High Court of Ireland Decisions

THE HIGH COURT

[2025] IEHC 129

Record No. 2015/10100P

BETWEEN

 

BALLYMORE RESIDENTIAL LIMITED,

CROSSWINDS COTTAGE LIMTIED

PLAINTIFFS

AND

ROADSTONE LIMITED,

CRH PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY,

MURPHY CONCRETE (MANUFACTURING) LIMITED,

WILLIAM MILEY LIMITED

DEFENDANTS

Ex Tempore JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Liam Kennedy delivered 11 February 2025.

1.       I thank the parties for their comprehensive oral and written submissions which I found helpful both in terms of the immediate issues in the application and also in briefing me for trial.  The application served as a useful tutorial for me in respect of the history of the litigation and the evolution of the issues as to where we are today; Ballymore 101, so to speak. 

 

2.       Both sides adopted Willie John McBride's tactic of getting their retaliation in first but this has a happy consequence that they must have exhausted their respective arsenals of rugby metaphors and we can dispense with those references going forward, and we will not weary those who are more focused on the application than the current Six Nations Championship. 

3.       If I was to give the comprehensive written judgment the parties' detailed submissions deserve, they could be waiting a long time, and we would lose the hearing date, which would not be in anybody's interest, therefore I will give the short version.  However, I have carefully considered all submissions, the lengthy affidavits, the pleadings and particulars and the authorities cited.

 

4.       When I reference the standards and the factual and technical issues, I'm setting the scene in provisional, illustrative, broad-brush, terms without deciding substantive issues.  There are many factual and legal nuances but I'm not trying to catch all of those nuances today.  My high-level description of the case in 20,000 feet terms does not conclude a view on such issues nor is it precluding either side from further ventilating the substantial factual, and legal and technical issues at trial. 

 

5.       I'm obviously parking for present purposes the fact that both liability and quantum are very much in issue. However, I do appreciate that Roadstone denies that its product contained pyrite or caused damage, including pyritic heave, or that it was defective. 

 

6.       I do not need to recite the legal authorities in detail because they are at least as well known to you as to me and they've been fully covered in submissions and I've considered all points made.  I do not consider that the authorities or principles are controversial or that there is any legal issue I need to resolve at this point apart from their application for current issues.

 

7.       There is no issue as to the Court's discretion to exclude evidence which is irrelevant or unnecessary. Necessity and relevance depend on the issues arising on the pleadings, therefore the extent to which expert evidence is reasonably required ultimately depends on the pleadings.  Nor is it necessary in this judgment for me to summarise the proofs required in respect of the pursuit of a civil liability claim against Roadstone as an alleged concurrent wrongdoer, thus the application ultimately boils down to the issues arising on the pleadings, well established principles in cases such as Mahon v. Celbridge confirming the importance of parties clearly pleading the nature of the claim and the facts and matters relied upon.  However, many authorities cited by the Defendant, on holding parties to their pleadings, seem distinguishable on the basis that either they relate to judicial review, a significantly more restricted jurisdiction than for plenary proceedings, including by virtue of the leave requirement, or they relate to attempts, such as Irish v. Irish, to introduce unpleaded issues from left field at trial which is generally impermissible.

 

8.       Courts do, of course, discourage unpleaded issues at any stage, particularly at an advanced stage and in commercial proceedings, and both parties accepted that these were and should be treated as commercial proceedings, just as if they were in the Commercial List.  The Courts are more willing to strictly apply the rules of pleading and to exclude evidence in such proceedings than say a routine personal injury action.  That said, the Plaintiff's position on this action would have been even more vulnerable if there had been no exchange of experts' reports and the issue had only arisen at trial.

 

9.       Ballymore's claim against Roadstone arises from the supply of stone used in the construction of residential properties.  The stone was supplied by Roadstone and another supplier.  It was alleged that the stone supplied contained pyrite and caused pyritic heave damaging the foundations. 

 

10.   The claims against Ballymore by the homeowners were in respect of a particular development and therefore this led to claims by Ballymore against Roadstone both in its own right and pursuant to the Civil Liability Act on the basis that Roadstone was a concurrent wrongdoer. 

 

11.   A range of factual and legal issues will arise, depending on whether claims are brought in contract between Ballymore and Roadstone, by Ballymore in its own right in tort or as a concurrent wrongdoer seeking a contribution in respect of the homeowners' claims pursuant to Civil Liability Act, which obviously gives rise to issues as to the same damage, etc, which I don't need to go into for present purposes.  In any event Ballymore was always seeking damages, indemnification, etc.

 

12.   Significantly, however, the litigation commenced, and it was originally framed in a different world in view of the then understanding of the technical requirements. The numbers of homes requiring replacement of the infill, obviously a substantial expense, dramatically reduced in the course of the litigation mainly following the change in the applicable standards.

 

13.   The proceedings were case managed and a six-week trial due to commence on 29 April 2025.  In July 2024 agreed directions provided for the exchange of expert evidence.  The Plaintiff raised a point about expert evidence only days after the relevant directions hearing and the Defendant has criticised Ballymore's failure to raise the issue before that hearing.  I understand the Defendant's concerns in that regard.

 

14.   The Plaintiff served its experts' reports in November 2024, triggering the current application to exclude the evidence.  The Defendants object to certain expert evidence which they say goes beyond paragraph 52 of the Statement of Claim in its various incarnations (the paragraph identifying the nature of the expert evidence which the Plaintiff anticipated would be required), and also beyond anything notified by the Plaintiff in the correspondence.  It includes a real estate agent's evidence and there was no previous indication of that expertise being required, and the reports also go to two points which, the Defendants say, do not arise from the Pleadings. 

 

15.   As I've said, much of the motion concerned the application of a particular standard, the 2013 Standard which was in force at the time that the pleadings were issued but subsequently replaced, but another point concerned whether the Plaintiff was entitled to refer in its expert evidence to Roadstone products used in houses which are not in issue in these particular proceedings but which are alleged to have contained pyrite, thus detracting from Roadstone's defence in respect of the houses actually in issue in these proceedings.

 

16.   The Plaintiff's claim has been significantly amended twice.  Often amendments address infirmities in the original proceedings, however in fairness in that was not the case here.  The initial amendments responded to replacement of the 2013 Standard, a development which significantly reduced remediation required and the quantum of the potential claim.

 

17.   There were subsequent amendments to reflect Ballymore's settlements with the individual homeowners in respect of which it seeks contribution and indemnity.  There have been numerous interlocutory battles, including in respect of the adequacy of the pleadings and Roadstone's demand for the further particulars.

 

18.   The chronology is obviously significant. Key dates include the following:

2002 - 2006	Product supplied
2001 - 2007	Houses built by Plaintiff using stone supplied by Roadstone and another supplier (who has since settled)
2013	standard promulgated
2015	Proceedings issued by homeowners and then these proceedings by Ballymore
2017	New Standard
2019	Proceedings amended
2021	Ballymore settles with homeowners
2022	Ballymore reamends proceedings
2024	Directions for exchange of expert evidence

 

19.   The 2013 Standard was in place when the proceedings were issued but not when the product was supplied or when the house was built, so there would always have been debate as to its applicability at trial but, in any event, the 2013 Standard formed the backdrop to the way the original homeowners' claim was brought and the way the original claim in these proceedings was framed.  The fundamental premise of the original litigation under the 2013 Regulations was that most foundations were defective and would require a replacement.  The main focus on the original proceedings was on the damage to the foundations and the necessity for replacement. 

 

20.   The 2017 Standard significantly changed the understanding of the issue and the necessary technical response.  It is now common ground that the infill will not need to be replaced in most of the houses in issue in these proceedings where the infill was supplied by Roadstone.  As I understand it, ultimately the infill only needed to be replaced for one of the houses in the relevant category which the Plaintiff built with the Defendant's product (and ignoring houses built using the other supplier's product).  This improvement in the remediation position is because most houses in the development are Category A under the 2017 Regulation, roughly equating to Category Green in the 2013 Regulations, so they are no longer regarded as susceptible to expansion and do not require replacement of the infill.  This led to the amendments and the re‑amendment first reducing the claim in light of the new rules because it no longer said that the infill "must be replaced" and that was changed to "may be replaced".  Secondly, it became possible for the homeowners to sell without remediation.  That also opened the way for Ballymore to settle with the homeowners, and it duly did so, and it further amended to reflect that settlement to recoup, to seek to recoup some or all of its settlement costs.

 

21.   There have been extensive particulars following the re‑amendments with the Plaintiffs pressing for basis of the case in light of the new standard.  Although the position changed with the 2017 Regulations, in simple terms the Plaintiff is still alleging that, when the 2013 Standards were still in force, many houses in these proceedings which were allegedly affected by the pyrite issue could not have been sold unless: (a) a Green Cert was obtained; or (b) the foundations were replaced.

 

22.   The Court of Appeal judgment of Faherty J summarises the perception at paragraph 126, and this is a quote where she says that: 

"Roadstone's potential exposure is not (sic) limited to one house in Category C since it is acknowledged by all that the damage caused, the damage being claimed by the homeowners is not restricted to the removal and replacement of the subfloor infill.  As is clear from the replies to particulars, Ballymore continues to maintain their allegation that 'damage had occurred in each of the houses the subject of the Homeowner Proceedings which is connected with damage caused by the heaving of the ground floor slabs due to the pyritic expansion of the hardcore stone infill beneath the ground floor slabs' and that 'remedial works were required in respect of each house'.  In any event, as I have said, it is a matter for the trial judge and not for this Court."

 

23.   That passage, like various references in the pleadings, is double edged; it helps the Plaintiff by confirming that the claim was not limited to infill replacement and that there could be a damages claim in respect of the Category A or Green Certificate houses.  However, the Defendant would say that such comments were still directed to physical damage, it just says did not occur.

 

24.   The July 2024 directions dealt with the exchange of expert evidence and this was in the context of previous indication of the fields of expertise in paragraph 52 of the Statement of Claim and in correspondence which did not provide for evidence from an estate agent or concerning the Green Certificate point. The Plaintiff first raised the issue in correspondence days after the hearing which made those directions on consent and the expert evidence was furnished in November 2024.  The speed and quality of the Plaintiff's engagement with this issue could perhaps have been better. It was only raised it after the directions hearing or and the Plaintiff could have dealt with the Defendant's correspondence and the issue more proactively.  I appreciate that there may have been a concern not to jeopardise the trial date and I accept that the issue must only have been fully appreciated by the Plaintiff after their minds were concentrated following the directions hearing, but further and earlier engagement on this issue would have been helpful, particularly as they were the party seeking to progress case management and an early trial date.

 

25.   In terms of the issues raised by the expert evidence, Ballymore was always seeking full indemnity for the cost of settlement, that was always obvious, but that does give rise to the question, as the Defendant points out, as to the extent to which homeowners had a valid claim against Ballymore and Roadstone and, if so, its quantum.  I'm parking for present purposes whether the claim is by homeowners against both parties and therefore a concurrent wrongdoer claim or a claim against Ballymore in respect of it has a right of indemnity for the supply of Roadstone?  

 

26.   From Roadstone's perspective the 2017 Standard reduces or eliminates a homeowner's claim in most cases and if there was no liability by either party to the homeowners there were nothing to indemnify. 

 

27.   From Ballymore's perspective the change in standard reduced but did not eliminate the liability to homeowners.  Even when there was no need to replace the infill there was still loss and damage and the homeowners had a claim which Ballymore prudently settled.  Ballymore would also say the settlement was reasonable and required by way of mitigation and the Plaintiff would be relying on objective evidence as the overall reasonableness of the settlement (rather than on advice from its lawyers).  Ballymore would emphasise the modest cost to the individual settlements.

 

28.   Doubtless at trial Ballymore will say that settlements in complex cases like these are never arithmetic in the final analysis, even if one party or the other tries to negotiate analytically, that is rarely the way it ends up in practice.  Overall it would be a comprehensive and commercially prudent settlement for the entirety of the case which a Plaintiff would claim to be entitled to recoup from Roadstone on the basis of authority of cases such as Biggin and Bovis, assuming it can prove that Roadstone has a concurrent liability liable to the homeowners in respect of that loss or in breach of duty to Ballymore directly and thus obliged to indemnify it on some basis. The Plaintiff also says that the settlement agreements were reasonable and effective loss mitigation.  They note that Roadstone could have but did not seek further particulars of that plea.  They cite Delaney and McGrath at paragraph [5-151] to the effect that if a party did not seek particulars of a plea it follows that it's satisfied that it knows that the case is being made and therefore cannot be heard to complain at the trial that they had been taken by surprise by the introduction of new evidence.

 

29.   In terms of those alternative positions, it will be an issue at trial as to the extent to which a party seeking an indemnity needs to lift the bonnet on the basis of the settlement or, in simple terms, just needs to establish that the obligation to indemnify, whether it just needs to establish the obligation to indemnify and the reasonableness of the settlement.  Obviously, the onus and burden would be on the Plaintiff in any event.

 

30.   The Plaintiff states that part of the settlement rationale was to compensate for the homeowners' distress and inconvenience due to the present pyrite in the foundation and the damage it caused.  Perhaps the most unusual aspect of the application is the argument that the homeowners were inconvenienced by being unable to sell their homes for a period until the rules changed and the restriction was removed.  It is suggested, but not admitted by the Defendant, that most of the houses would not have qualified for a Green Certificate and therefore could not be sold by the 2013 Standard was in effect unless the foundations were replaced.  Accordingly, such house owners are alleged to have suffered a loss due to the restriction for a period, even if the restraint was subsequently lifted.  Apart from this there would also be any claim for "above the ground" repair, redecoration, distress and anxiety even when the infill was not ultimately replaced.

 

31.   The Defendant says that any such anticipated or temporary impact due to the 2013 Regulations which were subsequently superseded is a pure economic loss claim and this would potentially give rise to issues as to the recoverability of such losses particularly insofar as they are claimed in tort.  The Defendant would also say that such losses were not pleaded and that the losses were always based on physical damage and the cost of the actual remediation.

 

32.   The Defendant has emphasised the Plaintiff's previous position as recognised in the Court of Appeal decision of Faherty J in which she says that Ballymore continued to maintain the allegation that: 

"...'damage has occurred in each of the houses the subject of the Homeowner Proceedings which is connected by damage caused by the heaving of slabs and that remedial works were required'."

The Plaintiff notes the emphasis on physical damage.

 

33.   The Defendant also says that the current pleadings do not identify such a "temporary inhibition" claim while the 2013 Standard remained in force.

 

34.   On a separate challenge to certain expert evidence, they say that the evidence of Roadstone product used in houses outside the proceedings is irrelevant and that both that evidence and the Green Certificate evidence is unnecessary, irrelevant and should be excluded as it does not relate to any issue in the proceedings. 

 

 

 

35.   The Plaintiff

 

a.        replies that the homeowners were never limited to the cost of physical remediation, it was always seeking full indemnity in the settlement for mitigation of loss and the 2013 terms are part of the factual narrative, and that the Defendant was not under any real doubt as to the nature of the proceedings. 

b.       say that the Defendant could readily have secured expert evidence at the time available and indeed since it served its evidence in November.

c.        accuse the Defendant of seeking to delay and obstruct the progress of the proceedings,and also say that the criticism of its responses to the requests for particulars for failing to advert to this issue ignores the fact that the requests for particulars were responsive to particular pleas in the pleadings.  In other words, they answered the questions asked by the Defendant. Since the Defendant's questions were aimed at the physical damage, the responses were likewise directed at that issue. The Plaintiff cannot be criticised for not responding to questions not put to it.

 

36.   In terms of my conclusion, I accept that throughout these proceedings Ballymore has been seeking a full indemnity in respect of the exposure to third parties.  The original focus does seem to be to have been in respect of the homeowners' physical damage claim for replacing the foundations, reflecting the then perception of the most serious exposure under the 2013 Standard.  It is fair to say that the original focus of the pleadings in both cases reflecting the parties' then view of the world under the then standards, focused on loss and damage resulting from the actual physical damage and the need to remediate actual damage and to prevent further actual damage and to render the premises saleable.  However, it's also fair to say that economic loss was not specifically excluded but different factual and legal issues would obviously arise.

 

37.   Replacing the 2013 Standard with the 2017 Standard was a welcome game changer for all parties.  Most houses would no longer require the replacement of the infill, however it's not evident to me that Ballymore ever conceded the new standard meant that there was no claim for replacement in respect of houses whose infill no longer required placement, nor do the 2017 Regulations and the amendments mean that the 2013 Regulations were no longer relevant- how relevant will be an issue at trial. It was obvious that Ballymore had settled and were seeking to recoup their costs from Roadstone.  At the same time, it does appear that there may be novel questions of loss causation, pure economic loss in respect of the Green Certificate claim, a variety of factual, technical and legal issues may arise. 

 

38.   I agree with the Defendant that it's not obvious from the pleadings that Ballymore is alleging that the homeowners suffered a loss purely by virtue of being temporarily restrained in their ability to sell their house until the rules changed, nor was it particularly obvious that the homeowners were advancing any such claim, although Ballymore may have anticipated that they would have got there in the end and therefore taken that into account in its approach to the settlement.

 

39.   Given the precision and clarity of the pleadings as a whole I expect that this point would have been expressly articulated in the Statement of Claim or its various incarnations if the Plaintiff had focused on it when drafting, amending or re‑amending the Statement of Claim.  Against this the Plaintiff rightly notes that it always sought an indemnity in respect of the homeowner claims and the latter Statements of Claim do allege they suffered and continue to suffer stress and inconvenience pending necessary remedial works, that they have been prevented from enjoying their home which became a source of extreme stress and upset and that the properties were adversely affected, rendered unsaleable in their non-remediated condition and they reserve the right to claim damages for diminution of value due to the need for such remediation.

 

40.   While the Plaintiff emphasises these aspects of the homeowners' claims as being distinct from the remediation costs and physical damage, the Defendant says (with considerable force in view of the particular wording each of those heads of claim) that these heads of loss were each tied to the need for remedial works under the 2013 Regulation, the need to fix existing damage or to prevent such physical loss, a requirement that arguably fell away with the new rules once no remedial works were required other than repair/redecoration in respect of above the ground loss.

 

41.   Against this the Plaintiff argues that even if infill did not need to be replaced it was still a liability to those homeowners if the foundations were affected by pyrite, which was stressful and inconvenient, particularly for the years of uncertainty when the official position was that remedial works were necessary and that they were restricted in their ability to sell their houses.  Even if that restriction also was lifted by the 2017 Regulations those house owners had suffered stress and inconvenience in the meantime and that was a legally cognisable claim, even if it subsequently transpired that they did not have to replace the foundations as they had first feared.

 

42.   While the Green Certificate's claim may face factual and legal hurdles it's certainly stateable.  It seems to me it's analogous to a plea in a personal injury Statement of Claim in respect of an anticipated need for surgery as a result of the Defendant's negligence.  While the need for such surgery may originally have been reasonably anticipated when proceedings were drafted, the position will evolve if the prognosis changes. In the event that such surgery is ultimately not required, it's conceivable that there could still be some claim for the angst suffered in the meantime.

 

43.   The homeowners would say that they were living under a cloud for years due to the other parties' negligence and that that merited compensation. To take a graphic example, if a Defendant was to be compensated for wrongful conviction for murder in the U.S., would they only be entitled to compensation for their period of false imprisonment, or would their entitlement increase if they had spent time on death row awaiting execution for a crime they didn't commit? 

 

44.   However, while stateable in principle, such a claim does not leap off the pages for me as the pleadings stand.  Perhaps the nearest Ballymore came to dealing with the issue in its pleadings and particulars from paragraph 8.1 of the consolidated replies.  That seems to me like an explanation of the original pleading.  I wouldn't have inferred from that reply that the Plaintiff was asserting a standalone head of loss as a result of the inability to sell the properties in the absence of a Green Certificate.

 

45.   It would have been better if Ballymore had more fully particularised the claim, the basis for the alleged liability to homeowners and the relevance of the standard notwithstanding its replacement.  I expect that they would have done so if this had been to the forefront of their mind when drafting, amending the pleadings or when seeking directions. It may be that they're only fully focused on the issue when addressing preparations following my July directions, as it would have been appropriate for them to disclose the issue at that hearing if they'd been alive to it. While I expect the Plaintiff only reached its conclusion after the July hearing that such issue should be raised and such expert evidence should be required, ideally the time for that reflection was when amending the pleadings and certainly before seeking agreeing those directions.

 

46.   On the other hand, as far as the Defendant's other main objection is concerned, I'm not convinced it was necessary to plead the position in respect of other houses not in issue in these proceedings.  It seems to me that that could potentially be admissible as what might be described as similar fact evidence and would be admissible, just as the details of the other inflammable Fiats was discoverable in the Murphy v. Donohoe case a number of years ago. 

 

47.   I do agree that when itemising matters of expert evidence in agreeing directions it would have been best practice to highlight it and it would have been also helpful if the Plaintiff had engaged more and more quickly in respect of the Defendant's objections.  That said, I still consider the Plaintiff is entitled to seek an indemnity on the basis of the alleged liability of the homeowners and that the position has been clarified in that regard. The onus remains on the Plaintiff to prove that there was such an alleged liability to the homeowners on the Defendant's part and the sentiment was reasonable.  I'm not going to resolve now the impact of Biggin and Bovis, and other cases like Sheppard, on the facts of this case or how far the Plaintiff must go to show that it did not overpay.

 

48.   In terms of the justice of the situation, the Defendant is a large corporation, well-resourced in legal teams and closely acquainted with the facts and the legal issues.  I do not believe that it will pose a huge challenge to its legal team to ask them to respond to the case now being made if they're given a reasonable opportunity to do so.  Indeed, the time, effort and energy spent by both sides litigating this motion could probably have resolved the issue by just progressing it if both sides had been able to engage constructively in that regard.  I'm not pointing a finger at either side when I make that observation, it's just a fact that the resources going into this motion could have actually gone into progressing the substantive claim and its defence.

 

49.   In any event, I do not believe that Roadstone would be prejudiced by allowing the evidence in trial providing that it is entitled to have more time to put in its expert evidence to respond to this twist in the case.  Six weeks should be ample and it can also put in replying real estate agent evidence, if required.  I note that as well as the real estate evidence that has been put in, if there is a suggestion that being deprived of the opportunity to sell was a loss then surely that must give rise to issues as to movements in the market as well which I'm not sure has been sufficiently addressed.

 

50.   I also recognise that, if necessary, if it believes it's still under any uncertainty as to the nature of the Plaintiff's case, the Defendant can make a suitably limited and focused request for particulars in respect of the Green Certificate issue.

 

51.   It's not obvious to me that any significant wide ranging or extensive additional discovery is necessary.  There has already been very extensive and wide-ranging discovery and I'm not convinced there is prejudice to the Plaintiff as a result of this issue being arisen, apart from the need to have its experts deal with it which, as I say, they will have time to do. However, it can raise the issue if further discovery is necessary.

 

52.   It's important that the onus is on the Plaintiff in respect of these matters and if it has not yet been explicitly dealt with in the Plaintiff's discovery there needs to be confirmation from the Plaintiff that it has discovered all documents which it would be relying upon in respect of the substantiation of its case in respect of this issue.  However, if Roadstone believes that any limited additional documentation is necessary it can make the appropriate request of Ballymore and/or the homeowners and, if necessary, issue the appropriate application.  While I believe that such issues should be resolved by agreement between such sophisticated parties, I will of course entertain a suitably limited and focused request for discovery arising out of the issues provided that any such request is confined to relevant documents which are strictly necessary for the fair hearing of these cases, proceedings or for saving costs. 

 

53.   Such references to "discovery" and "particulars" are not a charter for motion practice as an end in itself.  There seems to have been enough of that already.  Nor will I be in a position to allocate two days to further pre‑trial motions unless that is strictly necessary.  By making that comment I'm not criticising the approach to this motion, which helpfully brought me up to speed on the complex litigation, however going forward I would expect the parties to narrow the issues as much as possible.  Any further bundles, affidavits and submissions to be as concise as possible and I would not welcome unnecessary broad or burdensome applications.

 

54.   I would encourage the parties to cooperate to adopt a constructive approach to such issues in keeping with the ethos of the Commercial Court, although this is not typically a Commercial Court, and to confine any such applications to the bare essentials, and I'm not suggesting that the eminent barristers and solicitors appearing before me would have adopted any other approach.

 

55.    Finally, my conclusion that the expert evidence on both points be allowed, means that the Defendant must be given sufficient time to respond, and this means that the 29 April hearing cannot realistically proceed.  The parties are nevertheless anxious to bring this to trial and I agree that that's appropriate. I have reflected on putting the matter in for Trinity Term, but that could be ambitious in the light of the history of the litigation, and it would give no allowance for slippage. It would also be difficult to accommodate a six-week trial in f the Court Diary at that stage, given other Chancery List commitments.  Michaelmas appears more realistic, but I still intend to devote intensive case management to these proceedings with a view to ensuring that all pretrial matters are fully completed by April.  That means if there are any further directions or loose ends, hey can be dealt with without a further slippage and without affecting the trial date.

 

56.    I invite the parties to confer as to directions and I will put it in for next Tuesday at 10 o'clock.  I emphasise that in terms of those arrangements I would invite the parties to confer rather than necessarily correspond.  Papers can be lodged on Thursday, but I would hope that agreed directions would be proposed, failing which I would expect a short document concisely setting out the points of difference and a draft order containing the directions agreed, subject to the Court, with square brackets around items in issue.  I can deal with costs next Tuesday as well.