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England and Wales High Court (Queen's Bench Division) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Queen's Bench Division) Decisions >> Crow v Johnson [2012] EWHC 1982 (QB) (16 July 2012) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2012/1982.html Cite as: [2012] EWHC 1982 (QB) |
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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Robert Crow |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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Boris Johnson |
Defendant |
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David Glen (instructed by Collyer Bristow LLP) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 16 July 2012
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Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Tugendhat :
"Not Again: Ken wants to come back with his … Council Tax rises, Broken promises, cronies, scandals, waste Bob Crow. NotKenAgain.com"
"1.The Claimant's policies, leadership of the RMT and association with Mr Livingstone: (a) seriously damages his electoral prospects and (b) has caused and will cause grave harm to the interests of Londoners.
2. The Claimant was part of and supported a culture of political immorality involving broken promises, cronyism, scandals and waste".
"3. The claimant was part of a corrupt, scandalous, unaccountable and wasteful group of cronies".
"10. There was no dispute as to the applicable law. Although there are a number of well-known definitions of the legal meaning of the word "defamatory", the case proceeded before the judge on the basis of the definition used by Sir Thomas Bingham, MR in Skuse v Granada Television Limited [1996] EMLR 278 at 286 where he said:
"A statement should be taken to be defamatory if it would tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally or would be likely to affect a person adversely in the estimation of reasonable people generally."
11. In deciding what meaning the words complained of were capable of bearing, it was again common ground that the court must have in mind the guidance given in Skuse v Granada Television, summarised most recently by Sir Anthony Clarke MR in Jeynes v News Magazines Limited [2008] EWCA Civ 130 at paragraph 14:
"The legal principles relevant to meaning … may be summarised in this way: (1) The governing principle is reasonableness. (2) The hypothetical reasonable reader is not naïve but he is not unduly suspicious. He can read between the lines. He can read in an implication more readily than a lawyer and may indulge in a certain amount of loose thinking but he must be treated as being a man who is not avid for scandal and someone who does not, and should not, select one bad meaning where other non-defamatory meanings are available. (3) Over-elaborate analysis is best avoided. (4) The intention of the publisher is irrelevant. (5) [….] (6) The hypothetical reader is taken to be representative of those who would read the publication in question. (7) In delimiting the range of permissible defamatory meanings, the court should rule out any meaning which, "can only emerge as the produce of some strained, or forced, or utterly unreasonable interpretation…" …. (8) It follows that "it is not enough to say that by some person or another the words might be understood in a defamatory sense."
12. It was also accepted that there is a distinction between "people generally" and a section of people. The distinction is set out in a number of authorities but the one relied on before the judge was that of Greer LJ in Tolley v Fry [1930] 1 KB 467 at 479 where he said:
"Words are not defamatory, however much they may damage a man in the eyes of a section of the community unless they also amount to disparagement of his reputation in the eyes of right thinking men generally. To write or say of a man something that would disparage him in the eyes of a particular section of the community but will not affect his reputation in the eyes of the average right thinking man is not actionable within the law of defamation." "
"[45] There is a clear line of authority in Scottish law to the effect that a wide latitude is allowed to comment and criticism in the political and public sphere. In the late 19th century, Lord Shand observed at page 1113 of Godfrey v W & D C Thomson (1890) 17 R 1108:
"... I think that in these times persons must be allowed to speak pretty freely of public political conduct and principles ..."
In the same case, Lord McLaren stated at page 1114:
"In considering cases such as the present - actions of damages against newspapers of public speakers for defamation - it is to be remembered that it is the privilege of every citizen to express his opinions freely regarding the public acts and utterances of his fellow-citizens. It is sometimes said that everyone who occupies a public position invites such criticism, and it will not, I think, make the criticism actionable that it is uncourteous, or even offensive or vituperative, provided it amounts to nothing more than an expression of opinion on a matter of public concern ..."
[53] … criticism of public conduct in the context of a political struggle, even if strongly worded ("scab") and even if not always entirely accurate …, in our view falls well within the latitude permitted by the law where comments are made about persons acting in their public capacity. In particular, we are not persuaded that the article would lower the pursuer in the esteem of right-thinking members of the public. …
In our view, the readers of the article would appreciate that they were witnessing a political skirmish, with warring factions within the SSP and diametrically opposed views about how the party and its members should conduct themselves, .."
"Free elections and freedom of expression, particularly freedom of political debate, together form the bedrock of any democratic system ... The two rights are inter-related and operate to reinforce each other: for example, as the Court has observed in the past, freedom of expression is one of the "conditions" necessary to "ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature" ... For this reason, it is particularly important in the period preceding an election that opinions and information of all kinds are permitted to circulate freely."
SUBMISSIONS
DISCUSSION
CONCLUSION