Director of Public Prosecutions v Murphy [2020] IECA 65 (10 March 2020)

BAILII is celebrating 24 years of free online access to the law! Would you consider making a contribution?
No donation is too small. If every visitor before 31 December gives just £1, it will have a significant impact on BAILII's ability to continue providing free access to the law.
Thank you very much for your support!

JUDGMENT of the Court delivered on the 10th day of March 2020 by Birmingham P.

1. Mr. Darren Murphy was charged with the murder of one Olivia Dunlea at her home in

Passage West, Co. Cork, on 17th February 2013. On arraignment, the accused pleaded

not guilty to murder, but guilty to manslaughter. However, in circumstances where the

plea was not acceptable to the prosecution, the matter proceeded to trial. On 15th June

2018, he was convicted of murder by a unanimous jury verdict following a nine-day trial

in the Central Criminal Court and sentenced to life imprisonment. He now appeals that

(i) That the prosecution ought not to have been allowed adduce evidence of the bad

(ii) that the judge’s charge, particularly when dealing with the issue of provocation,

It may be noted that this was the third occasion on which Mr. Murphy had stood trial for

the murder of Ms. Dunlea. He had initially been convicted of the murder in 2014, but that

conviction was overturned by this Court in late 2015 (see DPP v. Murphy [2015] IECA 314).

A second trial took place in 2017 in which the jury failed to reach a verdict.

3. To provide some context, it should be explained that the deceased and the appellant were

in a relationship for some six to eight weeks prior to her death. On 16th February 2013,

the late Ms. Dunlea and Mr. Murphy were socialising with a number of friends at the

Rochestown Inn public house. At approximately midnight, they left the premises by taxi

to go to the home of the deceased and that journey is estimated to have taken some five

minutes. The taxi driver, Mr. Michael Aherne, gave evidence at trial that while Ms. Dunlea

was in seemingly good spirits, the appellant was, by contrast, “grumpy, kind of frosty”

4. At about 1.20am, the Fire Services were called to a blaze that had broken out at the

home of the deceased. It later emerged that two fires had been started at the house. One

was in the kitchen and caused limited damage, but another in the bedroom of the

deceased was much more serious in nature. It was in this bedroom that the body of Ms.

Dunlea would be discovered. There, she was found in a face-down position and much of

5. The body of Ms. Dunlea was examined by the then State Pathologist, Professor Marie

Cassidy, and she identified six stab wounds on the body, two directly behind the right ear

and four to the front of the neck. Professor Cassidy was of the opinion that the cause of

death was a combination of the stab wounds to the neck and the inhalation of fire fumes.

6. The appellant initially feigned shock when alerted to the fire. He had arrived to the scene

in different clothing to that which he had been wearing previously, having earlier hidden

those clothes, and gave a statement saying that he left the deceased’s home in the wake

of a verbal argument. Following the post-mortem, the Garda investigation was upgraded

to a murder enquiry and significant disparities with regard to the appellant’s initial

7. On the evening of 17th February 2013, the appellant was arrested on suspicion of

murder. During the course of his subsequent detention, he was interviewed a number of

times and under cautioned admitted to the killing. In summary, he asserted that an

argument had developed in relation to a previous boyfriend of the deceased, “Fas”. The

narrative advanced by the appellant was that they argued, that the deceased threw him

his keys, and told him to leave. The deceased then went upstairs and he followed behind

her. She told him to leave because Fas was calling. She then proceeded to take off her

clothes. He stated that he asked her what she was doing and she replied by saying “what

do you think, Fas was calling”. At that point, he claims to have become so enraged that

he just went blank and lost it. He grabbed a knife which had been at the side of her bed

and stabbed her twice with it. Thereafter, he put a phone which had been ringing down

the toilet and put the knife in her sink. According to his version of events, he knew her

children were coming home and he did not want them to find her so he set fire to the

house. He did this by setting alight the quilt that was on her bed as well as a kitchen roll

8. One of the witnesses called on behalf of the prosecution was Ms. Shirley Farrell, who at

one time was a next-door neighbour of the appellant and someone who would have

known him from childhood. It appears that Ms. Farrell was also very friendly with the late

Ms. Dunlea. Having learned by phone that there was a fire at the home of the deceased,

Ms. Farrell made her way to the scene. In direct examination, the prosecution adduced

evidence that she saw Darren Murphy there and spoke to him. She asked him about Ms.

Dunlea’s whereabouts and he said that they had had an argument. When she asked what

had happened, the appellant reportedly said they had an argument over “fricking Fas”.

Ms. Farrell also remarked that the appellant was shouting “Where is she? Where is she?”.

9. In the overall context of the case mounted by the prosecution, Ms. Farrell was a

peripheral witness. During the cross-examination, defence counsel asked the witness to

confirm that in her first statement to Gardaí, she had described Mr. Murphy as a “gentle

giant” and had also described him as a “great neighbour”. Further, she was asked to

confirm that she was aware that he had been involved in a previous relationship with a

woman called “Siobhan”, and that Mr. Murphy took the break-up of their engagement

very badly, slitting his wrists as a result, and ending up in the In-Patient Psychiatric Unit

10. Ms. Farrell gave her evidence on the second morning of the trial. On Day 6 of the trial, as

the prosecution evidence was drawing to a close, prosecution counsel indicated that it

was their intention to call a witness to give evidence in the nature of character evidence.

They felt that the defence had introduced evidence, through cross-examination, as to Mr.

Murphy being a “gentle giant”, entitled the prosecution to call the evidence to contradict

same pursuant to s.1(f)(ii) of the Criminal Justice (Evidence) Act 1924. This evidence was

to take the form of oral evidence from a former girlfriend who would say that in the

aftermath of their relationship coming to an end, that she was harassed by means of

phone calls and so on by Mr. Murphy, and that on one occasion, she had a bottle thrown

11. In the absence of the jury, counsel for the prosecution read the statement of evidence of

the witness it was proposed to call, Ms. Melissa Keane. In the statement, Ms. Keane

outlined that she had been previously in a relationship with the appellant. She referred to

the fact that she had fallen asleep one night, at which time the appellant went through

her phone and saw that she had texts and calls from other males who were wondering if

the club, a GAA club where she worked, was open for drinks. The appellant was angry and

upset with her. On another occasion, Ms. Keane had stayed at a friend’s house in Passage

West in February 2008. She awoke during the night and found the appellant was in bed

beside her. He had his shirt off and was wearing his tracksuit pants. On that same

evening, he is said to have gone through her phone and deleted some numbers. At this

point, Ms. Keane outlined that she told him to leave and said they could no longer be

friends. Thereafter, she received up to twenty calls a night from blocked numbers that

would go to voicemail. Breathing could be heard on the other end of the phone. There

were a couple of calls where she could hear the appellant calling the name of the person

that she was seeing at the time. Ms. Keane said that she recognised the appellant’s voice.

She reported the matter to Gardaí, but they were unable to trace the calls as the phone

was a “pay as you go” phone and so was the appellant’s. The statement also referred to

an incident that is said to have occurred in November 2009. Ms. Keane had attended a

licensed premises, the Ferry Inn Arms bar, and it was there that, quite suddenly, the

appellant threw an empty bottle in her direction. The bottle flew over her head, just

12. Having opened the statement, counsel for the prosecution said that there was already

evidence of the appellant’s possessive nature in the case, but he submitted that the

specific evidence sought to be advanced would contradict the suggestion that Mr. Murphy

was a “gentle giant”. Instead, it would corroborate the evidence that he was a possessive

person and prone to violence if there was a break-up. Counsel quoted from McGrath on

“[i]t would be inimical to the adjudicative function of the Tribunal of fact if an accused

could adduce evidence of good character and then shelter behind the exclusionary rule in

relation to bad character. It would leave the Tribunal of fact with a misleading impression

as to his or her character. As Coburn CJ explained in Rowton [1865] CCR, it has been put

that evidence in favour of the character of a person on trial raises a collateral issue. I can

hardly think it is a collateral issue in the ordinary sense of the term. It is one of the pivots

on which the jury are to find their verdict and take into their consideration with the

evidence, and if the prisoner thinks proper to raise that issue as one of the elements for

the consideration of the jury, nothing can be more unfair and unjust and fatal to the

proper administration of justice than that the evidence should go to the jury altogether

one-sided in its nature, and that the prisoner should have, on the consideration of his

guilt or innocence, the advantage of an assumed unblemished character when, in point of

fact, if his true character were known, it would be found to be just the reverse and

therefore that is a ground, and a reasonable ground, for not excluding it’. “

Counsel submitted that the accused had put his character in issue by eliciting evidence to

suggest that he was a gentle giant. He said that it was his understanding that the accused

would be seeking to advance the defence of provocation, of a sudden and temporary

complete loss of self-control resulting in the incident, whereas he said that it was in fact

the opposite, that the accused was completely controlling, that was the type of character

13. Counsel for the defence said there was no comparison between what the prosecution was

seeking to put in evidence and the situation at trial in circumstances where it was

admitted that Mr. Murphy had killed a person. This was a murder trial where the key

question was whether what had occurred was murder or manslaughter. It was further

highlighted that the relationship that the prosecution were proposing to give evidence

about was from eleven years prior. There had been complaints with no follow-up to the

Gardaí, and now, because of one phrase in a statement of a prosecution witness in the

Book of Evidence, it was proposed to put the character of the accused in issue. It was the

defence’s submission that to do so would be a completely unfair course of action because

what the prosecution was proposing to do was to blacken the appellant’s general

“I am going to receive this evidence in circumstances where I believe it passes the test of

relevance. Certainly, it passes that test. That, of course, is not the end of it. As has been

argued by Mr. O’Leary (SC for the defence), if there is a degree of unfairness, there can

be, I should say, degrees of unfairness, in the sense that the prejudicial effect will

outweigh the probative value of evidence and one must be very conscious of the need to

avoid that in cases where it is sought to introduce evidence which might be regarded as

evidence of bad character, as is the evidence in relation to the violent incident, if I might

describe it as such. The remaining evidence seems to be, in my view, relevant evidence,

and similarly not outweighed by its prejudicial effect because of the nature of the

relationship is, of course, relevant to what the state of mind was for the event in

question. The purpose, as we know, when a person puts his character in issue, the

purpose of the evidence in relation to the violent incident is something which must be

made quite clear to the jury by appropriate directions, and it must be made abundantly

clear, and will be made clear to the jury, that insofar as he has given evidence, so to

speak, of evidence being led as to his good character, that is something which, in fact,

may or may not be capable of acceptance by them in the light of the other piece of

evidence. I agree, in other words, with what had been elaborated from the leading and

elderly decision of Chief Justice Coburn. I think this is a case where it is admissible.”

15. In the Court’s view, the defence made a decision to cross-examine Ms. Shirley Farrell.

They did so in order that the jury would hear of her view that Mr. Murphy was a “gentle

giant” and a “good neighbour”, and also so that the jury would hear how he had coped

with the break-up of a previous relationship. It seems to us that in those circumstances, if

the prosecution had evidence available to further their case and suggest that Mr. Murphy,

far from being a “gentle giant”, was instead controlling and domineering, then they were

entitled to seek to achieve a situation where the jury could properly decide that for

16. Counsel on behalf of the appellant has pointed out that the evidence adduced by the

defence in cross-examination was material that had been included by the prosecution in

the Book of Evidence and he suggests that in this context that the judge ought to have

declined to admit the evidence. It must be remembered, however, that a criminal trial is

not decided on what is contained in the Book of Evidence but rather on the basis of what

evidence is heard at trial. Even so, in the Court’s view, the source of the information was

largely immaterial. What was material, however, was the picture that the defence sought

to paint for the jury. Once it was sought to paint that picture, if, in the prosecution’s view,

the picture was a partial one, and they had evidence which they believed painted a more

complete picture, then, in the Court’s view, they were entitled to adduce same.

17. The issue of the judge’s treatment of the provocation issue has been raised in the written

submissions, though it was not the subject of oral argument. The appellant’s position is

that he would wish to see the question of provocation and how it was addressed by the

trial judge dealt with as part of the overall appeal, while recognising that the substantial

ground of appeal is the first ground, the “bad character” point. In the written

submissions, there is a complaint that there was a failure by the trial judge to discuss

with the jury how the evidence at trial interrelated with the partial defence of provocation.

It is said that there was a failure to properly contextualise same. The complaint was made

that at times in his charge, the judge came perilously close to inviting the jury to

approach the defence of provocation in an objective manner. This complaint has its origin

in the fact that the judge, in the course of his remarks, commented:

“[y]ou must start somewhere, however, and as a matter of common sense, it’s perfectly

legitimate . . . to say, look, objectively speaking, what would a reasonable person have

done on that occasion? How would such a person have reacted? That is not the test you

are going to apply in deciding this, but you must start somewhere, after all, as a matter

of common sense. That, however, is only a tool which you might care to use in order to

assess the man’s state of mind. It is not the test. It is merely a tool which, reasonably

speaking, a person might consider as a good starting point in order to consider how

The passage highlighted, however, cannot be seen in isolation from the charge as a

whole. Read as a whole, the charge is a clear, indeed, emphatic direction that what is in

issue is not the reaction of the reasonable man, but the subjective reaction of Mr.

“I have referred to . . . the subjective test. You are looking at this state of mind, this

man’s state of mind, you are asking to put yourselves into the mind of the accused on the

occasion in question, and in doing that, of course, you use your powers of reasoning and

There followed thereafter the passage on which the appellant places reliance.

18. The Court is not persuaded that there is any great substance in the complaint about the

failure to contextualise. The judge pointed out to the jury that the appellant had been

interviewed by Gardaí on five occasions. The judge observed, correctly, in our view:

“…it is in those interviews that the core, I think it’s fair to say, of the evidence lies on this

19. In considering how much weight is to be attached to the complaints now made about how

the issue of provocation was treated by the trial judge in his charge, the Court regards it

as highly significant that no requisitions were raised at the time. The Court attaches

significance to this, not as a pleading point or anything of that nature, but as telling that

the experienced legal team that represented the appellant at trial did not take issue with

what the judge had to say. The question of the partial defence of provocation was front

and centre of the trial. The judge and all the lawyers in the case must have been very

conscious of the frequency with which appeals have been brought arising out of charges

in relation to provocation, and must also have been aware that some of those appeals

have been successful. If there were no requisitions on the provocation issue, it can only

be because those who heard the charge actually delivered, did not believe that they had

20. In the circumstances, the Court is not persuaded that the criticisms of the trial judge’s

charge in relation to the provocation issue are criticisms of substance. That being the

case, the positon is that the Court has not been persuaded to uphold either of the

grounds of appeal relied on, and so the Court will dismiss the appeal.

Result: Dismiss

	[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback]
	Irish Court of Appeal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Irish Court of Appeal >> Director of Public Prosecutions v Murphy [2020] IECA 65 (10 March 2020) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IECA/2020/2020IECA65.html Cite as: [2020] IECA 65

Irish Court of Appeal