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1. By Summons dated the 13th day of December, 1995 the Applicant was notified to attend at the Dundalk District Court on the 31st January, 1996. Having considered the Summons, the Solicitor for the Applicant appeared in the District Court for the purposes of objecting to jurisdiction. His objection was not to a defect in the Summons but to the form of application and complaint made to the District Court Clerk. It was submitted on behalf of the Applicant that an appearance to contest jurisdiction does not cure a defect in the application or complaint.

2. A Summons is a notification that a complaint has been made to an authorised person, and is itself merely a process by which an accused person is compelled to attend Court ( D.P.P. v. Gill [1980] I.R. 263 followed by Gannon J. in D.P.P. v. Sheeran [1986] I.L.R.M. 579).

3. The evidence does not disclose whether the complaint was made in writing or orally. As no original form of complaint has been produced, it would seem proper to assume that the Complaint was made orally at the time of issue of the Summons to the District Court Clerk by whom it was issued. It may, I think, be reasonably assumed that the contents of the Summons conform to whatever was stated to him. The evidence is unspecific as to the making or terms of complaint. The complaint as recorded in the Summons is one of assault. The Summons then proceeds to call upon the accused to show cause as to why he ought not to be bound to keep the peace. In my judgment this is not a complaint but rather indicates that the Complainant considered that the punishment for the assault should be in the form of an Order binding over the Accused to keep the peace and inviting the Accused to say to the District Judge why such an Order should not be made. Leaving aside all questions of the propriety of the Complainant suggesting how the complaint of assault (if proven) ought to be dealt with, the "showing cause" is not per se either a cause of action or a complaint. In my opinion the words are and always were surplusage and the District Judge very properly deleted them. The deletion of surplusage was not such as to confer jurisdiction where there was none - it was to strike out matter which was surplus to the law's requirements.

4. Considerable reliance was placed by the Applicant on Sheeran's case; Gannon J. sets out very clearly at p.584 of the report what that case was about:-

5. Having reviewed a number of authorities, Gannon J. summarised in a very helpful form the fundamental points established by the reviewed cases as establishing the following:-

6. In the eye of the law, binding to good behaviour is not a punishment, but a precautionary proceeding against misbehaviour. This is the basis of the decision in Lort v. Hutton (45 L.J.) (N.S.) N.C. 95 and is the ground relied upon by Lord Blackburn for the non-admissibility of witnesses for the defence in that case. The old cases relating to security of the peace and good behaviour, are conveniently commented upon by Gibson J. in Halpin v. Rice [1901] 2 I.R. 593 at 604 as follows:-

7. The making of a complaint upon which a District Court Summons may issue can be made under either the Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act, 1851 or the Courts (No. 3) Act, 1986. "The procedures provided for in the Act of 1986 must be considered as parallel to those provided for in the Act of 1851." ( D.P.P. -v- Nolan [1990] 2 I.R. 526 per Finlay, C.J. at p. 545). In my judgment there was no failure by the second named Respondent to comply with the terms of the Act of 1986. The Summons conveys in ordinary language particulars of the assault. I am also satisfied that the Summons falls within and did fall within the terms of the provisions of Rule 88 of the District Court Rules.

8. The Applicant sought to rely upon McGirl v. District Justice McArdle [1989] I.R. 596 as supporting his contention that because the Summons issued in the instant case (inter alia) called upon the Applicant to show cause as to why he ought not to be bound to the peace. However, it is clear from the judgment of Johnson J. that the application in that case was for the purpose of applying for an Order of Certiorari directed to the Respondent in respect of a warrant issued by him for the arrest of the Applicant. While it is true that the appearance by legal representation in McGirl's case, as in the instant case, was not a submission to jurisdiction, there the similarities cease. In the instant case the Applicant was ordered by the Summons to answer the complaint of assault. He was, in my judgment, bound to come to Court to answer that complaint. The Applicant was not obliged to come to Court "to show cause" - a fact clearly appreciated by the District Judge who struck this matter out, for it was not an offence and was mere surplusage and, in any event, purportedly would cast the onus of proof on the Applicant to show why he should not be bound to the peace.

9. In the Summons the accusation made against the person to whom it is directed is referred to as a complaint. One cannot accuse a person "to show cause" or make a complaint "to show cause", one may accuse another of committing an assault or assaulting or to make a complaint to the like effect. In my judgment the District Judge acted quite properly in deleting the surplusage and attending to the substance of the complaint which was one of assault only. I accordingly refuse the application for prohibition.