THE HIGH COURT
		1997 No. 677 CA
IN THE MATTER OF THE SCIENTIFIC SOCIETIES ACT, 1843 (6&7 VICTORIA, CHAPTER 36) AND
IN THE MATTER OF THE COURTS (SUPPLEMENTAL PROVISIONS) ACT, 1961 (NO.39 OF 1961) AND 
IN THE MATTER OF AN APPEAL AGAINST A DECISION OF THE REGISTRAR OF FRIENDLY SOCIETIES UNDER THE AFORESAID LEGISLATION
BETWEEN
THE TRANSPORT MUSEUM SOCIETY OF IRELAND LIMITED
		APPELLANT
AND
THE REGISTRAR OF FRIENDLY SOCIETIES
		RESPONDENT

Judgment of Mr. Justice Geoghegan delivered on the 5th day of October 1999

	This is an appeal brought by the Registrar of Friendly Societies from a decision of the Circuit Court reversing an earlier decision of the Registrar of Friendly Societies refusing the Applicant the benefit of a certificate under Section 1 of the Scientific Societies Act, 1843.  That Section reads as follows:-

	"1. ...no person or persons shall be assessed or rated, or liable to be assessed or rated, or liable to pay, to any county, borough, parochial, or other local rates or cesses, in respect of any land, houses, or buildings, or parts of houses, or buildings, belonging to any society instituted for the purposes of science, literature or the fine arts exclusively, either as tenant or as owner and occupied by it for the transaction of its business, and for carrying into effect its purposes, provided that such society shall be supported wholly or in part by annual voluntary contributions and shall not, and by its laws may not, make any dividend, gift, division, or bonus in money unto or between any of its members, and provided also that such society shall obtain the certificate of the Barrister at Law or Lord Advocate, as hereinafter mentioned."

As a consequence of statutory adaptations, the Registrar of Friendly Societies is now the equivalent of "the Barrister at Law or Lord Advocate" and there is an appeal from the decision of the Registrar to the Circuit Court.  The decision of the Circuit Court can be appealed in the ordinary way to the High Court and it is such an appeal which is now before this Court.  
	The Appellant is a company limited by guarantee.  The Memorandum of Association, as amended by a Special Resolution, dated 29th April, 1995 provides that the principal object for which the Company was established is "to establish and maintain a Working Transport Museum for scientific and literary purposes and to provide related education for the public benefit".  The Society as I will hereafter call the Appellant is effectively in existence for the purposes of restoring and maintaining obsolete transport vehicles such as buses, trams, vans, etc. and as far as possible displaying them in a museum.  The Society has two premises, one in Castleruddery and the other in Howth.  This appeal relates to the premises in Howth which is situated in the Howth demesne and leased from a Mr. Gaisford St. Laurence.  The evidence established that the Transport Museum in Howth contains a number of vehicle types all carefully restored at great expense and with great art and skill.  The Society maintains that having regard to Section 1 of the 1843 Act, as cited above, it should not have to pay rates in respect of the Howth premises.  The Registrar of Friendly Societies, however, refused to issue the certificate under the Section because he took the view that the Society was not a Society "instituted for purposes of science, literature or the fine arts exclusively".  He did agree that the other requirements of the Section were complied with.  The Society appealed that decision to the Circuit Court and in a careful and reasoned judgment, Judge Groarke overruled the decision of the Registrar and held that a certificate should issue.  The Registrar, in turn, has appealed that decision.  Judge Groarke in his judgment placed heavy reliance on the English case of British Launderers Research Association -v- Borough of Hendon Rating Authority (1949) 1 K.B. 462.  He cites the following passage in the judgment of Denning L.J. (as he then was).  At p.467:-

	"It is not sufficient that the society should be instituted 'mainly' or 'primarily' or 'chiefly' for the purposes of science, literature or the fine arts.  It must be instituted 'exclusively' for those purposes.  The only qualification - which, indeed, is not really a qualification at all - is that other purposes which are merely incidental to the purposes of science and literature or the fine arts, i.e. merely a means to the fulfilment of those purposes, do not deprive a society of the exemption.  Once however, the other purposes cease to be merely incidental but become collateral; that is, cease to be a means to an end, but become an end in themselves; that is, become additional purposes of the society; then, whether they be main or subsidiary, whether they exist jointly with or separately from the purposes of science, literature or the fine arts, the society cannot claim an exemption.  That is, I think, made quite clear by the opinions of Lord Watson and Lord MacNaghten in Commissioners of Inland Revenue -v- Forrest, 15 App. Cas. 334, 348, 354.  More difficulty arises, however, in saying what are "the purposes of science".  Science includes, of course, not only pure or abstract science, such as pure mathematics, but also the applied sciences, such as electricity or engineering: and the purposes of science include not only the advancement of knowledge by research work, but also the dissemination of it by lectures or teaching or writing.  Take the Department of Engineering at Cambridge.  It is undoubtedly an Institute for the purposes of science exclusively; and although it undertakes the training of students, that is merely incidental to the purposes of science."

	Quite apart from the reasons given by Denning L.J. I think it reasonable to assume that the word "science" in the 1843 Act would have been intended to be given a broad interpretation.  While English decisions have tended to treat the three words, "science", "literature", and "the fine arts" disjunctively, that was for the purposes of dealing with the facts of any given case.  I think it both helpful and correct not to lose sight of the total expression, "science, literature or the fine arts", because it would seem to me that the real purpose of the Section was to exempt in certain circumstances societies instituted for the purposes of higher knowledge.  It may be of some interest that the Act, either originally or possibly later, by virtue of some Short Titles Act, became known as "the Scientific Societies Act, 1843" even though Section 1 refers to literature and fine arts as well as science.  I am firmly of the view that it was never intended that science be interpreted in some narrow academic sense as covering mathematics, chemistry, physics and biology.  I would fully adopt the broader interpretation placed on the word by Denning L.J.  I would also adopt his view that the mere fact that there may be an educational aspect does not necessarily mean that the purposes are not exclusively scientific.
	The British Launderers case is only one of a number of English decisions to which I have been referred.  However, I find it unnecessary to review in any detail the English case law.  As it happens, since the hearing, McGuinness J. has given judgment in another case dealing with this Section, namely, The Continuing Trustees of Gurteen Agricultural College -v- The Registrar of Friendly Societies.  This judgment was delivered on 30th July, 1999.  In it, McGuinness J. reviews the case law in considerable detail and I entirely agree with the conclusions she has reached.  In that case reliance was placed by Counsel for the Registrar on Battersea Borough Council -v- British Iron and Steel Research Association, 41 R & IT 567.  In it, the English Court of Appeal had held that the question of whether a particular society was instituted for the purposes of science exclusively must be determined by reference to the purposes of the society as defined by its constitution rather than the purposes it might actually have pursued in practice, though the possibility in an appropriate case of recourse to the evidence of activities was not excluded.  In her judgment, McGuinness J. had this to say in relation to the argument based on the Battersea case:-

	"I accept that the Battersea case lays great stress on the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the Company in that case.  Even in that case, however, Jenkins J. in his judgment allows that 'the document defining a society's purposes must, no doubt, be construed in the light of surrounding circumstances, and I do not exclude the possibility, in an appropriate case, of recourse to evidence as to the actual activities of the society as an aid to construction'.

	While, of course, a judgment of the English Court of Appeal must be persuasive, I feel that the Battersea case goes much further than many of the earlier English cases.  It can also be distinguished from the instant case, in that it dealt with a company limited by guarantee and Jenkins J. himself pointed out (at page 16), 'I think this applies with particular force where, as here, the society concerned is a company incorporated under the Companies Act, with the Memorandum of Association formally stating, as required by that Act, the objects for which it is established'.

	Looking at the authorities as a whole and given that I am not bound by the Battersea case, I prefer to approach the matter by looking at the factual evidence of the present purposes and activities of the college, and I would agree here with the opinion of the learned Circuit Court Judge that any form of religious involvement which takes place is purely ancillary to the other activities of the college."

	While this case does involve a company limited by guarantee, the framework of the Memorandum of Association does not, in my view, merely by reference to the educational aspect move the society from the ambit of Section 1 of the 1843 Act.  I interpret McGuinness J. as effectively holding that the Court must stand back and decide what were the real purposes of the society and, while documents may provide evidence of those real purposes, they may not be conclusive.
	I am absolutely satisfied that the Society is entitled to a certificate under Section 1.  A great deal of the evidence, which has been adduced before Judge Groarke and before this Court, was not before the Registrar.  The Transport Museum is not a workshop for repairing vehicles nor is its purpose to provide either education or entertainment to the public.  Its purpose is to engage in what can only correctly be called the difficult science and indeed art of restoration of vehicles which, in many instances, are mere shells or in very bad condition when first dealt with by the Society.  It is only by very slow degrees and over years that vehicles can be restored as the Society is entirely dependent on voluntary contributions.  Any educational aspect is purely incidental.  In a sense, the vehicles could not be restored in the first instance without some public interest because without public interest there cannot be funding.  The reasons why members of the public may go to the museum would be many, in my view.  Some would go out a genuine interest in engineering.  Others would go out of nostalgia.  Others for aesthetic reasons.  But the Society was not instituted to confer these pleasures on the public.  It was instituted by persons genuinely interested in restoring vehicles.  Some of the vehicles contain most unusual technical aspects.  These had to be restored with great care.  Arriving at the correct livery, the correct crest, etc. are all part of the science and/or art of restoration. 
	McGuinness J. in the Gurteen Agricultural College case was apparently informed by Counsel on both sides that there was no Irish decision on the interpretation of Section 1 of the 1843 Act.  That is not perhaps entirely correct because in Cleeve & Others -v- Limerick City Manager and Commissioner of Valuation (1942) I.R. 77, Maguire P. in delivering the unanimous judgment of a Divisional Court containing Maguire P., Gavan Duffy J. and Martin Maguire J. did make an oblique reference to the question of exclusivity.  The society seeking exemption in that case was the Limerick Protestant Young Mens Association.  The following passage from the judgment of Maguire P. is of some interest:-

	"The Limerick Protestant Young Mens Association has a long history and appears to be a very excellent Institution.  We are asked to hold that the Circuit Court Judge, on the evidence before him, was justified in holding that the Association's premises belonged to a 'society instituted for the purposes of science, literature or the fine arts exclusively'.  We have before us the Annual Report of the Association, adopted at a general meeting in the year 1938.  This document contains the rules and regulations of the Association, and we are informed that these were the rules in force when the case first came before the Circuit Court Judge, and that they are still in operation.  The second rule states that the objects of the Association are:-

		'The spiritual, mental, moral, social and physical improvement of the young men of Limerick and its vicinity and...the promotion of literary and scientific study, and...the cultivation, as far as may be of artistic taste among the members.'

	These are very laudable objects and among them are the objects of scientific study and the cultivation of artistic taste.  In my view, the references in the first part of the rule to other objects do not necessarily preclude us from holding that the Association was founded for 'the purposes of science, literature or the fine arts exclusively'.  Rule 3 of these rules, however, provides that 'the means employed shall be the establishment of a library reading room, classrooms, laboratory, museum and gymnasium, together with sermons (anniversary or occasional), Bible, literary, science and art classes, lectures and other means which may be thought advisable'."

The Judge then goes on to deal with Rule 5 which contains still other purposes.  There was clearly no exclusivity in that case but what is of interest is that the former President did not consider that references to other objects as such in the first part of that second rule necessarily precluded the Court from holding that the Association could invoke Section 1 of the 1843 Act.  That seems to be in line with the views expressed by Denning L.J. in relation to educational aspects of a scientific or artistic endeavour.  In other words, 'exclusively' must be given its ordinary meaning but it should not be given an artificially literal meaning that would have been almost certainly contrary to the intentions of Parliament.  I am of the view that the necessary exclusivity has been established in this case and that a certificate under Section 1 should issue.  The appeal must therefore be dismissed.