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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Technology and Construction Court) Decisions >> Jordan & Anor v Geason (No. 2) [2007] EWHC 2270 (TCC) (01 October 2007) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/TCC/2007/2270.html Cite as: [2007] EWHC 2270 (TCC) |
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
TECHNOLOGY AND CONSTRUCTION COURT
133- 137 Fetter Lane London, EC4A 1HD |
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B e f o r e :
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(1) FIONA JORDAN (2) PHILIPPE JORDAN |
Claimants |
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- and - |
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DEAN GEASON |
Defendant |
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(No. 2) |
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6th Floor, 12-14 New Fetter Lane, London EC4A 1AG
Telephone No: 020 7936 6000. Fax No: 020 7427 0093
DX 410 LDE [email protected]
THE DEFENDANT did not appear and was not represented
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Crown Copyright ©
HIS HONOUR JUDGE PETER COULSON QC:
Introduction
The Contract
The Pleaded Claim
"All account of all monies paid to and incurred by the Defendant in connection with the project management and construction works at 16 Chepstow Villas, London, W11 2RB.
Damages for breach of oral contract between the Claimants and the Defendant in relation to the project management and construction of works at 16 Chepstow Villas, London, W11 2RB.
Repayment to the Claimants by the Defendant of monies had and received by the Defendant in respect of which the Defendant has been unjustly enriched.
Delivery up of garden furniture and/or damages in respect thereof.
Value
We expect to recover more than £15,000."
The Claim for an Interim Payment
9.1 Overpayment
It is said that the Claimants have paid the Defendant a total of £988,000. The Claimants' case is that the value of the works carried out by the Defendant in exchange for this sum is £443,689.52; thus they claim an alleged overpayment of £544,310.48.
9.2 Delay
The Claimants allege that the works should have been completed by Christmas 2006 but that, because of the Defendant's default, they have incurred (and will incur) additional rental costs until 31st October 2007. That gives rise to an additional figure for rent of £76,984.23.
9.3. Additional Professional Fees
This claim is estimated at £30,000. It is not particularised.
9.4 Garden Furniture
This claim is estimated at £15,000. Again, it is not particularised.
9.5 Summary
Although in her original affidavit Mrs. Jordan uses these figures to arrive at a total claim value of £665,000 odd, paragraphs 4, 5 and 8 of the statement of Mr. Leaman, which is itself the evidential basis for the interim payment claim, limit that claim to the £544,310.48 referable to the overpayment (paragraph 9.1 above).
Applicable Principles
"25.7(1) The court may only make an order for an interim payment where any of the following conditions are satisfied. ---
....
(b) the claimant has obtained judgment against that defendant for damages to be assessed or for a sum of money (other than costs) to be assessed.
...
(4) The court must not order an interim payment of more than a reasonable proportion of the likely amount of the final judgment."
"The Defendant has not filed an acknowledgment of service to the claim and the time for doing so has expired.
It is ordered that the defendant must pay the claimant an amount which the court will decide and costs. ... "
Although the Defendant has been back to court on at least one occasion after 09.08.07, he has never made any attempt to have this judgment in default set aside. I conclude, therefore, that the judgment in default is a valid judgment against the Defendant pursuant to CPR 12, and triggers the relevant parts of CPR 25 identified above.
(i) The amount of any interim payment should be an amount that the court considers just in all the circumstances; it must not exceed a reasonable proportion of the likely amount of the final judgment.
(ii) The Claimant's ability to repay any sum ordered by way of an interim payment is a factor to be taken into account in fixing the sum to be paid: see Ultraframe (UK) Limited v. Eurocell Building Plastics Limited [2005] EWHC 2111 (Ch). Similarly, in accordance with the overriding objective, and in particular rule 1.1(2)(c)(iv), the financial position of the defendant may also be a relevant factor in the exercise of the court's discretion: see also British Commonwealth Holdings Plc v. Quadrex Holdings Inc. [1989] 3 All ER 492 (CA).
(iii) The Claimants are not required to demonstrate a particular need for a specific sum over and above the general need for Claimants to be paid their damages as soon as reasonably can be done: see Stringman v. McArdle [1994] 1 WLR, 1653 (Court of Appeal). Similarly the court is not concerned with what the Claimants propose to do with any money that they receive by way of interim payment: see Campbell v. Mylchreest [1998] PIQR P20.
With those principles in mind I turn to consider my assessment of the interim payment to be made by the Defendant to the Claimants.
Assessment
a) The Starting Point
b) The Sums Paid
c) The Value
(i) In the absence of any proper paperwork on the part of the Defendant and in the absence, therefore, of tender packages, contract rates or other relevant valuation data, Mr. Vail had a difficult task. He himself notes that at paragraphs 3.2 and 3.3 of his report, where he states:
"Very little data, however, has been produced by the defendant to support the tendering of packages or invoiced general items.
I have therefore valued the work on an ad hoc basis using what little genuine data the Defendant has provided and/or applying reasonable market rates and prices to my assessment of works completed."
In those circumstances I regard it as more likely than not that, should there be a full trial of this action, at least some of the rates and prices that Mr. Vail has utilized in his ad hoc assessment will be the subject of debate.
(ii) On a related point, I note that the rates and prices that Mr. Vail has utilized are often quoted in very round figures. In addition he does not identify the source(s) of those rates and prices: there is, for example, no attempt to build up rates by reference to Spon's, or some other well-known pricing book. I make it plain that this is not to be taken as a criticism of Mr. Vail, because he was undertaking a relatively limited exercise at the precise time that the relationship between the parties came to an end. If this matter were to go to trial, I have no doubt that he would produce a much more extensive report, in which he sought to justify in detail the rates and prices that he had used. However, this again demonstrates that it is more likely than not that there will be disputes about at least some of the rates and prices that Mr Vail has relied on. Therefore, some form of reduction is necessary to reflect both this point and the point at subparagraph (i) above.
(iii) I note that Mr Vail's valuation goes up to 18th May 2007. Although there is evidence from Mrs. Jordan that the Defendant had a further involvement with the property after that date, there is no evidence to suggest that any further work was carried out at the property after 18th May. In those circumstances, I am prepared to accept that 18th May is the relevant cut-off date and that no deduction should be made to reflect any further involvement on the part of the Defendant after that date.
d) The Parties' Respective Financial Positions
Other Matters
Summary