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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> The Law Commission >> PUBLICATION OF LOCAL AUTHORITY REPORTS (A Consultation Paper) [2002] EWLC 163(4) (20 March 2002) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/other/EWLC/2002/163(4).html Cite as: [2002] EWLC 163(4) |
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Part IV
admissions of liability
4.1 It is obvious that the interests of the elected members of a local authority and their insurers might conflict. Whereas the members may wish to fulfil their political obligations by absorbing criticism and promising to compensate victims, when they think something has gone wrong with the delivery of their services, the insurers will be concerned about the disclosure of statements and documents that might prejudice their chances of a favourable settlement. Hence insurers often include a condition to prevent the authority from admitting liability without the insurer’s consent, as described in the previous Part.[1] In this Part we examine what might amount to an admission of liability in this context.
4.2 It should be borne in mind that the authority, and the insurer, will be concerned about admissions both where the authority’s liability is primary and direct, and where it is vicarious.[2] It is likely that only an employee of some seniority would be capable of making an admission of primary liability that would bind the authority, but any employee or member might make an admission of fact on which a claim of vicarious liability for the tort of its employees, or direct liability for breach of its own duties could be founded. In many cases, if the facts are as admitted, direct liability of the local authority will follow inevitably from the failures in supervision or procedural failures.
There is a world of difference between giving a factual account of what happened, without giving any expression of opinion as to blame, and an admission of liability.[3]
4.6 A formal admission is one made by a party which admits the whole or part of the truth of another party’s case in the proceedings, in writing by letter or in statement of case.[4] Admissions may be implied as well as express, but they must be clear.[5] If the defendant (for present purposes, we are assuming this to be the authority) makes such an admission, the claimant can apply for summary judgment on the admission.[6]
4.7 A formal admission would not be made without proper consideration by the legal officers, and appropriate consultation with insurers where necessary, but informal admissions are a different matter. An informal admission is a statement made by a party (or by some person by whose admission a party is bound as a matter of law)[7] from which the court would be entitled to, but is not bound to, find facts or draw inferences adverse to the case of that party.[8] These informal admissions are admitted as evidence by Civil Evidence Act 1995, section 7(1). They are not determinative of the issue but the court can give whatever weight it considers appropriate to the admission.[9] The weight to be attached to the admission increases with the knowledge and deliberation of the speaker, or the solemnity of the occasion on which it was made.[10]
4.9 Previous statements of witnesses are admissible in evidence with the leave of the court.[11] The statement can thus be adduced to support or undermine any oral evidence given by that party.
4.10 The issue of what actions constitute admissions subdivides into four: first, whether admissions may be made by officers or council staff to the inquiry. Secondly, whether the reception of the report by the council can constitute an admission of liability. Thirdly, whether adoption or endorsement, including publication,of the report can amount to an admission. Fourth, what public statements might amount to an admission of liability, and if so when. The answers to these sub-issues may vary according to whether the inquiry is independent (type 5) or internal (type 6).[12]
4.11 An authority will want to be aware to what extent, and how, the oral and documentary evidence its members, officers or staff give to an inquiry might amount to an admission of a relevant fact or an admission of liability which could be relied upon in later proceedings by a claimant. The claimant could have access to that information, even if the inquiry is held in private, because in some circumstances, the evidence given to the inquiry will have to be made available for public inspection as a background paper to the report when it is being considered by the council.[13]
4.13 It will only be where a person, whether employee or councillor, has authority to speak for the council that an admission could be construed as an admission of primary liability. If a person giving evidence sought to admit liability as a whole for the council, this would be beyond their authority so no statement would bind the authority as a matter of law.[14]
4.14 Even without expressly admitting liability for the authority as a whole, an officer or member giving evidence to an inquiry might make relevant admissions of facts from which an inference of primary or vicarious liability could be drawn. We anticipate that most oral or written admissions made to an inquiry would result in vicarious liability for the authority, rather than primary liability of the authority. Primary liability might follow where the person giving evidence is sufficiently senior for an oral or written admission of fact to amount to evidence of executive acts carried out by the authority. Hence any statement of this nature would not constitute a binding admission of liability, but it could be admissible in evidence. This is because section 1 of the Civil Evidence Act 1995 renders admissible an out-of court statement whether made by a party to the claim or by anyone else. The relevance of whether or not there is a relationship of agency or privity goes to the weight that the court will attach to the statement.[15]
4.19 In order to assess whether admissions can be made where the authority reacts to the report, the procedure used for the reception and adoption of reports must be examined.[16]
4.21 It may be that the report is of such concern to the elected members that it is more appropriate to discuss its findings in a meeting of the full council, in which case the report might be presented to the full council.[17] Such a procedure is most likely to be invoked where there is a good deal of public interest in the matter under investigation or the issue involves constituents of a councillor’s ward not represented on the Policy and Resources Committee.
4.22 If the report is likely to contain sensitive material excluded from the Access to Information Act 1985 regime then the report can be dealt with under part 2 of the agenda of the meeting, whereby the press and public can be excluded.[18] If the report is to be discussed at a meeting open to the public, we do not consider that making the report available in advance of the meeting would constitute any approval of its contents or any admission of liability.
4.24 The council’s response to the report may be simply that its contents were noted. This is unlikely to constitute a binding admission of liability, as it does not imply approval of the report’s findings. (In the Clwyd case, counsel thought the findings could simply be noted.) This will apply a fortiori if the report’s authors are independent of the authority. The report will be listed in the minutes of the meeting. We consider that the mere listing of a report in the minutes of a committee or council meeting is insufficiently emphatic an approval of its findings to amount to an admission. The minutes of the meeting will however be admissible in evidence to prove resolutions contained therein.[19]
4.26 Hence, any covering note, the language of the report itself, coupled with the wording of any resolution passed by the authority, may amount to an informal admission. For instance, a resolution may be passed that “the committee (or council) endorses the findings and recommendations of the report.”[20]
4.28 In some cases, the inquiry panel will not have been charged with determining the legal liability of the authority, and even if it has reached conclusions adverse to the authority, liability to individual claimants will not follow automatically. In other cases the authority’s liability (vicarious or primary) will be clear. It is possible in theory for the insurer to withhold consent to the admission even where liability is clear;[21] each claimant’s case will have to be considered individually. We discuss this potential problem further in Part VII, and ask consultees how far this is a problem in practice.
4.33 Conversely, if a councillor makes a public statement without the necessary authority of the council,[22] then any admission he or she makes will not be binding on the council.
4.38 It is not clear when an admission of fact might count as an admission of liability.
[1]See para 3.22 above. Even where an authority self-insures, it will wish to guard against admissions of liability being made without proper consideration by members.
[2]See paras 3.6 – 3.16 above for a brief description of these different types of liability.
[3][1970] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 524, 526.
[4]Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) Pt 14, r 1(1), (2).
[5]Ellis v Allen [1914] 1 Ch 904; Ash v Hutchinson and Co (Publishers) Ltd [1936] Ch 489; Technistudy v Kelland [1976] 1 WLR 1042; Murphy v Culhane [1977] QB 94.
[6]CPR Pt 24 provides for a fast track mechanism for the summary disposal of cases where there is no real prospect of the claim either being defended or made out, and there is no other compelling reason why the case or issue should be disposed of at a trial.
[7]See Tustin v W Arnold and Sons (British Dominions General Ins Co Ltd, third party) (1915) 31 TLR 368 and Burr v Ware RDC [1939] 2 All ER 688.
[8]P Murphy, Murphy on Evidence (7th ed 2000) p 244.
[9]A list of non-exhaustive factors to be taken into account is given in Civil Evidence Act 1995, s 4(2).
[10]Phipson on Evidence (15th ed 2000) para 28–09.
[11]Civil Evidence Act 1995, s 6.
[12]See paras 2.27 – 2.32 above for the typology we are using.
[13]See paras B.13 – B.19 and B.26 – B.29 below.
[14]Burr v Ware RDC [1939] 2 All ER 688.
[15]M Keane, The Modern Law of Evidence (5th ed 2000) p 314, commenting on Civil Evidence Act 1995, s 4.
[16]The risk of admitting liability in the Clwyd case affected what action was open to the council to take, formally, in relation to the Jillings report. The original plan (as related in counsel’s opinion) was to consider the report at a special meeting of a council committee, to be held a little over a week before the council ceased to exist. Counsel’s advice was sought on, amongst other things, how the council should handle the report at that meeting: the Waterhouse Report, paras 32.35 – 32.49.
[17]The leader of the council can call an extraordinary meeting of the full council at any time: Local Government Act 1972, Sched 12, para 3(1). If five members of the council call for a full meeting and the leader refuses, the meeting can nonetheless be called: Local Government Act 1972, Sched 12, para 3(2).
[18]See paras B.19 – B.25 below.
[19]Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976, s 41(1), (2A).
[20]In the case of the Jillings report, counsel accepted the insurer’s contention that there was a “considerable risk” that “any formal adoption or approval” of the report by the council would amount to an admission of liability in respect of any individual cases of abuse considered in the report, should such cases result in legal action being taken against the council: the Waterhouse Report, para 32.45.
[21]Although the insurer may not withhold consent arbitrarily: see para 3.24 above.
[22]The members of the council are distinct in law from the council: A Arden, Local Government Constitutional and Administrative Law (1999) para 8.3.2.