benefit of the principal or for the benefit of the agent. In the present case, there is no such agency relationship between the Defendant and the G4S security guard.
67. In conclusion, given that the security guard was not employed by the Defendant, and was not in a relationship akin to employment (as in Cox) there is no basis for vicarious liability.

Claims against court staff at the Leeds County Court or Court Centre

68. In so far as the allegations against court staff relate to incompetence, delay, rudeness and inattentiveness or such like, such conduct can be the subject of a complaint to the appropriate authorities. However, such conduct cannot be the subject of a civil claim. Certainly, what the Claimants have pleaded cannot justify civil proceedings.

The Children's Claim

69. As already indicated, the children's claim in HQ17X02606 cannot proceed as they have no discrete cause of action against the Defendant.

The Personal Injury Claim

70. Conducting litigation is very stressful. The Claimants perceive themselves as the victims of racial discrimination and bias at the hands of the judges. This perception would be deeply hurtful. However, there is no evidence of racial discrimination or wrongdoing by the judges. Furthermore, there is no medical evidence before me of any personal injury suffered by the Claimants. There is no medical report attached to the Particulars of Claim as required by CPR PD para.4.3 – assuming that the Claimants wish to rely on a report by a medical practitioner. In any event, the personal injury claim – such as it is – would fall away fall away with the striking out of the claims given the principle of judicial immunity and the operation of s.2(5) of the 1947 Act.
71. I should add that when the Claimants sent their written submissions to me by email on 29^th November 2024, Mr. Awodiya asked for additional time in which to obtain a psychiatric report. He explained that on the 28^th November 2024, the Claimants had found a solicitor who agreed to give instruction to their medical expert. He stated that the duration from providing the instruction and receiving the Medical Expert Report is 6 to 9 weeks. The Claimants state that they have been unlawfully prevented from accessing their medical records to date.
72. In the circumstances, I declined to defer the handing down of my judgment. My impression is that there is a risk of more than 9 weeks being required and that in any event the production of a medical report would not prevent the claim as a whole from being struck out.

The Claimants' summary judgment application

73. This application is totally without merit. It is clear from the Defences filed and the witness statements of Ms Roche in support of the Defendant's application, that the Defendant had a real prospect of successfully defending the claims (and striking out the claims) so that summary judgment for the Claimants would be impossible. As indicated above, the Defendant has a complete defence to the claims.
74. The Claimants' witness statement in support of their application for summary judgment ventilates various complaints but completely fails to address the question of whether or not the Defendant has a real prospect of successfully defending the claim.
75. Mr. Awodiya told me in argument that the Claimants issued the summary judgment application in order to get the hearing of the of the Defendant's applications listed. That may be so but it would have been better to issue an application for a short case management conference so that listing directions could be given.

Final Conclusions

76. Against the above background, I find that the claim form and Particulars of Claim in both HQ17X02606 and HQ17X02956 disclose no reasonable grounds for bringing the claims. Accordingly, I shall strike out these statements of case and the claims under CPR r.3.4(2)(a). There is no legally recognisable claim against the Defendant in either case. Each of these cases is totally without merit. For the avoidance of doubt, I shall strike out the composite claim of QB-2017-006084.
77. I should add that the Claimants have made various allegations of misconduct against the GLD, King's Bench listing staff and others occurring after the issue of the claim forms and Particulars of Claim. Given the nature of the applications, I have not found it necessary to consider these matters which do not assist in relation to whether or not the claims as pleaded show reasonable grounds for bringing the claim.
78. Put another way, the Claimants' have no real prospect of succeeding on either claim.
79. As far as the Claimants' application for summary judgment is concerned, I shall dismiss that application. As already stated, that application is totally without merit.
80. A draft of this judgment was sent to the parties on 19^th December 2024.

Note 1   The children were all minors at the time proceedings were issued and should have had litigation friends. This is an entirely academic point.     [Back]

Note 2   The application was issued in the County Court at Central London where proceedings then were.    [Back]

Note 3   Section G: Correspondence Generated following the hearing on 25th June 2024; Section H: GLD Communication with the Claimant following the hearing on 25th June 2024. The said hearing was before Deputy Master Grimshaw.     [Back]

Note 4   This order was made in the absence of the Defendant but they were given the option to apply to set aside or vary the order.     [Back]

Note 5   On the 1st July 2024 the Claimants applied to set aside the order of the Deputy Master. On the 16th July 2024 Master Eastman dismissed the application and held it to be totally without merit. The Claimants having attended the hearing before the Deputy Master were not entitled to apply to set it aside. Any challenge should have been by way of appeal. On the 15th September 2024 the Claimants made a complaint against DM Grimshaw to the Bar Standards Board alleging racial motivation, bias and fraud. How all this could arise out of a hearing and case management directions is a mystery to me. The Claimants have also made complaints against Mr. Thomann to the Bar Standards Board.    [Back]

Note 6   With some qualification in relation to defamation – which is not part of the Claimants’ case.    [Back]

Note 7   See CPR Part 52 and its Practice Directions.    [Back]

Note 8   However, the JCIO will not accept complaints about a judge’s decision or the way a judge has managed a case. The incorrect decision can be challenged on appeal.    [Back]

Note 9    Under rule 31(6) of the Prison Rules 1999 , prisoners may be paid for their work at rates approved by the Secretary of State.     [Back]