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Supreme Court of Ireland Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Supreme Court of Ireland Decisions >> Talbot -v- Hibernian Insurance & anor [2009] IESC 27 (26 March 2009) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IESC/2009/S27.html Cite as: [2009] IESC 27 |
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Judgment Title: Talbot -v- Hibernian Insurance & anor Composition of Court: Denham J., Kearns J. Clarke J. Judgment by: Kearns J. Status of Judgment: Approved
Outcome: Dismiss | ||||||||||||||
THE SUPREME COURT Denham J. Kearns J. Clarke J. [S.C. No. 350 of 2007] BETWEEN THOMAS TALBOT PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT AND HIBERNIAN GROUP PLC. FIRST NAMED DEFENDANT AND AMICUS THE UNION SECOND NAMED DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT This is an appeal brought by the plaintiff against the order of the High Court (Irvine J.) made on 14 November, 2007 dismissing his claim against the second named defendant under both Order 19, Rule 28 of the Rules of the Superior Courts and under the Court’s inherent jurisdiction. The involvement of the first named defendant in these proceedings arises by virtue of the fact that the plaintiff worked as a claims handler for Hibernian Insurance from 1956 until 2001. In the last ten years of his employment, unhappy differences arose between the plaintiff and his employers concerning both the nature and volume of work which the plaintiff was required to do and the levels of remuneration which he received. At all material times the second named defendant was the Union representing employees in the plaintiff’s position and the plaintiff in these proceedings contends that the second named defendant failed to adequately defend or vindicate his rights in its exchanges with his employers and further conspired with his employers to defeat or damage his rights and entitlements. The plaintiff may nowadays perhaps be better described as a serial litigant. He has engaged in one or other form of litigation over the past twenty years. Some of this litigation arose from the break up of his marriage, but lengthy and protracted proceedings were also undertaken by or on behalf of the plaintiff against his employers, his trade union and even his golf club. His multiple complaints deriving from his employment were the subject of hearings before the Rights Commissioner, the Labour Court and the Employment Appeals Tribunal. While voluminous papers have been lodged by the plaintiff for the purpose of this appeal, many consist of newspaper clippings, internal communications within the insurance company for which he worked and other documentation with little or no relevance to the issue which this Court must decide. However, a useful summary of the nature of the dispute which existed between the plaintiff and his employers is set out in the decision of the Labour Court on 18th June, 2001 where the dispute was characterised in the following terms:-
2. The re- grading offered to the worker was totally inadequate and insufficient given his vast experience and his expertise as senior claims handler going back to 1974. The appellant undertook a very significant volume of work in a very stressful environment. The salary of the worker does not reflect his duties and responsibilities over many years. The worker’s claim is for a pension, index linked to inflation, equal to his present salary, and loss of earnings, which he claims are deserved and were denied as follows: £30,000 for five years 1984 – 1989, £35,000 for five years 1990 – 1995 and £40,000 for five years 1996 – 2001.
2. The appellant sought an appeal of his assigned grade through the agreed procedure. He was represented by MSF during the appeals process and was regraded to a higher grade applicable to the duties and responsibilities of his position. The grading being sought by the appellant (Grade E1) is not applicable in any way to his role as a Claims Adviser. 3. The appellant has refused to sign the authority charter for his position and has also refused to co-operate with the company’s performance appraisal system. This served only to adversely impact on his earnings potential.” While the Labour Court proceeded to disallow the plaintiff’s claim, I do not wish to be taken as expressing a view one way or another as to the correctness of that decision. I merely insert this short summary to convey the gist of the plaintiff’s complaints. Furthermore, given that the plaintiff has not in any way contested the factual summary contained in the judgment delivered by the High Court in this matter (apart from a minor detail in respect of one person’s relationship to Mr. Gerry Shanahan, a member of the respondent union) it is unnecessary to refer to the factual background in any greater detail. Further, no argument was advanced during the course of the hearing of this appeal to suggest that incorrect legal principles were applied by the learned trial judge. The plaintiff’s essential complaints are that the learned trial judge wrongly exercised her discretion to dismiss the proceedings and, secondly, that she was biased against the plaintiff during, but more particularly at the conclusion, of the hearing before her. In April, 2006 the plaintiff instituted proceedings against the above defendants seeking to ventilate voluminous claims against both defendants arising from his employment over the later part of his employment term. In July, 2006 a new endorsement of claim detailing the complaints against the union Amicus was delivered and in that document Mr. Talbot alleged that Mr. Gerry Shanahan, an employee of Amicus, “abandoned” his obligations to take care of the plaintiff’s interests both in respect of his position and salary entitlements. He complained that in 1999 in particular Mr. Shanahan’s behaviour contributed to the unsatisfactory position he found himself in with regard to his pension and entitlements as of the date of his retirement. The defendants in those proceedings brought applications in the High Court to have same dismissed under the same provisions and jurisdiction invoked in the current proceedings. By order of the High Court (Dunne J.) made 11th January, 2007, those proceedings against both defendants were dismissed as disclosing no reasonable cause of action. They were not dismissed on the basis they were either vexatious or an abuse of process. Immediately following upon the order of Dunne J., Mr. Talbot issued the present proceedings against the same defendants. A plenary summons was issued on 22nd January, 2007. Between then and October, 2007 the plaintiff proceeded to deliver no less than seven documents purporting to set out details of his “statement of claim”. An appearance on behalf of the second named defendant was entered on 24th January, 2007. Subsequently a motion to dismiss the proceedings was issued on 22nd February, 2007. Before the hearing in the High Court, the second named defendant delivered its defence on 4th May, 2007. As is evident from her judgment, Irvine J. gave careful consideration to all of the documents setting out details of the plaintiff’s claim when hearing the application brought by the second named defendants herein. She also compared the statement of claim to the pleas made by the plaintiff in his earlier proceedings which were dismissed by Dunne J. in January, 2007. She noted that the present proceedings again asserted wrongdoing on the part of Mr. Talbot’s employers in terms of the nature and volume of work which he was required to undertake and also the level of remuneration received by him for such work. She noted that Mr. Talbot complained about the manner in which his complaints were dealt with by his employers and how the same were dealt with by means of an internal appeals system in 1999 followed by the processing of further complaints through the Labour Court in 2001 and the Employment Appeals Tribunal in 2002. The learned trial judge noted the assertion made by the plaintiff that he is due extensive payments in respect of arrears of salary from 1984 up to the date of his retirement and significant pension and lump sum payments based upon uplifted salary payments with effect from 31st November, 2001. She further noted that interspersed with this claim in respect of salary, lump sum entitlement and pension, the plaintiff had also brought serious allegations of fraud, malicious intent, defamation, theft, collusion, conspiracy, bribery and corruption against his former employers and furthermore asserted that the respondent union not only failed to protect him from such activities but actively colluded and conspired to act against his interests through the agency of Mr. Shanahan. The judgment noted Mr Talbot’s allegation that Mr. Shanahan negotiated against the plaintiff’s interests and as proof of his “corruption” the plaintiff had referred - pace the judgment - to an appointment alleged to have been procured by Mr. Shanahan for his ‘wife’s nephew’ in the Claims Department of the Hibernian Insurance Group in Cork. This detail is a matter I referred to earlier. It is an error in the judgment of the learned trial judge possibly based on her acceptance of a statement to that effect contained in written submissions prepared by counsel on behalf of the respondent wherein the particular relationship was so characterised. In fact it was some other individual (a Mr. O’Leary) whose wife’s nephew was allegedly appointed as a result of some alleged intervention by Mr. Shanahan. It is impossible to relate this allegation to any actionable complaint which the plaintiff may have against the respondent but I will return to this matter later when dealing with the allegation of bias raised against the trial judge. In the High Court, Mr. James Devlin, counsel on behalf of the respondent, contended:- 1. That the plaintiff’s claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action. 2. The action was frivolous and vexatious. 3. The pleadings delivered by the plaintiff were prolix. 4. The endorsement of claim should be struck out or amended so as to insure that the same did not prejudice, embarrass or delay the trial of the action.
Again, because it arises in the context of another complaint advanced by the plaintiff in the course of this appeal, it is important to note what the learned trial judge determined in relation to costs. At p.9 of her judgment, Irvine J. stated:-
Order 19, rule 28 of the Rules of the Superior Courts, 1986 provides:-
In the course of the appeal before this Court, I have heard nothing in the plaintiff’s submissions to suggest that the learned trial judge erred in any way in reaching the conclusion which she did. She found that the various claims, contained in numerous handwritten documents, which purport to set out a claim against Amicus remain completely amorphous and are not pleaded in accordance with the Rules of the Superior Courts. I agree. Nor do his pleadings in any way set out facts or contentions which are adequately particularised so as to support any maintainable cause of action. The learned trial judge was, in my view, restrained in her characterisation and comments about the documentation furnished by the plaintiff. I am in this context adverting not only to the seven statements of claim advanced by the plaintiff, but also to his voluminous submissions, including those filed following the conclusion of the appeals herein. The same are in my view prolix, unfocused and irrational to a high degree and almost entirely unrelated to the issue before the Court. There is no attempt made to engage with the reasoning of the learned trial judge or to provide grounds for challenging her conclusions both that the proceedings are frivolous and vexatious and that they fail to disclose a reasonable cause of action. For this simple and basic reason the plaintiff’s appeal must fail. There then remains the allegation that the learned trial judge was biased. This is partly based upon the suggestion that the learned trial judge in reaching her conclusions took on board the misdescription of a family relationship between a particular appointee to an insurance company and Mr. Shanahan. Because this characterisation corresponded with a similar error in written submissions filed by Mr. Devlin, the plaintiff assumes and contends that it must inevitably follow that counsel “wrote” the judgment for the learned trial judge or influenced her in some improper way to write a judgment which was to his liking. I reject this contention as manifestly absurd and indicative of the irrationality to which I have previously referred. When writing judgments, it is not uncommon or unusual for a trial judge to incorporate information contained in submissions filed in court. If the trial judge did so, and I am not so finding, that course is in no way suggestive of bias on the part of the judge in question, particularly when, as in the instant case, it relates only to a purely minor factual detail, and one which was of no significance in the resolution of the issue before the court. Other allegations raised by Mr. Talbot that the learned trial judge deferred excessively to counsel, agreeing with everything he said, while exhibiting hostility towards the plaintiff, are not substantiated in any way. I would unhesitatingly reject all complaints of bias in this case as utterly unfounded.
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