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High Court of Ireland Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> I. (M.) v. Refugee Applications Commissioner [2001] IEHC 187 (1st December, 2001) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2001/187.html Cite as: [2001] IEHC 187 |
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1. The
Applicant was born in Karachi on 6th September, 1975 and came to Ireland
through an agent, arriving on 20th August, 1999. He received a formal
questionnaire, on which certain information is contained. The copy of it in
exhibit RS2 is unsigned and no reply is made to queries 15-22, 38-56, 58-60 and
in another form certain questions are unanswered 1-26, 28-56, 58-60, 62, 65,
70, 74, 77, 82 and 83. It appears therefrom, i.e. exhibit RS2 (Q67) that the
Applicants journey went from Karachi - Peshawar, Afghanistan, Moscow to
Ireland; he apparently stayed in “Afghanistan while travelling”
(Q72). The Applicants response to question 84 is as follows:-
2. The
second or other questionnaire at question 84 refers to being in receipt of
death threats. Subsequent to the Applicant signing the questionnaires, he
attended at interview the record of which is dated 9th April, 2001, this is
exhibited MI-1 and pages 4, 6, 16 & 17 contain pertinent information.
(Lest there be any doubt in the matter the mere fact that I chose these pages
as pertinent does not mean that the other pages are irrelevant or wanting in
worth but they are the pages on which the arguments in Court centred about.)
The reports (under what would now be considered Section 11 & 13 of the
Refugee Act, 1996 as amended) were prepared and the application came to be
considered under the Hope-Hanlon procedures. The Applicant was informed that
his application was considered by the Refugee Appeals Commissioner (hereinafter
referred to as “the Commissioner”) whose recommendation intended
for forwarding to the Minister for Justice and Law Reform (hereinafter referred
to as “the Minister”) was that the claim for refugee status was
manifestly unfounded. No criticism was then made of the information in the
documentation and the manner in which that information was considered by the
Commissioner. The debate in Court centred around two matters (1) the
credibility of the Applicant, (2) the question as to whether serious
consequences - death threats - had been made against the Applicant. The
argument advanced on behalf of the Applicant was that the mere fact that some
matter was not referred to in the interview did not mean that the answers given
in the questionnaire were incorrect. Furthermore, it is stated that the
reports prepared subsequent to the questionnaire and interview distorted the
information therein contained to such an extent as to not be a true reflection
of the information supplied by the Applicant and further that the member of the
Tribunal failed to read the interview notes or to appreciate the fact that the
alleged distortion of the information in the reports had occurred as between
the information given by the Applicant and the manner in which the
recommendation was formulated which led to a decision or recommendation by the
Commissioner that the Applicant’s case was manifestly unfounded. The
expression “manifestly unfounded” is defined in Section 12(4) of
the Refugee Act, 1996 as amended, it does not mean that because a Court could
or may take a view that would differ from that of the Tribunal that the
decision made by the Tribunal that the application was manifestly unfounded is
incorrect. The Commissioner’s decision by way of recommendation was
appealed (within time) to the Refugee Appeal Tribunal (hereinafter referred to
as “the Tribunal”). It is of importance to note that the Applicant
had the advice for this purpose of a solicitor Mr. John F. Carroll of the firm
of Carroll & Kelly. The papers contained a letter from Mr. Carroll to the
Tribunal dated 7th June, 2001 (post the receipt of the documents exhibited at
exhibit B in Mr. Rowley’s Affidavit sworn on 27th November, 2001); he
refers thrice to the question of an oral hearing in this way:-
3. Exhibit
RS3 includes a form of appeal signed by both the Applicant and the solicitor
dated the 11th June, 2001. The form provides at paragraph 3 for grounds of
appeal and indicates what is required by way of appeal from the Applicant and
specifically seeks -
4. The
letter that preceded these two documents was a letter dated 1st June, 2001 to
the Applicant to the Commissioner indicating that:-
5. In
the light of the criticisms of the Interview and the distortions or
inaccuracies stated to have been made by the Commissioner and the reports made
for or by him which it appeared centred on creditability, the Applicant
emphasised the information contained in page 17 of the interview notes where
the queries were as follows:-
6. It
was contended for the Applicant that it was clear from this that the agent only
travelled as far as Peshawar and there could be no possible confusion in the
mind of the Commissioner that the inquiry touched on the immigration control in
Ireland (i.e. at Shannon Airport). Altogether from the relevance of whether in
fact any of the ports of call in a refugee case are of significance, it seems
to me that the inquiry is directed as to whether in fact the immigration
control in the country into which the refugee or asylum seeker is seeking to
enter is the subject of the inquiry.
7. If
there was an ambiguity in this regard, this ambiguity could and should have
been as clear to the solicitor before any appeal was made to the Tribunal and
the matter drawn to the attention of the Tribunal at the time the appeal was
lodged with the Tribunal. The other main ground of criticism of the task
undertaken by the Commissioner and by the Tribunal was that they failed to have
regard to, or proper regard for, the replies made in the two questionnaire at
question 84 which are as follows:-
8. Pages
6 to 11 inclusive of the interview notes touch upon this topic. The member of
the Tribunal who considered the matter, refers specifically to both the death
threats and the serious consequences specifically in the context of replies to
question 84. If the criticisms of the interview and the reports of the
Commissioner in the papers before the Court and the submissions of Counsel were
valid it seems incomprehensible that these points of controversy not addressed
in the letter of appeal. Understanding the tone of protest in the letter of
the solicitor of the 7th June, 2001 there is an inferential acceptance that the
appeal will be on documents submitted only, the Applicant had at all relevant
times the benefit of legal advice. The decision of the Supreme Court on the
Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Bill, 1999 (2000 2 IR 360 at 395) states as
follows:-
9. Furthermore
by way of assistance in considering these matters the Handbook on Procedures
and Criteria for determining Refugee Status as issued by the office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Geneva in January, 1992 at
page 47 states as follows:-
10. Two
forms of relief are sought in this case, one is an extension of time within
which to bring an application for leave to apply for Judicial Review and the
other is an application seeking leave. They were heard conjointly and I am
satisfied that the Applicant is for all practicable purposes entitled to an
extension of time within which to appeal the decision of the Tribunal but is
not entitled to any such extension of time referable to the decision or
decisions or recommendations of the Commissioner and I so hold.
11. The
Applicant made his election to proceed to appeal the decisions of the
Commissioner to the Tribunal. If dissatisfied with the earlier decisions and
having the benefit of legal advice at the time he could and should have
challenged them if he considered them in any way improper or warranted
challenge by way of Judicial Review. Notwithstanding the fact that a Court may
be inclined to a view that would differ from the deciding body or authority in
cases of this nature a Court must be ever mindful that it must not act as an
appeal court but concern itself with a review of the decision in suit. I
adopt the decision of Kelly J. in
Sekou
Camare v. The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, The Refugee
Appeals Authority, Ireland and the Attorney General
(Unreported 26th July, 2000) to the effect that:-
12. In
the instant case Counsel on behalf of the Applicant stated that the credibility
issue was of so great importance that the Applicant should have been afforded
an oral hearing. If the true position in this regard was quite clear to the
Applicant and to the Applicant’s solicitor before the Tribunal embarked
upon any part of its decision making and it was imperative that any question or
questions or credibility that required to be resolved were done so by clear
challenging to any of the alleged distortions or explanations of ambiguity as
existing in the papers up to that date. The words of Finnegan J. in
Valeri
Zgnat’ev v. The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform
(Unreported 29th March, 2001) seem opposite:-
13. In
the instant case such emphasis on ambiguities or distortions of reportage as
are alleged in the course of this hearing to have occurred in the
documentation, in particular that of the Commissioner, were capable of being
satisfactorily addressed in writing at the time of the appeal, but no attempt
was made to do that. Finnegan J. further stated:-
14.
I am mindful in making this decision of the decision of the Supreme Court in
Steffen
v. The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform & Ors
.
(Unreported 13th November, 2001.) In my judgment this case is clearly
distinguishable therefrom. I treated the application for leave as the
application in the fullest sense as I had given counsel every opportunity to
present the case in full to the Court. In the event the application neither
good nor substantial grounds have been established by the Applicant, and if
they could be said to exist were not substantiated.