High Court of Ireland Decisions

1. By Order of the High Court (O'Sullivan J.) dated the 23rd day of September, 1998 the Applicant was granted leave to apply, inter alia, for the following relief by way of Judicial Review that is to say:-

2. The origin of the jurisdiction of the District Court to try criminal cases of a minor nature in a summary form has been set out in some detail by the Supreme Court (Finlay C.J.) in The State (Clarke) -v- Roche [1987] I.L.R.M. 309 and by the High Court (Hamilton P.) and the Supreme Court (Finlay C.J.) in D.P.P. -v- Nolan [1990] 2 I.R. 526. Whilst the jurisdiction remains fundamentally derived from ss 10 and 11 of the Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act, 1851 (hereinafter referred to as the 1851 Act) the 1986 Act has "....set up a secondary mode of procedure whereby the issue of a summons in respect of an offence may be procured on the application by or on behalf of the Attorney General, the Director of Public Prosecutions, a member of the Garda Siochana, or any person authorised by or under Statute to prosecute an offence" [per Hamilton P. in D.P.P. -v- Nolan [1990] 2 I.R. 526 at p.536].

3. It is of importance to note that the 1986 Act "....does not replace Sections 10 and 11 of the 1851 Act, as had been suggested by the Supreme Court, but it does make the issue of a summons an administrative function" [per Blayney J. in Toss Limited -v- Dublin Metropolitan District Justice (unrep. High Court, 24th November, 1987)] and furthermore:-

4. These sections still remain in force, as do the District Court Rules, 1948 (S.R. & O No. 431 of 1947)" [per Hamilton P. in D.P.P. -v- Nolan [1990] 2 I.R. 526 at p.536].

5. The relevant provision is:-

6. The Section provides for three separate and distinct steps. They are:-

7. The first of these steps is for the complainant. He must make his complaint to the person authorised to receive it. The second step is for the latter to be satisfied that the complaint makes out a prima facie case while the third step involves the signing of the summons."

8. It follows that the foregoing three steps, validly taken, confer jurisdiction upon the District Court for the summary trial of various charges as prescribed by law. That jurisdiction however is dependent and conditional upon the complaint being made within six months from the time when the cause of complaint has arisen.

9. The ".....secondary mode of procedure....." referred to by Hamilton P. in D.P.P -v- Nolan (supra) created pursuant to the provisions of the 1986 Act also confers jurisdiction upon the District Court but it is clear that:-

10. Garda Long applied on the 27th August, 1997 for the issue of summonses in respect of alleged road traffic offences committed by the Notice Party on the 6th day of July, 1997 and there can be no doubt that the District Court has jurisdiction to hear the trial of those alleged offences because the application made by Garda Long was made validly and properly pursuant to the provisions of Section 1(4) of the 1986 Act and was made within six months of the date of the alleged offences.

11. It has been contended on behalf of the Applicant that, in addition to the jurisdiction conferred upon the District Court pursuant to the provisions of the 1986 Act, the said Court has concurrent jurisdiction to hear the trial of the offences concerned because at the sitting of the District Court in Bray, County Wicklow, on the 21st November, 1997 Garda Long made a valid complaint to the Respondent who was a person authorised to receive it and that the making of the complaint and the receipt of that complaint by the Respondent conferred jurisdiction upon the District Court pursuant to the provisions of Section 10 of the Act of 1851. I decline to make any express finding in respect of that argument because I believe it is unnecessary for me to do so having regard to my earlier finding herein as to jurisdiction, save to observe that Section X of the 1851 Act would appear to provide that jurisdiction is conferred where the lawfully authorised recipient has received ".... Information or Complaint...." and has commenced to ".... proceed in respect to the same....". In the instant case there is no evidence of any intention on the part of the Respondent to "proceed...." in respect of any complaint made by Garda Long on the 21st November, 1997 or to issue a Summons (as appears to be contemplated having regard to the other provisions of Section X of the 1851 Act). Rather the contrary appears to have been the case.

12. Having found (as I have) that the District Court has jurisdiction to conduct the trial of the offences alleged against the Notice Party it is now necessary for me to consider whether the Respondent was entitled to dismiss the charges preferred against the Notice Party without hearing evidence either as to the circumstances which gave rise to the charges or as to the fact which gave rise to the need for multiple applications for the issue of summonses.

13. I do not believe that the Respondent was so entitled. In D.P.P. -v- Sheeran , [1986] I.L.R.M. at 587, Gannon J. observed inter alia that where summonses are issued consequent upon a complaint made pursuant to the provisions of the 1851 Act:-

14. It is well settled that a summons does not confer jurisdiction. It is merely "...[a process] to compel the attendance of the person accused of the offence...." [per Kingsmill Moore J. in A.G. (McDonnell) -v- Higgins (1964) I.R. 374 at 391].

15. As I have already indicated the Respondent has jurisdiction to hear the trial of the offences alleged against the Notice Party for the reasons which I have already outlined.

16. It follows that the observations of Gannon J. in D.P.P. -v- Sheerin (Supra), to which I have just referred, apply with equal force to summonses issued pursuant to the provisions of either the 1851 Act or the 1986 Act so that a defect of form in a summons made pursuant to the provisions of the 1986 Act will not invalidate the proceedings and furthermore the court at which the person charged is present may proceed with the hearing notwithstanding deficiency in the form, content or service of the summons.

17. Prima facie, there were defects in the form (and possibly content) of the summonses which came before the Respondent on 20th February, 1998 in the District Court in Bray because each of the summonses referred, on its face, to the 1986 Act and recited that applications for the issue of the summonses were made on the 6th day of January, 1998 in respect of offences allegedly committed more than six months prior to the 6th day of January, 1998 (and, accordingly, were made outside the time limited in that behalf by the 1986 Act).

18. The apparent defect in the form or content of the summonses could have been rectified by the admission of evidence (and possibly by the amendment of the summons concerned) provided the Notice Party was present (and there is no indication that he was not) and thereafter the Respondent could quite lawfully have proceeded to conduct the trial of the offences alleged against the Notice Party.

19. In fact, however, the Respondent overlooked or rejected the wish of the Applicant to adduce evidence which might well have served to rectify any apparent defect or defects on the face of the summonses and proceeded to dismiss the charges which had been preferred against the Notice Party without hearing any evidence.

20. If the Respondent concluded that he did not have jurisdiction to conduct the trial of the offences preferred against the Notice Party (which conclusion would have been erroneous) then his proper course of action would have been to strike out the charges.

21. He was correct in accepting jurisdiction but was in error in dismissing the charges preferred against the Notice Party without hearing any evidence and accordingly the Applicant is entitled to the relief which he seeks.

22. The orders dated the 20th day of February, 1998 purporting to dismiss the various charges preferred against the Notice Party will therefore be and are hereby quashed and the said proceedings are remitted back to the District Court to be there dealt with in accordance with law.