HIGH COURT
JUDICIAL REVIEW
			1999 No 413

BETWEEN
MOTOR DISTRIBUTORS LIMITED
			APPLICANT
AND
THE REVENUE COMMISSIONERS
			RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT of Mr Justice Kearns delivered the 2nd day of February, 2001.

	Section 132 of the Finance Act, 1992 introduced an excise duty called "Vehicle Registration Tax" (VRT) which was to be charged, levied and paid on the registration of a vehicle at such rates as might stand specified for the time being by an Act of the Oireachtas.  
	The Applicant is a distributor of Volkswagen motor cars in the State.  Section 133 of the Finance Act, 1992 as amended by section 9 of the Finance (No 2) Act, 1992 provides that in the case of a new vehicle on sale in the State supplied by a manufacturer or sole wholesale distributor, that manufacturer or distributor is required to declare the price a vehicle of that model and specification might reasonably be expected to fetch on a first arms length sale thereof in the open market in the State by retail.  
	The full text of section 133 (as amended) is as follows:-

	"(1)	Where the rate of Vehicle Registration Tax charged in relation to a category A vehicle or a category B vehicle is calculated by reference to the value of the vehicle, that value should be taken to be the Open Market Selling Price of the vehicle at the time of the charging of the tax thereon.
	(2)	(a)	For a new vehicle on sale in the State which is supplied by a manufacturer or sole wholesale distributor, such manufacturer or distributor shall declare to the Commissioners in the prescribed manner the price, inclusive of all taxes and duties, which, in his opinion, a vehicle of that model and specification, including any enhancements or accessories fitted or attached thereto or supplied by such manufacturer or distributor, might reasonably be expected to fetch on a first arm's length sale thereof in the open market in the State by retail.
		(b)	A price standing declared for the time being to the Commissioners in accordance with this sub-section in relation to a new vehicle shall be deemed to be the Open Market Selling Price of each new vehicle of that model and specification.
		(c)	Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (b), where a price is declared for a vehicle in accordance with this sub-section which, in the opinion of the Commissioners, is higher or lower than the Open Market Selling Price at which a vehicle of similar type and character is being offered for sale in the State at the time of such declaration, the Open Market Selling Price may be determined by the Commissioners for the purposes of this Section.
		(d)	Where a manufacturer or sole wholesale distributor fails to make a declaration under paragraph (a) or to make it in the prescribed manner, the Open Market Selling price of the vehicle concerned may be determined by the Commissioners for the purposes of this Section.
	3.		In this Section  -
			"new vehicle" means a vehicle which is less than three months old when reckoned from its first entry into service or which has travelled less than 3,000 kilometres;
			"Open Market Selling Price" means -
			(a)	in the case of a new vehicle referred to in sub-section (2), the price 	as determined by that sub-section,
			(b)	in the case of any other new vehicle, the price, inclusive of all taxes and duties, which, in the opinion of the Commissioners, would be determined under sub-section (2) in relation to that vehicle if it were on sale in the State following supply by a manufacturer or sole wholesale distributor in the State,  
			(c)	In the case of a vehicle other than a new vehicle, the price, inclusive of all taxes and duties, which, in the opinion of the Commissioners, the vehicle might reasonably be expected to fetch on a first arm's length sale thereof in the State by retail and, in arriving at such price -
				(i)	There shall be included in the price, having regard to the model and specification of the vehicle concerned, the value of any enhancements or accessories which at the time of registration are not fitted or attached to the vehicle or sold therewith, but which would normally be expected to be fitted or attached thereto or sold therewith unless it is shown to the satisfaction of the Commissioners that, at that time, such enhancements or accessories have not been removed from the vehicle or not sold therewith for the purposes of reducing its Open Market Selling Price, and
				(ii)	The value of those enhancements or accessories which would not be taken into account in determining the Open Market Selling Price of the vehicle under the provision of sub-section (2) if the vehicle were a new vehicle to which that sub-section applied shall be excluded from the price."

	The Applicant has, since the coming into effect of the act, acted as a "sole wholesale distributor" within the meaning of section 133(2)(a) of the 1992 Act and has, in accordance with its obligations pursuant to the Act, made declarations to the Revenue Commissioners in the prescribed manner as to the open market selling price (OMSP) of, inter alia, the Volkswagen Passat vehicle, the value of which is in issue in these proceedings.  
	The basic dispute between the parties arises from the fact that the Respondents are of opinion that the open market selling price at which the Volkswagen Passat is offered for sale is greater than the price declared by the Applicant.  In those circumstances, the Revenue Commissioners contend that they have power to make a determination pursuant to section 133(2)(c) of the 1992 Act as to the open market selling price of the vehicle.  
	By way of background legislative history, chapter IV of part II of the Finance Act, 1992 introduced a new regime requiring the registration by the Revenue Commissioners of all motor vehicles in the State.  Section 131(1)(a) of the 1992 Act required the Revenue Commissioners to "establish and maintain a register of all vehicles in the State".  The entry of vehicles on the register is mandatory.  By virtue of section 131, it is an offence for any person after the 1st January, 1993 to have in his possession an unregistered vehicle unless he is a motor dealer or some other "authorised person" within the meaning of section 136 of the 1992 Act, or unless he falls within one of the other statutory exceptions.
	On the 28th May, 1999, the Applicant made a declaration pursuant to section 133(2)(a) of the 1992 Act.  In that declaration, the Applicant stated that in its opinion, the open market selling price of the Volkswagen Passat 1.6L petrol motor car as from 22nd June, 1999 was £16,110.  This equated to 90% of the Applicant's recommended retail selling price (RRSP) which was listed at £17,900.  
	During 1998, it appears that the Revenue Commissioners had initiated a nationwide survey of the retail prices at which certain models of vehicles were being sold on the open market in the State.  In March, 1999 the survey was extended to the Volkswagen Passat 1.6L petrol vehicle.  Authorised officers of the Revenue Commissioners visited 46 motor dealers during the period from March to June, 1999 where they examined sales records for the period from February to April, 1999 and extracted details of 214 retail sales on the open market.  Transactions involving sales between dealers or export sales (neither of which involve the payment of Vehicle Registration Tax) were excluded for the purpose of this exercise.  Similarly, transactions which were  not open retail market sales (such as those involving special fleet discounts) were excluded.
	During the period from February to April, 1999, a total of 298 Volkswagen Passat 1.6L petrol vehicles were registered.  The Revenue Commissioners were of opinion that the 214 transactions considered by them were sufficiently representative to allow them to form a reasonable opinion of the open market selling price (that is to say the price at which the Volkswagen Passat 1.6L petrol motor vehicle might reasonably be expected to fetch on an arms length sale on the open market).  
	As far as the Revenue Commissioners were concerned, the survey indicated that, on average, the OMSP of the Volkswagen Passat 1.6L petrol vehicle was 93% of the Applicant's RRSP in force with effect from 1st January, 1999.  The recommended retail selling price at that time was £17,765 while the open market selling price declared by the Applicant was £15,998.  However, the findings of the survey indicated that, on average, the open market selling price was £16,520.  
	In the Respondent's written submission, it is stated that the Respondents were "very surprised" when, in May, 1999 the Applicant submitted a new declaration which signalled an increase recommended retail selling price of £17,900 but purported to declare an open market selling price of no more than £16,110 (being 90% of the RRSP).
	By letter dated 19th July, 1999, Mr. John O'Leary, Assistant Principal in the Respondents' office, wrote to the Applicant drawing attention to the survey which the Respondents had undertaken.  The letter made clear that the survey suggested that, on average, the retail price of such vehicles (i.e. Volkswagen Passat 1.6L) was marginally above 93% of the recommended retail selling price and that this did not reconcile with the declared OMSP which was set at only 90% of the RRSP.  Mr. O'Leary therefore suggested that unless the Applicant was in a position to dispute the findings of the survey or to show that some of the relevant market conditions no longer applied, a revised declaration should be submitted by the Applicant.
	The Applicant refused to submit a revised declaration and contended that it had complied with the legislation.
	Following some further correspondence, Mr. O'Leary wrote on the 3rd September, 1999 stating:-

	"This office is required to activate an upward adjustment of the OMSP in respect of these models from 90% to 93% of RRSP (recommended retail selling price).  Should you wish to appeal against this decision, i.e. if you feel if the OMSP determined does not reasonably reflect the market place, there is an appeals procedure in place that you may avail of.  Of course, there is also an obligation on the Commissioners to adjust OMSP downwards (or restore the original OMSP) should actual selling prices fall.
	I am available to discuss these matters further with your company at any time and will await your response to this letter before activating the above-mentioned increase in OMSP."

	By letter dated 16th September, 1999 the Applicant contested the Respondents entitlement to adjust the open market selling price.  The letter contended that the Revenue Commissioners had no such right under section 133(2)(c) of the 1992 Act.  The letter concluded by indicating that the Applicant believed the Revenue Commissioners had been provided with a "clear analysis of the error inherent" in their approach and that they would use all legal means at their disposal to prevent the Revenue Commissioners from making any adjustment to the declared open market selling price.  The letter concluded:-

	"In the event of it being necessary to bring proceedings, we will be making the point that your are in possession of information which permitted you to understand the error of your interpretation and that in the circumstances to act was outside your jurisdiction, negligent and in breach of the duty you owe to us as parties directly affected by VRT and in the manner in which it is imposed."

	In a letter dated 29th October, 1999, Mr. O'Leary replied as follows:-

	"I have outlined the extent of our research and the details remain available to you.  I cannot, however, accept your contention that the Revenue Commissioners are not empowered to intervene where a significant difference between OMSP and market reality has been established.  
	Here a company has been invited to declare a revised OMSP in line with the market position but has indicated an unwillingness to do so.  In the circumstances there is no alternative but for Revenue to determine an OMSP for the vehicle in question under section 133(2)(c) of the Act as the Commissioners are now of the opinion that the OMSP declared is lower than the price at which these vehicles are being offered for sale.
	Accordingly, with effect from Monday, 8th November 1999, the Commissioners propose to determine a revised OMSP of £16,520 in respect of each vehicle of this type which is presented for registration."

	Within a few days of receipt of this letter, the Applicant sought and was granted leave to bring Judicial Review proceedings by order dated 5th November, 1999.  In these proceedings, the Applicant seeks an order of Certiorari to quash the purported determination by the Revenue Commissioners.  The grounds set out in November, 1999 were extended in February, 2000.
	Rather than laboriously reciting these amended grounds and/or the Statement of Opposition, it is perhaps more useful to focus upon the three points to which this case has effectively resolved itself, and which were stated by Mr. Gallagher S.C. on behalf of the Applicant to be as follows:-

(a)	The declaration or purported declaration the subject matter of these proceedings
	effected by John O'Leary, Assistant Principal of the Respondents, was made by a
	person	who is not a Revenue Commissioner and in the circumstances is an act
	ultra vires and bad in law.
(b)	The Applicant's obligation is not to declare a price which is the highest price or even the average price.  Once the price is a price which in the Applicant's opinion was one which might reasonably be expected to be fetched on a first arms length sale on the open market, then that price "shall be deemed to be the open market selling price for each new vehicle of that model and specification".  None of the material submitted by the Respondents established that the price declared by the Applicant was not one which in the Applicants opinion the vehicle "might reasonably be expected to fetch on a first arms length sale in the open market in the State by retail".  In short, the Applicant had complied with its obligations under section 133(2)(a), and if the Court so found, it would be highly unusual that the Respondents should be able to intervene if the Applicant had met their statutory obligation.
(c)	In seeking to replace the OMSP as determined by the Applicant, the Respondents
	have relied upon OMSPs on the sale of vehicles of the same model and
	specification and not vehicles "of a similar type and character” as mandated by
1	section 133(2)(c).  In short, it is alleged that the Respondents have misinterpreted
	the sub-section in question.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES
	Mr. Gallagher for the Applicant contends that the correspondence makes it clear that it was Mr. O’Leary, the Assistant Principal, who purported to form the opinion that the Open Market Selling Price was higher than the price declared for the vehicle and it was Mr. O’Leary who purported to determine the appropriate Open Market Selling Price.  Mr. O’Leary had attempted to avoid the plain meaning of his letters and the reality of what he did by contending in paragraph 19 of his Affidavit (sworn 26th day of November, 1999):-

“In all of the circumstances, I say and believe (and have been so advised by the Respondents legal advisors) that the Respondents are clearly entitled  pursuant to Section 133(2)(c) of the 1992 Act to make a determination as to the Open Market Selling Price of the vehicle for the purposes of the 1992 Act.  In the circumstances, I say and believe that the Respondents should not be prohibited from making such a determination.  I confirm that any such determination will be made by a Revenue Commissioner.”

	However, earlier in the same Affidavit, Mr. O’Leary makes it clear that it was he who questioned the Applicants declaration and intimated that it was the Respondents intention to invoke its power under Section 133(2)(c).  Mr. Gallagher argued that the Section is clear and compels the Respondents to form the opinion.  The provision does not authorise Mr. O’Leary or anybody other than the Commissioners to form that opinion.  Furthermore, Section 849(6) of the Taxes Consolidation Act, 1997 provides:-

“Any Act or thing required or permitted by this or any other statute to be done by the Revenue Commissioners in relation to tax may be done by any one Revenue Commissioner.”

	In the instant case, the particular powers were required to be exercised by the Revenue Commissioners.  They were not so exercised and accordingly the Respondent has acted ultra vires.  
1	While the situation has since changed, there was no power of delegation at the time of the making of the purported decision in this case.
	He cited from Wade and Forsyth (8th Ed) (Oxford University Press) “Administrative Law” at p.316:-

“An element which is essential to the lawful exercise of power is that it should be exercised by the authority upon who it is conferred, and by no one else.  The principle is strictly applied, even where it causes administrative inconvenience, except in cases where it may reasonably be inferred that the power was intended to be delegable.  Normally the Courts are rigorous in requiring the power to be exercised by the precise person or body stated in the statute, and in condemning as ultra vires action taken by agents, sub committees or delegates, however expressly authorised by the authority endowed with the power.”

	He also referred to the following passage at p.316:-

“The vital question in most cases is whether the statutory discretion remains in the hands of the proper authority, or whether some other person purports to exercise it.”
	He further referred to the following passage at p.318:-

“A public body which blindly rubber stamps its officers recommendations will therefore be acting unlawfully, as already seen in the case of the local board which had power to approve drains but allowed its surveyor to approve straight forward applications, merely reporting the numbers of such cases to the board.  Similarly a labour relations board, which had power to determine whether a trade union was supported by a majority of employees, could not validly commission one of its officers to determine this question and then merely adopt his decision.  In both these cases the decision would have been valid had it been taken on a report and recommendation from the officer which the board genuinely considered before determining the question itself.”

	He also referred to the decision of Murphy J. in O’Neill-v-Beaumont Hospital [1990] ILRM at 424 where he stated:-

“It seems to me that if one reads clause 11(2) in the light of the duties imposed on that body there is implicit in issuing a certificate of that nature and recognising the quasi judicial function that the correct construction to accord to the contract is that it is one which should be performed by the members of the board itself and not by officers appointed by them irrespective of the competence of such officers or the integrity with which such officers order their enquiry and there is no doubt cast on the bona fides of the officer involved or their competence or in the manner in which their officer conducted their enquiry at this stage, at any rate, but it seems to me that on the issue which arises at this stage, that I must conclude that no valid certificate has being issued for the purposes of clause 11(2).”

	In reply Mr. Fitzsimon’s for the Respondents simply states that the Respondents did not make any determination in this case.  They ‘proposed’ to make a determination but were restrained by injunction from doing so.  The attack mounted by the Applicant can only be made after the statutory power has being duly exercised.  That never occurred in this case.
	  In relation to the second point, Mr. Gallagher asserted that the Applicants obligation is not to declare a price which is the highest price or even the average price.  Once the price is a price which in the Applicants opinion was one which might reasonably be expected to be fetched on a first arms link sale on the open market, then that price “shall be deemed to be the open market selling price for each new vehicle of that model and specification.”
	He contended that quite apart from the issues raised by the Applicant concerning the accuracy or reliability of the survey carried out by Mr. O’Leary, the results of that survey, even if they were to be accepted, do not establish that the price declared by the Applicant was not one which in his opinion the vehicle “might reasonably be expected to fetch on a first arms length sale thereof in the open market in the State by retail”.  On the contrary, the survey revealed that 68 units or 32% of the sample were sold at or below the price declared by the Applicant at the time of the survey.  At the time the survey was carried out, the recommended retail price was £17,765 and the price declared by the Applicant was 90% of this, namely £15,988.  The survey reveals that there was a spread of actual prices ranging from £14,716 to £18,165.  The highest price found was 23% above the lowest.  
	Further, he argues there is nothing in the legislation which permits Mr. O’Leary to substitute a new criterion of “averaging” the selling price for the criterion set forth in Section 133(2)(c).
	Essentially Mr. Gallagher’s argument under this limb is that if a price declared can be regarded as reasonable, then, for the purposes of this Section, it is reasonable.  In this case it was not off the spectrum.  He further pointed out that the Applicants have no power over dealers to compel production of information or sales figures.  Further, retail sales figures can be very misleading because extras can be added in and widely differing prices can be negotiated between different dealers and customers.
	He further complained that his clients had no opportunity to challenge the survey to point out the very many variables which can exist as was suggested by the Affidavits sworn on behalf of the Applicant.
	Mr. Fitzsimon’s argued that what Mr. O’Higgins did was in effect to make a declaration solely by reference to 90% of the (RRSP), an exercise which he contended was plainly unreasonable, ignoring as it did the realities of the marketplace.  He further argued that it was not reasonable to make no enquiries or to seek no information when forming an opinion.  The Applicant, he argued, had not provided a single document to provide any basis for the estimate arrived at, nor had any information been placed before the Court to challenge the accuracy of the survey carried out by the Respondents.  And there is no claim made by the Applicant that the process of averaging the figures contained in the survey was irrational in any way.  
	On the third point, Mr. Gallagher submitted that what Mr. O’Leary had done in the instant case was to form an opinion as to the average price of a vehicle of the same model and specification at a time prior to the making of the declaration.  In so doing, Mr. O’Leary failed to comply with Section 133(2)(c).  In particular, he did not form any opinion as to the open market selling price of a vehicle “of a similar type and character” and his opinion was based on selling prices prior to the time of declaration and not on selling prices “at the time” of the declaration.  
	While the second part of this point was not argued to any degree, Mr. Gallagher forcefully submitted that the words “of a similar type and character” must mean vehicles which, though similar, are a different model and specification.  He referred the Court to Collins English Dictionary (3rd Ed) (p.1441) for a definition of “similar” as being:-

“Showing resemblance and qualities, characteristics or appearance; alike but not identical”

	He further argued that if Section 133(2)(c) existed to allow the Respondents deal with precisely the same matters being dealt with by the Applicant, it would produce the absurd situation that the Revenue would retain a power of intervention even if the Applicant had fully discharged its statutory obligations under Section 2(a).  It followed therefore that Section 133(2)(c) must relate to some other basis for intervention, and the ordinary sense of the words clearly conveyed that the opportunity afforded to the Respondent to intervene lay in respect of vehicles “of a similar type and character.” If any other construction were placed on the words, there would be little or no point in dealers carrying out an estimation exercise which would be a complete waste of time.
	Mr. Ftizsimon’s referred to the three basic rules of statutory interpretation outlined by Henchy J. in Inspector of Taxes-v-Kiernan [1981] IR 117.
	These principles are set out at p.121 as follows:-

“Leaving aside any judicial decision on the point, I would approach the matter by the application of three basic rules of statutory interpretation.  First, if the statutory provision is one directed to the public at large, rather than to a particular class who may be expected to use the word or expression in question in either a narrowed or an extended connotation, or as a term of art, then, in the absence of internal evidence suggesting the contrary, the word or expression should be given as ordinary or colloquial meaning.”

	At p.122 he continued:-

“Secondly if a word or expression is used in a statute creating a penal or taxation liability, and there is looseness or ambiguity attaching to it, the word should be construed strictly so as to prevent a fresh imposition of liability from being created unfairly by the use of oblique or slack language.”

	And finally:-

“Thirdly, when the word which requires to be given its natural and ordinary meaning is a simple word which has a widespread and unambiguous currency, the Judge construing it should draw primarily on his own experience of its use.  Dictionaries or other literary sources should be looked at only when alternative meanings, regional, reasonable usages or other obliquities are shown to cast doubt on the singularity of its ordinary meaning, or when there are grounds for suggesting that the meaning of the word is changed since the statute in question is passed.”
	
	Mr. Fitzsimon’s contended that these rules of statutory interpretation supported his position.  The words “of a similar type and character” should reasonably be regarded as including “the same vehicle” because slight modifications could be made to a vehicle, such as the provision of leopard skin upholstery which might justify describing the vehicle as being “of a similar type and character”, but that did not mean that the same vehicle was not always involved.
	Finally, Mr. Gallagher argued in the context of this third point  that, as an aid to construction, the Court should consider Section 101 of the Finance Act, 2000 which effected an amendment to Section 133 of the Finance Act, 1992 to substitute the following paragraph for paragraph Section 133(2)(c):-

“(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (b), where a price stands declared for a vehicle in accordance with this subsection which, in the opinion of the Commissioners, is higher or lower than the Open Market Selling Price at which a vehicle of that model and specification or a vehicle of similar type and character is being offered for sale in the State while such price stands declared, the Open Market Selling Price may be determined from time to time by the Commissioners for the purposes of this Section.”

	Mr. Fitzsimon’s for his part argued that the Court should have no regard to any subsequent amendment.
	
CONCLUSIONS AND DECISION
	In relation to the delegation point, it seems to me that if Mr. O’Leary in substance made the decision himself, leaving only a formality to the Respondents, it must follow that the discretion which the legislation vests in the Respondents was in fact exercised by Mr. O’Leary.  Mr. Fitzsimons has argued that the letter written by Mr. O’Leary dated 29th October, 1999 should be construed as merely indicating what the Respondents “proposed” to do, rather than being evidence of a decision already made.  
	However, it seems to me that all the characteristics of a decision, in the ordinary sense of the word, are contained within this letter.  The letter indicates the revised (OMSP) of £16,520.  The letter indicates the date with effect from which the revised (OMSP) shall have effect.  This letter, it seems to me, can only be construed as explaining the consequences of a decision already or thereby made.  If anything was being left over to the Respondents, it was merely a formality.  Furthermore, Mr. O’Leary did not qualify the letter by stating that he would be making a recommendation to the Respondents, or that he would revert to Mr. O’Higgins to confirm the making of a decision and the date upon which it would be made or had been made by the Respondents.  It was, for all practical purposes, a letter which conveyed to the recipient that the process was “done and dusted”.
	That purported decision was clearly ultra vires and must be quashed for that reason.  
	However, if I am incorrect in this view, I should express my views on the remaining points.
	Firstly, I do not accept Mr. Gallagher’s contention that once the Applicants complied with their obligations under Section 133(2)(a) that the matter was therefore at an end. The power of the Revenue to intervene if they feel a price declared is too high or too low is it seems to me, a separate and independent power conferred on the Respondents regardless of Section 133(2)(a).
	While the person fixed with statutory liability to make a declaration may not fall in to the area of “being off the spectrum” or “irrationality” by being able to show that a significant percentage of sales (as in the instant case) were made at a price lower than that declared, the Respondents might well nonetheless feel that the margin of appreciation extended under the legislation to the wholesaler was being exercised in a manner which the Respondent regarded as less than satisfactory.  It would seem unacceptable that the Respondents could be bound in every case by declarations which were 3% - 4% below what was ascertained to be the actual general position in the market place based on analysis of actual sales.
	This brings me to the third point in respect of which I feel obliged to state that the principles enunciated by Henchy J. in I.T.-v-Kiernan, far from supporting the Respondents case, point strongly towards an interpretation which favours the Applicant.  While this Section may be addressed to the motor trade, there is no sense in which the words can be deemed to have either a narrowed or an extended connotation on that account.  There is certainly no evidence to suggest that any forced construction is appropriate.  
	Secondly, as the words appear in a statute creating a taxation liability, Section 133(2)(c) must be strictly construed, a fact which again favours an interpretation along the lines argued for by Mr. Gallagher.  Finally, to the extent that I am required to draw on my own experience of the use of the word “similar”, I would favour the interpretation which is contained in the definition contained in the Collins Dictionary.
	It is also quite clear that to construe the words as meaning “a different model of vehicle” is quite a legitimate way of looking at the subsection, given that the Respondent may be of the view that in conducting any such exercise that other makes or models of vehicles with similar characteristics may provide a basis for contrast or comparison with any declaration made.  In other words, the subsection lends itself to an alternative functional interpretation without any straining or forced construction of language.
	Given that I can reach a decision in favour of the Applicant for these reasons on the third of Mr. Gallagher’s points, I refrain from expressing any view as to whether a subsequent statutory amendment, even one as focussed as S.101 of the Finance Act, 2000, is available as an aid to construction. 
	Accordingly, I would hold in favour of the Applicant on two of the three grounds argued.  

tc(413)kearnsj(fgpart2)