THE HIGH COURT
JUDICIAL REVIEW
RECORD NO. 594JR 2000
BETWEEN
G.	D.	AND 		M.	D.
APPLICANTS
THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE, EQUALITY AND LAW REFORM
JAMES NICHOLSON SITTING AS THE APPEALS AUTHORITY
IRELAND
AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
RESPONDENTS
Judgment of Mr. Justice Finnegan delivered on the 15th day of April 2002
This is an application for leave to apply for Judicial Review regulated by the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000 section 5 and leave shall not be granted unless the court is satisfied that there are substantial grounds for contending that the decision, determination, recommendation, refusal or order is invalid or ought to be quashed. The grounds relied upon by the Applicant are set forth in the schedule hereto. The grounds set out at 1. (a) - (p) and 2. are in substance identical to those relied upon by the Applicant in Z v The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform in which I gave Judgment on the 29th day of March 2001 and on appeal the Supreme Court gave Judgment on the 1st day of March 2002 and in K v The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform and S v The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform in which cases I gave Judgment on the 8th April 2002. It was agreed on the hearing of this application that I should leave over delivering Judgment until such time as the appeal to the Supreme Court in Z v The Minister for Justice, Equali , and Law Reform should be determined. The matrix of facts underlying this application is for practical purposes identical to that in the cases of Z, K and S save and except that in the present case the letters notifying the Applicants of the decision on their application is dated 12th April 2000 and the reasons for refusal are those set out in the Hope Hanlan Letter at paragraph 14(a)(c) and (j) and the decision of the Appeals Authority is dated 23rd May 2000. The arguments adduced at the hearing in respect of these grounds are identical to those relied upon in Z, K and S. Accordingly I refer the parties to my Judgments in those cases and to the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Z. Nothing was advanced at the hearing of this application to alter the views which I expressed in Z. Accordingly for the like reasons as I gave in that case I am not satisfied that any of these grounds are substantial grounds.
In this case further grounds are relied on and these may be summarised as follows:
(1)	The first named Respondent in making deportation orders against the Applicants failed to give any or any adequate reasons - Grounds 1(k)(r)(s).
(2)	The first named Respondent acted ultra vires in failing to specify in or on the face of the deportation order the period within which the Applicants were required to leave the State - Ground (t).
(3)	The first named Respondent in refusing the Applicants leave to remain and in making the said deportation orders failed to consider the application of section 5 of the Refugee Act 1996 and section 3 of the Immigration Act 1999 in conjunction with all the circumstances of the Applicant's case - Grounds 1(u),(v),(w),(x),(y),(aa).
(4)	The first named Respondent in refusing the Applicants leave to remain and in making the said deportation orders took into account irrelevant considerations - Grounds (z).
(5)	The first named Respondent in refusing the Applicants leave to remain and in making the said deportation orders applied a fixed policy.
(6)	The Respondents violated the Constitution of Ireland 1937 Articles 40.1 and 42 and the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Article 14.
With regard to the first ground the Applicants were notified by letters dated 17th October 2000 of the first named Respondent's intention to make deportation orders. The reasons for the Minister's decision are set out therein as follows -
"The reasons for the Minister's decision now that you are a person whose refugee status has been refused".

Having regard to the decision of the Supreme Court in P, B and L v The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform unreported Smyth J. 2nd January 2001 this is an adequate reason. I refuse leave on this ground.
The second ground is considered in the linked cases of P, B and L v The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform unreported Smyth J. 2nd January 2001 and I concur with this decision. The deportation order is in the prescribed form and the period appears from the accompanying letter and there is internal reference between the letter and the deportation order. I am not satisfied that this is a substantial ground: accordingly I refuse leave.
As to the third ground this again was considered in P, B and L v The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform in both the High Court and the Supreme Court. The letter notifying the Applicants of the intention to make the deportation orders explicitly states that the Minister had satisfied himself that the provisions of section 5 of the Refugee Act 1996 were complied with and that he has had regard to the factors set out in section 3(6) of the Immigration Act 1999. With regard to the requirements of section 3(3)(b)(2) the reason given that refugee status had been refused to the Applicants is sufficient and it is not suggested that the Applicnts did not understand the letter of 17th October 2000 and the fact that the application for leave was filed on the 27th October 2000 makes it quite clear that they were not in any way prejudiced by any deficiency in their understanding of English. Again I am not satisfied that substantial grounds exist under this heading. I so find notwithstanding the unique circumstances affecting the Applicants set out in the Grounding Affidavit of the first named Applicant at paragraphs 55, 56 and 57: judicial review is not an appeal and it is immaterial that the court on considering the circumstances of the case might well have come to a different conclusion provided only that the conclusion arrived at by the decision maker is not one that no reasonable decision maker could arrive at. In this case I am satisfied that there was ample material before the first named Respondent which would enable him to reach the decision which he in fact arrived at. The decision in these circumstances could not be unreasonable or irrational in the sense required by The State (Keegan) v Stardust Victims Compensation Tribunal) 1986 I.R. 642.
With regard to the fourth ground the irrelevant considerations relied upon by the Applicants are the following -
(i)	The U.N.H.C.R position or policy or advice in respect of Romanian applications for asylum
(ii)	The interests of public policy and the common good in maintaining the integrity of the asylum and immigration systems.
This ground is dealt with in the decision of the Supreme Court in P B & L v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform unreported 30th July 2001. I adopt that Judgment in this regard and I am satisfied that the invocation of the common good and the State's policies is legitimate. Again having regard to the status accorded to the U.N. H. C. R by the Geneva Convention referred to in my Judgment and the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Z v The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform & Others it is legitimate and appropriate to have regard to that body's position, policy and advice. As to this ground see also the decision of Smyth J. in P, B & L v The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform & Others. I am not satisfied that this is a substantial ground.
As to the fifth ground - that the first named Respondent applied a fixed policy-other than the bare assertion there is nothing in the grounding Affidavit to support this ground. Nonetheless I have reviewed the papers in detail and I can find nothing therein to suggest that a fixed policy is being applied by the first named Respondent. On a detailed consideration of the papers it is clear to me that at each stage the Applicants' cases were considered against the appropriate criteria and decisions made thereon which were open to the decision maker on the material before him and adequate reasons given for the decision made. I am not satisfied that this is a substantial ground.
As to the sixth and final ground the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is not part of the domestic law of the State and I do not propose to have regard to the same having regard to the constitutional provision contained in the Constitution of Ireland 1937 Article 29.6. The constitutional argument was not developed before me but having considered the application in detail against the provisions of Article 40.1 and Article 42 of the Constitution of Ireland 1937 I am not satisfied that the constitutional argument represents substantial grounds.
In summary then I am not satisfied that the Applicants have discharged the onus of showing substantial grounds and accordingly I refuse them leave to apply for Judicial Review.