Wei & Ors v Long & Ors [2025] EWHC 912 (KB) (11 April 2025)

This judgment was handed down remotely at 4.30pm on 11^th April 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

Mrs Justice Hill:

Introduction

By a claim issued on 19 July 2023 the Claimants ("C1", "C2", "C3" and "C4" respectively) bring proceedings for harassment contrary to the Protection From Harassment Act 1997 ("the PHA"), defamation (libel), malicious falsehood and various privacy-related [1] claims against the four Defendants ("D1", "D2", "D3" and "D4" respectively). It is also alleged that D1 has engaged in conduct in breach of Article 8 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights ("the ECHR"). D1 is a private individual. The claims against him rely heavily on internet posts on various websites for which it is said D2, D3 and D4 are responsible.

This is my second judgment on the claim, the issues between the Claimants and D4 having been determined by a judgment handed down on 31 January 2025: [2025] EWHC 158 (KB). I allowed D4's application challenging this court's jurisdiction under CPR Part 11. Consequently, the claim now proceeds against D1, D2 and D3 only.

D1 has not engaged with these proceedings in any way. On 30 March 2024, the claim was served on D1 out of the jurisdiction with the permission of the Master. On 10 June 2024, the Claimants obtained default judgment against D1 under CPR 12, for an amount of damages to be decided by the Court. Directions were given for a disposal hearing as defined under CPD 26, paragraph 23. The Claimants have made various other applications against D1.

This judgment determines all the remaining issues between the Claimants and D1. It is structured as follows:

Part A addresses certain preliminary matters including the decision to proceed in D1's absence and the approach to be taken to the assessment of damages and other remedies, given the order for default judgment and in the face of legal difficulties with the merits of some of the claims: paragraphs [8]-[103] below;

Part B determines all the issues and applications relating to damages, including general damages for harassment and libel, C2's personal injury claim and aggravated damages: [104]-[181];

Part C considers the various remedies other than damages, primarily an injunction and an order under the Defamation Act 2013, s.12 that D1 publish a summary of the judgment: [182]-[204]; and

Part D deals with costs, including summarily assessing the costs D1 is ordered to pay the Claimants: [205]-[222] and Annex 1.

The first effective disposal hearing took place on 27 February 2025. C1 and C2 required the assistance of an interpreter at the hearing. C4 joined the hearing remotely. A further remote hearing took place on 27 March 2025 at which one of the experts, Dr Forbat, gave evidence.

The Claimants have represented themselves throughout the litigation. Shortly before the 27 February 2025 hearing Ms Wisson was instructed by the Claimants under the Pro Bono Trial Advocacy Scheme in the Media and Communications List.

I am very grateful to the scheme administrators for making those arrangements and to Ms Wisson for the help to the Claimants and the court that she provided at the hearing and in written submissions thereafter. It is no understatement to say that her input transformed a voluminous amount of material into a focussed yet comprehensive position on behalf of the Claimants.

Part A: Preliminary matters

Proceeding in the absence of D1

D1 did not attend the disposal hearings on 27 February 2025, or the earlier hearings on 4 November 2024 and 12 December 2024 when it had originally been anticipated that the disposal issues would be dealt with.

The orders notifying D1 of both the 12 December 2024 and 27 February 2025 hearings included red text at the outset of the order confirming that default judgment had been obtained against him and what the next steps would be. The Claimants filed Certificates of Service confirming service on D1 of both these orders as well as the earlier order of the Master granting default judgment against him and the notice of the 27 March 2025 hearing. At no point had D1 communicated with the court about the claim in any way.

Under CPR 23.11(1) and 39.3(1) the court may proceed with the hearing of an application or with a trial in the absence of a party.

The Human Rights Act 1998 ("the HRA"), s.12 makes special provision in this regard for cases where the court is considering whether to grant any relief which, if granted, might affect the exercise of the Convention right to freedom of expression. That applied here, given that the Claimants sought an injunction restraining D1 from publishing defamatory or harassing material about them.

Under s.12(2), if the person against whom the application for relief is made ("the respondent") is neither present nor represented, no such relief is to be granted unless the court is satisfied that the applicant has taken all practicable steps to notify the respondent.

In Pirtek (UK) Limited v Robert Jackson [2017] EWHC 2834 (QB) Warby J (as he then was) considered a situation such as this, where the defendant was a litigant in person who had failed to appear without giving a reason, and the relief sought fell within the scope of s.12(2). Referring to his earlier decisions in Sloutsker v Romanova [2015] EWHC 545 (QB), [2015] EMLR 27 at [22]-[23] and Brett Wilson LLP v Persons Unknown [2015] EWHC 2628 (QB), [2016] EMLR 2 at [14]-[16], Warby J took a two-stage approach to deciding whether to proceed in the absence of the defendant, namely considering (1) whether the defendant had received proper notice of the hearing and the matters to be considered at the hearing; (2) if so, whether the available evidence as to the reasons for the litigant's non-appearance supplied a reason for adjourning the hearing: [19] and [20].

Applying the test in Pirtek, in light of the material at [9] above I was satisfied that D1 had received proper notice of the hearings and the matters to be considered at them; and there was nothing in the evidence before me as to the reasons for D1's non-appearance which justified adjourning either hearing. For the purposes of the HRA, s.12(2), I was satisfied that the Claimants had taken "all practicable steps" to notify D1 of these proceedings, such that it was permissible to grant relief which might affect D1's exercise of the Convention right to freedom of expression.

In those circumstances I concluded that it was appropriate to conduct both hearings in D1's absence under CPR 23.11(1) and 39.3(1). I therefore followed the approaches taken to this issue in Suttle v Walker [2019] EWHC 396 (QB) at [32]-[34] and Blackledge v Persons Unknown [2021] EWHC 1994 (QB) at [4].

The Claimants served various submissions and documents before and after the two hearings which were directly relevant to the issues considered in this judgment. The Claimant continued to serve all material on D1 and file Certificates of Service confirming that they had done so. At no point did D1 communicate with the court prior to the draft of this judgment being circulated.

I was therefore satisfied that D1 had also been made aware of all the further relevant documentation and chosen not to engage with it. It was therefore appropriate to proceed to determine the disposal issues by this judgment.

The approach of the court to assessing damages after default judgment

A default judgment under CPR Part 12 is a final judgment that is conclusive on liability; and a defendant may only raise issues that are not inconsistent with the judgment: Lunnun v Singh (Hajar) [1999] CPLR 587 and Pugh v Cantor Fitzgerald International [2001] CP Rep 74, considered in New Century Media Limited v Makhlay [2013] EWHC 3556 (QB) at [31]-[34]. In New Century Media at [30], Carr J (as she then was) explained that the Particulars of Claim are, in effect, a "proxy" for the judgment, setting out the basis of liability.

In Suttle v Walker [2019] EWHC 396 (QB) at [36], Nicklin J explained that:

"...the general rule is that where judgment has been entered in default the court will proceed to determine the remedies that the claimant should be granted on the basis of the claimant's unchallenged pleaded case. Where the defendant has not disputed the claimant's case there is no need to adduce evidence, or for the court to make express findings of fact. Indeed, it would usually be disproportionate and contrary to the overriding objective to use court resources to do so. The claimant can legitimately be granted remedies, therefore, on the assumption that his or her case is correct".

In Sloutsker v Romanova [2015] EWHC 2053 (QB) at [84]-[86], Warby J (as he then was) had recognised that the court might need to modify the general rule that it should proceed on the basis of the claimant's unchallenged Particulars of Claim, if, for instance, the court concluded that the claimant's interpretation of the words complained of was "wildly extravagant or impossible, or that the words were clearly not defamatory in their tendency."

In Suttle, Nicklin J applied Sloutsker, holding that the court may depart from the general rule "only if it is clear that the claim is for some reason impossible or that any required legal threshold has not been met" ("the Suttle exception").

Damages still have to be proved by the claimant. In Symes v St George's Healthcare NHS Trust [2014] EWHC 2505 (QB) the claimant took issue with the defendant's arguments on causation, contending that at least some of the arguments were precluded by the fact that they had been set out in the Particulars of Claim and default judgment had been entered: [52]. Simon Picken QC, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court, reviewed the authorities, before accepting the defendant's position: [28]-[46] and [56]. The judge observed that no authority had been cited in which it had been held that a defendant could not challenge causation in the face of a judgment in default where damages have been ordered to be assessed: [58]. The effect of this was that while specific damage had been alleged in the Particulars of Claim and the defendant could not argue at assessment that no damage had been caused, "it does not matter that the claimant's statement of case alleges that particular losses were caused: the defendant can argue that, whilst 'some damage' was caused, it was not the damage alleged by the claimant in his statement of case": [61]-[62].

Accordingly, it is necessary to take the Claimants' pleaded case on liability as proven (subject to the Suttle exception) and to assess the damages to which the Claimants are entitled. However, that does not mean that the court is bound to accept the Claimants' assertions to the effect that particular types of damage were in fact caused by D1's torts: rather, they need to make out their case on causation as to the type and level of damage caused.

The factual background

In accordance with the approach set out above, the factual background to the Claimants' claim is taken from the Particulars of Claim ("POC").

The POC are excessively long, running to 351 paragraphs over 185 pages, with no "appropriate short summary" of the claim at the outset as required by CPR PD 16, paragraph 1.3. They are repetitive and confusing. They do not set out the factual background in chronological detail but rather "jump around". The bulk of the factual detail of each claim is, incorrectly, set out under the heading "statement of truth" commencing at paragraph 10. The POC are not supported by CPR-compliant statements of truth for all four Claimants. They are undated, but according to court records, were first filed with the court on 19 July 2023.

With some effort, it is possible to discern from the POC that the factual basis for the Claimants' claims is as follows.

The parties

C1 is Chinese. She was a legal academic in China for 32 years before her retirement in January 2022. By then she was a professor of law at Shenzhen University who had trained a large number of students. The POC avers that C1 "also works as a lawyer and serves the public": POC at [2](1).

C2 is also Chinese. He is described in the POC as working as a lawyer, practising in the YingKe law firm in Beijing: POC at [2](1) and [9](2).

In China, lawyers are strictly regulated by the Ministry of Justice. There are high expectations of personal conduct. Every practising lawyer is assessed annually. C1 and C2 have been in compliance with the evaluation standards and have passed the annual inspections throughout their practices as lawyers: POC at [2](1) and (2).

C3 is the son of C1 and C2. He is a British citizen. He studied in the UK for about 10 years, at both undergraduate and postgraduate levels. His academic performance was excellent. He is active in voluntary work. While at university, he volunteered at the London Olympics 2012 and received a certificate of recognition for his voluntary work from the then Prime Minister David Cameron. He also worked as a volunteer teacher in a Chinese language school. After the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war he went to the Ukraine to do voluntary work: POC at [2](3).

C4 is Ukrainian. She is proficient in English, Mandarin Chinese and Russian in addition to her native Ukrainian language. From 2016 to 2019 she was an international student studying at the China Textile University: POC at [2](4).

D1 is Chinese-American. He has a bachelor's degree and a doctorate in engineering from universities in China and the USA. From 2001 onwards he has worked in a series of roles in the engineering and technology industry, including setting up several companies. Three of those companies are Chinese government-controlled: POC at [3](1).

The relationship between C4 and D1 and D1's actions in the Ukraine

In 2016, C4 met D1 in China. He is 23 years older than her. She then "blocked" him on social media for many years. During the coronavirus pandemic D1 found C4 again on social media. In September 2021 D1 insisted that C4 come to Kyiv in the Ukraine to become a guide for him. D1 did not tell C4 that he was still married at the time and convinced her to begin a "dating relationship" with him: POC at [9](1) and (5).

In March 2022, C4 ended her relationship with D1: POC at [11]. However, in June 2022 D1 "used" his son to make contact with C4 again. C4 agreed to assist D1's son with his university applications by providing evidence that he had undertaken voluntary work in the Ukraine. At the end of June 2022 D1 and his son arrived in Kyiv for this purpose. C4's assistance enabled D1's son to obtain offers of admission from West Point (the United States Military Academy) and Harvard University: POC at [9](5), [11] and [11](2)(ii).

In early July 2022, C4 told D1 that she had begun a relationship with C3. She asked D1 to respect her decision and not to disturb her further: POC at [2](5) and [11](3).

D1 did not do as C4 asked. On 30 July 2022, D1 arrived uninvited at C4's home in Kyiv and asked her to marry him. He offered to gift her a property at 275 School Street, Lincoln, Rhode Island, USA, showing her legal documentation in relation to this, and gave her a bank card. C4 refused the offer: POC at [11](4).

On 31 July 2022 D1 attended at C4's home again. During this conversation, he threatened to "destroy" C3's life by making it known that C3 is a liar with "fake education" and "no skills" to the extent that C3 would not be able to find a job: POC at [9](1)] and [11](5).

During July 2022, D1 located C3's home address in Manchester from Companies House and searched for the Title Register documents for that property on HM Land Registry: POC at [12]. During August 2022, D1 obtained the detail of two further properties belonging to C1 and C2: POC at [13].

On 2 August 2022 D1 contacted C4's friend Iryna, suggesting that C3 was "not what he claimed to be": POC at [12](4).

On 3 August 2022 D1 attended at C4's home again, but she refused to answer the door. C4 was afraid and had to move out of her home for several days. C4 sent D1 a text message asking him to leave her alone and confirming she had no romantic interest in him and never would: POC at [11](6)-(9).

D1's actions in the UK

On 6 August 2022, D1 left the Ukraine and came to the UK. He went to the home address of C1, C2 and C3 in the Manchester area and conducted a "secret visit" to the house, monitoring it and taking photographs and surveillance video footage of it, including from the park opposite. He then rang the doorbell of the home, uninvited. D1 refused to leave. He told C1 and C2 that C4 was a person "of bad character" and specifically that she was a "liar" and had been working as a "prostitute and sugar babe" for many years. D1's goal was to force C3 to end his relationship with C4 himself or under pressure from C1 and C2. D1 was "trembling" such that C1 gave him a new jacket. She and C2 then took D1 for dinner: POC at [11](10)(ii) and [14]-[17].

On 18 and 19 August 2022 D1 contacted C1 by email (including to her work email account) and SMS. He apologised for his "unexpected" visit to their house. He suggested that he was concerned that C3 was being "sucked in" to a situation in which C4's houses had been used to launder money. D1 said that C4 had been wrongly saying on a widespread basis that he had been "stalking" her. D1 threatened to "make public all her details, including some very private photos and videos". He also said that he felt that some information about C4 needed to be "made clearer, otherwise you may still be deceived by her, and you may get into trouble": POC at [11](10)(iii), [12](1) and (2), [23] and [24].

C2 had become increasingly unwell. On 24 August 2022 the Claimants were due to fly back to Hong Kong but had to change their flights due to C2's health issues. On 11 October 2022 C2 had a heart attack and required emergency surgery: POC at [21].

D1's actions in the USA

Having returned to the USA, D1 repeatedly tried to make contact with C4, including via her friend Olia. D1 advised Olia to tell C4 not to trust C3 (referred to as "Corey") as he had lied about his degree and his job; he and his family would not assist her financially as she hoped; he had "basically just treated her like a sex partner"; and his career was "going no where" [sic]: POC at [11](11).

On 10 October 2022 D1 sent D4 SMS messages from a series of accounts: POC at [11](12).

D1's social media posts about the Claimants

From approximately 21 January 2023 to 17 March 2023, D1 was responsible for a vast number of posts on social media about the Claimants, which is their central complaint in these proceedings. The Claimants have incorporated over 300 of the posts into paragraphs 34-343 of their Particulars of Claim at [34]-[343], and [28](3) avers that there were over 840 posts in relation to C3 alone. The posts were on a series of websites including https://www.6park.com, http://wenxuecity.com and https://fishandchips.fans.

The posts described C1 and C2 as "criminals", with "the purpose of causing them to lose their jobs, lose their income and ultimately fail to survive": POC at [5](1) and [9](1).

On 6 January 2023 D1 published the Title Register documents from two of the properties belonging to C1, C2 and C3 online: POC at [30](2).

On 24 January 2023 D1 published photographs of two cars and offered them for sale at a reduced price. One belonged to C3; one belonged to his neighbour. Neither were actually for sale and this caused both C3 and his neighbour significant harassment: POC at [29](1)-(2).

From 1-17 March 2023 D1 created seven "literary works" entitled "A deep dive into little liu and his little corruption parents" which were published on http://wenxuecity.com and forwarded on to different websites. The "characters" in this work were C1, C2 and C3 (referred to as "Xiao Liu" and "Xiailiu"). The works described C3 as a "scumbag", "piece of death meat", "dead mouse" and "mouse cub" and averred that "[t]he small family of three is like three cunning and greedy mice": POC at [28](2) and Annex 1 to the POC.

On 3 April 2023, the Claimants conducted a Google search and identified that there were 842 posts online about them: POC at [31](1). 346 of the posts named C1 and her employer as the Law School of Shenzhen University and accused her of being a criminal involved in corruption and money laundering: POC at [31](1) and (2). For one group of 295 posts, the minimum number of occasions on which the post was read was 30,900 times and the maximum number of occasions was 174,552 times: POC at [31](5). The Claimants identified 50 posts of a similar kind in the Chinese language: POC at [32].

Corruption and money laundering are very serious crimes in China. Neither C1 nor C2 have ever engaged in such activities. Neither has a criminal record: POC at [9](2) and (3).

The procedural history relevant to remedies

By their claim form, the Claimants sought damages in the sum of £950,000, to be paid by the Defendants jointly. The claim form apportioned the sum sought as (i) £500,000 in general damages (later said to equate to £150,000 each to C1 and C4 and £100,000 each to C2 and C3); (ii) £100,000 in special damages for C2; and (iii) £350,000 in aggravated or exemplary damages (later said to equate to £150,000 to C1 and £100,000 each to C3 and C4): POC at [8].

Although the claim form sought £100,000 in special damages, the POC claimed a much larger sum under this heading, namely (i) unspecified amounts for past physical therapy expenses and professional nursing costs for C2; (ii) £50,000 in out of pocket expenses for nutritional supplements and counselling sessions; (iii) £50,000 for "Mitigation of Damages...such as the cost of participating in various social activities to gradually restore reputation"; (iv) £100,000 for future medical expenses; (v) £200,000 each in past "lost wages and compensation as a lawyer" for C1 and C2; and (vi) a total of £200,000 for future loss in the form of "reasonable anticipated lost wages" (which I assume to relate to both C1 and C2).

The POC also sought an injunction against D1, to restrain him from harassment and defamation of the Claimants for life; and orders requiring him to issue an apology to the Claimants, delete the posts and provide information about the "poster" (presumably if not himself): POC at [8].

On 15 July 2024 and 25 September 2024 respectively, the Claimants made applications for interim payments of damages by D1 and for various other remedies in relation to him.

By Appendices 1-2 to their Skeleton Argument dated 28 October 2024, the Claimants indicated that they were seeking substantially higher sums by way of damages than the figure given on the claim form, namely £8,328,427 for C1, £8,007,387 for C2, £8,707,000 for C3 and £2,100,000 for C4, giving a total of just over £27,100,000. These Appendices were provided in the context of 15 volumes of material filed for the 4 November 2024 hearing.

Under CPR 16.3(7), the statement of value in the claim form does not limit the power of the court to give judgment for an amount which it finds the claimant is entitled to. I was nevertheless concerned to ensure that D1 was properly on notice of the level of damages being sought by the Claimants from him. I therefore directed that if the Claimants were maintaining the claims in their Appendices 1-2, they should apply to amend the statement of value on the claim form. After Ms Wisson was instructed to assist them, they confirmed that no such application would be made.

Under CPR PD 16, paragraph 4.2, in personal injury claims the claimant must attach to the Particulars of Claim a schedule of details of any past and future expenses and losses which are claimed. The Claimants had not done this, albeit that their Appendices 1-2 contained the sort of content that would normally feature in a Schedule of Loss.

The Claimants were ordered to confirm whether they sought an order granting permission to have their Appendices 1 and 2 treated as Schedules of Loss. They confirmed that they did not. Instead, a draft CPR-compliant Schedule of Loss for C2 alone was served, with confirmation that only C2 was advancing a personal injuries claim. On 18 March 2025 I granted C2 permission to rely on the Schedule of Loss, by extending time for him to serve it, and to the extent necessary, relief from sanctions for his failure to serve it earlier.

The Claimants' final position as to remedies was set out in Ms Wisson's submissions dated 17, 20 and 25 March 2025. These were structured by reference to the draft list of issues appended to my order from the 27 February 2025 hearing.

The evidence relevant to remedies

The Claimants provided many thousands of pages of material for the disposal hearings. Much of this focused on the merits of the underlying claims, for example, proving that the defamatory posts had been made and read. The Claimants did not appear to appreciate, at least until quite late in the chronology of proceedings, that the court would apply the general rule that they had succeeded on liability.

For the purposes of assessing the remedies to which the Claimants are entitled the key factual evidence I have considered is as follows: (i) C1's seventh witness statement dated 12 July 2024, with its exhibit XW/7 (which ran to 1,300 pages); (ii) the English translation of C2's first witness statement dated 21 September 2023; (iii) C2's further statement dated 25 February 2025; (iv) C3's third and fourth witness statements dated 21 September 2024 and 26 February 2025; (v) his further statement dated 25 February 2025 [2]; and (vi) C4's first, third and fifth witness statements dated 17 September 2023, 16 November 2024 and 26 February 2025.

The Claimants also relied on expert reports from Dr Harry Wood, Consultant Clinical Psychologist and Forensic Psychologist dated 20 and 23 February 2025 (in relation to C1) and 15 and 23 February 2025 (in relation to C2); and from Dr Lance Forbat, Consultant Cardiologist, dated 20 and 23 February 2025 (in relation to C2).

The approach to determining remedies in this case

As noted at [25] above, the POC in this case are procedurally deficient in the way in which they set out the factual background to the claim. These issues extend to the way in which the legal basis for the claims is advanced. The Claimants' claims are formulated in a wide-ranging, discursive manner. There is no attempt in the POC to link particular factual assertions with the specific elements of the causes of action alleged.

Ms Wisson fairly accepted the defects in the pleadings. She acknowledged, in particular, that the POC do not comply with all the requirements of CPR PD 53B, paragraphs 4.1 and 4.2, which make clear that in a defamation claim, Particulars of Claim must, among other things, set out the imputation(s) which the claimant alleges the statement complained of conveyed and full details of the facts and matters on which the claimant relies in support of the claim for damages.

Given these defects, it was necessary to consider whether the Suttle exception described at [21] above applied in respect of any of the Claimants' claims. Ms Wisson conceded that this was a permissible exercise, notwithstanding the fact that permission had been granted to serve the claim on D1 out of the jurisdiction, indicating a judicial decision as to the merits of the claims [3]. This was so, given the absence of a reasoned judgment for the grant of permission in respect of each Claimant and each claim. Ms Wisson submitted that had there been such a judgment, this exercise would have been less procedurally appropriate.

In conducting this exercise, I have read the POC as generously as I can and borne in mind that they were drafted by litigants in person. Although C1 and C2 have practised as lawyers and (in the case of C1) taught law in China, neither are qualified in England and Wales and/or have knowledge of libel law, which is a highly specialised and technical area of law.

It is recognised that it would be wrong in principle for a court to strike out a claim when pleadings prepared by a litigant in person are defective, but are capable of rectification: Kim v Park [2011] EWHC 1781 (QB) at [40]-[41], per Tugendhat J. I accept Ms Wisson's submission that, by analogy, it would be wrong in principle to refuse to award remedies following default judgment where the pleadings prepared by a litigant in person are defective, but from which all the essential elements of an arguable claim could be ascertained.

Given the overlapping factual basis for several of the claims it was also necessary to avoid the risk of over-compensation by double-counting: see, for example, Hourani v Thomson and others [2017] EWHC 432 (QB) at [237](4) for the application of this principle in the context of overlapping harassment and libel claims.

(1): C4's claims

C4 is a Ukrainian national who currently lives in the USA. C4 has never been to England or Wales.

C4's harassment claim is set out in the POC at [10]-[28], as being "entwined" with that of the other Claimants. Taken at its highest C4's harassment claim embraces (i) D1's unwanted visits to her home in the Ukraine in July/August 2022; (ii) the messages sent to her and her friend Iryna around this time, while D1 was in the Ukraine; (iii) the words D1 used about C4 orally when visiting C1, C2 and C3 in Manchester and in writing in emails and messages sent to C1, including threats to publicise C4's private photos and videos; (iv) D1's further contact with C4 once back in the USA, including through her friend Olia. For the avoidance of doubt, it is not said that any of the large number of social media posts referred to at [46]-[52] above mentioned C4.

In common with the other claimants, C4's harassment claim is advanced under the PHA. The material parts of the PHA for the purposes of her claim feature in ss.1-7. [4] However the territorial scope of ss.1-7 extends to "England and Wales only": s.14. This has been interpreted as meaning that conduct taking place outside England and Wales falls outside its scope: Piepenbrock v The London Schools of Economics and Political Science [2018] EWHC 2572 (QB) at [225]. There, it was accepted that alleged acts of harassment that took place in Boston and Seattle were outside the scope of a PHA claim brought in an English court. This renders those aspects of C4's harassment claim described at [72](i), (ii) and (iv) above out of the territorial scope of the PHA, as the acts complained of took place entirely in the Ukraine or the USA.

D1's actions as described at [72](iii) involve actions by D1 within England. However, the tort of harassment is not complete unless and until it impacts upon the person concerned and that impact must be within England or Wales, such that the person has actually been harassed within the jurisdiction: Shakil-Ur-Rahman v ARY Network Ltd [2016] EWHC 3110 (QB) at [103] and [115]-[120]. Accordingly, although D1's actions as described in [72](iii) took place in England, the tort was not complete within the jurisdiction as C4 was not present in England or Wales, but in the Ukraine. This renders C4's harassment claim legally impossible.

C4's defamation claim arises from D1's actions as described in [72](iii). This claim is also fundamentally flawed. Ms Wisson accepted that C4 could not prove serious harm to her reputation as required by the Defamation Act 2013, s.1 because there was no evidence that C1 believed the allegations made by D1 and/or that the allegations were spread to anyone else other than C2 and C3. I also note that insofar as C4 advances a slander claim based on the words spoken by D1, she has advanced no claim of special damage as is required: Duncan and Neill on Defamation and Other Media and Communication claims (5^th Edition) at 6.03.

It is unclear from the POC whether C4 advances discrete claims of malicious falsehood or privacy-related claims and if so, on what basis. Appendix 1 to the Claimants' Skeleton Argument dated 28 October 2024 suggests that any such claims also arise from D1's actions as described in [72](iii). To the extent that these claims are advanced by C4, they also suffer from the defect of C4's inability to show any damage within the jurisdiction of England and Wales.

Accordingly, Ms Wisson conceded that all of C4's claims are fatally flawed. In my judgment her concession was sound, for the reasons set out above. In various respects, C4's claims do not meet the required legal thresholds. It is therefore appropriate, notwithstanding the default judgment, to apply the Suttle exception and order no remedies in relation to C4.

(2): C1, C2 and C3's claims relating to Articles 8 and 10, ECHR

The POC assert, albeit under the heading "misuse of private [sic] and breach of privacy" that D1 "pursued a course of conduct in breach of Articles 8 and 10 of the [ECHR]". No specific reference is made to the HRA, albeit that that is how the Claimants would bring a claim for a breach of Articles 8 or 10 before the English courts: these articles are incorporated into domestic law via Schedule 1 to the HRA.

Articles 8 and 10 protect, respectively the rights to respect for private and family life, home, and correspondence and to freedom of expression. However, D1 cannot, as a matter of law, be liable to any of the Claimants for any breach of Article 8 and 10 because under the HRA, s.7 proceedings alleging such a breach can only be brought against public authorities and D1 is not such an authority.

Ms Wisson accepted that this claim was legally impossible. Accordingly, the Suttle exception also applies to this claim and no remedies will be ordered in relation to it.

(3): C1, C2 and C3's claims for harassment

The harassment claims brought by C1, C2 and C3 are again set out in the POC at [10]-[28]. Taken at their highest these claims embrace (i) D1's threat to "destroy" C3's life, made when visiting C4 in the Ukraine on 31 July 2022; (ii) D1's visit to the home address of C1, C2 and C3 in the Manchester area on 6 August 2022; (iii) his attempts from the USA to ruin the relationship between C3 and C4, including through contact with C4's friend Olia; and (iv) the large number of social media posts referred to at [46]-[52] above.

D1's actions as described in [81](i) and (iii) above took place entirely in the Ukraine or in the USA. Accordingly, they fall outside the territorial scope of the PHA, given the operation of s.14: see [73] above.

D1's actions in [81](ii) are within scope: they took place in England, and their impact was felt in England by C1, C2 and C3 who remained in England throughout.

In Piepenbrock at [225], it was accepted that allegedly harassing messages sent from outside England to people in England fell within the territorial scope of the PHA. This principle applies to bring D1's actions as described at [81](iv) within scope.

C1, C2 and C3 have properly pleaded a claim that by his actions as described in [81](ii) and (iv), D1 committed the tort of harassment as defined in the PHA, s.(1)(a) (see footnote [4] above). I have borne in mind the principle that in order to constitute harassment, a course of conduct needs to cross the line "between conduct which is unattractive, even unreasonable, and conduct which is oppressive and unacceptable [and] of an order which would sustain criminal liability under [the PHA, s.2]": Majrowski v Guy's and St Thomas's NHS Trust [2007] 1 AC 224 at 234D, per Lord Nicholls.

(4): C1, C2 and C3's claims for libel

The essential elements of a libel claim are that (i) the statement complained of referred to the claimant; (ii) the statement was defamatory; and (iii) the statement was published by the defendant or in circumstances in which the defendant was responsible for publication. Condition (ii) requires the claimant to show the statement complained of is defamatory at common law and fulfils the serious harm test in the Defamation Act 2013, s.1: Duncan and Neill at 6.01-6.02.

I have read the POC as a whole and noted that the particular words complained for the purposes of the libel claim are underlined in the vast number of posts set out in POC at [34]-[351] (internal pages 38-185). I have borne in mind the principle that serious harm is a threshold issue: it is "not an exercise in definitively quantifying harm caused...[t]hat...comes at the remedies stage, if reached": Blake v Fox [2024] EWHC 146 (KB), [2024] EMLR 6 at [64] per Collins Rice J.

Having performed this exercise, I am satisfied that while the pleadings do not comply with the procedural requirements of CPR PD 53B, they do contain the essential elements of the cause of action of libel, including an imputation of serious criminality and an inferential case on serious harm, such that the Suttle exception is not engaged in respect of these claims, for the following reasons.

(i): C1's libel claim

C1 has pleaded a clear case that the posts of which she complains bore the meaning that she was involved in "corruption and money laundering": see, for example, POC at [9](2)(ii), [9](3)(i); [31](1)(f) and [31](2)(d). There are over 150 uses of the words "laundering money", "launder money" and/or "money laundering" with reference to C1 in the pleaded publications: see, for example, those referred to in the POC at [37]-[40], [82], [115], [153], and [333]-[335]. Accordingly, the imputation of involvement of corruption and money laundering mirrors the wording used in the posts and is their clear natural and ordinary meaning. Such an imputation is inherently serious and clearly defamatory at common law. It is a factual "Chase level 1" accusation of criminal misconduct: see Chase v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1772, [2003] EMLR 11 at [45].

I accept Ms Wisson's submission that C1 has pleaded a case on serious harm, based on: (i) the inherent seriousness of the words complained of, imputing criminal offences; (ii) the fact that the words struck at the core of C1's identity as a legal professional (albeit one practising in another jurisdiction) with no criminal record; (iii) publication to the world at large on numerous different websites; (iv) the volume of publications referring to C1 in defamatory terms and the persistent repetition of the allegations of corruption and money laundering against her, given that the majority of the hundreds of publications referred to in the POC refer to C1; and (v) the extent of publication.

As to (v), this has been expressed in the POC as how many "reads" a particular publication had. Some of the posts have vast numbers of reads: for example, those referred to in the POC at [35], [261] and [333] had, respectively, 80,844, 114,062 and 1,096 "reads".

Ms Wisson fairly recognised that it is unclear from the POC how many of the "reads" occurred in England and Wales as required for the libel claim to be within the geographical jurisdiction of the court: Hourani at [80]-[82]. However, there is evidence from which it is safe to infer there were publishees within the jurisdiction: as C3 explained in his fourth witness statement at [4]-[6], the websites wenxuecity.com and 6park.com primarily target overseas Chinese audiences and both have a sizeable readership within the UK. In his witness statement dated 26 November 2024, Wayne Lin (Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer and Director of D3) has confirmed that wenxuecity.com has around 1 million users of whom c.2% (i.e. 20,000) are based in the UK: [3]-[5]. C2's statement dated 25 February 2025 at [41]-[43] cited evidence that 12,644 residents of the city of Manchester are people of Chinese ethnicity, inviting the inference that some of the UK readership would be from the Claimants' city of residence.

Further evidence as to the readership of the posts is information that could reasonably be anticipated to become available at the disclosure stage had D1 engaged with these proceedings. Accordingly, to the extent there are gaps in the evidence, D1 should not benefit from his "failure to engage or provide disclosure as to the extent of publication or otherwise": Blackledge v Persons Unknown [2021] EWHC 1994 (QB) at [41], per Saini J.

There is further evidence of the impact of the publications on C1's reputation in her seventh witness statement dated 12 July 2024 at [54.3.3] and C2's statement dated 25 February 2025 at [44] and [47]-[48], to the effect that (i) many of the publications targeted Shenzhen University, her former employer in China; (ii) a "lot of" students who "knew C1" continue their studies as international students in the UK; (iii) some of her legal colleagues are British and reside in the UK; and (iv) the publications have had an impact on C1's professional reputation in England and Wales, in that C1 applied for an academic research position at Manchester University in December 2021 but her plans in this regard were "all... ruined by D1's actions".

In Lachaux v Independent Print Media Ltd [2020] AC 612 at [14], the Supreme Court held that serious harm is a proposition of fact which can be established only by reference to the impact which the statement is shown actually to have had. It depends on a combination of the inherent tendency of the words and their actual impact on those to whom they were communicated. However a claimant "may be able to satisfy s.1, even in the absence of direct evidence, by relying on inferences of serious harm properly drawn from the level of defamatory meaning and the nature and extent of publication": Gatley on Libel and Slander (13^th Edition) at 4-014; and see, for example, Dhir v Saddler [2017] EWHC 3155 (QB), [2018] 4 WLR 1, Monir v Wood [2018] EWHC 2525 (QB) and Coker v Nwakanma [2021] EWHC 1011 (QB). I accept Ms Wisson's submission that the imputation in respect of C1 is plainly serious and an inferential case of serious harm is, as a matter of principle, arguable.

(ii): C2's libel claim

C2 is referred to by name in one of the posts: it is said that he "laundered the embezzled money to the UK in batches" and bought "real estate [and] luxury cars in Manchester": POC at [316]. Further, C2 is referred to in defamatory terms in the "literary works" as one of C3's "little corruption parents" who it is said "washed some stolen money": POC at [306]. The imputation complained of by C1 of corruption and money laundering could therefore equally apply to C2. As noted above, such an imputation is inherently serious and clearly defamatory at common law. It is a factual Chase level 1 accusation of criminal conduct.

Again, C2 has pleaded an inferential case on serious harm, based on (i) the inherent seriousness of the words complained of, imputing criminal offences; (ii) the fact that the words struck at the core of C2's identity as a legal professional (albeit one practising in another jurisdiction) with no criminal record; (iii) publication to the world at large on two different websites (6park.com; wenxuecity.com); and (iv) the extent of publication: the posts at [316] and [306] were read, respectively, 1,883 and 4,126 times.

(iii): C3's libel claim

Several of the posts about C3 such as those in the "literary works" contained statements which are defamatory at common law, such as that C3 became involved with an "underground bank" that "launders money" and "laundered part of his parents' stolen money": POC at [335] and [339]. As such, the imputation complained of by C1 of "corruption and money laundering" applies equally to C3. Such an imputation is inherently serious and clearly defamatory at common law. It is, again, a factual Chase level 1 accusation of criminal conduct.

Again, C3 has pleaded an inferential case on serious harm, based on: (i) the inherent seriousness of the words complained of, imputing criminal offences; (ii) publication to the world at large on 6park.com and fishandchips.fans; and (iii) the extent of publication: the post in the POC at [335] was read 819 times; and those in the POC at [347] and [350] which made similar allegations against C3 were read, respectively, 3,626 and 3,348 times.

(5): C1, C2 and C3's claims for malicious falsehood and their privacy-related claims

There were doubts about whether C1, C2 and C3 had properly pleaded privacy-related claims, because much if not all of the information said by them to have been misused was D1 was, in fact, publicly available title documentation about their properties and photographs of their cars.

However, it became unnecessary to consider this issue further because Ms Wisson sensibly conceded that the Claimants' malicious falsehood and privacy-related claims added nothing to their harassment and libel claims; and that they did not seek any separate remedies in relation to these claims.

I therefore agree that it is appropriate to order remedies only in relation to the harassment and libel claims, adopting a similar approach to that taken by Nicklin J in Suttle at [41].

Conclusion on the appropriate approach

For these reasons, the only claims for which remedies will be awarded are the harassment and libel claims brought by C1, C2 and C3.

Part B: Damages

General damages for harassment and libel: relevant legal principles

Damages for harassment under the PHA may be awarded for (among other things) any anxiety caused by the harassment and any financial loss resulting from the harassment: PHA, s.3(2). The principles applicable when assessing damages for harassment were set out by Nicklin J in Suttle at [54]-[56]. In summary, damages for anxiety, distress and injury to feelings are assessed by reference to the "Vento bands", namely the categories used to assess compensation for injury to feelings and psychiatric injury in discrimination and whistleblowing claims in the employment context, derived from Vento v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police (No 2) [2002] EWCA Civ 1871, [2003] IRLR 202 at [65]-[66].

The Claimants' claim was presented between 6 April 2023 and 6 April 2024, such that the applicable guidance is the Sixth Addendum to the Employment Tribunal's Presidential Guidance originally issued on 5 September 2017, dated 24 March 2023, [5] to this effect:

"In respect of claims presented on or after 6 April 2023, the "Vento bands" shall be as follows: a lower band of £1,100 to £11,200 (less serious cases); a middle band of £11,200 to £33,700 (cases that do not merit an award in the upper band); and an upper band of £33,700 to £56,200 (the most serious cases), with the most exceptional cases capable of exceeding £56,200."

Where, in a harassment claim, there is a claim for damages for both injury to feelings and psychiatric injury, there is no fixed rule for determining whether there should be separate awards or a global award. As Smith LJ explained in Martins v Choudhury [2007] EWCA Civ 1379, [2008] 1 WLR 617 at [18]:

"I would venture to suggest that there should be no hard and fast rule about whether separate awards should be made. It will all depend on the facts of the individual case. If, for example, as is sometimes the case, the psychiatric harm is very modest and to all intents and purposes merges with the injury to feelings, it will plainly be more convenient to make one award covering both aspects. If, as here, where the psychiatric injury is not insubstantial, it is positively helpful to the parties (and to this Court) if the judge separates the award for psychiatric injury from that for injury to feelings. This leads to a better understanding of the judge's thought processes. However, I do accept that there is a risk of double recovery by overlap if two awards are made and the judge must take care to avoid that."

As noted at [70] above, awards of damages for harassment and for libel have different, but overlapping, purposes. Damages for both torts include awards for hurt, upset and distress. Damages for libel also compensate for reputational injury which has been proved or might reasonably be inferred; and serve as an outward and visible sign of vindication: see Barron v Vines [2016] EWHC 1225 (QB) at [20]-[21] and [79]-[82], per Warby J (as he then was), citing John v MGN Ltd [1997] QB 586. However, damages for harassment should not include an element of compensation for injury to reputation: Hourani at [240] and Gatley at 25-2020.

To avoid double counting, when awarding damages for both harassment and libel, the court can either make a single award reflecting the totality of the damage, harm and distress that the claimant has suffered by both torts, or make separate awards. In deciding which approach to adopt, the court will need to consider the extent to which the causes of action overlap on the particular facts.

Here, C1, C2 and C3 contended that all of D1's publications were part of the "course of conduct" complained of for the purposes of their harassment claims. This included some posts that do not feature in their libel claims because they are not said to be defamatory, such as the publications of the property and car details. The harassment claims also included D1's surveillance of C1 and C2's home, his visit to it, and his actions in obtaining information about their properties from the Land Registry and photographing the cars. The libel claim only relates to some, albeit a large number, of the publications.

Accordingly, the factual background to these claims supports the approach of (i) assessing general damages for harassment; and (ii) making a separate award of general damages for libel, to compensate the Claimants for any additional injury to feelings by reason of reputational damage and to provide such vindication as will neutralise or limit the lasting effect of the damage. This approach is made even more appropriate given the provisions of the "SPEECH" Act 2010 [6], which limits the recognition of foreign libel judgments in the USA. This means that a single award containing elements for both the harassment and libel claims would add to the likely difficulties the Claimants will face in enforcing an award of damages for libel against D1 in the USA.

This approach was adopted in Royal Brompton & Harefield NHS Foundation Trust and others v Shaikh [2014] EWHC 2857 (QB). There, the harassment claim related to conduct over several years, "[m]uch (though not all)" of which consisted of defamatory allegations including imputations of lying, fraud, bribery and paedophilia by various individual claimants who had worked for the hospital trust claimant: [3]-[6]. HHJ Moloney QC assessed the damages in respect of harassment before considering whether to make an additional award for reputational injury, conscious of the need to ensure the totality of the award was fair and not exaggerated by the fact there are two separate awards to each claimant for "such closely related things", given the overlap between the two claims: [10]-[14].

In Davies v Carter [2021] EWHC 3021 (QB), the claimant succeeded in a libel claim relating to three publications and a harassment claim relating to conduct over a period of around three months: [58]-[91]. Saini J concluded that the libel claim was less extensive than the harassment claim and that he should make separate awards, but with a single award covering all three libels: [97].

General damages for harassment: awards to C1, C2 and C3

Comparable cases

Ms Wisson rightly recognised that awards in harassment cases are very fact-specific, with many factors contributing to an assessment of quantum, including the duration, nature and effect of the harassment. However, some assistance can be drawn from the following cases which are broadly comparable to the Claimants' case.

In Royal Brompton, the four individual claimants were awarded between £20,000 and £25,000 each - these awards straddled the middle and upper Vento bands (£7,000 to £21,000 and £21,000 to £35,000 at the relevant time): [10]-[11].

In Davies, the judge awarded the claimant £25,000 (towards the higher end of the middle Vento band at the time: £9,100-£27,400) for injury to feelings for harassment. In so doing, the judge accepted that the intrusion into the claimant's personal and professional life caused great hurt, anxiety and distress, which manifested in physical symptoms (headaches, shoulder and neck pain) and an inability to sleep. No medical evidence was submitted, but the judge accepted the physical symptoms could nevertheless be taken into account as an aspect of injury to feelings: [101]-[105].

Hibbert v Hall [2024] EWHC 26677 (KB) involved harassment and data protection claims against a conspiracy theorist who believed the terrorist bombing of Manchester Arena on 22 May 2017 was a hoax and accused the claimants (victims of the attack) of lying about their life-changing injuries. The harassment included the Defendant visiting the claimants' property on one occasion during which he spoke to their neighbours and took video footage, six online publications on YouTube, publication of a book, and (inferentially) in-person lectures over a period of approximately two years: [11], [13] and [175]-[176]. Steyn J awarded each claimant £22,500 (ie. towards the centre of the middle Vento band) for harassment.

Accordingly, the awards in these cases ranged from the centre of the middle Vento band to the upper band.

Suttle involved harassment occurred over around a month, predominantly via social media posts. Various allegations of animal cruelty were made against the Claimant who owned and kept pet dogs, including rescue dogs, and who supported animal welfare charities. Many of the posts were anonymous and resulted in online vitriol and threats against the Claimant: [2]-[12]. Nicklin J held the harassment claim justified an award in the upper Vento band and awarded £40,000 (i.e. £2,000 below the top of the upper band at the time): [56] and [59]. The award is described as a harassment award, but it included "a distinct element for the harm caused to the claimant's reputation" and, accordingly, no separate award and/or additional uplift was awarded for the claimant's libel claim: [59]. It is not unreasonable to infer that without the reputational element, the harassment award would have been in a similar range to that set out in the cases at [114]-[116] above. An award of £40,000 in January 2019 (the date of judgment in Suttle) would be worth just over £50,200 today, allowing for inflation.

Relevant factors in the awards to C1, C2 and C3

I agree with Ms Wisson that the following factors, which apply to each of the cases of C1, C2 and C3, are relevant to the seriousness of the harassment and thus to the determination of the level of damages.

First, although the tort of harassment does not require that the claimant be "targeted" by the defendant [7], that is in fact what happened here: D1's actions clearly and deliberately targeted C1, C2 and C3, especially when the publications are viewed as a whole. They form part of a consistent false narrative being promoted by D1, involving all C1, C2 and C3 in the same alleged criminal acts.

Second, the harassment lasted for more than 7½ months. It began on 6 August 2022, when D1 attended C1 and C2's property in Manchester. It ended in mid-late March 2023: 17 March 2023 is the date of the last publication pleaded (POC at [311]) and as noted at [183] below, there have been no new posts since 22 March 2023. The conduct "peaked" between 1 January 2023 and 18 March 2023, when there were an average of 11 posts naming C1 per day: POC at [31](1).

Third, prior to harassment D1 and C1, C2 and C3 were strangers. Their only connection arose from D1's romantic interest in C4 who was, by then, in a relationship with C3. D1 responded to C4 rejecting his proposal of marriage with a vast number of online posts, many of which were abusive to and/or defamatory of C1, C2 and C3.

Fourth, D1 hid behind online anonymity. This is a "hallmark of 'cyber bullying'...[and]...a particularly pernicious form of harassment because the victim may well feel constantly under siege and powerless to stop it": Suttle at [57.c].

Fifth, the harassment has plainly had an adverse impact on C1, C2 and C3's family life. C1 described the negative effects it has had on her relationship with C2 and C3 to Dr Wood: Dr Wood's 20 February 2025 report at [3.8]. C2 also described feelings of shame and humiliation, exacerbated by the importance of family honour in Chinese society: Dr Wood's 15 February 2025 report at [3.9]. D1 has Chinese heritage and so it is likely that he would have been aware that targeting the entire family unit would be an aggravating feature of his course of conduct for all three Cs. C3 described the "emotional toll" on his family and said that he found watching his parents' distress to be "deeply painful and psychologically exhausting": C3's 25 February 2025 witness statement at [10].

The awards to C1, C2 and C3

(i): C1

C1's pleaded case is that she has suffered substantial emotional distress as a result of D1's actions, being unable to sleep, having lost any joy in life, being nervous, unhappy and worried on a daily basis and fearful that D1 would attend at her and C2's home again: POC at [9](2)(v).

The evidence supports C's pleaded case on this issue: see, for example (i) the statement she provided to Greater Manchester Police on 13 October 2023, where she described D1's conduct as "fixated, obsessive and completely unwanted" which had led to her living with "constant emotional distresses (sic), unhappiness"; feeling "nervous every single day of living"; being unable to sleep; and having had a sharp increase in blood pressure and severe physical discomfort; (ii) her GP records which show that in November 2023 she consulted her GP for insomnia; (iii) her seventh witness statement dated 12 July 2024 at [25], [26], [62.4] and [62.7]; and (iv) her account when she was interviewed by Dr Wood on 27 January 2025. [8] Overall, Dr Wood diagnosed C1 with an adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood that is the direct result of the D1's course of conduct, for which he recommended a course of talking therapy [9].

The letters of instruction and case summary which the Claimants sent to Dr Wood were not as neutral in tone as was appropriate for the instruction of an expert. However, Dr Wood has over 20 years' experience as an expert witness and prepares an average of 130 reports per annum. He has, as one would expect, confirmed that he has been conscious of his duties to the court as an expert [10]. There is also evidence of him treating his instructions with care: for example, referring to "alleged" harassment/defamation and noting C2's tendency to over-report the extent of his difficulties. [11] I therefore accept his evidence in respect of C1 as strongly supportive of her own evidence.

In my judgment it is appropriate to take C1's self-reported physical symptoms, and Dr Wood's evidence, into account as an aspect of her injury to feelings, as in Davies (see [112] above). In light of this, and the factors set out at [120]-[125] above, I consider that a substantial general damages award is necessary to compensate C1 for the distress and injury she has suffered by D1's harassment of her; and that it properly falls into the upper Vento band of £33,700 to £56,200. In all the circumstances, I consider that an award towards the middle of the upper Vento band is appropriate. I award C1 damages of £45,000 for harassment, including an element for the aggravating features referred to at [170]-[174].

(ii): C2

C2's pleaded case is that due to D1's actions he has had difficulties with sleep, become depressed and has tried to commit suicide several times: POC at [9](3).

C2's medical records show him complaining of symptoms of depression to his GP shortly after the harassment by D1 began in August 2022. In May 2023 he was prescribed antidepressant medication. When he was interviewed by Dr Wood on 27 January 2025, he reported thoughts about ending his life; a loss of interest in activities that were previously enjoyed; loss of appetite; insomnia; and difficulties concentrating [12]. Like C1, Dr Wood has diagnosed C2 with a major depressive disorder as a direct result of D1's behaviour and the impact this had on other aspects of his life, including his physical health and has recommended C2 undertakes a course of cognitive behavioural therapy [13].

I accept this evidence. Taking into account these symptoms, and the factors set out at [119]-[124] above, I consider that C2 is also entitled to damages of £45,000 for harassment, again including an element for aggravating features.

(iii): C3

C3's pleaded case is that he has also suffered substantial emotional distress. He is a person of good character who has not committed any criminal acts. D1's actions "directly destroyed the beautiful love relationship" between C3 and C4 which was the "purest love in the world", causing irreparable emotional damage: POC at [9](4).

C3's 25 February 2025 statement broadly supports this picture: he describes how D1's actions have led to a deterioration in his mental health, constant stress and anxiety; as well as the abrupt end of his relationship with C4: [10]-[11] and [15]-[17].

I accept this evidence, although I struggle to accept his contention at [15] that time precluded him from obtaining expert medical evidence. I believe that the issue was raised at the hearing before Mrs Justice Steyn on 4 November 2024. Moreover, the need for medical evidence if the Claimants wished to pursue claims for personal injury damages was highlighted in terms in my order dated 16 December 2024 and in several orders since then.

Taking into account these symptoms, and the factors set out at [119]-[124] above, I consider that C3 is also entitled to a substantial award of damages for harassment, but of a lower sum to his parents. I consider a sum in the middle Vento band (of £11,200 to £33,700) appropriate. I award him £32,000 for harassment, including an element for aggravating features.

General damages for libel: awards to C1, C2 and C3

In accordance with the approach set out at [110] above, it is now appropriate to consider whether to make each Claimant an additional award for injury to their reputations; and to serve as an outward and visible sign of vindication, those being the purposes of damages for libel not embraced by the awards of damages to them for harassment.

In Royal Brompton, referred to at [111] above, the four individual claimants received an additional £10,000 to £20,000 each (£14,871 to £29,742 today) for injury to their reputation caused by defamatory allegations including (but not limited to) imputations of lying, fraud and bribery: [14]. In Davies, at [112] above, the judge awarded the claimant an additional £10,000 for injury to reputation caused by allegations of seriously disreputable and dishonest business conduct and for vindication (£12,463 today): [98]-[100].

The Claimants' cases on injury to reputation entirely overlap with their cases on serious harm summarised at [89]-[99] above. They pragmatically accepted, through Ms Wisson's submissions, that there were gaps in the evidence regarding reputational damage within this jurisdiction. For example, there was no evidence from anyone other than the Claimants of the impact of D1's actions on their reputations within the jurisdiction. The Claimants conceded that this would inevitably impact upon the awards that could properly be made under this heading.

In the POC, C1 contended that as D1's posts specifically referenced her work, her reputation has been damaged, the "social evaluation" of her has been greatly reduced and the consequences of the reputational damage have been irreparable, such that she has been unable to return to the Shenzhen University environment. The evidence also shows that she had applied for an academic research position at Manchester University in December 2021 but her plans in this regard were "all...ruined by D1's actions": see [94] above.

Given the gravity of the imputations made against C1, the regular linking of the posts with her employment, the volume of publications and the number of "reads" of the posts, I am satisfied that C1's pleaded case is accurate. Bearing in mind these factors and the comparator cases cited at [137] above, I consider that she is entitled to a further award for libel of £10,000.

While I accept that C2 and C3 have pleaded an arguable case on serious harm for the purposes of securing a remedy of some kind for libel, the evidence to support the suggestion of an impact on their reputations is very thin. For example, no real examples are given of how D1's actions have directly impacted their employment: that there has been such an impact is merely asserted.

I therefore conclude that a nominal award of £500 each to C2 and C3 by way of vindication only is appropriate, applying the approach taken by HHJ Parkes QC (sitting as a Judge of the High Court) in Reachlocal UK Ltd v Bennett [2014] EWHC 3405 (QB), [2015] EMLR 7 at [34] and [64].

Damages for personal injuries to C2

C2's claim

C2's pleaded case is that due to D1's actions his blood pressure rose sharply and his physical condition deteriorated, such that on 11 October 2022 C2 had a heart attack from which he almost died. He had emergency surgery at the Manchester Royal Infirmary Hospital. He continues to require daily medicine: POC at [9](3).

C2's claim for damages for personal injuries relating to his heart attack must, by definition, be advanced solely on the basis of D1's actions prior to 11 October 2022. These did not include the large number of social media posts, which did not commence until 21 January 2023: see [46] above. However, they did include the visit of D1 to C2's property on 6 August 2022, the communications to C1 on 18 and 19 August 2022 and certain other events around that time.

C2's claim in this regard is therefore only advanced under his harassment claim, and one factual part of that claim. In principle, damages for physical injury arising from the anxiety and stress of being harassed is recoverable. Foreseeability of the injury or loss sustained is not an essential element of the cause of action of harassment. Rather, the PHA, s.1 is concerned with deliberate conduct of a kind which the defendant knows or ought to know will amount to harassment and, accordingly, the defendant will be responsible for the injury and loss flowing from that conduct: Jones v Ruth [2011] EWCA Civ 804 at [32]-[33].

Dr Forbat's evidence

C2 relied on expert evidence from Dr Forbat in the form of two written reports and the oral evidence given at the hearing on 27 March 2025.

(i): The nature of Dr Forbat's instructions

As was the case in respect of Dr Wood (see [127] above), the documentation sent to Dr Forbat by the Claimants was not written in a neutral fashion.

However, Dr Forbat is a highly experienced expert, with 32 years' experience as a consultant in cardiovascular medicine and having authored medico-legal reports for the past decade.

In oral evidence, he confirmed that he prepares around 12 such reports a year, more for defendants than for claimants. He indicated that the tone of the instructions he had received from the Claimants was "not particularly" different from some he had received from professional legal representatives. He did not appear to have had sight of the Claimant's case summary which was particularly lacking in neutrality. He confirmed that he was well aware of his professional duties as an expert and that rather than the wording of the instructions, his main focus was the medical evidence and in forming his own professional opinion. This was also based on his lengthy meeting with and assessment of C2.

I found his evidence in this regard entirely credible. I do not therefore consider that he was unduly influenced by the nature of his instructions by the Claimants.

(ii): Evidence on causation

At [6](i) and [6](vii)(b) and (h) of his 20 February 2025 report, Dr Forbat concluded that C2 had pre-existing risk factors of hypertension, diabetes and dyslipidaemia, associated with underlying coronary disease; and that on the balance of probabilities the "stress" of D1's harassing conduct was "the likely trigger" of C2's cardiac incident and was likely "causal in the onset of his symptoms".

In oral evidence Ms Wisson took Dr Forbat carefully through events between 6 August 2022 (when D1's harassment began) and 11 October 2022 (the date of C2's heart attack), by reference to the POC and the various occasions on which C2 had consulted his GP (namely 9, 16 and 30 August 2022 and 6, 9, 6 and 22 September 2022).

Dr Forbat maintained his opinion as to causation. He observed that although there were underlying causes present before the harassment, C2 was displaying no symptoms: rather, C2 had lived for "decades" with his various risk factors without having a heart attack. C2 had then had a period of "chronic stress" and depression ("a particularly potent form of stress"), caused by D1's harassment. This, he considered, had led to an acute stress response in C2's body and played at least a "major contribution" in C2's heart attack. It was notable, for example, that on 6 September 2022 C2's blood pressure was recorded in his GP notes as increasing, which was a sign of cardiac difficulties.

I found Dr Forbat a straightforward and credible witness, and I accept his evidence as to causation.

(iii): Evidence on the nature of C2's heart injury

As to the nature of the injuries, Dr Forbat's 20 February 2025 report at p.15 made the following key points.

First, C2 made a good recovery from his myocardial infarction. However, he does have diastolic dysfunction that can cause symptoms of heart failure, namely breathlessness. He also has angina as there is disease in the distal vessels beyond the stented area and also in the untreated coronary arteries. These vessels are not suitable for revascularisation by any surgical intervention.

Second, the only treatment C2 has not had is Enhanced External Counter Pulsation ("EECP") which is not available on the NHS. The current available therapeutic interventions are limited to changes in medication and lifestyle.

Third, C2's QRISK score (predicting the risk of a heart attack in 10 years) was 18.5% before treatment for his myocardial infarction, but research indicates that C2 now has a 24% (1:5) chance of such an event in 10 years, an increase of 5.5%.

Guidance and comparable authorities

The Judicial College Guidelines (17^th Edition), Chapter 6, makes provision for chest injuries including heart injuries. The chapter recognises that this is an "especially difficult area" in which to assess damages, as the majority of awards relate to industrial disease and the range is very wide. The levels of award are affected by age and gender; any scarring; the effect on the capacity to work and enjoy life; and the effect on life expectancy. I agree with Ms Wisson that none of the descriptions of the brackets are directly applicable to C2's injury, and mostly relate to lung injury. Insofar as any assistance can be drawn from the brackets, injuries from which a full and uncomplicated recovery is made are valued at £2,680 to £6,500, whereas injuries leaving some residual damage, not serious enough to interfere permanently with function justify awards of £6,500 to £15,370.

Ms Wisson drew to my attention two authorities from Kemp & Kemp: The Quantum of Damages.

In Dunn v Rennoc (Kemp at K5-004): a 58-year-old male suffered a severe angina attack lasting one and a half hours, resulting in being admitted to hospital for three days. He had incorrectly thought he was experiencing a heart attack. He was awarded £2,000 in September 1997. Adjusted for inflation (including the Heil v Rankin 10% uplift) the award today would be £4,918.

In Re Hudson (Kemp at K5-001) a 16-year-old male with no pre-existing risk factors suffered permanent cardiac impairment as a result of a stabbing. The injury resulted in reduced life expectancy (a 20% risk of developing overt cardiac failure within 5 years, a 5 year survival rate of 50-60% and a 10 year survival rate of 80-85%). His symptoms included shortness of breath after moderate exertion and he could no longer work (as a manual labourer). He was awarded £37,500 in 1994, equivalent to £109,394 today.

Analysis and conclusion

Ms Wisson recognised that the authorities are of limited assistance, given that the injury suffered by C2 is more serious than that in Dunn and much less grave than that suffered in Re Hudson. However, she rightly contended that the award made in Dunn arguably provides an indication of the lower level of damages that is appropriate for C2, given that they are of a similar age, the same sex and had the same length of hospital admission.

She argued that taking into account the evidence of Dr Forbat, the Judicial College Guidelines and the caselaw, an award in the region of £5,500 to £7,500 should be made to C2. That would reflect an award for pain, suffering and loss of amenity slightly higher than that made in Dunn (when adjusted for inflation). I accept her analysis and award the Claimant the mid-point of these figures, namely £6,500, under this head.

Interest at the rate of 2% is payable on these damages, from 30 March 2024 (the date of service of the claim form) to 11 April 2025 (the date of this judgment), a total of 377 days. This gives a sum of £136.78.

The total award to C2 for personal injuries damages and interest is therefore £6,636.78.

Special damages for C2

Although the POC sought special damages in relation to a range of matters set out at [54] above as well as flight and hotel costs, in C2's schedule of loss the special damages claim was limited to £2,400 for 16 private sessions of future cognitive behaviour therapy for C2, together with £1,600 for the associated costs of a Mandarin translator. The need for this therapy and the costs of it were supported by Dr Wood's evidence and it is appropriate to award these to C2.

In their costs schedule, the Claimants also sought a total of £5,849.21 as disbursements, to reflect the fact that due to C2's health issues they had to apply to stay in the UK (£2,096), pay the immigration health surcharge (£3,120) and pay for some of C2's NHS treatment (£633.21). These are really items of special damage rather than disbursements and so if they were to be claimed should have featured in C2's schedule of loss. However, I accept the Claimants' evidence to the effect that these were losses that they incurred due to C2's heart attack. They have provided receipts confirming the amounts paid. I therefore also award these to C2.

The total award of special damages to C2 is therefore £9,849.21.

Aggravated damages

In Northcott v Hundeyin [2024] EWHC 2704 (KB), [2025] EMLR 2 at [65]-[66] Julian Knowles J summarised the relevant principles in relation to awards of aggravated damages in libel claims as follows:

"65. In relation to aggravated damages, Gatley says at [10-016]...

"[I]t is very well established that in cases where the damages are at large...the judge...can take into account the motives and conduct of the defendant where they aggravate the injury done to the plaintiff. There may be malevolence or spite or the manner of committing the wrong may be such as to injure the plaintiff's proper feelings of dignity and pride...

The conduct of a defendant which may often be regarded as aggravating the injury to the plaintiff's feelings, so as to support a claim for 'aggravated' damages, includes a failure to make any or any sufficient apology and withdrawal; a repetition of the libel; conduct calculated to deter the claimant from proceeding; persistence, by way of a prolonged or hostile cross-examination of the claimant, or in turgid speeches to the jury, in a plea of justification which is bound to fail; the general conduct either of the preliminaries or of the trial itself in a manner calculated to attract wide publicity; and persecution of the plaintiff by other means....

Aggravated damages have on occasion been awarded (or identified) as a sum separate from general compensatory damages. However, in Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd ([2021] EWHC 1797 (QB) [2022] EMLR 2, [227]) Nicklin J described the practice as "unnecessary...generally unwise"...

66. The defendant's conduct may properly be taken into account, as an aggravating feature, where it impacts on injury to feelings, per McCarey v Associated Newspapers (No 2) [1965] 2 QB 86, 104:

"...if there has been any kind of high-handed, oppressive, insulting or contumelious behaviour by the defendant which increases the mental pain and suffering caused by the defamation and may constitute injury to the plaintiff's pride and self-confidence, these are proper elements to be taken into account in a case where damages are at large."

Ms Wisson submitted that the impact of D1's conduct on the Claimants has been significant; and that it has been aggravated by his conduct of this claim which went "over and above" not engaging with the proceedings resulting in default judgment. She relied on two specific factors.

First, there is evidence that D1 has taken steps to conceal and/or transfer his assets in anticipation of a damages award and/or adverse costs order. On 12 July 2024 the Claimants issued an on notice application for an order directing D1 provide information regarding his assets under CPR 25.1(1)(g). Shortly thereafter, on 23 August 2024 D1 transferred a property valued at USD $282,400 to Zhou Zuqin (understood to be his wife) for £0. This invites the obvious inference that D1 transferred his assets in response to the Claimants' application and in anticipation of enforceable damages awarded and/or adverse costs orders. Further, D1 did not comply with the order dated 2 October 2024 requiring him to file and serve an affidavit setting out the location of all relevant property or assets which may be relevant to satisfy any awards of damages ordered against him at the disposal hearing.

Second, D1 has brought parallel police complaints and litigation in the USA, which the Claimants aver are vexatious and are a continuation of his harassment. I have seen court paperwork relating to several of these claims in the evidence submitted by the Claimants in support of their anti-suit injunction application. For example, on 18 November 2024 D1 brought a complaint in Dedham District Court against the Claimants for "wiretapping", arising from C4 allegedly recording a telephone conversation and sharing the audio recording with the Claimants. On or around 24 January 2025 D1 made a new complaint about the Claimants to Dedham Police Department in the USA. D1 has also brought numerous claims against C4 (at least one of which has been dismissed), for example, seeking to disrupt her employment. In these claims D1 has made allegations about the other Claimants, misrepresenting them (such as describing C1 as a police superintendent) and relying on orders in these proceedings to make allegations of fraud.

I accept Ms Wisson's submission that in these circumstances, the harm the Claimants have suffered would not be adequately compensated without some allowance being made for these factors. I have therefore increased each Claimants award of general damages for harassment by a relatively modest sum - the £2,000 figure suggested by Ms Wisson - to reflect these factors. I have made a global award to reflect compensatory damages and D1's aggravating conduct rather than making a discrete award for aggravated damages, in light of the guidance in Lachaux and following the approach taken by Julian Knowles J in Northcott at [67] and [90]-[95].

Other matters relating to damages

Loss of earnings

As noted at [54] above the POC intimated claims for loss of earnings in relation to C1 and C2. In his 25 February 2025 witness statement C3 suggested, I believe for the first time, that he also wished to advance a loss of earnings claim.

However, no clear basis for any of these claims was pleaded by the Claimants; nor was any convincing evidence provided to support such claims, despite the number of witness statements provided by the Claimants and the expert evidence from Dr Wood and Dr Forbat.

Accordingly, Ms Wisson sensibly conceded in her closing submissions that the Claimants no longer sought damages for loss of earnings.

Exemplary damages

The Claimants sought exemplary damages as an alternative to aggravated damages on their claim form and in their POC at [9]. Ms Wisson's submissions focussed on the Claimants' claim for aggravated damages which I have addressed at [170]-[174] above. I infer from this that the Claimants do not pursue any claim for exemplary damages.

It is not immediately obvious, in any event, how any of the circumstances in which exemplary damages can be awarded as set out by the House of Lords in Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129 would have been satisfied here: D1 is not a government servant; there is no apparent basis for contending that his conduct was calculated to result in profit; and this is not a situation in which the award of exemplary damages is authorised by statute.

The Claimants' application for an interim payment of damages

D1 will be ordered to pay the damages set out above within 14 days of the date of the court's order. On that basis Ms Wisson rightly conceded that the Claimants' application dated 15 July 2024 for an order for an interim payment of damages had fallen away.

I observe that, in any event, it is unlikely that the Claimants would have satisfied all of the conditions for such an order, given that there is no evidence that D1 is insured in respect of the claim; nor is he a defendant whose liability will be met by an insurer under section 151 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 or an insurer acting under the Motor Insurers Bureau Agreement; nor is he a public body. The Claimants would have had to satisfy one of these conditions to secure an order for interim payments: CPR 25.7(e)(ii).

Part C: Remedies other than damages

An injunction restraining D1 from future harassment and defamation

In their POC the Claimants sought an injunction in the following terms: an injunction that D1 "[s]top all harassment and defamation and never stalking the Claimants for life".

As C1 explained in her seventh witness statement dated 12 July 2024 at [54.3.7]-[54.3.10], on or around 22 March 2023, D1 stopped posting publications about the Claimants online. This was after they complained about his conduct to the police in Dover Town, MA, USA, and officers visited him and warned him about his conduct. C1's evidence is that during a telephone call with C4 at around this time, D1 confirmed that he would no longer post any publications about the Claimants.

Under the HRA, s.12(1) and (4), before granting any relief which might affect the exercise of the Convention right to freedom of expression, particular regard must be had to the importance of that right and, where the proceedings relate to material which the respondent claims, or which appears to the court, to be journalistic, literary or artistic material (or to conduct connected with such material), to (a) the extent to which (i) the material has, or is about to, become available to the public; or (ii) it is, or would be, in the public interest for the material to be published and (b) any privacy code.

I do not consider that ss.12(1) and (4) preclude the grant of the injunction sought by the Claimants, for the following reasons.

First, although some of the publications about the Claimants are described by D1 as "literary" they are not genuinely so. D1 is not engaged in journalistic activity and/or publishing artistic material. There is no live issue of public interest.

Second, D1's right to freedom of expression under Article 10 is qualified. He has used publications to pursue a course of conduct which he knew, or should have known, amounted to harassment. His Article 10 rights do not justify allowing him to continue to post defamatory content about the Claimants online.

Third, as Tugenhadt J made clear in ZAM v CFW and TFW [2013] EWHC 662 (QB) at [22], once a final judgment has been entered, whether after a trial or summarily, a claimant is "normally entitled to a permanent injunction to vindicate the right that he has proved that he has", notwithstanding Article 10 rights. Hourani at [12](2) and Davies at [106] also refer to claimants having an "entitlement" to injunctive remedy on their facts. As Ms Wisson correctly submitted, injunctive relief is a discretionary remedy, but it is one that flows naturally from a court's judgment that a publication is libellous and/or a course of publications are harassing.

Fourth, although D1 has stopped posting material online, he has provided no cogent account to the court, nor apologised to the Claimants. He has also pursued litigation and police complaints in the USA. I therefore accept that the Claimants are concerned that D1 will resume harassing them in the jurisdiction of England and Wales if not restrained from doing so by an injunction. Further, the extent of D1's assets is uncertain and, as noted at [172] above, he has apparently transferred property to a third party. Accordingly, an award of damages and costs alone is unlikely to provide a sufficient deterrent effect. I therefore accept that the Claimants have legitimate interests that cannot be protected other than by way of a carefully framed injunction restraining D1.

For these reasons it is appropriate to exercise the discretion of the court to make a final injunction restraining D1 from further harassment or defamation of the Claimants. In this regard, I take the same approach as Nicklin J in Suttle at [61], Saini J in Blackledge at [55]-[56].

By an application dated 9 August 2023, the Claimants sought an order that a power of arrest be attached to the injunction. On 4 November 2024, Steyn J dismissed this application on the basis that a power of arrest can only be issued where an injunction to restrain harassment has been made and where there is a basis for concluding that the defendant has "done anything which he is prohibited from doing by the injunction": the PHA, s.3(3)(b). Accordingly, if there is a basis for considering that D1 has behaved in such a fashion in the future, the Claimants could apply to the court for the issue of a warrant for his arrest.

An order that D1 publish a summary of the judgment on fishandchips.fans and www.6park.com

By their application dated 25 September 2024 the Claimants sought an order that D1 publish a summary of the judgment. Ms Wisson made submissions to the effect that such an order should be made in respect of the websites fishandchips.fans and 6park.com.

The power to make such an order is derived from the Defamation Act 2013, s.12, which provides as follows in material part:

"(1) Where a court gives judgment for the claimant in an action for defamation the court may order the defendant to publish a summary of the judgment.

(2) The wording of any summary and the time, manner, form and place of its publication are to be for the parties to agree.

(3) If the parties cannot agree on the wording, the wording is to be settled by the court.

(4) If the parties cannot agree on the time, manner, form or place of publication, the court may give such directions as to those matters as it considers reasonable and practicable in the circumstances".

In Monir, Nicklin J summarised the relevant principles as follows:

"239. The purpose of this section is to provide a remedy that will assist the claimant in repairing the damage to his reputation and obtaining vindication. Orders under the section are not to be made as any sort of punishment of the defendant.

240. Orders under s 12 are discretionary both as to whether to order the publication of a summary and (if the parties do not agree) in what terms and where. Exercising the power to require a defendant to publish a summary of the Court's judgment is an interference with the defendant's Article 10 right. As such, the interference must be justified. The interference may be capable of being justified in pursuit of the legitimate aim of 'the protection of the reputation or rights of others'. Whether an order under this section can achieve this aim will be a matter of fact in each case. If the interference represented by a s 12 order is justified, then the Court would then consider whether (if the parties agree) the terms of the summary to be published is proportionate. The Court should only make an order that the defendant publish a summary of the Court's judgment if there is a realistic prospect that one or other of these objectives will be realised and that the publication of a summary is necessary and proportionate to these objectives.

241. There is an obvious purpose, in an appropriate case, for ordering a newspaper to publish a summary of the judgment because there is a realistic basis on which to conclude that the published summary will come to the attention of at least some of those who read the original libel and others who may have learned about the allegation via the "grapevine" effect. In a smaller scale publication, where it is possible for the original publishees (or at least a substantial number of them) to be identified, again an order requiring the publication to them of a summary of the judgment may well help realise the objectives underpinning s.12. Each case will depend upon its own facts. If the defendant has already published a retraction and apology then, depending upon its terms, that may mean that an order under s.12 is not justifiable or required. The claimant will be able to point to that to assist in his vindication or repair to his reputation.

242. It is difficult to justify ordering a defendant to publish a summary of the court's judgment when there is no realistic prospect that by doing so it will come to the attention of any of those to whom the original libel was published (or republished). Put simply, the legitimate aim cannot be realised, and the order will either not be necessary at all or the requirements as to publication will be disproportionate".

Ms Wisson highlighted that s.12 orders have been made (i) in cases where the defendant has refused to engage with the litigation and default judgment has been granted (see, for example, Northcott at [98]-[99] and Schofield v Politicalite [2024] EWHC 543 (KB) at [59]-[65]); and (ii) in cases with a jurisdictional element and in which publication of the summary would inevitably be disseminated outside of the jurisdiction of England and Wales: see, for example, Mincione v Gedi Gruppo Editoriale SPA [2022] EWHC 3268 (KB), [2022] EMLR 19 at [73]-[77].

It is also right to note that s.12 orders have been refused in cases where, on the evidence, the court was not satisfied that the defendant had an effective means of communicating the summary of the judgment: see, for example, Suttle at [62], where no s.12 order was made because the defendant's Facebook page on which the libellous publications had been posted had been removed.

In this case, I accept Ms Wisson's submission that the publication of a summary of the judgment would assist in repairing the damage to the Claimants' reputation and obtaining vindication. It therefore pursues a legitimate aim.

A short statement with no more than a factual account of the court's decision is appropriate, along the lines of those proposed in Schofield at [62]. The statement will refer to the date of the judgment, the fact that D1 was ordered to pay C1, C2 and C3 damages in libel and harassment and the amount of those damages, as well as the fact that he was ordered to pay costs. A link to the full judgment will be given.

In my judgment D1 should be ordered to post a summary of this judgment on fishandchips.fans and www.6park.com using his pleaded usernames [14], because the summary would thereby be likely to come to the attention of those who read the original posts, and so would be justified as a measure designed to protect the Claimants' reputations. Given the number of "reads" of each publication the Claimants are unlikely to be able to target delivery of the disposal judgment, or a summary of it, to where it is needed effectively without an order of the court against D1.

In oral submissions at the 27 March 2025 hearing Ms Wisson indicated that the Claimants instructed that they also sought an order under s.12 requiring D1 to post a summary on the above websites in his own name. Given that he has posted anonymously to date I am not persuaded that such an order is appropriate: it is hard to see how a reader of the original posts would understand that the summary was related to the original posts. It would thus not be effective.

Other remedies sought by the Claimants

The Claimants, representing themselves, also sought (i) a s.12 order requiring D1 to post a summary of this judgment on wenxuecity.com using his pleaded usernames [15]; (ii) an order that D1 publish "an undertaking not to republish any defamatory statements"; and (iii) an order that D1 "retract his posts...and publish a retraction of a statement".

As to (i), wenxuecity.com is the website said to be operated by D3. The issues relating to D3 have yet to be fully argued and in my judgment whether or not a s.12 order in relation to that website should be made should be deferred until the issues relating to D3 are clarified.

I am not persuaded that orders (ii) or (iii) are appropriate given the injunction and the s.12 order that I will make, which renders them unnecessary.

By an application dated 6 January 2025, the Claimants sought an anti-suit injunction against D1 to restrain several claims he has brought in the USA, primarily involving C4. By her submissions dated 25 March 2025, Ms Wisson indicated that this application was no longer pursued.

Part D: Costs

Under CPR 12.5(3), where default judgment is ordered on a claim for an unspecified amount of money on the filing of a request, the default judgment will be for an amount of damages to be decided by the court "together with costs". Although the Master who granted default judgment ordered that costs were reserved, in my judgment the Claimants are entitled to an order that D1 pays their costs of their claim against him subject to certain issues highlighted in my assessment of the level of costs.

In deciding what order to make about costs, the court has regard to all the circumstances, including the parties' conduct and whether a party has succeeded on part of its case, even if that party has not been wholly successful: CPR 44.2(4)(a) and (b). The court may make an order that a party must pay a proportion of another party's costs; a stated amount in respect of another party's costs; costs from or until a certain date only; costs incurred before the proceedings have begun; and costs relating to particular steps taken in the proceedings: CPR 44.2(6)(a)-(e).

The basis of the assessment of costs

The Claimants contended that D1 should pay their costs on an indemnity rather than the standard basis. They argued that D1's conduct has been "outside the norm" in the context of reasonably conducted litigation, including litigation in which default judgment is obtained in the absence of an acknowledgement of service and/or defence. They pointed to the factors relied on in support of their claim for aggravated damages, referred to at [170]-[174] above, namely (i) D1's attempts to evade due process by taking steps to conceal and/or transfer his assets in anticipation of a damages award and/or adverse costs order; (ii) his pursuit of parallel police complaints and litigation in the USA against C1, C2 and C3, which the Claimants submit are vexatious and are a continuation of his harassment; and (iii) his failure to comply with any court orders in this litigation.

In my judgment this characterisation of D1's conduct of the litigation is sound. I therefore order that D1 pays the Claimants' costs to be assessed on the indemnity basis under CPR 44.3(1)(b). The effect of this order is that while costs which have been "unreasonably incurred or are unreasonable in amount" will not be allowed, I will resolve any doubts as to whether costs were reasonably incurred or were reasonable in amount in favour of the Claimants: CPR 44.3(1) and (3). Further, the proportionality test does not apply.

The method of the assessment of costs

The Claimants invited me to summarily assess the costs of the proceedings against D1 under CPR 44.6(1). I consider that this course is appropriate.

Under CPR PD 44, paragraph 9.1, whenever a court makes an order about costs which does not provide for only fixed costs to be paid, it should consider whether to make a summary assessment of costs. Under paragraph 9.2, it should generally do so at the conclusion of any hearing other than a fast track trial which has lasted "not more than one day...unless there is good reason not to do so, for example where the paying party shows substantial grounds for disputing the sum claimed for costs that cannot be dealt with summarily".

Although there have been several hearings relating to the disposal of the claim against D1, the total amount of time in court addressing these issues as not exceeded one day. D1's lack of engagement with the process means that he has provided no grounds for disputing the sums claimed. Further, I have conducted all but one of the hearings relating to the disposal of the claim against D1 in this very complex case and have made a significant number of case management orders relating to these issues and the various linked applications made by the Claimants. It is therefore likely to be much easier, and thus consistent with the overriding objective of fairly allocating court resources, for me to summarily assess the costs than expect a costs judge to do so some time in the future. Finally, this claim relates to events in 2022 and the medical evidence shows that the litigation is having an adverse impact on C1's health in particular. This provides a further reason to resolve the costs issues now.

The amount of the Claimants' litigant in person costs

Although Ms Wisson assisted the Claimants by making general submissions on the principles relevant to the costs issues, she was not instructed to assist them on the amounts of those costs which they sought. The Claimants provided a detailed statement of their litigant in person "time" costs and their disbursements dated 30 March 2025. This complied with CPR PD 44, paragraph 9.5.

I have summarily assessed those costs in the total of £49,199.26, comprising £23,313 in time costs and £25,886.26 in disbursements, for the reasons set out in Annex 1 to this judgment.

Pro bono counsel's costs

The Legal Services Act 1997, s.194 and CPR 46.7 make provision for payments to prescribed charities in respect of pro bono representation in civil proceedings in England and Wales.

Under s.194(4), in considering whether to make such an order and the terms of such an order, the court must have regard to (a) whether, had the representation of the party not been provided free of charge, the court would have ordered the person to make a payment to the party in respect of the costs payable to the representative by the party in respect of that representation, and (b) if it would, what the terms of the order would have been.

Here, if Ms Wisson had not provided the assistance she did to the Claimants on a pro bono basis, I would have ordered that D1 pay the costs the Claimants had incurred by instructing her. The terms of that costs order would have been the amount detailed on the costs schedule Ms Wisson provided, namely £16,781. These costs were all reasonably incurred and are reasonable in amount. On behalf of the court, I repeat my thanks to counsel for the very considerable assistance she provided.

The prescribed charity for the purposes of the order is the Access to Justice Foundation. Under CPR 46.7(3) the Claimants must send a copy of my order to the prescribed charity within 7 days of receipt of the order.

The time for payment

The Claimants sought an order that the costs payable by D1 are paid within the usual 14 day period set out in CPR 44.7(1). There is no reason not to make this order.

Conclusion

Accordingly, for all these reasons, I order that D1 pays:

(i) £55,000 in damages to C1, comprising £45,000 for harassment and £10,000 for libel;

(ii) £61,985.99 in damages to C2, comprising £45,000 for harassment, £6,636.78 for personal injuries damages and interest, £9,849.21 for special damages and £500 for libel;

(iii) £32,500 in damages to C3, comprising £32,000 for harassment and £500 for libel.

(iv) £49,119.26 in costs and disbursements to C1, C2 and C3 apportioned between them in the manner set out in Annex 1 at [14]; and

(v) £16,781 to reflect pro bono costs to the Access to Justice Foundation.

All of these sums must be paid within 14 days.

I also make the injunction and s.12 order that D1 publish a summary of the judgment on fishandchips.fans and www.6park.com, as described at [182]-[199] above.

I reiterate my thanks to Ms Wisson for her considerable assistance.

Annex 1: Summary assessment of the Claimant's litigant in person costs

Time costs

1. In relation to the reasonableness of litigant in person costs, as the Guide to The Summary Assessment of Costs (2021 edition) explains:

"23. Generally, litigants in person may be expected to spend more time than would reasonably be spent by a legal representative. The time allowed to a litigant in person should therefore be measured against the time that would reasonably be spent by a person without legal training or specialist knowledge.

24. However, there is an absolute cap on the amount recoverable by a litigant in person, namely the reasonable costs of disbursements plus two thirds of the amount which would have been allowed if the litigant in person had been legally represented: r.46.5(2). The correct approach is therefore to assess the reasonable costs for the litigant to do the work at the appropriate rate, consider what a legal representative would have been allowed for doing that work, calculate two thirds of that figure, and allow the lower of the two figures."

2. In respect of their time costs, the Claimants had been directed to focus their schedule on the time and work done solely in relation to the claim against D1 (rather than D2, D3 and D4). They had done this. The hourly rate applied by the Claimants on their schedule was £19, in line with CPR PD 46, paragraph 3.4.

3. The total amount claimed in time costs was £64,125, reflecting work done on documents and attendance at hearings, with each Claimant seeking a different amount. This was understandable and reflected what was apparent to me, namely that C1 had done the vast majority of the work necessary to advance the Claimants' case.

4. C1 sought £33,231 in costs, reflecting 1,749 hours work. She had meticulously detailed the work she had done and I have no doubt that her records were accurate. However, there were certain difficulties with the costs claimed by C1, which were reflected to some degree in the costs claimed by the other Claimants.

5. First, some of the costs claimed by C1 reflected applications made by the Claimants which were no longer pursued or which were unsuccessful, such that I do not consider it appropriate to order D1 to pay C1's costs of preparing them. This applies to the amounts sought for the applications for examination of a witness (lines 73-76), interim payments (line 77), anonymity (lines 93-95) and the anti-suit injunction (lines 154-156). Similarly, £570 reflecting a total of 30 hours' time to travel to each of the three hearings is disallowed in the "work done on documents" section (see lines 119, 122, 141, 144, 199 and 202) as this has also been claimed in the "attendance at hearings" section.

6. Second, and more fundamentally, many of the costs claimed by C1 reflected an amount of time she had spent on various aspects of the case which was very far in excess of the amount of time that a legal representative would have been allowed for doing that work, even allowing for the volume of posts by D1 and the need to use Chinese translators. This means that the two thirds "cap" set out at [1] above applies.

7. Doing the best I can, I have therefore considered what a nominal legal representative would have been allowed for doing each of the items of work and calculated two thirds of that figure, as that will be the lower of the two figures referred to in the guidance:

Line number on schedule and work done	Amount claimed by C1	Nominal legal representative amount	Two thirds amount
1: Collating and organising evidence for claim to D1	300	60	40
16: Drafting claim form and Particulars of Claim against D1	200	30	20
24, 29, 30, 55, 69 and 89: Drafting witness statements in relation to claim against D1	130 [16]	45	30
68, 106, 128 and 150: Preparing bundles for the various disposal hearings	420 [17]	90	60
107 and 162: Preparing authorities bundles	160 [18]	30	20
132: Preparing replacement skeleton argument	40	18	12
158: Preparing reading list for disposal hearing	40	9	6

8. In the remaining respects, C1's claims for work on documents and attendances at hearings were reasonable and did not breach the cap referred to. I therefore allow them.

9. C2 sought £18,287.50 in costs, reflecting 962.50 hours work. His claims for costs cannot be allowed in full for the same reasons as are given at [5]-[6] above in relation to C1. Accordingly, I allow no costs for his claims on lines 74-76, 78-79, 93-95 and 156-157 or for the £570 in travel costs; and reduce some of his other costs as follows, bearing in mind the work also done on these items by C1, but recognising that it was reasonable for C2 to provide some input into these tasks:

Line number on schedule and work done	Amount claimed by C2	Nominal legal representative amount	Two thirds amount
1: Collating and organising evidence for claim to D1	300	30	20
16: Drafting claim form and Particulars of Claim against D1	75	18	12
68, 106 and 150: Preparing bundles for the various disposal hearings	100 [19]	9	6
107: Preparing authorities bundles	10	3	2

10. In the remaining respects, C2's claims for work on documents and attendances at hearings were reasonable and did not breach the cap referred to. I therefore allow them.

11. C3 sought £8,550 in costs, reflecting 450 hours work. Again, his claims for costs cannot be allowed in full for the same reasons as are given above and I allow no costs for his claim on line 154 or for the £570 in travel costs; and reduce some of his other costs as follows, bearing in mind the work also done on these items by C1 and C2:

Line number on schedule and work done	Amount claimed by C3	Nominal legal representative amount	Two thirds amount
1: Collating and organising evidence for claim to D1	92	30	20
16: Drafting claim form and Particulars of Claim against D1	75	18	12
68, 106, 128 and 150: Preparing bundles for the various disposal hearings	80 [20]	9	6
107 and 162: Preparing authorities bundles	50 [21]	6	4
132: Preparing replacement skeleton argument	10	3	2
158: Preparing reading list for disposal hearing	10	3	2

12. In the remaining respects, C3's claims for work on documents and attendances at hearings were reasonable and did not breach the cap referred to. I therefore allow them.

13. C4 sought £950 in costs, reflecting 50 hours work in asking D1 to remove the posts, preparing her various witness statements and attending the hearings on 4 November 2024, 12 December 2024 and 27 February 2025. Although C4 also obtained default judgment against D1 her claims against him were fundamentally flawed, as outlined at [71]-[77] of the judgment. As a result, she has recovered no damages from D1. I therefore consider that she has not, in any real sense, succeeded in any part of her claim, such that D1 should not be ordered to pay her costs, under CPR 44.2(4)(a).

14. Accordingly, the total amount to be paid to the Claimants by D1 to reflect their litigant in person time is £11,428.50 for C1, £9.148.50 for C2 and £2,736 for C3, giving a total of £23,313.

Disbursements

15. Litigants in person are allowed costs for the same categories of disbursements as would have been allowed if sought by a legal representative on their behalf: CPR 46.5(3)(a)(ii).

16. The Claimants sought £9,620.04 for experts' reports and £750 for Dr Forbat to attend the 27 March 2025 hearing; £1,827.50 in interpreter fees for each of the four hearings and for the attendances on the medical experts; and £784.61 in travel and accommodation costs for each of the hearings. These costs were all reasonably incurred and D1 will be ordered to pay them. This gives a total of £12,982.15.

17. They also sought £13,010 in court fees and £529.06 to reflect the costs of service on D1. Deducting the court fees and service costs in relation to the witness examination, interim payments and anonymity application [22] gives revised figure of £12,469 and £435.11 respectively. These were all reasonably incurred.

18. The Claimants sought to recover from D1 the £58,185.50 costs I had ordered them to pay D4: see [2025] EWHC 158 (KB) at [114]-[127]. They argued that (i) these costs had been incurred as an indirect result of D1's actions; and thus (ii) should be recoverable from him. The first of these propositions is correct, but the second is not. For the reasons I gave in my earlier judgment, whatever the merits of the Claimants' claim against D1, a costs order against the Claimants in respect of D4 was merited. In summary, they had lost all their applications against D4 and had persisted in them, despite D4 highlighting the difficulties with them. I therefore cannot order D1 to pay the Claimants the £58,185.50 in costs that they were ordered to pay D4.

19. Accordingly, the total amount of disbursements to be paid to the Claimants by D1 is £25,886.26.

[1] This refers to the claims variously described by the Claimants as claims for "misuse of private [information] and breach of privacy" and "misuse of personal data and breach of privacy".

[2] Items (iii) and (v) were described by C2 and C3 as "submissions" but were supported by a statement of truth and were effectively witness statements. I have therefore treated them as such.

[3] Permission to serve out of the jurisdiction can only be granted where the court is satisfied that (i) there is a good arguable case that the claims are of a kind that fall within one of the "gateways" set out in CPR PD6B ("the Gateway Requirement"); (ii) the Claimant has a real as opposed to a fanciful prospect of success on the claim or, put another way, could show that any "reverse" summary judgment application made by D1 would fail ("the Merits Test"); and (iii) England and Wales is the proper place in which to bring the claim" under CPR 6.37(3) ("The Forum Test") (which, for the purposes of the libel claim, incorporates the requirement in the Defamation Act 2013, s.9 that this jurisdiction is "clearly the most appropriate place" in which to bring an action in respect of the statement): Soriano v Forensic News [2022] QB 533 at [11].

[4] The relevant sections provide that (i) a person must not "pursue a course of conduct (a) which amounts to harassment of another, and (b) which [they] know...or ought to know amounts to harassment of the other": s.(1)(a); (ii) a "course of conduct" must involve, in the case of conduct in relation to a single person, "conduct on at least two occasions in relation to that person": s.7(3)(a); (iii) the person whose course of conduct is in question ought to know that it amounts to harassment of another if "a reasonable person in possession of the same information would think the course of conduct amounted to harassment of the other": s.1(2).

[6] Namely the Securing the Protection of our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage Act (124 STAT 2380, US Public Law No: 111-224); see, in particular, §4102 thereof.

[7] Levi v Bates [2015] EWCA Civ 206 [2016] QB 91 at [27], per Briggs LJ

[8] See Dr Wood's 20 February 2025 report at [3.10], [13.2] and [14.17]

[9] Ibid., at [3.15], [15.3]-[15.8] and [15.10]

[10] See his 15 and 20 February 2025 reports at [1.12]-[1.13] and [16.12]-[16.15]

[11] See Dr Wood's 15 February 2025 report at [3.4]

[12] See Dr Wood's 15 February 2025 report at [3.5] and [13.8]

[14] Namely, Fishandchips.fans: 太空神曲; 就爱八卦; 张三李四; and 某人的马 and 6park.com: gonewithsmoke; J海外猎狐; 大熊猫宝宝; and 御前金牌小密

[15] Namely kolobok; 扒拉扒拉吧; and 海外猎狐人

[16] comprising 20, 20, 10, 20, 50 and 10 hours respectively on each of the dates in the first column

[17] comprising 100, 100, 100 and 120 hours respectively on each of the dates in the first column

[18] comprising 80 and 80 hours respectively on each of the dates in the first column

[19] comprising 40, 50 and 10 hours respectively on each of the dates in the first column

[20] comprising 20 hours on each of the dates in the first column

[21] comprising 30 and 20 hours respectively on each of the dates in the first column

[22] namely £119, £303 and £119 in court fees and £27.15, £33.40 and £33.40 in service costs

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	England and Wales High Court (King's Bench Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (King's Bench Division) Decisions >> Wei & Ors v Long & Ors [2025] EWHC 912 (KB) (11 April 2025) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/KB/2025/912.html Cite as: [2025] EWHC 912 (KB)

England and Wales High Court (King's Bench Division) Decisions