Irish Court of Appeal

harp graphic.

THE COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL

 

[approved]

[no redaction needed]

Neutral Citation Number: [2025] IECA 80

[2021 No. 2213P]

[2024 No. 263]

The President

Whelan J

Pilkington J

BETWEEN

MARTIN TUCKER

PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT

AND

TAILTE ÉIREANN

DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT

 

JUDGMENT of Ms Justice Costello delivered on the 4^th day of April 2025

Introduction

1.                  This appeal is against the judgment of 31^st July 2024 and order of 22^nd October 2024 of the High Court, dismissing these proceedings pursuant to O.19, r.28 of the Rules of the Superior Courts and the inherent jurisdiction of the court on the grounds that the proceedings constitute an abuse of process and are frivolous and vexatious. The court also made an order restraining Mr Tucker ("the appellant") from issuing any further proceedings (in any court or forum) against the respondent ("the respondent") or any servant or agent of the respondent relating to or touching upon a property in Clontarf in the City of Dublin ("the property"), without prior leave of the President of the High Court or such other judge as may be nominated by the President of the High Court, with the respondent having been put on notice of any application for such leave.

2.                  The appellant appealed the dismissal of the proceedings but not the litigation restriction order.

 

Background

3.                  The appellant has been involved in extensive litigation which has been detailed in a number of judgments of the High Court and this Court, the details of which are set out in an appendix to this judgment. Allen J, in the High Court, in proceedings entitled Martin Tucker v Havbell Designated Activity Company [2020 No 7879P], [2022] IEHC 15, noted that the Dublin County Registrar granted an order for possession of the property on 10^th May 2018 and that the premise for the Civil Bill action -and thus the order- was:

"1. That Mr. Tucker and [Ms. C.] had borrowed €260,000 from Irish Life & Permanent plc and had, by deed dated 18th June, 2003, mortgaged the property to Irish Life & Permanent plc to secure the repayment of the loan;

2. That on 29th June, 2012 Irish Life & Permanent plc changed its name to Permanent TSB plc;

3. That by deed of conveyance and assignment dated 19th June, 2015 Mr. Tucker's and [Ms. C's] loan and the security held for it were assigned to Havbell, which was then a limited liability company;

4. That the assignment to Havbell had been duly registered in the Registry of Deeds;

5. That on 29th September, 2016 Havbell was converted into a designated activity company;

6. That Mr. Tucker and [Ms. C] had failed to pay the instalments due on foot of the loan;

7. That Havbell had demanded repayment of the loan;

8. That the loan had not been repaid;

9. That Havbell was entitled to an order for possession of the property."

4.                  It is important to emphasise that the title to the property is unregistered and that the Mortgage Deed and the Deed of Conveyance and Assignment were each duly registered in the Registry of Deeds. Registration of these deeds does not affect the title of the grantee to the security over the property, as the appellant appears to believe. The system of registration of deeds - as opposed to registration of title - governs the priority of interests in land; it does not determine interests in land.

5.                  The appellant's attempts to appeal the order of the County Registrar, and thereafter to extend time in which to appeal the order of the Circuit Court affirming it, were all unsuccessful. Thus, the order for possession is final and conclusive and Havbell's right to possession of the property is no longer open to question.

6.                  On 21^st March 2019, the order for possession was executed by the Dublin City Sheriff. The appellant re-entered the property on 15^th May 2019. This was just the commencement of what can only be described as an extraordinary campaign by the appellant to resist the realisation of the security he and Ms C gave for a loan which remains outstanding. The details of this campaign are set out in the judgments of Allen J, referred to above, Butler J, on an appeal from the decision of Allen J, Noonan J in proceedings entitled Martin Tucker v A Judge of the Circuit Court [2021 No. 808 JR] [2022] IECA 32, the judgment the subject of this appeal [2024] IEHC 491, and the appendix to this judgment. What is undeniable is that since 10^th May 2018, there has been an order for possession of the property which has become final and conclusive, and it is not open to the appellant to challenge this order further. It follows that any attempts to do so are an abuse of the processes of the courts.

 

These Proceedings

7.                  In these proceedings, commenced in 2021, the appellant seeks to challenge the registration in the Registry of Deeds of the mortgage entered into between himself and Ms C and Irish Life & Permanent plc dated 18^th June 2003, whereby the property was mortgaged to Irish Life & Permanent plc to secure the repayment of the loan ("the Mortgage Deed"), and secondly, the Deed of Conveyance and Assignment by Permanent TSB plc to Havbell Ltd dated 19^th June 2015 ("the Deed of Conveyance and Assignment"), whereby certain identified loans and associated securities were conveyed and assigned by Permanent TSB plc to Havbell Ltd. He does so on the basis of alleged breaches of the Registration of Deeds Rules, 2008.

 

Jurisdiction to dismiss proceedings which are bound to fail or an abuse of the process of the court

8.                  The High Court set out the relevant principles and authorities applicable to an application of this nature. As they are well known and there was no suggestion that they were not correctly stated, I shall adopt Dignam J's statement of those principles and apply them to this appeal.

 

Collateral Attack on the Order for Possession

9.                  At para. 61 of his judgment, Dignam J held that the appellant's claim was "frivolous and vexatious and an abuse of process as being brought for an improper purpose as a collateral attack on the earlier judgments of the Circuit Court and the High Court". He reiterated this at para. 67.  He identified the appellant's motives in bringing these proceedings by reference to the appellant's own words. Dignam J. sets these out in detail at paras. 69 to 72 of his judgment. It is not necessary to repeat them here. At para. 73, he concluded:

"It is clear from the above that these proceedings are brought for the collateral purpose of continuing a long battle with Havbell which has proceeded through several sets of proceedings in the Circuit Court and High Court and appeals or attempted appeals to the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. They are brought with a view to 'obtaining evidence' against Havbell to undermine or attack the Order of the Circuit Court. Any issue about Havbell's entitlement to an Order for Possession including whether or not they held the plaintiff's mortgage was a matter for those proceedings and indeed it seems from the above that this was raised by the plaintiff in those proceedings. There is a final and binding decision of the Circuit Court, affirmed by the High Court, and it is an abuse of process to seek to continue that dispute and to seek to go behind those Orders."

10.              In my judgement, this conclusion of the High Court was wholly justified. Indeed, one could go further. In addition to the matters relied upon by Dignam J, in replies to the respondent's notice for particulars in relation to the damage allegedly suffered by the appellant, the appellant replied, on 25^th November 2021 to particular 3, that:

"[D]espite raising the issue of the fact that Havbell did not have or hold a valid transfer of the mortgage in the name of the Plaintiff, the lack of evidential proof of same was accepted by the Circuit Court, or, conversely, evidence that was obtained by Havbell from the Registry of Deeds was accepted by the Circuit Court which did not and could not have provided for a valid transfer of the mortgage to Havbell in the name of the Plaintiff."

In reply to particular 4, the appellant alleged that the respondent's actions caused him damage "in light of the fact their erroneous records have been used in evidence against [him] in the exercise of his constitutional rights to respect for his property and right to a fair trial". In reply to particular 6, he said that the "[respondent's] conduct has caused the Register to be used in bad faith by third parties by the use of the Registry of Deeds records to allege that Havbell held a valid transfer of the mortgage in the name of the Plaintiff, which is not the case."

11.              In response to a letter from the Chief State Solicitor's Office, calling upon him to discontinue the proceedings, the appellant rejected the suggestion on the basis that:

"Havbell have claimed without providing any evidence that it holds a valid transfer of the mortgage from PTSB to Havbell in the name of Martin Tucker - I am simply seeking this evidence and sought that evidence in proceedings brought against Havbell on a number of grounds, namely the evidence of a valid transfer in the name of Martin Tucker and to enforce an agreement made between Martin Tucker and Havbell in 2020, Allen J acceded to Havbell's application to strike out the proceedings, which will be appealed albeit reluctantly."

12.              This underscores the fact that the proceedings had been brought for an ulterior motive: to continue to challenge the order of possession granted to Havbell in respect of the property. In answer to questions from the court at the hearing of the appeal, the appellant confirmed that this litigation "is not the end of the road". When pressed by the court, he indicated that there could be "breaches" of the General Data Protection Regulation "by everybody". When asked to explain whom he had in mind, he stated Permanent TSB, Havbell and their associates and their legal teams, the Courts Service, but he was not sure about the respondent.

13.               In all the circumstances, it is clear from the appellant's own submissions and pleadings that these proceedings are brought for an ulterior purpose, and in particular to facilitate further attacks on the order for possession of 10^th May 2018. It is beyond doubt that Havbell's title was definitely determined in the concluded possession proceedings and is no longer open to challenge. In the circumstances I have no hesitation in agreeing with the High Court judge that the proceedings are an abuse of process, and I would dismiss the appeal on these grounds alone.

U-Turn

14.              Furthermore, in my judgement, it is not open to the appellant to argue on appeal that the registration of the Mortgage Deed was unlawful, or in some way flawed, in view of the fact that at the hearing in the High Court, he accepted that it was incorrect - as he had pleaded - to say that the Registrar registered an undated Mortgage Deed and he effectively abandoned his claim that the registration of the Mortgage Deed was unlawful. This is recorded at para. 34 of the judgment of the High Court where Dignam J held that:

"The [appellant] has said that his claim is focused on the registration of the Deed of Conveyance and Assignment and he accepts that what the [respondent] says about the registration of the mortgage deed is correct."

And that being so, he did not consider paras. 5 to 12 of the statement of claim (relating to the Mortgage Deed) and the reliefs based upon them.

15.              The main focus of his argument in the High Court was that the Deed of Conveyance and Assignment should not have been registered on the grounds that the Excel spreadsheet refers solely to a mortgage from Ms C and does not refer to him as a mortgagor.

16.              On appeal, the appellant largely reversed his position. His main - if not sole - focus was on the alleged invalidity of the registration of the Mortgage Deed. Limited arguments were advanced as to why the High Court erred in its conclusions regarding the registration of the Deed of Conveyance and Assignment.

17.              In my judgement, it is not open to a party, on appeal, in effect to do a U-turn. Having accepted that what the respondent said about the registration of the Mortgage Deed was correct, he may not argue to the contrary on appeal. It certainly cannot ground an argument that the High Court erred in reaching a conclusion which the appellant accepted in the High Court was correct.

 

Grounds Upon which The Appellant Alleges the High Court Erred

18.              The appellant alleged that the High Court erred in hearing and determining the respondent's motion to dismiss the proceedings prior to ruling upon his motion for discovery. Secondly, he says that the High Court erred in failing to deal with a motion to admit new evidence issued long after the hearing had concluded but prior to delivering judgment.

19.              The appellant's motion for discovery issued before the respondent's motion to dismiss the proceedings. The two motions "travelled together" in the list and were listed for hearing before Dignam J on 14^th December 2022. Dignam J heard and determined the motion to dismiss the proceedings. The transcript shows that the appellant did not ask the High Court to deal with the motion for discovery prior to hearing and determining the motion to dismiss the proceedings, and in fact he made no reference to the motion for discovery at all in submissions. When asked by the court why he did not raise the question of the discovery motion at all during the hearing in the High Court, he said that he was being "mannerly".

20.              The appellant was aware of the importance of raising this issue if he intended to pursue it. He appealed the order of Allen J in the Havbell proceedings on the sole ground that the High Court did not hear certain interlocutory motions including a motion for discovery prior to dealing with the motion to dismiss those proceedings. That appeal was heard in the previous month, in November 2022. Judgment in that appeal was delivered after the hearing in the High Court in these proceedings. The observations of Butler J, at para. 4 of the judgment, are worth repeating in the context of these proceedings

"The notice of appeal filed by the appellant raises a single ground of appeal against the various orders made by the High Court, namely that the appellant was not afforded a fair hearing by the High Court. The basis for this complaint seems to be that the respondent's application to strike out the proceedings was heard and determined before various motions which had been issued by the appellant seeking discovery and other interlocutory relief. However, at the hearing of this application before the High Court, the appellant did not object to the respondent's motion being heard first, and when presenting his appeal the appellant did not make any argument in support of this ground. If this were a live issue, I would have no hesitation in finding that Allen J was correct to deal with the respondent's motion - which sought the striking out or dismissal of the appellant's entire case - before dealing with discrete applications made by the appellant in the proceedings. It would a waste of court time and would incur unnecessary legal costs to deal with pre-trial applications made in proceedings if those proceedings were not going to be permitted to continue. Therefore, it makes sense to decide that fundamental issue first and to move on to the other applications only if the proceedings remain extant."

21.              I am in complete agreement with the reasoning and logic expressed by Butler J and it applies with equal force to this ground of appeal in these proceedings. His failure to raise the issue before Dignam J is fatal to his appeal in my view. I would refuse the appeal insofar as it is grounded upon the failure of the High Court to deal with the discovery motion prior to the respondent's motion to dismiss or strike out the proceedings.

22.              The second alleged error by the High Court was the failure to deal with the appellant's application to admit new evidence which he issued on 10^th July 2024, more than 18 months after the High Court had heard the motion to dismiss or strike out the proceedings. The motion was given a return date in October 2024, but the appellant did not take any steps to bring the motion to the attention of the court, nor requested that Dignam J be furnished with a copy of the motion prior to delivering his judgment. In the event, judgment was delivered on 31^st July 2024. In the circumstances, it is difficult to understand how the High Court can be said to have erred in delivering a judgment in respect of a motion which had been heard some 18 months earlier without reference to a motion to admit new evidence which had issued three weeks prior to the delivery of the judgment and of which motion the judge remained entirely in ignorance. The High Court determined the respondent's motion on the basis of the papers before it and the arguments presented. In my judgement, the failure to take into account something which was not before the court and of which the judge was unaware, cannot amount to an error on the part of the High Court which would justify this Court overturning its decision and allowing the appeal.

23.              In any event, the additional evidence could only serve to undermine the appellant's argument that the Mortgage Deed ought not to have been registered in the Registry of Deeds and therefore he cannot have been prejudiced by any failure on the part of the motion judge to consider the evidence which the appellant belatedly sought to introduce into the proceedings. The appellant pleaded that the Mortgage Deed was undated, though at the hearing he accepted that this was incorrect, and he accepted that the Mortgage Deed was in fact dated. He then argued that the date was illegible on the grounds that the date of the year - 2003 - was unclear. He contended that the number 3 could equally read 8 or g. Quite clearly, the date was not 200g. The only issue, then, was whether the appellant had arguable grounds for contending that the date of the Deed was uncertain as it could be 2003 or 2008 and that therefore the Mortgage Deed had been improperly registered in the Registry of Deeds.

24.              The poorly written date appeared on the first page of the Mortgage Deed. However, the back page of the Mortgage Deed is clearly dated 18^th June 2003. The appellant did not contend that this date was illegible or that this did not form part of the deed. In my judgement, it is absolutely clear, when the Mortgage Deed is read as a whole, that it is dated 18^th June 2003.

25.              For reasons which were never explained, the copy of the Mortgage Deed before the High Court was incomplete, in that it did not include the dated back page. One of the items of additional evidence which the appellant sought to introduce by his motion of 10^th July 2024, was a complete version of the Mortgage Deed, including the back page, with a clear, legible date. That being so, had the High Court considered the motion to adduce additional evidence, and had it granted the application, the admission of the complete Mortgage Deed into evidence could only have resulted in the High Court rejecting the appellant's argument that the Mortgage Deed ought not to have been registered on the basis that the date was illegible as, patently, the date was not illegible on the back page. The complete Mortgage Deed put paid to any such argument, and accordingly, insofar as the proceedings were grounded upon such an argument, the document reinforced the view that the proceedings were bound to fail. It follows, as a matter of logic, that the fact the High Court did not hear the motion to admit new evidence before giving judgment on the respondent's motion, could not have altered the outcome of the application insofar as it was based upon the dating (or otherwise) of the Mortgage Deed.

26.              The remaining two items of evidence which the appellant sought to adduce before the High Court were the Irish Life & Permanent plc mortgage conditions 1999 and the Irish Life & Permanent plc mortgage conditions 2002. The appellant contends that as the mortgage was entered into in June 2003, the relevant mortgage conditions were those from 2002. Accordingly, in the submission of the appellant, the reference in clause 7 of the Mortgage Deed to the 1999 mortgage conditions was incorrect. In a manner which was never clearly articulated, the appellant contended that the reference in clause 7 to the "wrong" mortgage conditions had the effect of invalidating the mortgage. It was then further contended that the Registrar ought to have checked the provisions of clause 7 and ascertained that the Mortgage Deed was invalidated by this alleged error, and, on that basis, ought not to have registered the Mortgage Deed in the Registry of Deeds. He then argued that as the Mortgage Deed ought not to have been registered, it should now be removed from the Register.

27.              In my judgement this argument is misconceived and is based upon a mistaken premise as well as a misconstruction of clause 7 of the Mortgage Deed. Simply put, under the Registration of Deeds Rules 2008, the Registrar has no function - and accordingly, no obligation - to consider the contents of the deed to be registered, other than the information specified in the rules (to be considered further below). These do not include the terms and conditions of the mortgage. Thus, whether there was an error in clause 7 which resulted in the "wrong" terms and conditions being incorporated into the Mortgage Deed or not was a matter for the parties to the deed but not the Registrar.

28.              It follows that the evidence which the appellant sought to introduce in relation to the differing mortgage terms and conditions issued by Permanent TSB was not relevant to the validity of the registration of the Mortgage Deed and thus to any issue to be decided by the High Court on the motion to dismiss the proceedings. That being so, the failure of the High Court to address a motion to adduce new irrelevant evidence cannot form a basis for overturning the decision of the High Court. It is not a basis upon which to appeal the decision and I would reject this ground of appeal.

Registration of the Deeds

29.              In any event, I am quite satisfied, based upon a limited scrutiny of the key documents in this case, that the appellant's arguments that the Mortgage Deed and the Deed of Conveyance and Assignment were wrongly registered and ought to be removed from the Register are misguided and unstateable.

30.              The respondent is required to comply with the rules governing the Registration of Deeds set out in Registration of Deeds Rules 2008 (S.I. No. 52/2008).

31.              Rule 4 sets out the information to be maintained in respect of each Deed registered under the Act. Subrule (5) provides:

"(5) The register shall contain the following information in respect of each deed registered under the Act—

(a) the name of the deed,

(b) the date of the deed,

(c) the grantors in the deed,

(d) the grantees in the deed,

(e) a description of the property,

(f) the serial number allocated under Rule 7,

(g) the date of registration,

(h) such other information as may be considered necessary by the Authority."

Rule 5(2) requires the Register to keep a record of "the name of the deed, the date of the deed, the name of each Grantor, the name of one Grantee, the description of the property, the serial number, the date of registration and the general nature of the deed."

32.              Rule 6 states that applications for Registration of a Deed "shall be in the appropriate form of the Schedule of Forms to these Rules, with such alterations and additions as the circumstances require and which the Authority allows and shall be accompanied by the deed and the prescribed fee."

33.              The appellant relies on r. 6(2) which provides:

"(2) If it appears to the Authority that any application is improper in form or in substance or is not clearly expressed or does not indicate with sufficient precision the particular interest or land which it is intended to affect or refers only to matters which are not the subject of registration under the Act or is otherwise expressed in a manner inconsistent with the principles upon which the register is to be kept, it may refuse registration, either absolutely or except subject to such modifications therein as it shall approve."

while the respondent relies on r. 6(4) which provides:

"(4) To ensure accuracy in the registered details the Authority shall compare the details on the application form with those in the deed in respect of which registration is being made."

34.              The application to register the Mortgage Deed between the appellant and Ms C and Permanent TSB was completed by the solicitor acting for Permanent TSB using Form 3 of the Registry of Deeds as required. The following details are set out: the date of the Deed (18^th June 2003), the names of the two Mortgagors (the appellant and Ms C), the name of the Lender (Irish Life & Permanent plc) and the details of the property, the serial number, the date of registration and a description of the general nature of the deed. Thus, all of the details specified in r. 4(5) and r. 5(2) are recorded.

35.              The appellant argues that the respondent should have refused to register the Mortgage Deed, and it should now be removed from the Register, on the grounds that it is undated. This is clearly incorrect, as I have described. Secondly, he says it should be removed from the Register on the grounds that the year of the deed was illegible. As I have already discussed, this argument is bound to fail. Even if the court accepted that the date on the front of the deed was unclear, the back page of the deed is undeniably legible and shows that the Mortgage Deed is dated 18^th June 2003. The application records that this is the date of the deed, and according to r. 6(4), the respondent is required to compare the details in the form with the details in the deed "to ensure accuracy". This includes the back page of the deed, and thus there is no error in the registration of the date of the deed.

36.              The second argument relating to clause 7 of the Mortgage Deed, which incorporates the terms and conditions of Permanent TSB plc into the mortgage, is not a matter which requires to be registered on the Register, and accordingly, any argument in relation to the validity or legal effect of clause 7 is not a matter for the Registrar or a matter to be entered in the Register. Rule 4(5)(h) does not assist the appellant as the respondent did not think it was necessary to register the details of the terms of the mortgage; it suffices to register a description of the general nature of the deed. There being no obligation to register these details, it follows that there is no obligation to scrutinise the details, and thus even if they were incorrect in any way, this did not imply that the registration of the deed is legally flawed.

37.              Finally, it should be noted that in reply to oral submissions, for the first time in these proceedings, the appellant alleged that part of the Mortgage Deed was "not his mortgage". This amounts to an allegation of forgery or fraud against a party (or parties) not before the court. The allegation is completely unjustified and without any substance or foundation. It was obviously the last grasping effort of the appellant to persist with an utterly unsustainable argument and it was most improper to make such an allegation without a shred of evidence to support it and without affording the injured party any opportunity to respond to such a grave accusation. If affords no basis for impugning the registration of the Mortgage Deed, and further underscores the abusive nature of these proceedings.

38.              A similar exercise shows that the registration of the Deed of Conveyance and Assignment complied correctly with the rules. Form 1 was completed by the solicitor acting for Havbell Ltd, the form states the date of the deed (19^th June 2015), the name of the Grantor (Permanent TSB plc), the name of the Grantee (Havbell Ltd) and the description of the property refers to an Excel spreadsheet. The Excel spreadsheet lists 196 entries which identifies the properties the subject of the conveyance and assignment. Entry number 80 identifies the property by a unique number and the property address, the date of the mortgage and the registration ID. It gives the name of one of the mortgagors, Ms C, but not the appellant. This omission does not detract from the fact that it identifies the property as required by the rules. It is not necessary to identify the appellant as he is not a party to the deed in question and so his details are not required to be entered on the register. The registration of the Deed of Conveyance and Assignment also included the serial number, the date and a description of the general nature of the deed.

39.              The appellant argued that because his name is not set out in the Excel sheet, that the Mortgage Deed of 18^th June 2003 is therefore not captured by this document, and accordingly, the registration of the Deed of Conveyance and Assignment is flawed and should be removed from the Register. This argument must be rejected. The omission of his name from the spreadsheet identifying the properties conveyed and assigned is irrelevant to validity of the registration of the Deed of Conveyance and Assignment. The relevant details have been specified in the form and properly registered.

40.              Whether or not the Deed of Conveyance and Assignment operated to actually convey and assign the interests of Permanent TSB plc in the Mortgage Deed to Havbell Ltd was not a matter to be decided by the Registrar. In any event it has subsequently been determined conclusively by the Circuit Court that the Mortgage Deed was validly conveyed and assigned to Havbell Ltd and the issue raised by the appellant in these proceedings either seeks to overturn that finding or to address a matter which was not within the remit of the respondent to assess. Either way it amounts to an impermissible collateral attack on that judgment and cannot ground a claim against the respondent.

41.              For all of these reasons, I am satisfied that there is no substance to the appellant's arguments that either of the deeds were wrongly registered, and accordingly, the High Court was correct to dismiss the proceedings on this ground also as the proceedings were bound to fail and their institution and continuation amounted to an abuse of the process of the court.

42.              My provisional view is that the respondent has been entirely successful in the proceedings and thus is presumptively entitled to the costs of the appeal and the proceedings. If the appellant wishes to contend otherwise, he should file written submissions of no more than 1500 words within 10 days of the delivery of this judgment. The respondent may reply within 10 days with submissions of no more than 1500 words. The court will consider the submissions and deliver its decision thereafter.

43.              Whelan and Pilkington JJ have authorised me to indicate their agreement with this judgment.

Result:     Appeal Dismissed

 

Appendix

Date	Detail
18 June 2003	Deed of Mortgage executed over the property
29 June 2012	Irish Life & Permanent plc changed its name to Permanent TSB plc
19 March 2015	'Form 3' application lodged in the Registry of Deeds for registration of the Mortgage Deed
19 June 2015	Deed of Conveyance and Assignment between PTSB and Havbell (LLC), by which the loan and security assigned to Havbell
28 January 2016	Registration of the Deed of Conveyance and Assignment
29 September 2016	Havbell converted into a designated activity company
Possession Proceedings                                                                                        2018/501CA
21 December 2017	Havbell brought Circuit Court proceedings for an order of possession of the property
10 May 2018	Order for possession granted by Dublin County Registrar
25 June 2018	Order for possession affirmed by Circuit Court (Judge Linnane)
13 August 2018	Execution ordered by the Sheriff
24 August 2018	Application to the Master of the High Court for extension of time within which to appeal against the order of the County Registrar
22 November 2018	The motion dismissed as it was then recognised to be in respect of the County Registrar's order and not the order of the Circuit Court.
26 November 2018	Second motion issued by Mr Tucker, in respect of the order of the Circuit Court
25 February 2019	The High Court (Cross J) refused the motion
21 March 2019	Mr Tucker applied to the Supreme Court for leave to appeal against Cross J's judgment
16 October 2019	Application for leave to appeal refused by the Supreme Court in determination Havbell v Tucker [2019] IESCDET 232
21 March 2019	Order for possession executed by the Dublin City Sheriff
24 April 2019	Mr Tucker and Ms C attended at the property by invitation to collect personal belongings
15 May 2019	Mr Tucker re-entered the property
12 March 2021	Mr Tucker applied to the Circuit Court to vacate the order of 10 May 2018 in these proceedings
4 May 2021	Motion refused by the Circuit Court
Equity proceedings
8 July 2019	Equity Civil Bill issued by Havbell seeking an injunction restraining Mr Tucker from trespassing on the property
18 July 2019	Circuit Court (Judge Linnane) order requiring Mr Tucker to vacate the property, stayed until 25 July 2019 to allow Mr Tucker to comply with his undertaking to vacate by that date
25 July 2019	Mr Tucker applied for an extension of the stay pending the determination of his application to the Supreme Court, made 21 March 2019 (in the possession proceedings)
25 July 2019	Notice of Appeal to the High Court filed by Mr Tucker against the Circuit Order of 18 July 2019 [2019/340CA]
26 July 2019	Mr Tucker averred that he left the property on this date
26 July 2019	Ex parte docket seeking a stay on the Circuit Court order filed by Mr Tucker
29 July 2019	Second execution order on foot of the Circuit Court order taken out by Havbell
29 July 2019	An agent of the Sheriff attended at the property but was met with a group of individuals and he was unable to execute the order
22 August 2019	Motion issued by Havbell seeking Mr Tucker's attachment and committal
13 January 2020	Appeal by Mr Tucker from the Circuit Court order of 18 July 2019 (injunction restraining trespass) dismissed by the High Court (Eager J) and the application for a stay was refused
20 February 2020	Notice of Discontinuance filed by Mr Tucker of the Circuit Court appeal [2019/340CA]
12 March 2021	Mr Tucker applied to the Circuit Court to vacate the order of 18 July 2019
4 May 2021	Motions to overturn the Circuit Court orders in the possession and equity proceedings heard together and refused
20 May 2021	Motion for Mr Tucker's attachment and committal before the Circuit Court (Judge O'Connor) and granted by the Judge
2 June 2021	Failed attempt to execute the order for attachment
9 June 2021	Motion issued in the appeal of the Circuit Court order of 20 May 2021, seeking a stay on the attachment order
16 June 2021	Gardaí executed the warrant, arrested Mr Tucker and brought him before Judge O'Connor. He gave an undertaking to vacate the premises
18 June 2021	Following adjournment, Havbell confirmed that the premises had been vacated
Appeal from the Circuit Court attachment order                                                   2021/74CA
28 June 2021	Urgent appeal brought by Mr Tucker to the High Court
18 October 2021	Appeal from the order of attachment of 20 May 2021 heard by the High Court (Hyland J)
1 November 2021	Ex tempore judgment of Hyland J rejecting the appeal
5 November 2021	Order of the High Court made and perfected
4 May 2022	Supreme Court refused leave to appeal from Hyland J's judgment in determination Havbell DAC v Tucker [2022] IESCDET 54
Plenary proceedings against Havbell                                                                    2019/6453P
15 August 2019	Plenary summons issued by Mr Tucker against Havbell
15 August 2019	Statement of claim delivered by Mr Tucker and registered the action as a lis pendens
20 February 2020	Notice of Discontinuance filed by Mr Tucker
Settlement proceedings
19 August 2019	Mr Tucker wrote to Havbell's solicitors to enter into discussions
13 December 2019	Settlement negotiations initiated
16 January 2020	Havbell communicated willingness to accept €310,00 in full and final settlement
5 February 2020	The original mortgage made available for inspection by Mr Tucker
17 February 2020	Mr Tucker raised a number of queries following the inspection
19 February 2020	These queries were answered by Havbell
20 February 2020	Draft deed of settlement signed and returned by Mr Tucker
20 February 2020	Mr Tucker filed and served Notice of Discontinuance of the Circuit Court appeal and his 2019 plenary action
20 February 2020	Settlement agreement signed and dated by Mr Tucker
24 February 2020	Havbell agreed to extend the time for execution and implementation of the settlement agreement until 20 March 2020
18 March 2020	Draft deed of settlement signed and returned by Ms C
19 March 2020	Mr Tucker asked for an extension of time to complete legal and financial aspects of the transaction, to which Havbell assented on the same day (until 30 April 2020)
24 April 2020	Mr Tucker wrote to say his funder required evidence that the equity proceedings had been withdrawn and the order for possession vacated
27 April 2020	Havbell responded that the Circuit Court proceedings would not be withdrawn until settlement monies had been paid and that he misunderstood the agreement
29 April 2020	Mr Tucker wrote to contend that he had not misunderstood and he disputed certain elements of the agreement
15 May 2020	Havbell agreed to a further extension of time (until 30 June 2020)
24 June 2020	Havbell received a letter from a personal insolvency practitioner, Mr McDarby, appointed on behalf of Mr Tucker, who indicated his intention of applying for a protective certificate
30 June 2020	Application made for a protective certificate
9 July 2020	Mr McDarby wrote again to say a protective certificate had been granted that day
21 August 2020	Prescribed financial statement completed by Mr Tucker
11 September 2020	Protective certificate extended
22 October 2020	Proposed PIA was rejected at a creditors' meeting
3 November 2020	Mr Tucker wrote to Havbell seeking documentation
20 November 2020	Havbell replied to Mr Tucker, enclosed the court orders in its favour and the charge from PTSB and demanded he vacate the property by 23 November 2020
20 November 2020	Mr Tucker replied, questioned Havbell's authority to take such action, and said he would attend at the solicitors' office to serve High Court proceedings
Plenary proceedings against Havbell                                                                    2020/7879P
23 November 2020	Plenary summons issued by Mr Tucker
23 November 2020	Notice of Motion by Mr Tucker seeking an interlocutory injunction restraining Havbell from taking possession of the property
4 January 2021	Action registered as a lis pendens against the property
24 March 2021	Statement of claim delivered
16 March 2021	Motion issued seeking voluntary discovery of all deeds relied on by Havbell
7 April 2021	Notice of Motion by Mr Tucker to join Ms C, and a number of solicitors, and leave to issue subpoenas
4 May 2021	Motions to overturn the Circuit Court orders in the possession and equity proceedings heard together and refused
17 June 2021	Mr Tucker issued a motion for judgment in default of defence
18 January 2022	Judgment of High Court (Allen J) in Tucker v Havbell DAC [2022] IEHC 15, dismissing the action and making an Isaac Wunder order against Mr Tucker
23 March 2022	High Court order perfected
8 February 2023	Judgment of the Court of Appeal (Butler J) delivered in Tucker v Havbell DAC [2023] IECA 24 affirming order of High Court
14 June 2023	The Supreme Court refused leave to appeal in Tucker v Havbell DAC [2023] IESCDET 79
Plenary proceedings against the Registrar of Titles                                              2021/2213P
1 April 2021	Plenary summons issued against the Registrar of Titles
25 May 2021	Statement of Claim delivered
8 November 2021	High Court Order made by Allen J substituting the Property Registration Authority of Ireland as defendant
19 November 2021	Letter sent seeking voluntary discovery
31 March 2022	Notice of Motion by PRAI seeking the dismissal of the claim
14 December 2022	Hearing of the motion
10 July 2024	Motion issued by Mr Tucker to admit further evidence
31 July 2024	High Court Judgment (Dignam J) delivered in Tucker v PRA [2024] IEHC 491
10 October 2024	High Court Order made by Dignam J to correct the title of proceedings to read "Tailte Éireann" and dismissing the claim
22 October 2024	The High Court order was perfected
19 November 2024	Notice of Appeal filed
19 December 2024	Respondent's Notice filed
Judicial review proceedings                                                                                  2021/808JR
8 September 2021	Mr Tucker field an originating statement of grounds
11 October 2021	Ex parte application heard by the High Court (Meenan J) and refused
21 October 2021	Notice of Appeal filed
7 February 2022	Judgment of the Court of Appeal (Noonan J) in Tucker v A Circuit Court Judge [2022] IECA 32, dismissing the appeal
6 May 2022	The Supreme Court refused leave to appeal in determination Tucker v A Judge of the Circuit Court [2022] IESCDET 58