[New search]
[Help]
APH Manufacturing B.V. t/a Wyeth Medica Ireland v. DHL [2000] IEHC 131; [2001] I ILRM 224 (28th June, 2000)
THE
HIGH COURT
1995
No. 2390p
BETWEEN
APH
MANUFACTURING B.V. TRADING AS WYETH MEDICA IRELAND
PLAINTIFF
AND
DHL
WORLDWIDE NETWORK N.V., DHL WORLDWIDE EXPRESS GMbH
AND
DHL INTERNATIONAL (IRELAND) LIMITED
DEFENDANTS
JUDGEMENT
of Finnegan J. delivered the 28th day of June 2000.
1. The
Plaintiff is a pharmaceutical manufacturer manufacturing inter alia the female
contraceptive pill an ingredient in which is gestodene micronised manufactured
by Schering AG of Berlin.
2. The
Defendants were retained for the purposes of the carriage of a consignment of
gestodene micronised from Berlin to the Plaintiff's premises at Newbridge, Co.
Kildare. The consignment was contained in a single cylindrical millboard
container 42cms x 42cms x 42cms specified to carry 74 kgs. The consignment
weighed much less than this, the total weight of the consignment including the
container being 9.3 kgs. The design of the container is such that when
carrying 75 kgs it will withstand a fall of 15 feet; having regard to the
actual weight of the consignment the container would probably withstand a fall
from up to 80 feet.
3. It
is accepted that the consignment was suitably packed. The consignment had a
value of DM1,800,000. The container was damaged and the contents lost in the
course of carriage. In this action the Plaintiff claims against the Defendants
for the value of the consignment and the losses being agreed at £
.
THE
DEFENDANTS' OPERATION
4. The
Defendants provide an overnight delivery service. In 1994 their main sorting
operation was carried out at Brussels Airport - the Brussels Hub. At the
relevant time some 100,000 shipments weighing 300 tonnes per night were handled
at the Brussels Hub. In a very intensive operation lasting some four hours
shipments would arrive by road or air from all over Europe and other parts of
the world and would be turned around and forwarded to their destination within
that four hour period.
5. The
Brussels Hub is the largest of its kind outside of the United States. Some
1,900 staff are employed there at present but something less than this would
have been employed in 1994. Each night some 28 aircraft and 70 trucks and vans
would arrive and depart within the four hour period. On arrival an aircraft
would park on an area called the ramp. Adjoining the ramp were two main
buildings in which shipments were sorted for onward carriage. Shipments were
classified as either -
1.
"Conveyables"
being shipments suitable to travel on the conveyor belt system and which were
sorted in building no. 3.
2. "Non-conveyables"
being shipments unsuitable for placing on the conveyor belt system because they
exceed 25 kgs in weight or in size exceed one metre on a side and which were
dealt with in building no. 2.
3. "Small
non-conveyables" being shipments less than 25 kgs in weight or less than one
metre on a side but which because of the manner in which they are packaged,
their shape or otherwise are not classified as conveyables and these are dealt
with in building no. 2. There they are removed from the aircraft container and
stacked and then taken to building no. 3 where they are sorted and taken
directly to the appropriate outbound aircraft container.
6. The
Defendants' evidence was to the effect that small non-conveyables were
transported from building no. 2 to building no. 3 either by baggage trolley or
in an aircraft container and in each case being towed by an electrical tractor.
The baggage trolley is a form of trailer of the type used to carry suitcases to
aircraft at airports the contents being retained within the same by strong
waterproof sheets. The aircraft container sometimes called an igloo is also
designed to secure its contents. However, in cross-examination Mr Sodergard
the General Manager of the Brussels Hub accepted that the Defendants' induction
manual in dealing with small non-conveyables states that the same will be
collected by fork lift truck or by other means for transport to the destination
sort (building 3). He further accepted that fork lifts were in fact so used.
He described this as a not very practical means of transporting small
conveyables.
THE
LOSS OF THE CONSIGNMENT
7. It
is common case that the damage to the consignment is not consistent with
falling from an aircraft or mishandling. On the evidence I find as a matter of
probability that the consignment fell from a vehicle while being transported
from building 2 to building 3 and was then run over by another vehicle. The
risk of a small non-conveyable so falling being run over by another vehicle is
very high having regard to the large number of vehicles operating in the
Brussels Hub and the speed at which and the pressure of time under which the
vehicles operate in that area and the relatively confined area over which such
vehicles must travel. The importance of properly securing a small
non-conveyable must have been very evident to the Defendants. If this
consignment had been carried in a baggage trolley or an aircraft container it
is most unlikely that the same could have fallen in the course of being
transported. For this reason, having regard to the contents of the Defendants'
induction manual and the evidence given by Mr Sodergard I find as a matter of
probability that this consignment was being carried from building 2 to building
3 on a wooden pallet by a fork lift truck and that it was unsecured and
expected to stay in place under its own weight. Had this consignment been
carried on a baggage trolley or aircraft container it is most unlikely that it
could fall out unless the baggage trolley or the container was not completely
or properly closed which, according to Mr Sodergard is not very likely to have
occurred.
THE
CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE
8. The
contract of carriage is partly in writing and partly oral. Insofar as the same
is in writing it is contained in the following documents
1.
The
Defendants' standard terms and conditions.
Prior to the discussions concerning the carriage of gestodene micronised the
Defendants acted as a carrier to the Plaintiff. On the 16th September, 1993
the Defendants furnished to the Plaintiff their standard terms and conditions.
The effect of the same is that where the Warsaw Convention applies the
Defendants should have no liability beyond that imposed by the Convention.
2.
The
Airwaybill.
The Defendants stipulated that it would only carry the gestodene micronised
provided the hold harmless agreement hereinafter referred to was executed by
the Plaintiff. The hold harmless agreement expressly provides that the same is
in addition to and does not alter the application of the terms and conditions
included in the Defendants' airwaybill. The airwaybill has endorsed on the
same "important notes" which summarise the Defendants' conditions of carriage.
The conditions of carriage to themselves were not led in evidence. The
important notes provide that where the Warsaw Convention applies the
Defendants' liability shall be limited by the Convention except as follows:-
"(a) In
respect of direct consequence of damage loss or unreasonable delay of the
consignment where the Defendants have demonstrated wilful intent or gross
negligence.
(b) In
respect of indirect consequences of damage loss or unreasonable delay of the
consignment the Defendants shall be liable in respect of wilful action, gross
negligence and culpable non-observance of essential contractual terms."
9. The
Plaintiff's claim in this action is for the direct consequences of damage to
and loss of the consignment and accordingly (a) only is relevant. The effect
of the provision is that in the event of damage to or loss of the consignment
the Defendants will be liable to the Plaintiff subject to the limitation
provided for in the Warsaw Convention Article 22 but such limitation shall not
apply if the Plaintiff can establish wilful intent or gross negligence.
3.
The
Hold Harmless Agreement.
The
relevance of the hold harmless Agreement is that it incorporates into the
contract of carriage the terms and conditions of the airwaybill.
10. I
hold that as the same related exclusively to the carriage of gestodene
micronised it supersedes the terms of the standard terms and conditions issued
in respect of general carriage
4.
The
Plaintiff's Fax of 16th February, 1994.
By this fax the Plaintiff stipulated as a key point for shipments of gestodene
micronised the following -
"Every
shipment should be monitored through the system and marked for priority
attention."
11. On
the evidence of Mr Pat Walsh, the Plaintiff's shipping manager I am satisfied
that this required of the Defendants that they should be in a position to
identify the location of each consignment of gestodene micronised at each point
on its journey from Berlin to the Plaintiff's premises at Newbridge and also
that each consignment should be so marked that at each stage on its journey the
employees of the Defendants dealing with the same should be aware of the
importance of the consignments and deal with the same promptly.
5.
Fax
dated 17th February, 1994
from
Ursula Murray on behalf of the Defendants to Pat Walsh on behalf of the
Plaintiff which stipulated that the consignment would not be accepted unless
the hold harmless agreement was signest by the Plaintiff and that and without
additional controls the consignment should be carried at the Plaintiff's risk.
12. In
addition to the foregoing it was orally agreed between Mr Pat Walsh for the
Plaintiff and Mr John Dunne for the Defendants that the Plaintiff would insure
the consignment.
13. Having
regard to the provisions of the Warsaw Convention Article 23 thereof as
hereinafter set out insofar as the contract purported to restrict the liability
of the Defendants below that provided for in the Warsaw Convention it was
ineffective. Thus the hold harmless agreement, the fax of 17th February 1994
and the terms agreed orally do not relieve the Defendants from liability under
the Warsaw Convention
THE
WARSAW CONVENTION
14. The
Warsaw Convention was adopted into Irish law by the Air Navigation and
Transport Act, 1936. The amendments thereto by the Hague Convention were
adopted into Irish law by the Air Navigation and Transport Act, 1959 and the
amendments thereto by the Guadalajara Convention were adopted into Irish law by
the Air Navigation and Transport Act, 1956.
15. The
relevant provisions of the Warsaw Convention as amended (hereinafter called
"the Convention") are as follows:-
"Article
1(3) Carriage to be performed by several successive air carriers is deemed for
the purposes of this Convention to be one undivided carriage if it has been
regarded by the parties as a single operation whether it had been agreed upon
under the form of a single contract or of a series of contracts and it does not
lose its international character merely because one contract or a series of
contracts is to be performed entirely within the territory of the same State."
"Article
18
(1)
The
carrier is liable for damage sustained in the event of the destruction or loss
of or of damage to any registered luggage or any goods if the occurrence which
caused the damage so sustained took place during the carriage by air.
(2)
The
carriage by air within the meaning of the preceding paragraph comprises the
period during which the luggage or goods are in charge of the carrier whether
in any aerodrome or on board an aircraft or in the case of landing outside an
aerodrome in any place whatsoever.
Article
20
(1) The
carrier is not liable if he proves that he and his agents have taken all
necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for him or
them to take such measures.
Article
22
(2) (a) In
the carriage of registered baggage and or cargo the liability of the carrier is
limited to a sum of 250 francs per kg unless the passenger or consignor has
made at the time when the package was handed over to the carrier a special
declaration of interest in delivery at destination and has paid a supplementary
sum if the case requires. In that case the carrier will be liable to pay a sum
not exceeding the declared sum unless he proves that the sum is greater than
the passenger's or consignor's actual interest in delivery at destination.
(4) The
limits prescribed in this act shall not prevent the Court from awarding in
accordance with its own law in addition the whole or part of the Court costs
and of the other expenses of the litigation incurred by the Plaintiff. The
foregoing provision shall not apply if the amount of the damage as awarded
excluding Court costs and other expenses of the litigation does not exceed the
sum which the carrier has offered in writing to the Plaintiff within a period
of six months from the date of the occurrence causing the damage or before the
commencement of the action if that is later.
Article
23
Any
provision tending to relieve the carrier of liability or to fix a lower limit
than that which is laid down in the present Convention shall be null and void
but the nullity of any such provision does not involve the nullity of the whole
contract which will remain subject to the provisions of the present Convention.
Article
24(1)
In
the cases covered by Articles 18 and 19 any action for damages however founded
can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits set out in the present
Convention.
Article
25
The
limits of liability specified in Article 22 shall not apply if it proved that
the damage resulted from an act or omission of the carrier, his servants or
agents done with intent to cause damage or recklessly and with knowledge that
damage would probably result; provided that in the case of such act or omission
of a servant or agent, it is also proved that he was acting within the scope of
his employment.
Article
30(1)
In
the case of carriage to be performed by various successive carriers and falling
within the definition set out in the third paragraph of Article 1 each carrier
accepting passengers luggage or goods is subject to the rules set out in this
Convention and is deemed to be one of the contracting parties to the contract
of carriage insofar as that contract deals with such part of the carriage as is
performed under his supervision.
(3) In
the case of luggage or goods the consignor will have a right of action against
the first carrier and the consignee who is entitled to delivery will have a
right of action against the last carrier and further each may take action
against the carrier who performed the carriage during which the destruction,
loss, damage or delay took place. These carriers will be jointly liable to the
consignor or consignee.
LIABILITY
OF THE DEFENDANTS
The
Defendants have not sought to rely on the Convention Article 20(1) to release
them from liability. Accordingly, they are liable to the Plaintiff subject to
the limitations contained in the Convention Article 22(2)(a). However, the
Plaintiff claims to be entitled to recover fully in respect of its loss upon
the following basis -
(a) that
it delivered to the Defendants a special declaration of interest in delivery at
destination in accordance with the Convention Article 22(2)(a)
(b) that
the damage resulted from an act or omission of the Defendants done recklessly
and with knowledge that damage would probably result
(c) that
the Defendants were in breach of the terms of the contract of carriage
contained in the airwaybill, the damage to the consignment having resulted from
gross negligence on the part of the Defendants.
SPECIAL
DECLARATION OF INTEREST
The
Convention limits on liability do not apply where a consignor has made at the
time when the package was handed over to the carrier a special declaration of
interest in delivery at destination. There are no provisions in the Convention
as to the form which such declaration should take: Shawcross and Beaumont Air
Law 4th Ed. Vol. 1 para 570. Shawcross and Beaumont suggest that an oral
declaration may be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article 22(2)(a).
Declarations made for purposes other than the purpose of Article 22(2)(a) have
been held not to constitute a declaration for the purposes of the article. In
Corcraft
Limited -v- Pan American Airways Inc
.
[1969] 1 All ER 82 and
Westminster
Bank
Stot -v- Imperial Airways
1936 All E.R. 890. It was held that the value declared for customs was
insufficient. In
Cie d'Assurances Alpina -v- Cie Transworld Airlines
[1984] 18 RFDA 234 it was held that a declaration for insurance purposes was
insufficient.
The Plaintiff relies on three documents as each constituting a special
declaration. The first is a fax dated 16th February, 1994 from the Plaintiff
to the Defendants which gives the following information:-
"Value
of gestodene shipments will be IR£1 million approx per shipment"
16. In
construing Article 22(2)(a) significance must be accorded to the word special
and I take the view that special requires that the declaration be directed
towards invoking the provisions of the Article. The fax of 16th February, 1994
was not so directed and could not reasonably have been understood by the
Defendants as being so intended. The intention of Mr Walsh who sent the fax
was merely to alert the Defendants that the consignment was of significant
value. Accordingly, it does not amount to a special declaration for the
purposes of the article.
17. The
second document relied upon by the Plaintiff is one headed "Luftfracht" (Air
freight). This document emanated from Schering AG in response to a fax dated
18th February, 1994 from Miss Viebig on behalf of the Defendants in which she
requested certain information in relation to the consignment, but not the
value. The luftracht in response stated the value of the consignment at
DM1,800,000. Prior to that date the defendants' Berlin office had already
ascertained from Schering AG the value of the consignment for the purposes of
ascertaining whether or not the Defendants would carry the shipment. At the
time the luftracht issued the Defendants were already in possession of the
consignment so that even if it could otherwise be said to constitute a
declaration for the purposes of Article 22(2)(a) it had not been given at the
time that the consignment was handed over to the Defendants. Further I accept
the evidence of Miss Viebig that the information furnished by Schering AG was
in response to her request for information which would satisfy her that the
consignment did not consist of goods restricted for carriage according to IATA
regulations and it was not therefore given for the purposes of Article
22(2)(a).
18. The
third document relied upon by the Plaintiff is an invoice from Schering AG
which accompanied the consignment. On the basis of the comments in Shawcross
and Beaumont 4th Ed. Vol. 1 para 604 I hold that the invoice could not amount
to a declaration for the purposes of the Convention Article 22(2)(a).
19. Accordingly,
the Plaintiff is not entitled to be relieved from the limit on liability
pursuant to the Convention Article 22(2)(a) as having made a special
declaration of interest in delivery at destination.
ACT
DONE RECKLESSLY AND WITH KNOWLEDGE THAT DAMAGE WOULD PROBABLY RESULT
20.
In order to preclude the limit on liability under the Convention the consignor
must show that the damage resulted from an act or omission of the carrier, his
servants or agents -
(a) Done
recklessly and
(b) with
knowledge that damage would probably result
21. To
apply a single composite test would be to deprive the conjunctive
“and” in Article 25 of meaning
22. As
to the meaning of reckless in
R
-v- Stephenson
[1979] 2 All ER 1198, Lane L.J. said -
"A
man is reckless when he carries out a deliberate act appreciating that there is
a risk that damage ... may result from his act. It is however, not the taking
of every risk which could properly be classed as reckless. The risk must be
one which it is in all the circumstances unreasonable for him to take."
23. Lane
L.G. Applied a subjective test. This was overruled by the
House
of Lords in metropohitan Police Commissioner -v- Caldwell
(1982) AC 341
.
In
R
-v- Lawrence
[1981] 1 All ER 974 Lord Diplock defined reckless in its proper meaning as
describing an act which is one that presents a real risk of harmful
consequences to which anyone acting with reasonable prudence would recognise
and give heed to. This objective test was approved by the House of Lords in
R.V.
Reid
(1992) A.C. 341. In
Shawinigan
Limited -v- Vokins and Company Limited
[1961] 3 All ER 397 Megaw J. had to consider the meaning of the word
"recklessly" in the London Lighterage Clause applying an objective test and at
p. 403 said -
"In
my view, 'recklessly' means grossly careless. Recklessness is gross
carelessness - the doing of something which in fact involves a risk, whether
the doer realises it or not; and the risk being such having regard to all the
circumstances, that the taking of that risk would be described as 'reckless'.
The likelihood or otherwise that damage will follow was one element to be
considered, not whether the doer of the act actually realised the likelihood.
The extent of the damage which is likely to follow is another element, not the
extent which the doer of the act, in his wisdom or folly, happens to foresee.
If the risk is slight and the damage which will follow if things go wrong is
small, it may not be reckless, however, unjustified the doing of the act may
be. If the risk is great and the probable damage great, recklessness may
readily be a fair description. Each case has to be viewed on its own
particular facts and not by reference to any formula. The only test, in my
view, is an objective one. Would a reasonable man, knowing all the facts and
circumstances which the doer of the act knew or ought to have known, describe
the act as 'reckless' in the ordinary meaning of that word in ordinary speech?
As I have said my understanding of the ordinary meaning of that word is a high
degree of carelessness.
In
Gurtner
-v- Beaton
(1991) I & B. Au. R. Vii 499. Owen J. In the context of Article 25 applied
on objective test for recklessness. Srawcross S Beaumount at para.447 express
their opinion that “recklessly” in Article 25 must now be given an
objective uneaning
Upon
the basis of these authorities I take the view that the test for recklessness
is an objective one.
However
Article 25 contains the additional requirement of knowledge that damage would
probably result. In the United Kingdom it was held in Goldman v Thai Airways
International Ltd (1983) 3 ALL E.R. 693 and in Gurnter v Beaton (1991) 1 S
& B Av. R vii 1992 1 S & B Av. R vii 723 that the test as a whole i.e
without separately construing “recklessly,” is a subjective one.
Goldman v Thai International Airways Ltd was followed by the New South Wales
Court of Appeal in SS Pharmaceutical Company Ltd v Qantas Airways Ltd (1988) 1
S & B Av. R vii 313. The same approach was adopted byt eh Swiss Court in
Claudio v Avinca Acrovais Nationles de Colombia SA (1987) 1 S& B A v.R vii
281, by the Begian Court de Cassation in Tondriau v Air India (1976) Eur.Tr.907
and by the Italian court in Belgian International Air Service v Mandreoli 1 S
& B Av.R vii 601. The alternative view has been taken by the French courts
which adopted an objective test for the actors knowledge: Emery v Sabena (1968)
22 RFDA 184, Moynot v Cie. Air France 34 RFDA 105, Eid v Ste. Union des
Transports Aeriens Court de Cassation 25th June 1991. This view is also taken
in Canada: Swiss Bank Corporation v Air Canada 1 S & B Av. R vii 37.
Having
considered the authorities I hold that while the test of recklessness is
objective the test of knowledge is subjective. However, the onus on a
Plaintiff to satisfy the Court on the subjective test of knowledge can be
satisfied by his establishing facts which must have been apparent to the actor
and which would give the requisite knowledge to a reasonable person that damage
would probably result whereupon the onus would pass to the Defendant who could
offer the actor in evidence as to his subjective state of knowledge. In the
present case the actor has not been identified and accordingly in order to
satisfy the requirement of Article 25 it is sufficient for the Plaintiff to
show that the circumstances are such that a person acting with knowledge of
those circumstances must be regarded as having the requisite knowledge. As to
knowledge being inferred circumstantially see Phibson on Evidence 14th Ed. para
1610.
This
is the approach which was adopted by Gleeson CJ and Handley LJ in SS
Pharmaceutical Company Ltd v Qantas Airways Ltd where subjective knowledge was
inferred from circumstances proved in evidence the actor not being called by
the Defendant to give evidence. While Kirby P dissented he did so upon the
basis that the evidence was insufficient to discharge circumstantially the
subjective text which he applied to the phrase “recklessly etc” as
a whole.
While
it was held in SS Pharmaceutical Company Ltd v Qantas Airways that the Court
may more readily draw an adverse inference where the Defendant does not call
the actor to give evidence I do not draw any additional inference from the
failure to do so in this case as the evidence before me was that the actor had
not been identified and indeed had he been identified the onus would
nonetheless remain on the Plaintiff as the Defendant here as always is not
obliged to give evidence.
Article
25 requires knowledge that damage would probably result. In the context of
Article 25 “probably” must not be confused with “on the
balance of probability”. As the latter phrase clearly recognises, there
may in a given set of circumstances be several results which are probable as
opposed to merely possible: it is a matter of degree whether a result it to be
categorised as probable or merely possible. It is not necessary that the
damage would more likely result than not. In Goldman .v. Thai Airways
International Ltd at p.700 Eveleigh J said as to the meaning of probably in
Article 25:-
“Thus
something more than a possibility is required is required. The word
“probable” is a common enough word. I understand it to mean that
something is likely to happen”.
24. I
accept the view that “likely” accurately conveys the meaning of
probably as used in Article 25. In S S Pharmaceutical Company Ltd v Qantas
Airways Ltd an analysis of the facts as found makes it clear that if something
more than that damage was likely was meant by probable, for example more likely
than not, the majority could not have found for the plaintiff. In Gurtner v
Beaton the Court of Appeal considered its approach as consistent with S S
Pharmaceutical Company Ltd and also with Goldman v Thai Airways International
Ltd as to the meaning of “probable”.
25. Having
regard to the foregoing I find that the Defendants were reckless having regard
to the following circumstances:-
1. The
consignment was carried on a wooden pallet by forklift without being secured.
2. The
nature of the consignment was such it was likely risk that it would be
dislodged by movement of the fork lift.
3. It
was likely that if dislodged the consignment would be run over by another
vehicle having regard to the heavy volume of vehicular traffic, the speed at
which that traffic travelled and the constraints under which the drivers
operated.
26. To
adopt the phrase from S.S. Pharmaceutical Co Ltd v Qantas Airways Ltd the
treatment of
the
consignment amounted to deplorably last handling
27. Further
I find that a reasonable person having knowledge of the circumstances
enumerated above would have knowledge that damage of the nature which in fact
occurred would probably result if the consignment fell from the fork lift. The
onus therefore, passed to the Defendants to show that the actor did not
subjectively have the requisite knowledge; they did not apparently seek to
identify the actor although it would probably have been possible to do so from
their rosters for the night in question and in consequence no evidence as to
the actual state of knowledge was led.
28.
In consequence of these findings the Defendants are not entitled to rely on
the limitation of liability under the Convention.
GROSS
NEGLIGENCE
29. The
effect of the airwaybill is to render the Defendants liable if damage was
caused by gross negligence. Gross negligence is not a concept known to Irish
law (see Austin v Manchester etc. Railway to 138 E.R. 181) but as it is
included in the contract of carriage it is necessary to ascribe some meaning to
the same. The important notes endorsed on the airwaybill are in German and the
phrase translated as "gross negligence" is grobe fahrlassigkeit".
As
to the meaning of the term in German law I have had the evidence of Dr
Grewantshki for the Plaintiff and Dr Menke for the Defendant. Grobe
fahrlassigkeit requires recklessness - an inexcusable breach of duty which
substantially exceeds the ordinary degree of negligence. While in general the
test in German law is the subjective state of mind of the actor as to the risk
which he is taking if the actor recklessly did not have knowledge of the risk
this can amount to grobe fahrlassigkeit.
30. On
the evidence of both witnesses as to German law I am satisfied that the
expression "gross negligence" is intended to equate with "grobe fahrlassigkeit"
both what has been described and conscious or unconscious and which for present
purposes can be termed subjective or objective. Both witnesses gave evidence
as to the understanding of Article 25 in German law as being the equivalent to
conscious or subjective grobe fahrlassigkeit. This corresponds with the view
which I have taken as to the meaning of Article 25 in regard to the second
element there required i.e. knowledge, so however that applying the Irish law
of evidence, as I must, the required knowledge can be proved circumstantially.
Upon the basis of the evidence of the German legal experts having found the
Plaintiff to have established its entitlement to be relieved from the limits of
liability imposed by Article 25 the Plaintiff must also be entitled to be so
relieved pursuant to the provision contained in the airwaybill whereby the
Defendants assume liability for damage caused by gross negligence if negligence
is equivalent to grobe fahrlassigkeit.
31. I
hold that the term gross negligence in the airwaybill is indeed equivalent to
grobe fahrlassigkeit in German law.
THE
HOLD HARMLESS AGREEMENT
32. The
Defendant seeks to be relieved from liability on foot of the hold harmless
agreement. However, the hold harmless agreement insofar as it purports to
restrict the liability of the Defendants under the Convention having regard to
the provisions of Article 23 of the Convention is null and void and so cannot
affect the Defendants' liability under Article 22, neither can it relieve the
Defendants from liability under the provisions of the airwaybill for gross
negligence as in its terms it expressly provides as follows -
"This
agreement is in addition to and does not affect the application of the terms
and conditions included on DHL's airwaybill."
33. Thus
in the event of a conflict between the hold harmless agreement and the
airwaybill the latter takes precedence.
FAILURE
TO FURNISH A REPORT
34. The
fax of the 16th February, 1994 forms part of the contract of carriage and
provides as follows -
"Every
shipment should be monitored through the system and marked for priority
attention".
35. The
Plaintiff contends that pursuant to this provision they were entitled to
receive a report on the loss of the consignment and indeed the Defendants
agreed to furnish such a report but failed to do so. Earlier in this judgment
I construed this clause and I hold that the same does not entitle the Plaintiff
to a report. The agreement by the Defendants to furnish such a report is not
supported by consideration and cannot amount to a separate contract. The
Plaintiff fails on this aspect of it claim.
CONCLUSION
36. Accordingly,
I hold that the Plaintiff is entitled to recover the amount of its loss without
regard to the limit of liability specified in Article 22 of the Convention
upon the basis that the damage resulted from the act or omission of the
Defendants done recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably result
and further having regard to the term of the contract of carriage that the
limits of liability specified in Article 22 of the Convention should not apply
where the damage resulted from the Defendants' gross negligence.
© 2000 Irish High Court
BAILII:
Copyright Policy |
Disclaimers |
Privacy Policy |
Feedback |
Donate to BAILII
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2000/131.html