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High Court of Ireland Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> Kenny v. Minister for Trade and Employment [1999] IEHC 110; [2000] 1 IR 249 (19th February, 1999) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/1999/110.html Cite as: [2000] 1 IR 249, [1999] IEHC 110 |
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1. The
Applicant was employed by Durkan Brothers (Dublin) Limited of Sandford Road,
Ranelagh, pursuant to a contract of service in 1978. Initially he was employed
in Ireland and in 1984 was given an assignment in America by his employer to
develop a construction business on their behalf. It was envisaged that the
Applicant would be some two years in America and would thereafter return to
Ireland and resume his former role with Durkan Bros.
2. In
the event he was directed to remain in America in the service of his employer
but at all times it was envisaged that he would return to Ireland at its
termination.
3. That
employment was terminated in America with effect from the 25th May 1989, that
is in excess of four years after he went to America.
5. He
brought proceedings against his employer in this country which resulted on the
5th March 1996 in an award,
inter
alia
,
for £12,682.80 for wrongful dismissal. Some days before the case was
heard his employer went into voluntary liquidation and the liquidator has
indicated that the company is unable to meet the award.
6. The
Protection of Employees (Employers' Insolvency) Act, 1984 (the Act of 1984)
establishes,
inter
alia
,
a fund out of which the Minister is obliged in certain circumstances to pay the
amount of awards such as the Applicant's. As required under the Act of 1984
the liquidator applied to the Minister for such a payment and by letter of the
12th June 1997 the Minister refused the Applicant's claim made on his behalf by
the liquidator.
7. That
refusal is the subject of challenge in these proceedings in which the Applicant
seeks appropriate reliefs.
10. It
is agreed that the Applicant in the present case qualifies under sub-sections
(b) and (c) above.
11. Counsel
for the Respondent contests, however, that the Applicant qualified under
sub-section (a).
14. As
will be seen from the foregoing the Applicant is an employee who got the
benefit of an award for wrongful dismissal and accordingly qualifies under
section 6 (3)(a).
15.
However, he must also qualify under sub-section (b) which provides
inter
alia
that the Minister be satisfied on the application made by him that he :
17. I
have not found, nor could Counsel find, a definition of the phrase
"employment
which is insurable"
for the purposes of section 3. However, the phrase
"insurable
employment"
is defined in section 2 of the Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act, 1981 (the
Act of 1981) and Counsel agreed, I think correctly, that this definition
applies to the phrase just quoted from section 3 of the Act of 1984.
19. The
above category of employments clearly captured the Applicant when he was
working in Ireland.
20. With
regard to working outside the State section 8 together with regulations deemed
made thereunder are relevant. Section 8 of the Act of 1981 provides as follows:-
21. I
have been referred by Counsel to the Social Welfare (Contributions) (Amendment)
Regulations, 1961 (S.I. No. 139 of 1961) which both Counsel are agreed have
been deemed to be regulations made under Section 8 of the Act of 1981.
23. As
will be seen, therefore, the limitation on the category of employment set out
in part 1, paragraph 1 of the first schedule to the Act of 1981 to the effect
that it must be employment
"in
the State"
is suspended in favour of insured persons who are ordinarily resident in the
State but who are temporarily employed outside it. They cease to be treated as
"temporarily employed outside the State"
however after 52 contribution weeks. Thereafter, their employment, in my view,
is no longer employment
"in
the State"
within the meaning of that phrase in paragraph 1 of part 1 of the first
schedule to the 1981 Act with the result that they are no longer employed
contributors for the purposes of the Act of 1981 by reason of the operation of
section 5(1)(a) thereof. Not being an employed contributor means in turn that
their employment is no longer
"insurable
employment"
as defined under section 2 of the Act of 1981 and this in turn, in my view,
means that such employment is not
"employment which is insurable for all benefits under the Social Welfare Acts,
1981 to 1984"
within the meaning of that phrase as it appears in section 3 of the Act of
1984. It will be recalled that the phrase
"employment which is insurable"
is not, in terms, defined but that Counsel accepted , I think correctly, that
the definition of
"insurable
employment"
in section 2 of the Act of 1981 is also the definition of
"employment which is insurable"
in section 3 of the Act of 1984.
24. It
follows from the foregoing, that the Applicant's claim fails to satisfy the
requirements set out in section 6(3)(b) of the Act of 1984, specifically,
because the Minister could not have been satisfied that his application was
made by
"a
person to whom (the Act of 1984) applies"
which is a necessary prerequisite to qualifying for an entitlement under
section 6(3) of that Act.
25. Mr
Horan BL for the Applicant makes a further point. He says, that
notwithstanding the foregoing, section 5(1)(b) of the Act of 1981 demonstrates
that his client has an entitlement to the benefits conferred by section 6(3) of
the Act of 1984 because he is insured for life. The relevant sub-section
provides as follows:-
26. True
it is, that the Applicant once having become an employed contributor remains an
employed contributor for his life. That does not mean, however, in my view,
that his employment automatically becomes
"insurable
employment"
simply by reason of the fact that he as a life time employed contributor is the
employee concerned. This is not, in my view, the meaning of the definition of
"insurable
employment"
in section 2 of the Act of 1981. The nub of that definition is that the
employment in order to be
"insurable
employment"
must
be
such
that a person who is employed therein
would
be
an employed contributor. One ascertains whether any employment is
such
employment by reference to,
inter
alia
,
section 5(1)(a) and part 1 of the first schedule to the Act of 1981 as I have
set out above. One does not identify
"insurable
employment"
by reference to the status of the employee but rather by reference to the
qualifying characteristics of the employment itself. I do not agree,
therefore, that the Applicant's employment is
"insurable
employment"
simply because it is the Applicant's employment, as this submission would
require me to do. It is insurable employment because it fits the definition
of that category of employment by reference to the relevant statutory provisions.
27. Once
the Applicant had worked outside the State in such employment for a period in
excess of 52 contribution weeks his employment ceased to be insurable
employment for the reasons set out above and accordingly the Act of 1984 did
not apply to him.
28. Counsel
for the Applicant also submitted that pursuant to section 9(3) of the Act of
1984 if it appeared to the Minister that a doubt existed as to whether or not a
claim such as was made by the Applicant is allowable he may refer any matter
arising in connection with the claim to the Employment Appeals Tribunal. It is
submitted that the Minister should have done this and whilst Counsel did not go
so far as to say that the Minister's failure to refer the Applicant's appeal
under this section was irrational in the sense that would entitle him to a
judicial review thereof, he did submit that the Minister should have referred
the matter for appeal and that his decision should be set aside on this
account. I cannot agree with this submission: in the first place I think
there was no doubt as is clear from what I have already said, but even if there
were doubt I consider that section 9(3) of the Act of 1984 gives the Minister a
discretion whether or not to refer the matter to the Employment Appeals
Tribunal. I can see no case for saying that the Minister acted outside his
discretionary jurisdiction.