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England and Wales Lands Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Lands Tribunal >> Grosvenor Estate Belgravia v Adams [2008] EWLands LRA_131_2007 (27 March 2008)
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Cite as: [2008] EWLands LRA_131_2007

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LRA/131/2007
LANDS TRIBUNAL ACT 1949
LEASEHOLD ENFRANCHISEMENT – procedure – late application to LVT for permission to
appeal – LVT granting permission – whether grant of permission valid – Leasehold Valuation
Tribunals (Procedure) (England) Regulations 2003 regs 20, 24
IN THE MATTER OF AN APPEAL FROM THE LEASEHOLD VALUATION
TRIBUNAL FOR THE LONDON RENT ASSESSMENT PANEL
BETWEEN
GROSVENOR ESTATE BELGRAVIA
and
SHIRLEY ELIZABETH ADAMS
Appellant
Respondent
Re: Flat 2,
10 Eaton Place,
London SW1
Before: The President
Sitting at Procession House, 110 New Bridge Street, London EC4Y 6JL
on 19 March 2008
Anthony Radevsky instructed by Boodle Hatfield for the appellant
Anthony Tanney instructed by Farrer & Co for the respondent
The following case is referred to in this decision:
Arrowdell v Coniston Court (North) Hove Ltd [2007] RVR 39
© CROWN COPYRIGHT 2008
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DECISION ON AN APPLICATION TO DISMISS THE PROCEEDINGS
1.      The respondent in this appeal seeks to have the appeal dismissed on the ground that the
LVT’s purported grant of permission to appeal was invalid.
2.      The appeal arises out of an application made by the respondent leaseholder to the leasehold
valuation tribunal for the London Rent Assessment Panel under section 42 of the Leasehold
Reform (Housing and Urban Development) Act 1993 for a determination of the terms and the
price to be paid for an extended lease. The application related to Flat 2, 10 Eaton Place, London
SW1. The LVT held a hearing into the application together with a similar application relating to
Flat 4, 49 Eaton Place, London SW1. An appeal in respect of that property (LRA/129/2007) has
been settled.
3.      The LVT’s decision was dated 4 May 2007, but it was only sent to the parties on 30 May
2007. On 11 June 2007 the leaseholders in each case requested an extension of time for applying
for permission to appeal, and on 12 June 2007 the appellant Estate similarly requested an
extension of time. On 22 June 2007 the LVT sent a correction certificate to the parties and
extended to 20 July 2007 the time for applying for permission to appeal. On 17 July the
leaseholders applied for permission to appeal, and on 24 July 2007 (after the expiry, therefore, of
the extended time) the Estate too applied for permission to appeal. On 8 August 2007 the LVT
granted permission to appeal both to the leaseholders and to the Estate, and this was sent to the
parties on 7 September 2007. It said:
“1 The Tribunal grants leave to appeal to both the Applicant and the Respondent having
regard to the very unusual nature of the GEB lease which has wide application across
the Grosvenor Estate.
2  The issues raised in the application involved complex questions of law and/or
valuation in relation to this lease and the Tribunal considers that each party has raised
arguable grounds of appeal.
3 The grounds raised by each side on the appeal appear to the Tribunal to form opposite
sides of the same question namely whether the unusual nature and reduction in value of
the GEB lease should be reflected in the deferment rate or in the existing lease value.
4 The Tribunal therefore concludes that it would be wrong to grant leave to one party
and not the other so that notwithstanding the late receipt of an application from the
Applicant leave is granted to both parties on all grounds.”
4.      On 7 September 2007 the Estate gave notice of appeal, and on 17 October 2007 the
leaseholder gave notice of intention to respond. The notice of intention to respond was given
without prejudice to the applicant’s contention that the Estate had failed to obtain a valid
permission to appeal from the LVT. This contention was advanced in an application made on
the same day under rule 45(2) of the Lands Tribunal Rules 1996 seeking the dismissal of the
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appeal on the ground that the Estate has no permission to bring the appeal and is now out of time
to obtain permission. The leaseholder has not given notice of appeal, but she reserves her right
to apply to this Tribunal for an extension of time to enable her to do so if her present application
to dismiss the appeal is unsuccessful.
5.      The right of appeal to the Lands Tribunal from a decision of an LVT is contained in section
175 of the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002, which provides:
“175 Appeals
(1) A party to proceedings before a leasehold valuation tribunal may appeal to the
Lands Tribunal from a decision of the leasehold valuation tribunal.
(2) But the appeal may only be made with permission of –
(a)  the leasehold valuation tribunal, or
(b) the Lands Tribunal
(3) And it must be made within the time specified under section 3(6) of the Lands
Tribunal Act 1949.”
6.      Section 3(6) of the Act provides for the making of rules for regulating proceedings before
the Lands Tribunal, including (paragraph (a)(ii)) provision as to the time within which any
proceedings before the Tribunal are to be instituted. Under the Lands Tribunal Rules 1996 as
amended, where an LVT grants permission to appeal, notice of appeal must be given within 28
days. Where the LVT has not granted permission to appeal, permission id required from the
Lands Tribunal, and this is provided for by rule 5C:
“(1) A person (‘the applicant’) may only apply to the Lands Tribunal for permission to
appeal if he has made application to the first-tier tribunal for such permission and that
application has been refused.
(2) An application for permission to appeal must be made to the Lands Tribunal within
14 days of the date on which the decision of the first-tier tribunal to refuse permission to
appeal was sent to the applicant.”
Under rule 5B(A) “first-tier tribunal” includes an LVT.
7.      Provision for permission to appeal is made in the Leasehold Valuation Tribunals
(Procedure) (England) Regulations 2003. Regulation 20 provides:
“20 Permission to appeal
Where a party makes application to a tribunal for permission to appeal to the Lands
Tribunal –
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(a)  The application shall be made to the tribunal within the period of 21 days starting
with the date on which the document which records the reason for the decision
under regulation 18 was sent to that party; and
(b) A copy of the application shall be served on every other party.”
8.      Regulation 24 makes provision for the extension of time:
“24 Allowing further time
(1) In a particular case, the tribunal may extend any period prescribed by these
Regulations, or prescribed by a notice given under these Regulations, within which
anything is required or authorised to be done.
(2) A party may make a request to the tribunal to extend any such period but must do so
before that period expires.”
9.      For the respondent Mr Anthony Tanney submits that, since under regulation 20 the right of
a party to seek permission is time limited, a party who is outside the time limit has the right to
apply for permission to appeal only if he is granted an extension of time. The LVT can grant a
valid extension on an application by a party under regulation 24(2), but there was in this case no
application to extend time beyond 20 July 2007. The LVT can also extend time of its own
motion under regulation 24(1), but the LVT did not act of its own motion; and, since own motion
powers are tools for the efficient management of litigation, such power cannot be used to
condone a failure to comply with regulation 24(2) at the request, and for the benefit, of one party.
The result, Mr Tanney says, is that when the estate applied for permission to appeal it did so
without any right to make the application. Nowhere in the Regulations is any power given to the
LVT to confer a right to seek permission to appeal on a party that has lost the right, save by
validly extending the time.
10.    In purporting to grant permission to appeal to the appellant, says Mr Tanney, the LVT did
not purport to extend the time limited for applying for permission to appeal. The grant of
permission was therefore invalid. Alternatively, if it did purport to extend the time, it had no
power to do so. On either basis the purported permission to appeal was invalid.
11.    Mr Tanney submits that the approach urged on behalf of the respondent is consistent with
the view expressed by the Lands Tribunal (George Bartlett QC, President, and N J Rose FRICS)
in Arrowdell Ltd v Coniston Court (Hove) Ltd [2007] RVR 39, where at paragraph 9 it said:
“Regulation 20 of the Leasehold Valuation Tribunals (Procedure) (England)
Regulations 2003 imposes a time limit for applying to the LVT for permission to appeal
against a decision made by it. Under regulation 24 the LVT has power to extend this
period, but only if an application to do so is made before the period has expired.”
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12.      For the Estate Mr Anthony Radevsky submits that the effect of regulation 24(2) is that a
party cannot make a request for an extension after the time period has elapsed. However, that
does not prevent the LVT from extending the time in the exercise of its own discretion under
regulation 24(1). What the Tribunal said in Arrowdell was obiter, and in any event it did not
address the specific wording of regulation 24(1).
13.    There are other reasons, Mr Radevsky submits, why the respondent’s interpretation should
not be followed. It would deprive a party who is a couple of days late in seeking permission of
the right to appeal, even where (as here) the LVT considers that the justice of the case requires
permission to be granted. The 2003 Regulations should not be construed in a way which is
inconsistent with the 2002 Act, which authorised them to be made. There is nothing in the 2002
Act which permits inflexibly strict time limits to be imposed on the grant of permission to
appeal.
14.    In the event that these arguments of his are not successful Mr Radevsky seeks to contend
further that the Lands Tribunal has no power to determine that the LVT’s purported grant of
permission to the Estate was invalid and of no effect. Its validity, he says, can only be
challenged by judicial review.
15.    I cannot accept Mr Tanney’s contention that, assuming that the LVT had power to extend
the time limit, it nevertheless failed to do so. In paragraph 4 of its decision granting permission
to appeal it said that “notwithstanding the late receipt of an application from the Applicant leave
is granted to both parties on all grounds”. It could only grant permission on the application of
the party concerned, and, where the application was out of time, it could only do so if the time
for applying was extended. The terms in which it expressed itself in paragraph 4 make clear that
the LVT was granting permission, expressly taking into account the fact that the appellant’s
application was out of time. Necessarily, therefore, it was by implication extending time, and it
was unnecessary for it to state explicitly that it was doing so.
16.     I also reject Mr Tanney’s contention that the LVT has no power to extend the time for
applying for permission to appeal to a party that has requested permission to appeal but after the
time for applying has elapsed. Mr Tanney accepts that under regulation 24(1) the LVT has
power of its own motion to extend the time for applying even though the time has elapsed. It
would be extraordinary if the effect of the provisions is that it loses the power to extend the time
if the party in question has applied out of time for permission to appeal. I can see no reason in
justice or in terms of the scheme of the provisions why that should be the effect. Of course a
party that applies for permission out of time has no right to have its application determined, so
that, if the LVT, having received such an application out of time, does nothing about it, it cannot
be compelled on judicial review to determine the application. But if the LVT considers in the
exercise of its discretion that permission to appeal out of time should be given, in my judgment it
has power to grant permission.
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17.    The statement by the Tribunal in Arrowdell that under regulation 24 the LVT has power to
extend the period for applying for permission to appeal, but only if an application to do so is
made before the period has expired, is in terms not correct, as both counsel in the present case
agree. The matter is put correctly by saying that the LVT does have power to extend the period
but a party applying to have the period extended after it has elapsed has no right to have its
application determined. The reasoning of this part of the Arrowdell decision, which is concerned
with cross-appeals in the Lands Tribunal, in my view holds good if the correction is made.
18.    In view of these conclusions, the respondent’s application fails. There is therefore no need
to consider Mr Radevsky’s alternative argument that her only remedy in any event is by judicial
review.
Dated 27 March 2008
George Bartlett QC, President
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