High Court of Ireland Decisions

1. This is an Appeal by way of Case Stated from the determination of the Valuation Tribunal of a valuation of the premises of the Appellant. The Case Stated comes before this Court pursuant to the provisions of Section 5 of the Valuation Act, 1988. The premises, the subject matter of the valuation, was found by the Tribunal to be a purpose built Training Centre located at Sandyford Road, Dublin 16. The Case Stated goes on to explain that the Institute runs approximately 200 courses each year and these courses are attended by 6,000 Irish managers. All management disciplines are covered and the courses which are run range in duration from two days to four years. In addition the Institute provides training programmes not alone in the subject premises but also various regional centres where its programmes are conducted in Vocational Schools and Regional Technical Colleges. These range from working evenings and seminars to lectures and conferences. Such training programmes have been and continued to be carried out in 20 centres throughout the country. It was further found that the Institute had formal links with certain Universities and other Higher Education Bodies. In addition to a Training Centre, the premises also comprise administration offices. There are very detailed findings of facts set out in the Case Stated which it is unnecessary to set out in this judgment. One finding of relevance which was made was that a planning permission for the use of the Administration Block as commercial offices was granted to the Institute by Dublin County Council in July, 1984 and that portions thereof had been let for temporary convenience on leases for less than three years which were current as of the 1st November, 1987 being the relevant time. There was the usual evidence relating to appropriate comparisons and certain findings relating to these are also set forth in the Case Stated. The Tribunal determined the correct rateable valuation of the subject premises as being £2,500.

2. The questions of law posed in the original case stated for the decision of this Court were as follows:-

3. The Appeal came before Mr. Justice Morris who clearly found difficulty, as indeed I have, in discerning what exact questions of law were required to be determined by this Court. Accordingly, by Order of the 5th May, 1992, Mr. Justice Morris ordered that the matter be referred to the Valuation Tribunal to clarify and identify with precision "the questions of law to be determined in said case stated". In what I suppose might be described as a sort of supplementary Case Stated or perhaps more accurately a supplement to the earlier Case Stated, the Tribunal in response to the Order of Mr. Justice Morris but (incorrectly reciting the terms of his Order as requiring the Tribunal to "clarify and identify with precision the question of law to be determined in the said case stated" whereas the Judge had used the word "questions") poses now one question only for the opinion of this Court and that reads:-

4. The terms of this question are somewhat mystifying in that it cannot easily be reconciled with the terms of the first of the three questions contained in the original case stated. But to add to the confusion there is an express finding in the original case stated that the subject hereditament is partly commercial "as evidenced by the lettings and the existence of the planning permission". That would seem to suggest that it was not merely the planning permission by itself which led the Tribunal to the view that the building should be valued as being used partly for commercial purposes, yet that is what seems to be suggested in the new revised question. But even that does not end the confusion. In the section of the Tribunal's judgment headed "Findings" at p.26, the Tribunal observes as follows:-

5. Thus, it seems to suggest that the existence of the planning permission was not regarded as particularly relevant. This case has had a very long history. There was an even older appeal by way of case stated which was heard by Mr. Justice Barron who held that the Tribunal had erred in law and referred the case back. Because the persons sitting on the original Tribunal were no longer members of it, a newly constituted Tribunal had to rehear the case and did so apparently over many days. By agreement certain other evidence that had been heard by the original Tribunal was admitted. The same problems would arise if this Court were to send the matter back to the Tribunal either on the grounds that the Tribunal had erred in law or even for further clarification of the questions to be posed. But if necessary that would have had to be done.

6. I have, however, come to the firm opinion that part of the reason why the Tribunal has had difficulty in phrasing questions is that there simply is no question of law involved. In this connection I am in complete agreement with the submissions made both in writing and orally by Counsel for the Respondent, Mr. O'Caoimh. There were, of course, obviously disagreements between the parties but they were primarily as to what comparisons were appropriate and as to how they should be approached. These are all matters within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and unless it can be shown that the Tribunal went clearly wrong in law they cannot now be reopened on a case stated. There is nothing in the Case Stated by which I mean the document first before Mr. Justice Morris and the supplementary document which indicates that any error of law was made by the Tribunal. Indeed, I think it would be a fair comment to make that Mr. Cooke himself with all his experience in this area of the law and all his ingenuity had difficulty in discerning any clear question of law which should properly arise in this Appeal. In the end, the point which he mainly concentrated on was one which was not even raised as a question in the Case Stated. He suggested that since one of the Valuers in one of the reports had allegedly put forward a letting value on a Landlord and Tenant Act basis rather than a net annual value basis under the Valuation Acts and that there was some evidence that the Tribunal might have relied on this, I should hold that it erred in law in its approach and send the matter back. I cannot accept this. There is nothing in the findings in the Case Stated or indeed in the judgment of the Tribunal which would indicate that the Tribunal misunderstood what was involved in the concept of net annual value. Indeed, it would be extraordinary if it did misunderstand that concept which is at the very heart of its own jurisdiction.

7. The criticism which Mr. Justice Barron made of the original Tribunal was essentially that it had disregarded the rent of the F.Á.S. Training Centres. The newly constituted Tribunal which reheard the case did not fall into that error and I cannot discern any error of law in the approach which the Tribunal adopted. The only answer which I will make to the revised question will be as follows:-