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High Court of Ireland Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> Morris v. Dublin City Coroner [1999] IEHC 256; [2000] 3 IR 592 (8th October, 1999) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/1999/256.html Cite as: [2000] 3 IR 592, [1999] IEHC 256 |
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1. This
is an application for an Order of Certiorari by way of an application for
Judicial Review of the ruling and decision of the Respondent made on 10
September, 1998 to permit witnesses who are members of the Garda Siochana to
testify at the inquest of John Morris, deceased, with anonymity in a manner
whereby they would be identified only by code letter.
They
also seek by Order of Certiorari a Judicial Review of the ruling and decision
of the Respondent made on 10 September, 1998 to permit the identification of
the forensic and ballistic reports which are to be adduced in evidence at the
inquest by identification numbers which would identify the weapons used and the
exclusion from the said reports of the identity of witnesses and members of the
Garda Siochana.
In
the Coroners Act, 1962 it is provided under Section 28 that:-
"Where
a coroner holding an inquest does not take depositions he shall take a note of
the name and address of every person who gives evidence at the inquest."
29(1)
Every deposition or note of the names and addresses of witnesses taken at an
inquest, every report of a post-mortem examination made in pursuance of this
Act and every record of the verdict returned at an inquest shall be preserved
by the coroner.
(2)
When a coroner ceases to hold office all documents preserved by him under this
section shall be handed over to the county registrar for the county or county
borough in which his district is situate and the county registrar shall
preserve the documents.
(3)
A coroner shall furnish a copy of any document preserved by him under this
section to every applicant therefor and, except where the application is made
on behalf of the Minister of State or the Garda Siochana, may charge for a copy
such fee as may be prescribed.
(4)
A county registrar shall furnish a copy of any document preserved by him under
this section to every applicant therefor and, except where the application is
made on behalf of the Minister of State or the Garda Siochana, shall charge for
a copy such fee as may be prescribed.
Section
30 provides that questions of civil or criminal liability shall not be
considered or investigated at an inquest and accordingly every inquest shall be
confined to ascertaining the identity of the person in relation to whose death
the inquest is being held and how, when and where the death occurred.
Section
56 provides that forms may be prescribed in respect of the inquest including
depositions and records. Until forms have been prescribed under this section
the forms usually used before the commencement of this Act continue to be used
and may when necessary be modified so as to conform with the provisions of this
Act.
It
is clear that under the Act an agreed deposition or note of the names and
addresses of witnesses taken at an inquest and a report of a post-mortem
examination and every record of a verdict must be preserved and copies of any
preserved documents must be provided on payment of the appropriate fee to every
applicant therefor.
Accordingly,
at first blush the coroner is obliged to provide the name and address of every
person who gives evidence at the inquest if he does not take depositions. Mr
Charleton argues that Section 29, Sub-section (1), makes a clear distinction
between every deposition or note of the names and addresses of witnesses taken
at an inquest. He argues that a deposition does not have to be signed or the
person who makes it identified.
What
is a deposition? In Osbourn's Concise Legal Dictionary (8th Ed) London Sweet
& Maxwell, 1993, p 113 it is defined as:-
"A
statement on oath of a witness in a judicial proceeding: in committal
proceedings, the evidence of a witness before examining justice is taken down
in writing and signed by the witness. The examining justices should sign a
certificate listing each witness who gave oral evidence and signed a
deposition."
In
Mozley & Whiteley's Law Dictionary (11th Ed) Butterworths, 1993, at p 80
defines a deposition as follows:-
"A
word to indicate written evidence or oral evidence taken down in writing."
A
Dictionary of Irish Law, Henry Murdock, (Revised 2nd Ed) Topez Publications
Dublin, 1993 at p 156 defines a deposition as:
"A
statement on oath of a witness in a judicial proceeding, eg, the statement of
witnesses in criminal matters before the committing justice: RSC O 86 r 50.
Generally a deposition may not be given in evidence at a trial without the
consent of the party against whom it may be offered, unless the deponent is
dead, or beyond the jurisdiction of the court, or unable from sickness or other
infirmity to attend the trial: RSC O 39 r 17. If the deponent refuses to sign
the deposition, it must be signed by an examiner: RSC O 39 r 11, 15."
Cross
on Evidence (7th Ed) Butterworths, London, 1990 confirms at p 263 that:-
"When
depositions are taken by a coroner, there does not appear to be any similar
statutory provision for their being read at any trial that takes place on the
coroners inquisition."
This
is subject to the exception that a deposition might be read where the deponent
has since died and if the deposition was signed by him and the coroner and the
accused had the opportunity to cross-examine the deponent. RSC O 39 r 11
provides that a deposition when completed is read over to the witness and
signed by him in the presence of the parties or of such of them as may think to
attend. If the witness refused to sign the deposition the Examiner shall sign
the same.
The
case is made that the gardai will give evidence behind the screen in the
presence of the lawyers for the deceased the jury and the coroner but will be
identified by letters and no-one else will be allowed to know what they look
like and the letters will not be identified by a name or address to anyone
including the coroner. This would be a radical departure from the normal
procedure for a coroner with statutory inquiries which are of their nature
extremely limited.
In
the very useful "Handbook for Coroners in the Republic of Ireland" by Patrick
O'Connor, Old House Press, Swinford, 1997 presently President of the Law
Society, precedents are given for depositions at pp 95-96. They appear as
follows:
"Coroners
Act, 1962
Depositions
Coroner's
District: . . .
Inquest
on body of: . . .
Place
of Inquest: . . .
The
Deponent: . . .
(name
of deponent)
says
on oath/affirmation
Taken
before me this . . . day of . . ., . . .
.
. .
Signed:
. . .
CORONER."
The
Dublin City Coroner is a registered medical practitioner and a Barrister at
Law. He has filed an Affidavit in this matter which sets out the facts.
The
inquest under the provisions of the Coroners Act, 1962 were performed by him in
the Coroners Court in Store Street, Dublin 1 on 16 July, 1997 inquiring into
the death of John Morris on 4 June, 1997. On the grounds that garda inquiries
were on-going, the said inquest was adjourned on the application of an
Inspector of An Garda Siochana.
Initial
submissions by Counsel were made on 9 July, 1998:
(a)
that the gardai concerned should not be called to give evidence in person as a
threat to their safety had been made by a subversive organisation, namely, the
INLA; and
(b)
it was also indicated that the threat was made to RTE and that the gardai had
serious concerns for their personal safety and the safety of their families if
they be required to give evidence in person at the inquest.
Counsel
for the Commissioner of An Garda Siochana reiterated the concerns of the gardai.
Counsel
for the gardai further submitted that the forensic reports on the garda weapons
used should not be admitted as this would identify the garda(i) who fired the
fatal shot(s). The gardai concerned did not know who fired the fatal shots and
there were security considerations in their not so knowing. Counsel for the
family of the deceased opposed these applications indicating that an inquest
was a public hearing and that the gardai concerned should give evidence in
person. Counsel for the family also opposed the application for exclusion of
the forensic report.
He
then avers that:-
"Contrary
to what is alleged in the Affidavit of the Applicants at paragraph (6) no
application was made to the effect that the Gardai be granted anonymity at the
hearing. The application was that the gardai not be called at all to give
evidence at the inquest."
5.
No question arose as to the reality of the threats made against the garda
members. All Counsel present (including Counsel for the family) accepted that a
threat was made and in particular Counsel for the family publicly distanced the
members of the family from any threat made. His statement on behalf of the
family was subsequently reported in the media.
6.
Inspector Coburn was present at all hearings and was available if required to
give evidence of the threat made. It has not been necessary to call him as all
present accepted that a threat was made and that there was no application to
call evidence to that effect.
7.
I am advised by Counsel and believe that the presiding coroner is entitled to
accept uncontradicted submissions of Counsel as to the reality and validity of
a threat to personal safety. In the event there were several preliminary
hearings and on no occasion did Counsel for the family question that a threat
had been made.
8.
The inquest was adjourned for this Deponent to consider the submissions of
Counsel.
9.
On 10 September, 1998 this Department made a ruling based on the submissions of
Counsel and on the law governing the coroner's inquest that:
(a)
the inquest was a public hearing and there was no precedent for a hearing in
camera;
(b)
the only occasion where the need for public inquest was abrogated was under the
provision of the Restoration of Order in Ireland Act, 1920 when inquests were
held by the military;
(c)
at common law the coroner has power to admit documentary evidence in the form
of written statements at an inquest;
(d)
this power was only exercised when the evidence was undisputed or
uncontroversial;
(e)
while a coroner has discretion at common law to admit hearsay evidence, this
would only apply to minor (undisputed) matters usually in the unavoidable
absence of a witness and not to the principal witness to a death;
(f)
while a coroner had discretion to admit documentary evidence this was in the
context of the best evidence rule, ie, wherever possible the main witnesses
should give evidence "viva voce" and be available to be examined by the coroner
and legal representatives. This requirement is consistent with the principles
of constitutional and natural justice applied to Courts and Tribunals;
(g)
the public interest require that full inquiry be made into the circumstances of
the death of John Morris and the law require that the best evidence should be
made available at such inquiry;
(h)
this Deponent ruled that the gardai concerned were material witnesses and
should give evidence in person and be available to examination by the coroner
and Counsel. In view of the threat to the personal security of the gardai
concerned this Deponent ruled that he would permit the Gardai to give evidence
without their names being read out and that they be publicly identified as
garda A, B, C, D, E etc; and
(i)
the forensic report on the weapons used would have to be admitted in evidence
to prove that the deceased was killed by a garda gun and not by any other
weapon. The identification of the particular weapon used could however be
deleted from the report at the inquest in the interest of the personal security
of the gardai concerned.
10.
Having made the ruling a further submission was made by Counsel for the Gardai
that in the event of their being present to give evidence in person that the
gardai could be visually identified and this was a further security concern and
the Deponent made a further ruling that:-
'(j)
Once the Gardai were present in person they could be screened from the public
gallery but be visible to the coroner, Jury, legal representatives and members
of the press.
Objection
to this additional ruling was made on the grounds that there was no notice of
this application so the Coroner very properly adjourned the matter further to
seek further submissions. After that he confirmed his ruling and then adjourned
the inquest when Counsel indicated that there would be an application for
Judicial Review of his decision. He also avers that the Coroner retains
discretion to control proceedings and that this discretion must be exercised
with regard to the requirements of constitutional and natural justice but his
ruling did not infringe the immunities and privileges of a witness at an
inquest and the Coroner did not disregard the provisions of Sections 28 and 29
of the Coroners Act, 1962 and that the Coroner will take note of the name and
address of every person who gives evidence at the inquest and will preserve
every document and furnish every document to every applicant therefore. He says
that far from preventing the applicants from cross-examining witnesses the
Coroner was facilitating such examination. He also denies that he had not
disregarded the provisions of the Oaths Acts and that the witnesses would be
required to provide names and addresses to the Coroner. There was no evidence
before the Coroner regarding threats but apparently this was because the
existence of the threats was not denied as can be seen in the Coroner's
Affidavit. There is a useful note made by the Solicitor for the Applicant on
the Coroner's ruling on 10 September, 1998. It is clear that the Coroner
carefully considered the various legal authorities open to him. In particular
he refers to Roe v Blood Transfusion Service Board & Ireland [1996] 3 IR
67, In Re: R Limited [1989] IR 126 and the Irish Constitution at p 330-400. The
applicable law is stated by Keane J in Farrell v The Attorney General [1997] 1
IR 203 at 223 and I quote:-
"The
holding of an inquest by a coroner, with or without a jury, has been a feature
of our law for many centuries. While few would dispute the need to have a
public inquiry by a person with appropriate legal or medical qualifications
into the death of a person as a result of violence or in other circumstances
which render such an investigation appropriate, our present law governing
inquests, despite its partial modernisation in 1962, is in some ways
anachronistic, as witness the continuing jurisdiction to hold inquests into
'treasure trove'. (see S 49 of the Act of 1962).
In
its modern form there are two features of the Coroner's inquest which are of
particular relevance in this case. First, it is a purely inquisitorial
procedure. As Lane LCJ put it in R v South London Coroner, Ex-parte Thompson
(1982) 126 SJ 625:-
'.
. . it should not be forgotten that an inquest is a fact finding exercise and
not a method of apportioning guilt. The procedure and rules of evidence which
are suitable for one are unsuitable for the other. In an inquest it should not
be forgotten that there are no parties, there is no indictment, there is no
prosecution, there is no defence, there is no trial, simply an attempt to
establish facts. It is an inquisitorial process, a process of investigation
quite unlike a criminal trial where the prosecutor accuses and the accused
defends, the judge holding the balance or the ring, whichever metaphor one
chooses to use.'
Secondly,
the verdict resulting from an inquest cannot impose civil or criminal liability
of any sort to any person (of Section 30 of the Act of 1962).
Indeed,
the only result of coroners inquests is a death certificate. This is a public
document and is receivable as such evidence.
The
Court was also referred to the "Handbook for Coroners in the Republic of
Ireland" already cited, by Patrick O'Connor, pp, 8-12 and Halsbury's Law of
England, (4th ed) Vol 9(2). The Applicant admits that if a garda witness gives
evidence with anonymity and in a manner whereby they will be identified only by
a code letter, the Coroner granted the said witnesses a privilege which would
not be available to a witness before the High Court and accordingly disregarded
the aforesaid legislative decision in [Roe v Blood Transfusion Service Board
& Ireland, [1996] 3 IR 67].
The
situation in Northern Ireland is totally different. In Leckey, J and Greer, D
"Coroners' Law and Practice in Northern Ireland", SLS Legal Publications,
Belfast, 1998, it is provided under the heading "The Screening of Witnesses" at
para 9-37 as follows:-
"A
witness who is a member of a special unit of the police or armed services may
in certain cases wish to conceal his identity and/or physical appearance on
grounds of national security or for some other reason. In such case, an
application will be made to the coroner normally grounded on a Public Interest
Immunity Certification that the witness be allowed to give evidence from behind
a screen which prevents him from being seen, at least by members of the public.
It may be necessary for the coroner to convene a preliminary hearing for the
purpose of receiving legal submissions in relation to such an application.
Should the coroner accept that the witness has established that such
"disclosure" is not in the pubic interest, he will permit the witness to give
his evidence from behind a screen. Whilst everyone in court will still be able
to hear the witness give evidence only the coroner, legal representatives and
Jurors will be able to see him."
They
also refer to In re Ministry of Defence's Application [unreported QBD (Crown
Side)], 9 July, 1993 [transcript on lexis], [1994] NI 279 (CA)). Counsel on
behalf of the Ministry of Defence had made an application to the coroner,
grounded on a Public Interest Immunity Certificate that three soldiers should
be screened whilst giving evidence. The coroner refused the application and the
Ministry of Defence sought a Judicial Review of that decision. McColum J (as he
then was) in the High Court quashed the coroner's decision and remitted the
matter for reconsideration by the coroner. In the course of his judgment, the
learned Judge observed:-
In
my view the effect of [rule 5] is to curtail the power of the Coroner to
regulate the conduct of proceedings in his court. He has a statutory duty to
conduct the hearing in public and in my view he would not be entitled to
regulate procedures in his Court so as to hold any part of the hearing other
than in public . . . except as allowed by the proviso to the rule. In relation
to the public nature of the hearing, therefore, the Coroner's only discretion
is to exclude the public from an inquest or any part of the inquest if he
considers that it would be in the interest of natural security so to do."
The
quote in textbook confirms that McColum J's statement must be taken as
representing the law. The textbook continues at para 9/39:-
"In
the Ministry of Defence case, McColum J appeared to hold that the screening of
a witness derogates from the principle that an inquest should be held in
public, but when required in the interest of national security, such screening
is authorised by the proviso in rule 5: 'The power to exclude the public must
also include the power of partial exclusion by way of a screen.
At
paragraph 9/40 it also states:-
"Where
an application for a witness to be screened is based on national security
considerations the coroner is in any event required to balance the restrictions
inherent in screening against the considerations of national security set out
in a Public Interest Immunity Certificate. In Re Ministry of Defence's
Application, Hutton LCJ advised that the coroner should bear in mind that even
if the witnesses (in that case three soldiers) are screened:-
'the
legal representatives of the parties will be able to see the faces of the
soldiers as they give evidence and are cross-examined and that the only
restriction on the public hearing will be that members of the public and of the
press and media will not be able to see the faces of the soldiers as they give
their evidence. This is undoubtedly a restriction on the public nature of the
hearing but it is a limited restriction and the Coroner will have to balance
that limited restriction against the considerations of national security set
out in the Certificate of a Secretary of State, to which certificate he must
give due weight'."
The
Court was also referred to R v HM Coroner for Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Ex-parte A,
QBD, December 19, 1997, Tucker J. In that case it was held that a coroner had
an inherent power to order the screening of witnesses in exceptional cases if
the administration of justice so requires and this does not transgress Rule 17
of the Coroners Rules, 1984 which provides that an inquest shall be heard in
public unless the coroner considers exclusion necessary in the interest of
national security so to do. A Coroner who had interpreted the rule (Coroners
Rules, 1984 -- English) to mean that screening a witness excludes the public
was held to have erred. The Court also considered Regina v Her Majesty's
Coroner at Hammersmith, Ex-parte Peach, [1980] 2 All ER 7, In Re: Mailey &
Ors, QBD [1980] NI 102, R v Edgar & Ors, [1958] 2 All ER 494, R v Kerry
1976 CR at App Rep 152, R v Barnet Magistrates Court, Ex-parte Wood, Crim LR
78, In the matter of an application by Hugh Jordan for Judicial Review,
unreported, 28 June, 1996, Court of Appeal. It was pointed out to the Court
that Costello P allowed screening in sex cases before the video-link was
established and Budd J had done it in a garda compensation case to protect the
garda.
In
the Superior Courts the procedure governing the taking of depositions is
covered by Order 39, Rule 11. In the English Courts, including several of the
judgments cited above, did not require that the deposition to be signed and
documents used to ground jurisdiction, although there is some confusion. A
requirement which happened in the Magistrates Court was regarded as merely
directory and not mandatory in character. The Coroner has obviously given great
care and consideration to the problems raised in this Court. One also
sympathises with the garda who have a very difficult job to do and fear for
their own safety and in particular the safety of their own families. However,
there is no suggestion that there is any question of national security being
involved. It is very much a question of personal security. We do not have the
equivalent to Rule 17 here. The purposes of the rule is firstly to allow
parties and members of the public to hear the evidence of the circumstances of
the death and secondly to prevent members of the public from hearing evidence
of matters affecting national security. The Coroner quotes cases which appeared
before other coroners in which the gardai were allowed to be identified by
letters. However, the legal grounds for such procedures in this jurisdiction
has not been questioned or tested.
It
would certainly seem desirable that the request for anonymity should be
investigated by the Coroner. It is not for the gardai personally to claim it.
The State can take the point before the Coroner decides the matter on tested
evidence. The Coroner must take a note of the names and addresses of witnesses
or a deposition. In this jurisdiction a deposition must normally identify who
is the deponent. The Coroner in his cited affidavit ruled that the gardai were
material witnesses who must give evidence. There is no precedent, he admits,
for anonymity. The Coroners Court is a creature of Statute under the
Constitution and therefore English and Northern Ireland cases are not
necessarily helpful.
While
anonymity may be necessary for national or personal security reasons the
Coroners have no such power and it is for the legislature not the Courts to
remedy this lacunae (DPP v Goulding, Supreme Court, 2 July 1999, unreported).
The Courts are not allowed to seek pragmatic solutions.
Accordingly,
the coroner must confine himself to the duties imposed by the Act and
particularly Section 28 thereof. He must preserve and provide all documents
received by him under the Act. He has ruled that the forensic report is
necessary. It is obviously part of the post-mortem report.
While
the Court fully appreciates the difficulties and worries of the gardai, and
hopes that the necessary legislation may be considered and if deemed
appropriate enacted. The Coroner has not got the powers the purported to
exercise. In the circumstances, the Court doth grant the two Orders of
Certiorari sought.