High Court of Ireland Decisions

  THE HIGH COURT

[2025] IEHC 168

BETWEEN                                                                                      Record No 2022 EXT 234

 

MINISTER FOR JUSTICE

APPLICANT

v.

 

JAMES FAWL

RESPONDENT

 

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Patrick McGrath delivered on the 13 March 2025

 

1.      In this application, the applicant seeks an order for the surrender of the respondent to the United Kingdom on one Trade and Co-Operation Agreement warrant ('TCAW'), for the purposes of being prosecuted for three offences being:-

-          One offence of Causing Grievous Bodily Harm with Intent contrary to Section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act, 1861; and

-          Two offences of Assault contrary to common law and Section 47 of the 1861 Act.

 

2.      The particulars of the offences are set out in paragraph (e) of the TCAW. It is alleged that on the 25 December 2020, the Respondent punched his partner's father, resulting in him losing all vision in his left eye. This conduct relates to the Section 18 Grievous Bodily Harm offence.

 

3.      On the same occasion he is alleged to have struck his partner and her mother on their arms and body resulting in bruising to both victims. This is the conduct alleged to amount to the Section 47 offences.

 

4.      The Respondent was charged and, having been committed for trial by Laganside Magistrates Court to the Crown Court, released on bail and thereafter failed to attend at the following court date, 31 August 2021, when a warrant issued for his arrest.

 

5.      A Trade and Co-Operation Agreement Warrant ['TCAW'] was thereafter issued by Her Honour Judge Patricia Smyth at Belfast Crown Court on the 25 October 2022. This TCAW was endorsed by this Court pursuant to Section 13(2) of the European Arrest Warrant Act, 2003 (as amended) ['the 2003 Act'] on 29 November 2022. Mr Fawl was arrested on foot of the said TCAW and produced before this Court on 8 October 2024. He was initially remanded in custody but subsequently released on bail pending the determination of these proceedings.

 

UNCONTROVERSIAL MATTERS

 

6.      The TCAW was issued by Her Honour Judge Patricia Smyth, a 'judicial authority' in the United Kingdom within the meaning of s. 10 of the 2023 Act.

 

7.      No issue is taken in relation to identity, and I am satisfied the Respondent is the person named in the Warrant.

 

8.      I am satisfied that none of the matters referred to in sections 21A, 22, 23 and 24 of the European Arrest Warrant Act, 2003, as amended ("the 2003 Act"), arise for consideration in this application and surrender of the respondent is not precluded for any of the reasons set forth in any of those sections.

 

9.      The TCAW is a Warrant issued in accordance with Article LAW.SURR.112 of the Trade and Co-Operation Agreement. It is therefore necessary to demonstrate correspondence in accordance with s38 of the 2003 Act.

 

10.  Section 5 of the 2003 Act provides:-

 

'For the purposes of this Act, an offence specified in a European Arrest Warrant corresponds to an offence under the law of the state, where the act or omission that constitutes the offence so specified would, if committed in the State on the date on which the European arrest warrant is issued, constitute an offence under the law of the State'.

 

11.  The relevant principles for showing correspondence are now well established. In assessing correspondence, the question is whether the acts or omissions that constitute the offence in the requesting state would, if carried out in this jurisdiction, amount to a criminal offence - Minister for Justice v Dolny [2009] IESC 48

 

12.  No issue is taken by the Respondent in relation to correspondence. I am, in any event, satisfied that the acts or omissions that constitute the offences on the warrant correspond with offences in Ireland, including:

 

a.       Assault contrary to Section 2 of the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act, 1997 ['the 1997 Act'];

b.      Assault causing harm contrary to Section 3 of the 1997 Act; and

c.       Causing Serious Harm contrary to Section 4 of the said Act.

 

13.  The minimum gravity requirement under the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003 (as amended) ['the 2003 Act'] is met as the maximum sentence in respect of these offences meets the requirements of the Act.

 

GROUNDS OF OBJECTION

 

14.  The Respondent objects to surrender on the following grounds:-

 

(i)                 At grounds 2 and 3 the Respondent raises the arguments which were advanced in the case of McAuley, namely that the amendments effected to the 2003 Act, particular to Section 4A and 22 thereof, by way of secondary legislation in the European Union (European Arrest Warrant Act 2003) (Amendment) Regulations  2021 were ultra vires and are of no lawful effect. Furthermore, no presumption of compliance with the terms of the Trade and Co-Operation Agreement arises, nor can arise as a matter of EU law, following the decision of the CJEU in Alchaster (Case C-202/24, Alchaster [2024]);

(ii)              His surrender is prohibited under s. 37 of the 2003 Act as, were he to be detained in a UK prison following surrender, there is a real risk of a breach of his rights under the Constitution, European Convention on Human Rights ['ECHR'] and / or Charter on Fundamental Rights of the European Union ['the Charter'];

(iii)            Surrender would constitute a disproportionate interference with his family rights under the Constitution, ECHR and the Charter;

(iv)             If convicted the Respondent will have a sentence imposed which will include a licence regime and during this licence period, he will not be permitted to leave the issuing State. This is a contravention of his rights under Protocols 4 and 12 to the ECHR and provisions of the Charter;

(v)               There is a lack of clarity in the offences to which the Warrant relates

 

15.  The Respondent filed an affidavit, dated the 28 November 2024, for the purposes of a bail application. In that affidavit, having complained about the alleged failure of the Irish Prison Service to provide him with medication on a timely basis or at all, says that he suffers from ongoing mental health issues. He says that he has been taking an antipsychotic medicine, Quetipiane, for some seven years. He further says that he has failed to obtain access to a doctor and psychiatrist whilst in prison in Ireland. Attached to this affidavit are emails between his solicitor and the prison authorities concerning complaints he raised as to the lack of provision of medication whilst detained in prison in this jurisdiction.

 

16.  He lost his mother in unfortunate circumstances and is a father of three children, aged 10, 16 and 21. He is in a long-term relationship with a woman in Cork and his life is in Cork, where he also has access to a doctor, psychiatrist and pharmacist.

 

Alchaster and TCAWs

 

17.  The Respondent submits that the amendments effected to the 2003 Act, particular to Sections 4A and 22 thereof, by way of secondary legislation in the European Union (European Arrest Warrant Act 2003) (Amendment) Regulations 2021 were ultra vires and are of no lawful effect.

 

18.  This argument was rejected in Minister for Justice v McAuley [2025] IEHC 28. At paragraphs 7.5 to 7.10, the court made the following comments on this issue:-

 

19. 

20. 

21. 

22. 

23. 

24. 

25. 

26. 

27. 

28. 

29. 

'7.5 The submission of the Respondent as to the lawfulness and / or constitutionality of Section 4A of the 2003 Act (as amended) is in any event misconceived and based on a misinterpretation of the amended section.

 

7.6    Section 4A (as amended) provides:-

'It shall be presumed that an issuing state will comply with the requirements of the relevant agreement, unless the contrary is shown'

Section 2 of the 2003 Act (as amended) defines 'relevant agreement' as follows:-

'relevant agreement' means

In relation to a European arrest warrant, the Framework Decision,

In relation to a Trade and Cooperation Agreement arrest warrant, the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, and

In relation to an arrest warrant within the meaning of the EU - Iceland Norway Agreement, the EU - Iceland Norway Agreement'

 

7.7    Section 4A (as amended) therefore means that there is a presumption that the issuing state will comply with the requirements of whichever of the 'relevant agreements' applies. In this case the Court is concerned with the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, which is one of the three types of 'relevant agreement' as set out in Section 2 of the 2003 Act (as amended).

 

7.8     Contrary to the submission made by the Respondent, Section 4A (as amended) does not seek to apply the principles of mutual trust and confidence to the Trade and Cooperation Agreement. Section 4A requires this Court to presume, unless the contrary is shown, that the United Kingdom will comply with the requirements of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement and there is no principle of mutual trust and confidence in or underlying the operation of that Agreement.

 

7.9    The Trade and Cooperation Agreement itself envisages that the parties thereto will act with mutual respect and good faith in carrying out the tasks flowing from the Agreement. By way of illustration, Article 3 of the Agreement provides:-

 

'1. The parties shall, in full mutual respect and good faith, assist each other in carrying out tasks that flow from this agreement and any supplementing agreement.

2.  They shall take all appropriate measure, whether general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of the obligation arising from this Agreement and from any supplementing agreement, and shall refrain from any measures which could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of this Agreement or any supplementing agreement'

 

7.10  I agree with the Ministers submission that the effect of Section 4A of the 2003 Act (as amended), insofar as it applies to the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, does no more than confirm the existence of the general presumption of good faith that applies to all extradition arrangements into which this state enters, and ensures its application to the principles set out in the Agreement. The matter is put succinctly and correctly by the Applicant when she states that:

'There is no new presumption, or any presumption which was unlawful for the Minister to insert, by way of statutory amendment in accordance with the provisions of the European Communities Act, 1972, into section 4A of the 2003 Act'

 

19.  This ground of objection is rejected for similar reasons in this case.

 

Non-Application of Mutual Trust and Confidence

20.  It is further submitted that, in arriving at its decision in this case, the Court must disregard s. 4A of the 2003 Act and cannot rely on any presumptions arising from the principles of mutual trust and confidence which underlie the operation of the Framework Decision.

 

21.  It is accepted by both parties that, following the withdrawal of the UK from the European Union and the clarification of the law by the CJEU in Alchaster, that the principles of mutual confidence and trust that underlie the operation of the Framework Decision have no application to TCAWs received from that state.

 

22.  Although, the principles of mutual trust and confidence do not apply to TCAWs received from the United Kingdom, this Court should consider fundamental rights objections cognisant of the fact that Ireland has entered into extradition arrangements with the United Kingdom pursuant to the Trade and Co-Operation Agreement and that the United Kingdom is a party to the European Convention on Human Rights. As indicated in the decision of this Court in Minister for Justice v McAuley [2025] IEHC 28;

 

' 7.2 There is no dispute between the parties that, following the decision of the CJEU in Alchaster, as a matter of law the presumption of mutual trust and confidence which underlies the operation of the Framework Decision cannot apply where, as here, the Court is considering fundamental rights objections to surrender to the United Kingdom on foot of a TCAW. The Court agrees that the presumption of mutual trust and confidence has no application in this case.

 

7.3 For reasons elaborated upon below, I am satisfied that the correct position is that a weaker presumption applies where the Court is considering objections to surrender to the United Kingdom on foot of a TCAW. Consistent with the general approach by the Irish Courts to extradition applications from other third countries (countries that are not within the Framework Decision), as modified to take into account comments of the CJEU in Alchaster as to the significance of a history of compliance by the United Kingdom with international human rights treaties including the European Convention on Human Rights, this weaker presumption is one of good faith and compliance on the part of the UK with the fundamental rights of the Respondent if surrendered in particular those set out in the ECHR.'

 

23.  Where objections are raised to surrender to the United Kingdom on the basis that, if surrendered to the United Kingdom on foot of a TCAW, there would be a real risk of a breach of fundamental rights, then the Court must not adopt the two stage test as set out in Aranyosi & Caldaru, as such a test only applies because of the system of mutual confidence and trust which applies under the Framework Decision and the United Kingdom is no longer a part of the EU and the Framework Decision.

 

24.  A one step test applies which requires an evaluation, without any reference to the presumption underlying the operation of the Framework Decision, of all the circumstances in the individual case in order to consider whether there are valid reasons for believing that that person would run a real risk to the protection of his or her fundamental rights is surrendered to the United Kingdom.

 

25.  In the course of considering an objection to surrender to the USA made on the grounds of a risk of inhuman and degrading treatment, in AG v Martin Wall [2022] IECA 42, Donnelly J explained the approach to be adopted in the following terms :-

 

'18.  The principles on which a court in this jurisdiction must act in cases of surrender under the 2003 Act were authoritatively set out by the Supreme Court in Rettinger and have become known as the Rettinger principles. In a case where a requested person claims that he will be at real risk of being subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment on extradition, the burden is on him to adduce evidence that there are substantial/reasonable grounds for so believing that if he is returned he will be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to such prohibited treatment. The Rettinger principles, themselves a reflection of principles in the leading European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR") case of Saadi v. Italy (App. No. 37201/06) (2009) 49 EHRR 30 apply to extradition requests as well as to EAWs. This was most recently stated by the Supreme Court in the case of Attorney General v. Davis where, having considered whether there was a difference between the Rettinger principles and those gleaned from Saadi v. Italy, McKechnie J. said:

"Accordingly, it is the... Rettinger...principles, as subsequently explained and adapted in Attorney General v. O'Gara...and Attorney General v Marques [2015] IEHC 798...in relation to extradition to the U.S, which form the applicable test in an [A]rticle 3 situation: the question, as stated, is whether the evidence establishes that there is a real risk that, if surrendered and extradited, the proposed extraditee will be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment. This test applies where the objection raised is based on what is prohibited by that provision, [...] As one can never be definite regarding future events, the aim of the exercise is to measure risk. This requires a fact-specific inquiry conducted in part against known facts and in part against future events. The matters for consideration will inevitably be particular to the person concerned and may range over an extensive area; likewise in relation to the prison conditions, and perhaps even in respect of the legal and judicial regimes of his intended destination. The exercise so conducted should and must be as thorough as the facts and circumstances demand."

19.  A point to note is that McKechnie J. referred to the fact that some authorities use "substantial grounds" (the language of Saadi v. Italy) while other authorities use "reasonable grounds" (the language of legislation). He opined that, given the difficulty in obtaining evidence, he preferred the latter although there may be no difference between the two. Of particular significance to the issue in the present case is the fact that McKechnie J. identified the aim of the exercise as being to measure risk: measuring the downstream risks to this appellant is therefore vital

20. The Rettinger principles state that a requesting State may dispel any doubts by evidence, but this does not mean that the burden has shifted. The principles emphasise that a court has to be forward-looking in assessing the foreseeable consequences of sending the person to the requesting State, and that the mere possibility of ill treatment is not sufficient.

 

26.  As stated in previous cases where this issue was raised it is my opinion that the general approach outlined by Donnelly J in Wall is, with one modification, compatible with the approach to such matters as outlined by the CJEU in Alchaster. That one modification arises from the observations by that Court at paragraph 80 of Alchaster. Although the principles of mutual confidence and trust do not apply when considering objections in the context of a TCAW warrant, this Court must nonetheless approach fundamental / human rights objections to surrender to the United Kingdom cognisant of it being a party to the European Convention on Human Rights, its long standing respect for the protection of fundamental rights as set out in that Convention and the provisions in place in UK law to ensure the protection of such rights and freedoms.

 

Prison Conditions

27.  As noted above the Respondent has raised a number of complaints in relation to his treatment for mental health difficulties whilst detained in prison in this Jurisdiction.

 

28.  He further contends that surrender should be refused as, if surrendered to Northern Ireland and detained in prison in that jurisdiction, there is a real risk of a breach of Articles 2, 3 & 8 of the Convention and Articles 3, 4, 7 and 35 of the Charter owing to conditions of detention and alleged inadequate treatment for mental health issues. The Respondent has cited general country of origin material which he says demonstrates that the penal situation in the issuing state is poor. He also says that mental health services in prisons in Northern Ireland are underfunded compared to the rest of the United Kingdom. The Respondent further refers to a sharp rise in the prison population in Northern Ireland and says this has put a strain on an already frail system.

 

29.  In this regard the Respondent has referred to the following Country of Origin Information and has, in a precis filed in this case, cited various issues as to prison conditions in Northern Ireland highlighted therein. These include the following:-

 

a.       CPT Report of 6 December 2018 following Committee's visit to Northern Ireland between 29 August and 6 September 2017.

The Respondent highlighted recommendations that certain blocks be closed to provide better living conditions and the UK Government referred in its reply to the construction of an additional new large block. Issues were raised re- claims of violence at the hands of prison officers (without these being accepted), inter prisoner violence (which had lessened) and a lack of out of cell activities, delays in access for medical consultations, privacy during medical treatment, giving of wrong medication, recording of injuries, shortcomings re psychiatric treatment and drug misuse in prison.

 

b.      A report from the Regulation and Quality Improvement Authority for Northern Ireland in 2021 which referred to the underfunding of healthcare for prisoners in Northern Ireland as opposed to the rest of the UK but did positively comment on the dedication and compassion of staff.

c.       A second CPT Report of 16 June 2023 which followed on from an unannounced visit in late 2022 to Maghaberry Prison.

Once again there was some criticism re for example wear and tear in prison accommodation, but it was noted that new facilities had been constructed. There was reference to the lack of a clear strategy in dealing with drug problems in prison and delays to access to substance abuse programmes. Also, there was some overcrowding due to a rising prison population. A number of matters highlighted before (including lack of adequate out of cell activities, failures to bring prisoners to healthcare appointments on time and failure to fully investigate all safeguarding incidents) were again highlighted. Sufficient progress had not been made in a number of areas previously mentioned. Rates of self-harm were rising. Furthermore, the illicit use of drugs remained a problem. Interestingly there was a relatively positive review of progress in relation to the improved handling of mental health issues, though there was still said to be room for improvement.

 

d.      Report of Independent Review of Progress on Maghaberry published on 8 February 2024.

Issues remained concerning the illicit trade in medication, though a Drug Strategy Committee had been established to deal with this issue. There was a staff shortage which affected areas such as psychological services for prisoners. Too many prisoners on remand continued to share cells. Illicit drugs and the trade therein remained an issue. Although there were continued efforts to address the unmet mental health needs of prisoners in this facility, there were long waiting times, and the service remained under resourced.

 

e.       Other reports and updates that refer to the issues of general overcrowding in the prison estate.

 

30.  The Respondent submits that the information provided shows a real risk of a breach of his rights under the Convention and Charter. At a minimum he says that this is a case where the Court should seek guarantees from the requesting state as to conditions of detention and / or treatment for the Respondent whilst detained.

 

31.  The only evidence that the Respondent has put before this Court as to his medical condition is that set out in the Affidavit which he filed in support of his application for bail. In that document there are a few generalised references to his mental health: he says his mental health is 'poor' and he makes some vague reference to his doctors, psychiatrist and a pharmacist in Cork. He also refers to taking Quetiapaine tablets - an antipsychotic medication - daily for the last seven years and to taking sleeping tablets. A handwritten note from Dr Padraic Quinn, dated the 11 December 2024, states he has a history of mental health issues from his first suicide attempt in 2008. It further states he suffers from depression and felt suicidal in jail. His then medication was Quetiapane and Stilnoct.

 

32.  I agree with the Minister that the Respondent has not established any evidential platform from which to argue that he would receive an inadequate level of healthcare, treatment and / or medication if surrendered to Northern Ireland. Other than the medical note referred to above, no medical report has been put before the Court to give any detail as to the conditions from which he is currently suffering, the permanency of such conditions, the treatment which is required for any such conditions and / or the medication which is required for such conditions. No evidence has been put before the Court to support any suggestion as to what medical care he would require if detained in Northern Ireland and to show any basis to suggest that such care - if required - might not be provided. The Respondent has simply not engaged with this issue and has not made any attempt to establish an evidential basis for assertions of a potential breach of his rights if surrendered and detained.

 

33.  Detention conditions were considered by this court in relation to two applications for surrender to Northern Ireland within the last two years, Minister for Justice v Ward [2024] IEHC 513 and Minister for Justice v Mark Andrew Adams [2024] IEHC 435 and in neither case was it is established that, owing to issues raised in relation to prison conditions in Northern Ireland, there was any risk of a breach of rights such that surrender might be refused under s. 37 of the 2003 Act.

 

34.  Although both of those cases were decided prior to the decision of the CJEU in Alchester, I am of the opinion that adopting (as the court must) the approach to such objections set out in Alchaster, the same conclusion applies in this case. In other words carrying out an evaluation, without any reference to the presumption underlying the operation of the Framework Decision, of all the circumstances in the individual case, including the country of origin information presented by the Respondent, I do not consider there are valid reasons for believing that there is a real risk of a breach of the rights of Mr Fawl or of a failure to protect the rights of Mr Fawl if surrendered to Northern Ireland and detained in one of its prisons. On the basis of the information provided I do not consider it necessary to seek any assurances from the Northern Ireland authorities in relation to the matters raised by the Respondent.

 

Family and Personal Rights

35.  Once again, the only evidence presented in support of this objection is to be found in the Affidavit filed in support of the Respondent's bail application. In that affidavit he refers to the passing of his mother and grandmother, to his parentage of three children (aged 10, 16 and 21) and to his relationship with an unnamed woman in Cork who is not the mother of any of his children. He asserts his life is in Cork, his doctors etc are in Cork and his mental health is poor.

 

36.  It is well established that, for an objection of this nature to be sustained, a high threshold applies and cogent evidence must be presented which shows that the effect on the family / personal rights of the person whose surrender is sought is not merely well outside the norm for such cases but 'truly exceptional' . This high threshold has been repeatedly referred to in case law such as Minister for Justice v Ostrowski [2012] IESC 57 and Minister for Justice v Vestartas [2020] IESC 12.

 

37.  On the facts of this case there is no evidence before the Court to suggest that the interference with the family / personal rights of the Respondent occasioned by his surrender would be well outside the norm let alone of a kind which is 'truly exceptional' such as to engage Article 8 of the Convention and raise the question of whether surrender should be refused as being so disproportionate as to constitute a breach of the rights of the Respondent and thereby prohibited under s. 37 of the 2003 Act.

 

Right to Travel

 

38.  The Respondent makes a novel and general submission based on what might occur in the future in event that he is surrendered and, having been tried and convicted for the offences for which he is sought, is sentenced to a term of imprisonment in Northern Ireland. Under the sentencing regime in operation in Northern Ireland he would, having served part of that sentence in custody, be likely released into the community to serve the balance of such sentence on licence. The Respondent submits that, whilst possibly on licence at some time in the future, any requirement that he then remain in the requesting state during the licence period, unless he is granted permission to travel by the authorities of that state, would constitute an impermissible interference with his right to travel.

 

39.  The Respondent has filed a 'Preliminary Report / Note' prepared by Mr Philip Henry, KC and member of the Bar of Northern Ireland. In this report Mr Henry sets out the licence conditions which are likely to apply if the Respondent is convicted and sentenced in Northern Ireland for the offences in the TCAW.

 

40.  Having given his opinion as to the likely custodial sentence which might be imposed in this case upon conviction, Mr Henry says that the normal split between custody and licence is 50/50. So, for example, if the Respondent were he to receive an 8-year sentence - 4 years would be served in prison and 4 years in the Community. He refers to 'standard' licence conditions which are generally imposed under Article 24 of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order, 2008 and these include ones that the prisoner must permanently reside at an address approved by the probation officer and obtain permission for any change of address and not travel outside the UK without prior permission.

 

41.  He says that it is implied from the standard conditions that the residence of a person on licence would be in the UK and notes that the purpose of conditions of a licence is to bring about rehabilitation and therefore the person must be in the UK so that they can be monitored and take part in any programme recommended or provided. Although it is conceivable a person may be allowed to live outside the UK when their address is close to the border, he has not heard of this, and it could not happen in his view where the address was further from Northern Ireland eg. Dublin or Limerick.

 

42.  Relying on a series of decisions of the CJEU which confirm the centrality of the rights of citizens of the Union and their family members to move freely within the EU, various provisions of EU law, Article 14.1 of the Withdrawal Agreement, Article 13.2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 2.2 of the Fourth Protocol to the ECHR, the Respondent makes the claim that the possible ongoing restriction on his right to leave the UK if he were subjected to a condition on a licence prohibiting him from so doing during the licence period, leads to a risk of breach of his rights.

 

43.  This argument is without any merit. The Respondent has cited a series of provisions and Judgments which are founded on facts and circumstances which bear no relation to the facts and circumstances in this case. Not one of the cases cited by the Respondent even touched upon or alludes to the situation of a person who might be released on licence as part of a sentence lawfully imposed following conviction.

 

44.  The rights of EU citizens to move freely within the Union, though fundamental, are not absolute. The UK, as a contracting state to the ECHR, may interfere with the right of a person to travel for a legitimate purpose. There is no suggestion that the Respondent, upon the completion of his sentence, will be prevented from leaving the UK. Minister for Justice v O'Donnell [2014] IEHC 138, is clear authority against the argument made by the Respondent.

 

45.  Any future licence would be part of a sentencing regime to which Mr Fawl might be subject following conviction. Part of the purpose of being released on licence is rehabilitation and it is therefore logical and reasonable that a person on licence is not generally permitted to leave the sentencing jurisdiction without permission. A person continues to serve a sentence whilst on licence, but the licence portion of the sentence is served in the community.

 

46.  Furthermore, the United Kingdom is a contracting party to the Convention and this Court, as observed by the CJEU at paragraph 80 of Alchester, applies the principles of good faith when considering applications for surrender on foot of TCAWs and this includes taking into account the fact that the UK is a member of the ECHR and has a long history of compliance with the Convention. No evidence has been put before the Court to raise any concern that, at some future time when he is released on licence, the Respondent would not have access to the UK Courts to challenge any unlawful restriction on his freedom to travel and / or that those Courts would not uphold his rights under the Convention.

 

47.  This objection is dismissed.

 

Lack of Clarity

 

48.  Following the receipt of the most recent reply from the Issuing Judicial Authority, dated the 17 February 2025, there is no absence of clarity in relation to the three separate offences in respect of which surrender is sought.

 

49.  There is no reason to believe that the Northern Ireland authorities, in breach of their obligations under the Trade and Co-Operation Agreement, have any intention to prosecute the Respondent for any offence other than those set out in the TCAW without first seeking the permission of this Court. No evidential basis has been laid so support the wholly groundless suspicion that this may occur.

 

50.  There is therefore no lack of clarity in the TCAW, and the Warrant complies with the requirements of the Agreement and the 2003 Act.

Conclusion

51.  I will therefore make an order for the surrender of the Respondent to Northern Ireland pursuant to s. 16 of the 2003 Act.