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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> The Law Commission >> TOWARDS A COMPULSORY PURCHASE CODE: (1) COMPENSATION (A Consultative Report) [2002] EWLC 165(2) (24 June 2002) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/other/EWLC/2002/165(2).html Cite as: [2002] EWLC 165(2) |
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Part II
the existing law
2.2 The origins of the modern law are to be found in numerous private Acts, passed in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, authorising the construction of canals, railways and harbours.[1] These normally contained powers of compulsory acquisition, and provided procedures for implementation and determining compensation. Standard clauses were developed which were consolidated in the Land Clauses Consolidation Act 1845.[2] This did not itself confer the power of compulsory acquisition, which was derived from the private Act authorising the specific project (“the special Act”). However, after 1845, any Act authorising compulsory purchase was treated (unless otherwise provided) as incorporating the 1845 Act.[3]
2.3 The framework provided by the 1845 Act remained in place for most of the 19th century. A typical acquisition would be for the purposes of a utility (for example, a railway or water company) under powers contained in a private Act, usually promoted by a limited company. The cases established that compensation should be paid on the basis of “the value to the owner”.[4] Compensation was usually assessed by a jury. The fact that the schemes were promoted for profit, rather than purely public motives, was reflected in the sympathetic treatment of dispossessed owners:
Compulsory acquisition of land to any great extent first took place in connection with the Railway development in the first half of the 19th century, and public opinion in regard to compensation was undoubtedly much influenced by the fact that railway enterprise undertaken for profit rather than the interest of the State was the moving force. The sense of grievance which an owner at that time felt when his property was acquired by railway promoters, then regarded as speculative adventurers, led to sympathetic treatment by the tribunal which assessed the compensation payable to the owner…[5]
2.4 By the end of the 19th century and in the period up to the First World War, the role of public authorities became much more important. Local authorities had greatly extended functions in provision of public services, including housing, highways, and public health.[6] To facilitate acquisitions for such purposes, and to avoid the need for a special Act for each project, compulsory powers were conferred by general Acts. Initially, authorisation of particular schemes was still subject to Parliamentary approval, by means of a “provisional order” procedure. But this was gradually replaced by the modern procedure, involving a compulsory purchase order confirmed by the relevant Minister.[7] Implementation of the order and assessment of compensation continued to be governed by the 1845 Act.
2.5 The Scott Committee[8] was established in 1918 to carry out an urgent review of the compensation laws in anticipation of the end of the war, and the likely need for acquisition by public authorities of large quantities of land “in the early stages of the Reconstruction period”.[9] By this time the emphasis was on acquisition for public purposes, and the overriding rights of “the community”:
It ought to be recognised, and we believe is today recognised, that the exclusive right to the enjoyment of land which is involved in private ownership necessarily carries with it the duty of surrendering such land to the community when the needs of the community require it. In our opinion, no landowner can, having regard to the fact that he holds hisproperty subject to the right of the State to expropriate his interest for public purposes, be entitled to a higher price when in the public interest such expropriation takes place, than the fair market value apart from compensation for injurious affection, &c
2.6 The Committee was concerned that the “value to the owner” concept had allowed “highly speculative elements of value” to be included.[10] The Committee made a number of specific recommendations relating to compensation,[11] which were enacted as a set of six “rules” in section 2 of the Acquisition of Land Act 1919 (“the 1919 rules”), later replaced by section 5 of the Land Compensation Act 1961. The most significant was the introduction of the “market value” principle (rule (2)): compensation for the land taken should be based on “the market value as between a willing seller and a willing buyer”, with no special allowance for compulsory acquisition.[12] The 1919 Act also established a panel of official arbitrators to determine compensation disputes.[13]
2.8 The most dramatic change of policy was represented by the Town and Country Planning Act 1947 (“the 1947 Act”), under which planning control was extended to the whole country,[14] and local authorities were given extensive powers to acquire land for comprehensive redevelopment.[15] At the same time, all development value was expropriated by the State, resulting in land acquisitions being made at existing use value.[16] A succinct summary was given by the Lord Chancellor in 1959:[17]
… the 1947 Act set up a new financial system, designed to solve once and for all the problems of compensation and betterment that prevented effective planning in the pre-war years. The State took over all development rights. Before anybody could carry out development, he had to buy back the right to develop by paying a development charge. Owners were to be compensated for the loss of the development values existing in 1947 out of a £300 million find, and machinery was set up for the making and establishment of claims on the fund. It was assumed that, in these circumstances, land would be bought and sold in the market at existing use value. As a logical consequence of this it was provided that compensation for land bought compulsorily should be limited to existing use value.
2.9 This system was not a success. Continuing the same summary:
As is well known, the system did not work well in practice. The public found it difficult to understand and the development charge was regarded simply as a tax on development. The Conservative Government in the Town and Country Planning Acts of 1953 and 1954, therefore abolished development charge, so leaving owners of land free to realise the development value of their land provided that they could get planning permission… [18]
Even after abolition of development charge in 1954, compulsory acquisitions continued to take place at existing use value, plus a share of the 1947 compensation fund. Since this was based on 1947 development values, there was an ever-widening gap between compensation payments and prices at which land was being sold in the market.[19]
2.10 The market value principle for compensation was not fully re-established until 1959. The Town and Country Planning Act 1959 restored the principles established by the 1919 Act, but supplemented them with an elaborate set of provisions relating to disregard of associated development, and to planning assumptions, intended to take account of the comprehensive system of planning control introduced in 1947. The relevant provisions were in sections 2-9 of the Act. [20]
2.12 The following 15 years saw two further attempts[21] by Labour Governments to take direct control of land development and deal with the perceived problem of betterment, but neither survived a change of Government. In one respect, however, the legacy of the 1947 Act survived. Development potential had ceased to be seen as an intrinsic right of land-ownership, the restriction or removal of which would attract compensation.[22] Thus, even in cases where restriction would formerly have carried a right to compensation, the right could in effect be nullified by planning controls.[23]
2.13 The first two terms of the Conservative Administration (from 1979) opened a new phase. The role of public authorities as direct providers of services or initiators of development was drastically reduced. Even where development schemes were initiated by public authorities they were usually in partnership with private developers.[24] Land acquisition powers were exercised with a view to handing the land over to the private developer, who might indemnify the authority against the cost. Privatisation resulted eventually in most of the major utilities passing into the hands of companies owned by private shareholders, and operated for profit (albeit subject to regulatory control). The Transport and Works Act 1992, which replaced the private Bill procedure for railway and other transport works, enabled any undertaking (public or private) to apply for compulsory powers for such projects.
2.15 At the end of this period, most of the rules governing procedure and compensation remain as they were in 1961. The Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 re-enacted, without material change, the main extant provisions of the 1845 Act, but did not repeal that Act.[25] It is the principal Act governing the implementation of compulsory purchase orders. It was supplemented in 1981 by the Compulsory Purchase (Vesting Declarations) Act 1981, which enabled orders to be implemented by a vesting declaration, as an alternative to the traditional notice to treat procedure.[26] The Acquisition of Land Act 1981 reproduced (again without substantive change) the 1946 Act and subsequent legislation, relating to the making and authorisation of orders.
2.16 The most substantial changes in this period were made by the Land Compensation Act 1973. This followed a “full scale review of the compensation code”.[27] In addition to numerous detailed amendments, there were some major innovations, including:
(1) A new right to compensation for depreciation in the value of land due to “physical factors caused by the use of public works”;[28]
(2) A new category of payments for those displaced from land, including “home loss payments” and “farm loss payments”; and “disturbance payments” for those without compensatable interests;[29]
(3) A right to advance payment of 90% of the authority’s estimate of compensation;[30]
(4) Substantial extension of the rights of those affected by planning blight.[31]
(1) Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (including provisions for compulsory acquisition of rights over land);
(2) Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980;
(3) Planning and Compensation Act 1991.[32]
2.18 The Human Rights Act 1998 requires existing compensation law to be interpreted and applied, as far as possible, in conformity with the European Convention of Human Rights.[33] Article 1 of the First Protocol provides:
Every natural and legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and the general principles of public international law.
2.19 As hitherto interpreted, this provision does not impose any specific standard of compensation. The general principle is that the property taken should be compensated by payment of an amount “reasonably related to its value”; but this does not “guarantee full compensation in all circumstances”, since “legitimate objectives of ‘public interest’, such as pursued in measures of economic reform or measures designed to achieve greater social justice, may call for less than reimbursement of the full market value”.[34]
2.20 It is implicit in this statement, and in general principles of Convention law, that any departure from “full compensation” needs to be adequately justified by considerations of public interest, such as those mentioned, and must be reasonably proportionate to the aim pursued.[35] Further, the law must not discriminate unfairly as between different groups of property owner affected by the interference.[36]
2.21 Also relevant is Article 6(1), which guarantees a right to a fair hearing by an independent tribunal in the determination of civil rights. In the recent Alconbury case, the House of Lords has held that the role of the Secretary of State in confirming compulsory purchase orders does not breach this principle, in view of the policy content of the issues involved, and the supervisory role of the High Court.[37] Lord Hoffmann explained the balance between democratic and legal accountability:
Importantly, the question of what the public interest requires for the purposes of art 1 of protocol 1 can, and in my opinion should, be determined according to the democratic principle – by elected local or central bodies or by ministers accountable to them. There is no principle of human rights which requires such decisions to be made by independent and impartial tribunals. There is however another relevant principle which must exist in a democratic society. That is the rule of law. When ministers or officials make decisions affecting the rights of individuals, they must do so in accordance with the law. The legality of what they do must be subject to review by independent and impartial tribunals. This is reflected in the requirement in art 1 of Protocol 1 that a taking of property must be ‘subject to the conditions provided for by law’. The principles of judicial review give effect to the rule of law. They ensure that administrative decisions will be taken rationally, in accordance with a fair procedure and within the powers conferred by Parliament.[38]
2.22 This decision leaves some issues unresolved. Thus, there may be doubts over the Secretary of State’s role in determining appeals in respect of “certificates of appropriate alternative development”, which might be said to have no policy relevance in the real world, sufficient to satisfy the Secretary of State’s involvement.[39]
2.23 Article 6 may also be breached if determination of compensation is unreasonably delayed.[40]
2.25 The sources of the current law are most conveniently considered under separate heads:
(1) Powers of compulsory purchase;
(2) Making and authorisation;
(3) Implementation;
(4) Determination of compensation;
(5) Compensation rules;
2.26 The vast majority of compulsory acquisitions are made under powers granted by numerous general Acts, for the purposes of functions of public authorities or utilities.[41] It is not part of our terms of reference to review these powers. The Government has announced its intention to supplement them by new powers which would:
enable local planning authorities to exercise compulsory purchase powers for a full range of planning and regeneration purposes, including halting the physical, economic and/or social deterioration of an area.[42]
2.27 Until recently it was common practice for transport and other similar undertakings to promote Private or Local Bills to authorise particular projects.[43] However, their use has become less important, since the Transport and Works Act 1992 enabled compulsory powers to be obtained without recourse to Parliament in most cases.
2.28 There appear to be no detailed, up to date statistics of the numbers of orders promoted under different powers. A 1995 study for the DETR showed an annual average of 255 orders over the preceding three and a half years, broken down between Housing, Planning, Local Roads, Trunk Roads and Motorways, and Public Utilities.[44] The figures relate solely to acquisition of land, as such. Thus, for example, the figures for public utilities do not include powers obtained for the acquisition of rights in land, such as wayleaves for electricity lines or easements for pipelines.[45]
2.29 The law relating to the making and confirmation of compulsory purchase orders is in the Acquisition of Land Act 1981, and regulations made under it.[46] The Act contains separate (but substantially similar) sets of rules for orders promoted respectively by ministerial and non-ministerial authorities. It contains special rules for particular categories of land, such as land of local authorities or statutory undertakers, National Trust land or commons. It also contains an exclusive procedure for court challenges to the validity of orders.
2.30 The procedure in outline is as follows:
(1) Authorisation of compulsory purchase is conferred by a compulsory purchase order, which is made by the acquiring authority and confirmed by the relevant Minister (“the confirming authority”).[47] The order must be in the prescribed form, including a description of the land by reference to a map, and a statement of the purpose for which the land is required.[48] Notices of the making of the order must be published in local newspapers, and served on owners and occupiers (other than tenants for less than a month).[49]
(2) All those served with, or entitled to service of, a notice (“statutory objectors”) have the right to object or make representations within the time specified by the notice. Other objections or representations may be received by agreement with the acquiring authority or at the discretion of the confirming authority. Objections may be disregarded if they relate exclusively to issues of compensation.[50] A public inquiry or hearing must be held for objections by statutory objectors, but is discretionary in other cases.[51]
(3) After consideration of the objections, and the report of the inquiry or hearing, the order may be confirmed by the confirming authority, with or without modifications (but not, except by agreement, so as to extend the area of land taken).[52] Notices of confirmation must be published, and served as under (1).[53]
(4) There is a statutory right to challenge the order on legal grounds in the Courts within 6 weeks of publication of the notice of confirmation.[54] Otherwise, the validity of the order is immune from challenge in legal proceedings.[55]
2.32 In the result, there are two alternative ways by which an acquiring authority may secure title to land, once the CPO has ministerial confirmation: by notice to treat and by vesting declaration:[56]
(1) The notice to treat procedure involves service of a statutory notice on each affected landowner to initiate the process of agreeing or determining compensation. Title does not pass to the authority until compensation (both eligibility and amount) has been settled, but the authority may take possession in the meantime by serving notice of entry.[57] The land is valued at the date of entry (or the date of determination of compensation if earlier) and interest runs from that date.
(2) The more recent vesting declaration procedure enables the authority, after confirmation, to make a declaration, vesting in itself title and authorisation to enter after expiry of a defined period (not less than 28 days) from the service of a notice on those affected. Title passes on the date so fixed, whether or not compensation has been settled. [58]
2.33 The 1965 Act also contains provisions enabling the owner of land partly included within an order, to compel the purchase of the whole.[59] These have been supplemented by provisions of the Land Compensation Act 1973. [60]
2.34 The Land Compensation Act 1961 requires unresolved issues of compensation to be referred to the Lands Tribunal.[61] The constitution and jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and procedures before it, are governed by the Lands Tribunal Act 1949, and rules made under it.[62]
(1) Land Compensation Act 1961:
(a) “1919 rules” (including market value principle, rules for compensation based on equivalent reinstatement etc);
(b) Disregard of value attributable to associated development on adjoining land;
(c) Planning assumptions, including provision for certificates of appropriate alternative development.
(2) Compulsory Purchase Act 1965:[63]
(a) Compensation for severance or injurious affection relating to land held with the land taken (s 7);
(b) Compensation for injurious affection caused by the works, where no land is taken, and compensation for interference with easements or restrictive covenants (s 10)[64];
(c) Treatment of short tenancies (s 20).
(3) Land Compensation Act 1973:
(a) Compensation for depreciation caused by the use of public works (Part I);
(b) Extra payments for displacement from land (Home or Farm Loss Payments, Disturbance Payments (Part III));
(c) Advance payment of compensation (s 52).
(4) Acquisition of Land Act 1981:
Disregard
of new interests or works intended to enhance compensation
(s 4(2)).
[1]For a concise account of the early history, see K Davies, Law of Compulsory Purchase and Compensation, (5th ed 1994) chapter 1.
[2]The 1845 Act was also exported throughout the former British Empire, and accordingly provided the basis for the development of the law in most common law countries. In some cases the principles of the cases were codified at an early stage (see e.g. the Indian Land Acquisition Act 1870). Decisions of the courts of other common law jurisdictions (notably Canada and Australia), as well as those of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, have made a vital and continuing contribution to the development of the law.
[3]1845 Act, s 1.
[4]See App 5.
[5] Scott Report, para 8 (See para 2.5 below).
[6]See e.g. Public Health Act 1875.
[7]See e.g. Housing, Town Planning etc Act 1909. K Davies, op cit, paras 1.32-4.
[8]See Second Report to the Ministry of Reconstruction of the Committee Dealing with the Law and Practice Relating to the Acquisition and Valuation of Land for Public Purposes (L. Scott QC, Chairman), Cd. 9229 (1918) (“the Scott Report”). His judgment (as Scott LJ) in Horn v Sunderland BC [1941] 2 KB 26 contains an illuminating discussion of the background to the 1919 Act.
[9]Scott Report, para 5.
[10]Ibid,para 8.
[11]The Committee’s first recommendation (not unlike that of the CPPRAG Review, 80 years later) was that “the Lands Clauses Acts are out of date… and should be repealed and replaced by a fresh Code”: ibid, para 6. Unfortunately, this was not implemented; most of the 1845 Act remains in force, and its extant provisions were re-enacted, with some re-wording, in the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965, which forms the basis for most modern acquisitions.
[12]Scott Report, paras 8-9, given effect respectively by rules (2) and (1) of the 1919 rules. This did not affect the rules for compensation for disturbance or “any other matter not directly based on the value of land”: rule (6). Rule (3), requiring the disregard of value due to “special suitability”, is discussed in App 5.
[13]1919 Act, s 1. This procedure took the place of the various procedures under the 1845 Act, under-which, depending on the amount and the choice of the claimant, compensation might be determined by two justices, by an arbitrator, or by a jury: 1845 Act, ss 22, 68.
[14]Under pre-war planning legislation (see Town and Country Planning Act 1932), there was provision for the preparation by councils of planning schemes, under which land became subject to planning restrictions. The landowner whose land was injuriously affected by a planning scheme had a right to compensation for the diminution in value. Since the introduction of general planning control by the 1947 Act (even following the restoration of market-value compensation in 1959), the landowner is not entitled to compensation for such planning restrictions.
[15]Similarly, the New Towns Act 1946 and the Town Development Act 1952 envisaged a central role for public authorities in promoting, and acquiring land for, development.
[16]This scheme followed the recommendations of the Uthwatt Committee on Compensation and Betterment (Final Report, Cmd 6386, 1942). Its terms of reference had been “to make an objective analysis of the subject compensation and recovery of betterment in respect of public control and use of land”, with a view to making recommendations for action before the end of the war “to prevent the work of reconstruction thereafter being prejudiced”: see Corfield and Carnwath, Compulsory Acquisition and Compensation (1st ed 1978) pp 4-7.
[17]Viscount Kilmuir LC: Hansard (HL) 14th April 1959, col 579 (introducing the 1959 Bill, which restored market value).
[18]Ibid, col 579.
[19]See Corfield and Carnwath, op cit, p 13; also pp 28-9 (a historical summary of changes in the basis of compensation and fiscal impositions from 1845 to 1977).
[20]See App 5, paras A.53-54.
[21]The Land Commission Act 1967 (introducing Betterment Levy) and the Community Land Act 1974 (allied with Development Land Tax).
[22]See Belfast Corp v OC Cars Ltd [1960] AC 49.
[23]Westminster Bank Ltd v MHLG [1971] AC 508 (highway widening); Hoveringham Gravels Ltd v Secretary of State [1975] QB 764 (ancient monument protection).
[24]Such schemes had become more common from the early 1970s: see the Report of the Working Party on Local Authority/Private Enterprise Partnership Schemes (HMSO, 1972).
[25]The “Lands Clauses Acts” are incorporated into some public statutes still in force (see App 2 below) and may also still be relevant to pre-1965 local and private Acts, so far as still operative.
[26]See paras 2.31-32 below.
[27]Development and Compensation – Putting People First (1972), Cmnd 5124, para 4.
[28]Land Compensation Act 1973, Pt I. See para 2.35 below.
[29]Ibid,Pt III. See para 2.35 below.
[30]Ibid,s 52. See para 2.35 below.
[31]Ibid, Pt V. These are now incorporated in the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, ss 149ff, Sched 13. The Government proposes a new statutory power to enable that revised provision governing blight to be defined in regulations: Policy Statement, p 31, para 5.2. This issue is not within our current terms of reference.
[32]This reflected in part proposals made in a report by the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors: Compensation for Compulsory Acquisition (RICS, 1989).
[33]Human Rights Act 1998, s 3.
[34]Lithgow v UK (1986) 3 EHRR 329, 371. See also James v UK (1986) 8 EHRR 123 (an unsuccessful attempt to challenge the valuation provisions of the Leasehold Reform Act 1967, as contrary to Art 1 of Protocol 1).
[35]See Sporrong and Lonroth v Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 35, para 69 (“a fair balance”). See also Clayton and Tomlinson, The Law of Human Rights (1st ed 2000) para 18.82ff, for a review of Convention cases relating to the UK prior to the Human Rights Act. The term “full compensation” does not appear to be used in any precise sense; the term “full market value” is also used. Generally, the case law of the European Court of Human Rights on damages adopts the principle of equivalence (or restitutio in integrum), but does not lay down any consistent principles for assessment (see the Law Commission’s Report on Damages under the Human Rights Act, LC266).
[36]Article 14 prohibits discrimination in the enjoyment of Convention rights. In Pine Valley Developments Ltd v Ireland (1991) 14 EHRR 319, substantial damages were awarded for a breach of this Article, where remedial legislation, designed to correct a misapplication of planning law, excluded the applicant property owners, while applying to others in the same category.
[37]R (Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2001] 2 WLR 1389.
[38]Ibid, p 1412.
[39]Land Compensation Act 1961, ss 17-18. The planning authority (or an appeal to the Secretary of State) determines for compensation purposes the development that would have been appropriate in the absence of compulsory purchase. See further Part VII, paras 7.43-45 below.
[40]See e.g. Guillemin v France (1997) 25 EHRR 435.
[41]A list of statutes conferring compulsory powers, taken from Butterworth’s Compulsory Purchase and Compensation Service Division B, Chapter 1.F, is reproduced as Appendix 2 to this Report.
[42]Policy Statement, p 13, para 2.10.
[43]For example: the Channel Tunnel Act 1987, the London Underground (Victoria) Act 1991, the London Docklands Railway Act 1991, the Croydon Tramlink Act 1994.
[44]City University Business School, The Operation of Compulsory Purchase Orders (DETR 1997) para 1.21. The figures show the following annual average proportions, based on the annual average of 255 orders, between the categories: Housing (86); Planning (58); Local Roads (94); Trunk Roads and Motorways (13); and Public Utilities (3).
[45]Ibid, para 1.5. CPPRAG commented on the “inconsistencies caused by the wide variations in the powers available to the different suppliers” and recommended further work to standardise them: op cit, para 209, 218. This issue has been examined in detail by Norman Hutchison and Jeremy Rowan-Robinson in two recent articles: “Utility wayleaves: time for reform” [2001] JPEL 1247; “Utility wayleaves: a compensation lottery?”[2002] JPIF 159. The latter article has been reproduced, with kind permission, in App 7.
[46]Compulsory Purchase of Land Regulations 1994, SI 1994, No 2145. Procedure at inquiries held under the Act is governed by rules made under the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1971; see e.g. the Compulsory Purchase by Non-Ministerial Acquiring Authorities (Inquiries Procedure) Rules 1990, SI 1990, No 512.
[47]Acquisition Act, s 2. Ministerial orders follow a similar procedure, save that (instead of being “made” and then “confirmed”), they are initially “prepared in draft” and then (following publication and objections) “made”: ibid, Sched 1, para 1.
[48]The standard prescribed form is Form 1 in the Schedule to Compulsory Purchase of Land Regulations 1994, SI 1994, No 2154 (as amended by SI 1996, No 1008).
[49]Acquisition Act, ss 11, 12.
[50]Ibid, s 13(4).
[51]Ibid, ss 13(2), 13(3).
[52]Ibid, ss 13, 14.
[53]Ibid, s 15.
[54]Ibid, s 23.
[55]Ibid, s 25.
[56]The Policy Statement has accepted the CPPRAG recommendation that, in the interests of flexibility, both procedures should be retained: Policy Statement, p 54, para 2.28.
[57]1965 Act, s 11(1).
[58]Compulsory Purchase (Vesting Declarations) Act 1981, s 4.
[59]1965 Act, s 8.
[60]1973 Act, s 53ff.
[61]1961 Act, s 1.
[62]See Lands Tribunal Rules 1996, SI 1996, No 1022.
[63]Or, where it applies, the equivalent provisions of the 1845 Act (ss 63, 68, 121).
[64]The law in this respect is largely the result of judicial interpretation, which bears little relation to the words of section 10: see Wildtree Hotels Ltd v Harrow LBC [2001] 2 AC 1: Part IX, para 9.20 below.