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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Supreme Court of Ireland Decisions >> Moran -v- Fogarty [2009] IESC 55 (21 July 2009) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IESC/2009/S55.html Cite as: [2009] IESC 55 |
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Murray C.J.
Denham J.
Finnegan J.
BETWEEN
PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
Judgment of Mr Justice Finnegan delivered on the 21st day of July 2009
On the 23rd April 1999 the respondent was travelling as a front seat passenger in a motor car the property of and then being driven by the appellant. The car collided with a wall and in consequence the respondent sustained personal injury and suffered loss and damage. Following a hearing over five days the learned High Court judge found that there was contributory negligence on the part of the respondent and apportioned fault to the appellant 85% and to the respondent 15%. He then proceeded to assess damages and awarded damages under the following headings:-
Special Damages
(i) Loss of earnings to-date 195,000
(ii) Loss of earnings for the future 650,000
(iii) Agreed special damages 2,691
(iv) Care and maintenance in the past 25,000
(v) Care and maintenance in the future 267,792
Deductible benefit 2,428
General Damages
(vi) Pain and suffering to date 80,000
(vii) Pain and suffering in the future 140,000
____________________
Total 1,154,37.00
The Notice of Appeal
The appellant appeals on the following grounds:-
(a) the learned High Court judge erred in law and in fact in not dismissing the plaintiff/respondent's claim in circumstances where the proximate cause of his injuries, loss and damage, was the crash which occurred as a result of the driving of the intoxicated driver and where the learned High Court judge found as a fact that the plaintiff/respondent knew at the time he got into the car the defendant/appellant was intoxicated.
(a) The learned High court judge erred in law and in fact in finding that the plaintiff was only contributorily negligent to his injury, loss and damage by knowingly allowing himself to be carried in a car when the driver was intoxicated. The proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, loss and damage was the accident and the plaintiff would not have been involved in the accident if he had refused to travel in the car where he knew the driver was intoxicated.
(b) The learned High Court judge erred in law and in fact in failing to find that the contributorily negligence in this regard was not at least 50% or such other amount as this honourable court deems appropriate.
(a) the learned High Court judge erred in law and in fact in making such a finding where the sole evidence on that point came from a witness (Mary Clifford) who admitted to having had at least five alcoholic drinks, where the uncontradicted evidence of the defendant was that she was drinking large bottles of cider, where the said Mary Clifford admitted being unconscious after the accident and where the medical report from Mr Kearns (Maxillofacial Surgeon) for the plaintiff/respondent) was agreed as to its contents and specifically recorded that the plaintiff/respondent told him that he was not wearing a seat belt.
(b) The learned High Court judge erred in law and in fact in not finding, on the evidence before him, that the plaintiff/respondent was not wearing his seat belt and in failing to find him contributorily negligent to at least the extent of 25% in that regard or such other amount as this honourable court deems appropriate.
(c) In the circumstances the learned High Court judge failed to properly evaluate the evidence before him or in the alternative reached a conclusion on the available evidence which no reasonable judge would have reached on the evidence.
(a) The learned High Court judge erred in law and in fact in awarding to the plaintiff losses which did not take into account the nature of his prior work history or incidents of unemployment in the course of his apprenticeship as block layer. Instead the award of loss of earnings to date was predicated upon him qualifying as a block layer and working without interruption thereafter.
(b) In the circumstances the learned High Court judge failed to properly evaluate the evidence before him or in the alternative reached a conclusion on the available evidence which no reasonable judge would have reached on the evidence.
(a) The learned High Court judge erred in law and in fact in awarding to the plaintiff/respondent losses of that magnitude. In that regard the learned High Court judge ignored the uncontested evidence before him from the plaintiff's rehabilitation consultant that the plaintiff/respondent had a residual earning capacity of between 275 and 400 per week. Further the award made did not take into account his prior work history or incidents of unemployment in the course of his apprenticeship as a block layer. Instead the award of loss of earnings into the future was predicated upon him qualifying as a block layer and working without interruption thereafter.
(b) In the circumstances the learned High Court judge failed to properly evaluate the evidence before him or in the alternative reached a conclusion on the available evidence which no reasonable judge would have reached on the evidence.
(a) The learned High Court erred in law and in fact in awarding the plaintiff/respondent damages for any brain injury. The said finding was contrary to the weight of the evidence and had no regard to the fact that the first time it was alleged that the plaintiff/respondent suffered such an injury was some years after the event.
(b) In the alternative, if he did have a brain injury then there was no causal connection, on the evidence, between that injury and the accident.
(c) In the circumstances, the learned High Court judge failed to properly evaluate the evidence before him or in the alternative reached a conclusion on the available evidence which no reasonable judge would have reached on the evidence.
(a) The learned High court judge erred in law and in fact in awarding to the plaintiff/respondent damages for future care costs at the level that he did in circumstances where he stated, prior to Noreen Roche, nursing consultant, giving oral evidence that that element of the case was minimal and was being approached as such by him. In that event Noreen Roche was not called. Having made such a finding it was not open to the learned trial judge to thereafter make an award in respect of that head of claim in the sum of 267,792. Any award in respect of future care costs should have formed a part of general damages in a modest sum bearing in mind the court ruling.
(b) In the circumstances, the learned High Court judge failed to follow his own finding in the case or in the alternative reached a conclusion on the findings made which no reasonable judge would have reached on the evidence and the findings made.
The law
The manner in which the Supreme Court exercises its appellate jurisdiction is clearly and succinctly set out in Hay v O'Grady [1992] I.R. 210 by McCarthy J. as follows:-
"Order 58 of the Rules of the Superior Courts 1986 provides:-
'1. All appeals to the Supreme Court shall be by way of rehearing and (save from the refusal of an ex parte application) shall be brought by notice of motion (in this order called "the notice of appeal"). The appellant may appeal from the whole or any part of any judgment or order and the notice of appeal shall state whether the whole or part only of such judgment or order is complained of and in the latter case, shall specify such part'.
This does not mean that the Supreme Court re-hears oral evidence but, rather, the arguments based upon the findings of fact, including arguments that the findings are unsupported by evidence, itself a question of law. Although the jurisdiction confirmed by Article 34, s.4, sub-s.3 is, save as there expressed and already instanced, unlimited, the Court has, in effect, limited its jurisdiction in the manner detailed in the succession of cases cited in the course of argument. The role of this court, in my view may be stated as follows:-
"1. An appellate court does not enjoy the opportunity of seeing and hearing the witnesses as does the trial judge who hears the substance of the evidence but, also, observes the manner in which it is given and the demeanour of those giving it. The arid pages of a transcript seldom reflect the atmosphere of a trial.2. If the findings of fact made by the trial judge are supported by credible evidence, this Court is bound by those findings, however voluminous and, apparently, weighty the testimony against them. The truth is not the monopoly of any majority.3. Inferences of fact are drawn in most trials; it is said that an appellate court is in as good a position as the trial judge to draw inferences of fact. (See the judgment of Holmes L.J. in "The Gairloch"; Aberdeen Glenline Steamship Co. v Macken [1899] 2 I.R. 1 cited by O'Higgins C.J. in The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v Madden [1977] I.R. 336 at p.339). I do not accept that this is always necessarily so. It may be that the demeanour of a witness in giving evidence will, itself, lead to an appropriate inference which an appellate court would not draw. In my judgment, an appellate court should be slow to substitute its own inference of fact where such depends upon oral evidence or recollection of fact and a different inference has been drawn by the trial judge. In the drawing of inferences from circumstantial evidence, an appellate tribunal is in as good a position as the trial judge.4. A further issue arises as to the conclusion of law to be drawn from the combination of primary fact and proper inference in a case of this kind, was there negligence? I leave aside the question of any special circumstance applying as a test of negligence in the particular case. If, on the facts found and either on the inferences drawn by the trial judge or the inferences drawn by the appellate court in accordance with the principles set out above, it is established to the satisfaction of the appellate court that the conclusion of the trial judge as to whether or not there was negligence on the part of the individual charged was erroneous, the order will be varied accordingly.5. These views emphasise the importance of a clear statement, as was made in this case, by the trial judge of his findings of primary fact, the inferences to be drawn and the conclusion that follows."
I propose to deal in the first instance with the grounds of appeal which relate to the seat belt issue and quantum of damages awarded, that is with grounds 3 to 7 inclusive. Thereafter I will deal with the grounds relating to contributory negligence raised at grounds 1 and 2.
In direct examination the respondent said that he would usually wear a seat belt. Putting this answer in context, the respondent had given evidence that he did not remember the accident and had no recollection of the day or days before the accident. He did not remember who was in the car with him at the time of the accident. In cross-examination it was put to the respondent that his injuries were consistent with his having struck his head on the dash board in the accident, and that the reason for that is that he was not wearing a seat belt. From the documents which were before the learned High Court judge the following appear:
a. On admission to Nenagh Hospital on the 23rd April 1999 it was recorded in the notes taken "seat belt?"
b. On admission to Limerick Regional Hospital on the 26th April 1999 it was recorded that he was not wearing a seat belt.
c. Gerard Kearns, Consultant Oral and Maxillofacial Surgeon, in his report of 26th May 1999 records that the respondent was not wearing a seat belt.
d. Dr. Simone Carton, Clinical Neurophysiologist, in a report of July 2003 records in the history that the respondent was wearing a seat belt.
e. In a report of Mr James M. Sheehan, Orthopaedic Surgeon, it is recorded that the respondent did not remember if was wearing a seat belt. It is also recorded that no air bag was fitted to the motor car.
f. The report of Dr. Kieran O'Driscoll, Consultant Neuropsychiatrist, dated 17th September 2003 records that the respondent was wearing a seat belt.
g. Other reports are silent on the question.
Mary Clifford gave evidence. She was a rear seat passenger in the car. The respondent was a front seat passenger. Her evidence was that the respondent was wearing a seat belt. In cross-examination she said that she had passed out after the accident and that her recollection of the accident was incomplete she remembered bits and pieces. Her recollection prior to the accident was not tested in cross-examination. She said that she saw the respondent putting on his seat belt and that he was sitting in front of her.
In the course of his ex tempore judgment the learned trial judge said:-
"I am satisfied on the evidence of Mary Clifford that the plaintiff was wearing a seat belt, and that is out of it."
I am satisfied that there was before the learned trial judge credible evidence for him finding that the respondent was wearing a seat belt notwithstanding the existence of some indications to the contrary. This being so I would not interfere with that finding.
The learned trial judge had the oral evidence of Mr Gerard Walsh and Mr Michael Walsh who together carry on a block laying business and for whom the respondent was working up to the date of his accident. Gerard Walsh gave evidence of the rates paid to block layers as of the date of hearing. Since about 2000 there had been ample work and as at the date of hearing he would not be idle for two minutes. A third or fourth year apprentice would earn 600 per week into his hand. A qualified block layer would earn 1,000 per week upwards. Mr Michael Walsh described the respondent as in the top three of the apprentices he had had up to the date of the accident. He described the respondent's diminished ability since the date of the accident on his return to work in short the respondent is no longer up to the job. When the respondent worked for him after the accident he paid him at most 170 to 180 per week and this is more than the respondent is worth. Sean O'Sullivan, Vocational Rehabilitation Consultant, gave evidence. He gave evidence of the amount which the respondent was earning at the date of the accident exclusive of overtime. As of the date of hearing the demand for block layers was such that the respondent could easily earn over 1,000 per week and more likely in the region of 1,200 per week. There was then virtually unlimited work.
Nigel Tenant, Actuary, gave evidence as to the respondent's loss of earnings to date and into the future. The appellant did not call a Vocational Rehabilitation Consultant or an Actuary.
On the evidence before him the learned trial judge awarded a sum for loss of earnings to-date within the parameters of the evidence adduced. There was evidence to support the award made. In these circumstances I would not interfere with the same.
In relation to the fourth ground I have already outlined the evidence available
to the learned trial judge. As in the case of loss of earnings to-date, the award was within the parameters of the evidence adduced. In these circumstances I would not interfere with the award made. The learned trial judge expressly had regard to Reddy v Bates.
The award for general damages was divided into an award for pain and suffering to-date in the amount of 80,000 and for pain and suffering in the future of 100,000.
Central to the issue on the award of general damages is the conflict between the evidence adduced on behalf of the respondent and on behalf of the appellant as to the nature and extent of the brain injury suffered by the respondent. The appellant relies heavily on a divergence between the opinion expressed by Mr Michael O'Sullivan, Consultant Neurosurgeon, for the respondent in his first report dated 19th October 2001 and his evidence given at the hearing. On this basis it is submitted that the weight of the evidence did not support a finding that the plaintiff had suffered significant brain damage and that accordingly the award of general damages was in all the circumstances grossly excessive. The only medical evidence adduced on behalf of the appellant was that of Dr. Hugh Staunton, a neurologist.
The opinion of Mr O'Sullivan in his report of 16th March 2001 is that the respondent had moderate traumatic brain injury with symptoms of poor memory and change in personality and that it was unlikely that any future recovery would occur. Mr O'Sullivan had a second consultation with the respondent in October 2001 and furnished a report dated 19th October 2001 in which his opinion and prognosis was unchanged from that arrived at the previous March. A further report was based on a consultation on the 19th September 2003 and again his opinion and prognosis remained unchanged.
In his evidence Mr O'Sullivan said that he first saw the plaintiff in October 2000. At that time he had no access to reports of any other doctor or medical specialist and had no access to hospital records. He had sight of a CT scan of the cranium performed some four months following the accident which was normal. His opinion then was that the respondent had suffered a moderate diffuse type brain injury. He saw the respondent again in March 2001 and furnished his report on the 16th March 2001 when the respondent had symptoms consistent with a moderate diffuse brain injury. He saw the respondent again in October 2001 and September 2003 and on each occasion his opinion remained unchanged. On each occasion on which he saw the respondent he carried out the Serial Seven test. On each occasion it was slow. On the first occasion the respondent's immediate recall were three out of four and on the subsequent two occasions two out of four. The test entails the patient being asked to subtract seven in a serial manner from one hundred and timing the exercise. The respondent had great difficulty in performing the test. A diffuse axonal injury can result in cognitive impairment particularly in memory, information processing and attention span and the test is used to elicit these abilities. His opinion was that the respondent had poor pre-morbid cognitive ability which was exacerbated and compounded by the injury which he sustained in the accident and the combination of these two factors would make it difficult for the respondent to undertake gainful employment. His opinion was that the respondent suffered a moderate traumatic brain injury of a diffuse axonal type. Patients may recover from such an injury for up to two years but thereafter there is very little improvement.
In cross-examination he corrected his reference to the Serial Seven test carried out on the 16th March 2001 as the test was normal on that date: however on an earlier test on the 11th October 2000 the test was slow and the respondent made numerous mistakes. On other occasions the respondent did not complete the Serial Seven tests. The respondent suffered a period of post-traumatic amnesia of three days and from the literature this will determine the outcome of a mild to moderate head injury: the outcome is not determined by performance on the Glasgow Coma Scale. He did not attach significance to a clear MRI or CT scan for an axonal type injury. It remained his opinion that the respondent suffered a diffuse brain injury in the accident.
Mr O'Sullivan's was not the only evidence. Dr. L. Fitzpatrick, Consultant Psychiatrist, gave his opinion that the respondent was suffering from organic personality disorder with cognitive impairment resulting from the head injury sustained in the accident. There had been a poor response to therapeutic intervention and the prognosis for recovery in his opinion was poor. In later reports he noted significant personality change and depression. His opinion was that the deficits which he outlined are a consequence of the injury sustained by the respondent in the accident. Finally in a report of the 14th June 2004 he had this to say:-
"In view of Mr Moran's established cognitive impairment and his propensity to substance abuse I would consider him an extremely vulnerable young man and one who is unable to manage his financial affairs particularly if awarded a significant sum of money. I also would have serious concerns regarding his vulnerability to exploitation by others. At present Mr Moran's parents play a very supportive role in his life; consideration has to be given to the future however and the likelihood of Mr Moran requiring some type of care environment in the absence of his parents in the future. On the basis of these concerns therefore I would recommend that Mr Moran should be made a Ward of Court prior to the assessment of his compensation claim."
Dr. Simone Carton, Clinical Neurophysiologist, detailed the very significant changes in the respondent's life following the accident and attributed these to significant traumatic brain injury in the accident.
The learned trial judge was greatly influenced by the reports of Dr. Brenda O'Halloran, the respondent's General Practitioner, who dealt in very great detail with the change in the respondent following the accident.
There was also available to the court the evidence and a report of Dr. Kieran O'Driscoll, Consultant Neuropsychiatrist. On the basis of a three day period of post traumatic amnesia he was of opinion that the respondent suffered traumatic brain injury of moderate severity.
For the appellant Dr. Hugh Staunton, a Neurologist, gave evidence. He examined the respondent, once only, on the 24th March 2003. The respondent outlined his then present condition in relation to his injuries. Dr. Staunton did not think that the accident was sufficient to cause such a long term outcome. Following that report he obtained information of hospital attendances by the respondent prior to the accident. In the period 1985 to 1987 he attended with complaints of being bad tempered, of headache and anxiety. He also learned of the normal MRI scan carried out in March 2002. If the respondent had developed severe behavioural problems as a result of a brain injury he would have expected to see secondary changes on the MRI scan at that time and accordingly a negative MRI scan is evidence against significant brain injury. In relation to the comments in evidence of the respondent's Neurophysiologist these were outside the realm of that expertise. He would expect to see secondary atrophic changes in the brain on the MRI scan if the brain injury was severe. While it is difficult to come to an integrated answer he would feel that the problems of the respondent are psychological or psychiatric rather than neurological. In cross-examination Dr Staunton said that he could not say what was wrong with the respondent. He would agree that the respondent has a post-accident syndrome but not that it was associated with brain damage. He accepted that the respondent had a significant head injury. He was adamant that the significant affect on the respondent would be apparent on an MRI scan if it was due to a severe brain injury. However he had no explanation of how the respondent ended up in his then present condition. He accepted that in his initial report he said that the respondent experienced a significant head injury with a significant pre-traumatic and post-traumatic amnesia.
Clearly there was a conflict in the evidence. However Dr. Staunton's evidence was to the effect that the respondent did not suffer a severe brain injury but did suffer a significant head injury. The respondent did not claim a severe brain injury but rather a moderate brain injury which impacted on the respondent's pre-morbid cognitive ability. There were, however, other matters in conflict in the medical evidence. It is the function of the learned trial judge who heard the witnesses, and indeed had the opportunity of hearing and observing the respondent, to resolve these conflicts. There was ample credible evidence to support the learned trial judge's findings and accordingly I would not interfere with the same.
7. Future Care Costs
This aspect of the respondent's claim was based on a report of Noreen Roche, Nursing Consultant, dated 21st June 2004 and actuarial evidence. Ms Roche's report was duly disclosed to the appellant. Notwithstanding this the appellant did not, pursuant to the Rules of the Superior Courts, Order 39, Rule 45 disclose an intention to call a nursing consultant as a witness nor did he disclose any nursing consultant's report of his own. The finding of the learned trial judge as to the support which the respondent required up to the date of hearing and would require into the future is supported by the medical evidence and Ms Roche's report.
On day 3 of the trial counsel for the respondent informed the court that he wished to call Ms Roche out of sequence as she could not be present after that day as she was travelling to China. For the appellant counsel submitted that there was no evidential basis for evidence of care requirements at that stage. The respondent relied upon the evidence of Dr. O'Driscoll, the only medical witness who had up to then given evidence. His reports had been seen by the learned trial judge and were admitted in evidence. The effect of Dr O'Driscoll's evidence, according to the trial judge, was that the respondent would require minimal supervision. Counsel for the appellant admitted Ms Roche's report "on that basis". Then followed the following exchange:-
"Mr Tynan (for the respondent) I will call her briefly. If my friend will permit the report then there is no difficulty.
Mr Justice Johnson Make such use of it as you will but as far as I am concerned it is of minimal significance. Make whatever you want.
Mr Tynan We can do it on that basis, My Lord. You consent to that? Do it on the basis of the report."
Dr. O'Driscoll's report is comprehensive and sets out the documents which were provided to him for the purposes of the report. The documents included reports of the other medical witnesses called. From the report it is clear that the respondent as a result of moderate traumatic brain injury suffers inter alia from symptoms of poor memory to a significant degree. From Dr O'Driscoll's report it appears that the respondent cannot remember conversations. He cannot remember what his doctors tell him. He is a musician but has difficulty remembering tunes which he knew from before the accident. He has forgotten people from his class at school, including their names. He cannot either add or subtract or deal with money. He rarely knows what day it is. A collateral history taken by Dr. O'Driscoll from the respondent's father makes clear that while the respondent had shown improvement he had difficulty in attending to his personal appearance in terms of shaving and cleanliness. His medical advisers, to whose reports Dr O'Driscoll had access, disclose that his compliance with medication and attendance on doctors was poor and that he forgot to take his medication. He suffered from poor concentration and slowness in mental activity. In his evidence Dr. O'Driscoll said that the respondent was neglecting himself and not washing or shaving properly. He was very sluggish mentally. Dr. O'Driscoll was asked if in his opinion the respondent required a certain amount of care or attention from outsiders and how the respondent would cope if living on his own. His reply was as follows:-
"I think he would struggle. He would certainly struggle in complying with medication, not necessarily because of him being obstructive, but I think his memory is so poor I doubt he would remember if he had taken his medication. For that reason alone he would require supervision. I think he would also potentially withdraw and neglect himself. He has a tendency to isolate, and with the apathy, he would need someone there to stimulate and encourage him. I think he is going to need his life, in a sense, organised for him with specific tasks and goals to which he could direct himself. In the short term with encouragement and motivation I think he could achieve a certain amount.
Dr. O'Driscoll was asked if the respondent could handle his own money and he replied as follows:-
"No, for a few reasons. One is, he says himself that he has difficulty in actual calculations, so I think he would have difficulty on that simple level. But I think he would struggle to remember what decisions he had made, be able to plan ahead and anticipate the consequences what he did with his money. So I think he would be quite vulnerable."
Finally Dr. O'Driscoll was asked what the respondent's position would be when his parents are no longer there to look after him and his reply was as follows:-
"He will need more help. The difficulty would be, also, in respect of relationships, building up a social network, having a partner, married, children, friends, work colleagues. I would worry about his social network. He does not display an ability to construct that safety net around him."
What is clear from Dr. O'Driscoll's evidence is that at the date of the hearing the respondent required the assistance of his parents and that when they are no longer available to him he will require even more assistance. On the evidence of the respondent's general practitioner Dr. O'Halloran, which was given later in the hearing, the respondent's deficits and needs became much clearer. Her evidence was in accordance with her disclosed correspondence and reports which were available to the appellant in advance of the hearing so that nothing in her evidence could have come as a surprise to the appellant. Thus in a report of 15th September 2003 she records that the respondent lived mainly on sandwiches and whatever meals his parents deliver out to him. She concludes her report as follows:-
"I am concerned for his future in that I don't know how viable he will (be) on his own in the long run or how capable he will (be) at looking out for himself and basically his employment prospects are bleak."
In a report of 26th May 2004 Dr. O'Halloran records a collateral history from the respondent's father as follows:-
"He also confirmed that there were major problems in dealing with Roy on a day-to- day basis. He could forget to eat. He did not seem capable of caring for himself, he could forget his medication and he could forget doctors' appointments. All in all Roy's mother and father (have) spent quite a bit of time looking out for him and organising his life."
Dr. O'Halloran expressed the opinion that the respondent is someone who as he gets older will find it increasingly difficult to look after himself.
In his reports, which were available to the appellant, Dr. L. Fitzpatrick, Consultant Psychiatrist, refers to the very supportive role the respondent's parents play in his life and states that in the absence of his parents he would require a care environment and should be made a Ward of Court.
Dr. Simone Carton, Clinical Neuropsychologsit, in her report of July 2003, which was available to the appellant, records the following:-
"At the moment Mr Moran requires daily support in terms of ensuring that he is taking his medication and that he has safely undertaken basic activities of daily living."
But for the intervention of the trial judge, it is submitted, that Ms Roche would have been cross-examined.
From the documents before the court the following matters are clear:-
1. By virtue of the respondent's disclosure the applicant was aware of the witnesses to be called on behalf of the respondent and had available his expert's reports.
2. The appellant had available the report of Ms Roche. From the appellant's disclosure it is clear that he did not propose calling any witness to counter the same.
3. The report of Ms Roche discloses the expert reports upon which it is based. With one exception the witnesses gave evidence. The exception related to the respondent's orthopaedic injuries.
4. The learned trial judge accepted the medical evidence adduced on behalf of the respondent.
5. At the time of admitting Ms Roche's report the respondent was aware of the further medical evidence to be adduced on behalf of the respondent. The appellant called only one medical witness who did not dispute the evidence on behalf of the respondent as to his care needs.
Ms Roche's report gave the cost of retrospective care for the respondent on the basis of the medical reports and of her own interview with the respondent and likewise cost of future care. Her opinion was that the respondent would require three hours care per day for fifty weeks of the year Monday to Friday and three hours care each Saturday and Sunday. For two weeks each year he would require additional care in relation to holidays. She gave evidence that the cost of care on days other than Sunday would be 10.45 per hour but on Sunday 20.90 per hour. From age sixty five her opinion was that the respondent would require sleepover care in addition. Excluding such sleep-over care the annual cost as estimated by Ms Roche was 22,723.49.
The learned trial judge dealt with Ms Roche's evidence as follows:-
"Now, with regard to the future and this is where I need the assistance of you gentlemen it is a difficult case to assess, regarding the maintenance and care he needs in the future; but it was accepted by Noreen Roche's report was handed into me, and I am taking the lowest presenter of maintenance care set out in that. And I will allow the following hours, which can be worked out, then: for the next twenty years, two hours a day and that is on the basis that hopefully his parents will continue to be in a position to have an eye out for him for the next twenty years. Thereafter I will allow three hours a day. And you gentlemen can do the calculations on that."
Mr Brendan Lynch, an Actuary, was then called and he gave evidence that the cost for the first twenty years is 138,212 and thereafter 129,580 making in total 267,792.00.
It is clear that the learned trial judge carefully analysed the evidence of Ms Roche in the light of the evidence as a whole. He reduced substantially the care requirements suggested by her for the first twenty years from three hours per day to two hours per day thus giving to the appellant free of cost the care afforded to the respondent by his parents for that period of twenty years. Having regard to all the circumstances I am satisfied that in making this award no injustice to the appellant occurred, notwithstanding that the respondent may have been lulled into a false sense of security by the learned trial judge's intervention immediately prior to the report of Ms Roche being admitted. I would not interfere with the award under this heading.
Having regard to the foregoing I would disallow the appeal on each of the grounds 3 to 7 inclusive and which relate to the quantum of damages awarded and would affirm the judgment and award of the learned High Court judge in respect of the same.
1 and 2 Contributory Negligence
The evidence before the High Court was as follows. The respondent had no recollection of the evening in question. As to the events of the evening the respondent led evidence of Mary Clifford. On the 23rd April 1999 she met with the respondent and the appellant. They went to a bar which was some twenty minutes from Nenagh where she was living. They arrived at the bar at about 9 p.m. and left at closing time. All three got into the appellant's car the appellant driving, the respondent being the front seat passenger and the witness the rear seat passenger. She was not worried about the capacity of the respondent to drive. She noticed nothing strange about him and considered him "fine". The accident occurred when they were approximately half way home and during the period of driving she had no concerns as to the ability of the respondent to drive because of his consumption of drink. She thought the accident occurred around midnight. She had perhaps five drinks during the course of the evening. If there was evidence that the respondent was drinking cider and shorts she would be surprised as he normally drank pints. She did not now how much the appellant or the respondent had to drink as she was not with them all the time throughout the evening.
Sean Hogan a fellow musician of the respondent gave evidence to the effect that on occasion he drank with the respondent and that on a night out the respondent would normally have five, six or at most seven pints.
Garda Graham Rollie, the investigating Garda, gave evidence. He arrived at the scene of the accident at 2.40 a.m. Both the appellant and the respondent were standing beside a crashed car. Ms Clifford was in the rear seat of the car. He spoke to all three and got a smell of intoxicating liquor. The respondent admitted driving and was arrested for drink driving. A sample taken at the Garda Station was returned with a reading of 155 milligrams of alcohol per 100 milligrams of urine. The respondent was charged and pleaded guilty. The legal limit at the time of the accident was 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of urine.
The appellant gave evidence. He, together with the respondent and Ms Clifford, arrived at the bar at approximately 8.30 p.m. and remained there until closing time, that is about 1.30 a.m. the following morning, the 24th April 1999. He had seven or eight pints. The respondent most likely had the same amount. The respondent was drinking large bottles of cider and had a short as well. Ms Clifford was also drinking large bottles of cider but had somewhat less perhaps five or six large bottles.
The learned trial judge's finding was succinct:-
"On the question of drink, yes, he undoubtedly travelled in the car, and I think, in this day and age with the kind of publicity attached, there must be a finding of contributory negligence regarding that, and I will so find to the extent of 15%."
On the basis of this evidence, on behalf of the appellant, it is submitted that as a matter of probability the appellant and the respondent having been in each others company in the bar all evening the respondent must have known that the appellant was incapable of driving safely. Reliance is placed on the decision in Judge v Reape [1968] 1 I.R. 226 where the plaintiff and the defendant had been in each others company for twelve hours during which time the defendant consumed a gallon and three pints of beer and a small whiskey. The plaintiff's evidence as to the defendant's condition was that he did not notice anything about him and that he was not drunk. O'Dαlaigh J. at page 229 said:-
"It has not been questioned by counsel for the plaintiff nor, indeed, could it be - that a person who knows, or should know, that a driver is by reason of the consumption of alcohol not fit to drive, and who nevertheless goes as the driver's passenger is not taking reasonable care for his own safety and must, therefore, be found guilty of contributory negligence."
It was held that the jury's finding of no negligence on the part of the plaintiff was made in the face of the plainest evidence to the contrary and a re-trial was ordered.
The appellant also relied on the decision in Hussey v Twomey and Ors, the High Court, unreported 18th January 2005 where the learned High Court judge assessed the plaintiff's contributory negligence at 40%. The decision was upheld by the Supreme Court on appeal: the Supreme Court, unreported, 21st January 2009.
For the respondent the correctness of the decision in Judge v Reape is accepted. However, it is submitted that this court should only interfere with the determination of the trial judge on apportionment if it is satisfied that there was a gross want of proportion in the apportionment of fault between the parties which amounted to a gross error on the part of the trial judge and that on the evidence before the court no such gross want of proportion exists in this case. Reliance is placed on a passage from the judgment of Walsh J. in O'Sullivan v Dwyer [1971] I.R. 275:-
"(A) judge, in directing a jury, must direct their minds to the distinction between causation and fault and that they should be instructed that degrees of fault between the parties are not to be apportioned on the basis of the relative causative potency of the respective causative contributions to the damage, but rather on the basis of the moral blameworthiness of their respective causative contribution. However, there are limits to this since fault is not to be measured by purely subjective standards but by objective standards. The degree of incapacity or ignorance peculiar to a particular person is not to be the basis of measuring the blameworthiness of that person. Blameworthiness is to be measured against a degree of capacity or knowledge which such a person ought to have had if he were an ordinary reasonable person Fault or blame is to be measured against the standard of conduct required of the ordinary reasonable man and the class or category to which the party whose fault is to be measured belongs."
In relation to the decision of the Supreme Court in Hussey v Twomey the Supreme Court's conclusion that the apportionment of 40% for contributory negligence to the plaintiff should not be disturbed does not represent a wholehearted endorsement of that apportionment but rather a principled approach whereby the court declined to interfere on the basis that the apportionment against the plaintiff was not so grossly excessive as to justify interference in the circumstances of that case.
Conclusion on the Law
The Civil Liability Act 1961 section 34 insofar as relevant provides as follows:-
"34(1) Where, in any action brought by one person in respect of a wrong committed by any other person, it is proved that the damage suffered by the plaintiff was caused partly by the negligence or want of care of the plaintiff or one for whose acts he is responsible (in this part called contributory negligence) and partly by the wrong of the defendant, the damages recoverable in respect of the said wrong shall be reduced by such amount as the court thinks just and equitable having regard to the degrees of fault of the plaintiff and the defendant."
Section 34 was considered by the Supreme Court in O'Sullivan v Dwyer [1971] I.R. 275. It was there held that fault in section 34 is not equated to causation but flows from causation in the sense that if there is no causation there can be no fault: "fault" in section 34 is equated with blameworthiness and the blameworthiness of the plaintiff is the measure for the reduction of damages recoverable by him and not the potency of his causative contribution to the damage.
This court when asked to interfere with an apportionment of liability should only do so if there has been an error of law or having regard to undisputed facts and findings of fact there is a significant disproportion.
In general it can be said that the blameworthiness of the driver will be greater than that of a passenger permitting himself to be driven. The decision to drive is that of the driver and it is he that poses the risk to his passengers and to other road users. Accordingly an apportionment to such a passenger will normally be less than that to the driver. However there may be other elements of fault, for example failure to avail of a seat belt. In such circumstances the correct approach for the court is to take an overall view of the blameworthiness of the passenger and arrive at an apportionment which is just and equitable. Should there be two or three elements of fault it is not necessary that the court should ascribe a percentage to each but rather on an assessment of the blameworthiness as a whole an apportionment should be made.
The law on this topic was most recently considered by this court in Hussey v Twomey and Ors, the Supreme Court, unreported 21 January 2009. In the course of his judgment Kearns J. said:-
"Finally, in relation to the extent of the apportionment, the same must be seen as one made against the back drop of changed societal perceptions as to how issues of this sort are to be regarded In the context of a passenger travelling with an intoxicated driver the fault lies in the decision to travel with such a driver in the first instance. The more the passenger should have realised, or did realise, the risk being undertaken the greater the degree of contributory negligence. There is thus scope for a much higher finding of contributory negligence in this context than in the case of a failure to wear a seat belt. It is inescapable in my opinion to think other than that the plaintiff was well aware of the defendant driver's inebriated condition, having spent an hour in his immediate company and having also had plenty of opportunities of seeing the defendant driver during the time spent in these licensed premises. On her own evidence she made no effort to ascertain whether he was fit to drive. I am satisfied, as was the trial judge, that she must have been aware his driving was likely to be impaired and the circumstances were clearly such as to put her on inquiry. In all of the circumstances I believe the apportionment of 40% for contributory negligence should not be disturbed."
Conclusion
The following circumstances seem to me to be relevant to the apportionment of liability in this case:-
1. The evening was in the nature of a joint venture in that the appellant and the respondent travelled together by car on a twenty minute journey to a bar. On the evidence it is clear that their intention was to travel on the return journey having consumed alcohol.
2. They spent a period of time from approximately 8.30 p.m. to at least 1 a.m. the following morning in a bar in each others company.
3. They, in each others presence, consumed between six and nine alcoholic beverages in that period: on the respondent's case he consumed between five and seven pints of cider and one short while in his presence the appellant had at least six pints..
4. The respondent knew, or certainly ought to have known, that the appellant's ability to drive was impaired by drink and quite clearly ought not to have driven. This is so regardless, in the circumstances of this case, of whether or not the appellant's appearance indicated the extent of his impairment as the appellant and the respondent were in each others company throughout the evening and the respondent had actual knowledge of the appellant's consumption of alcohol.
5. The accident, the car having left the road, was entirely attributable to the appellant's driving.
6. However the greater blameworthiness is that of the appellant. It was his decision to drive to the bar and to drive home notwithstanding his consumption of alcohol. It is he who had control of the car and its driving and it was he who represented a danger not just to the respondent but to road users and the public in general.
Having regard to the foregoing circumstances I am satisfied that the apportionment of 15% of fault to the respondent represents a significant disproportion between the respective blameworthiness of the appellant and the respondent. Accordingly I would set aside that part of the judgment and order of the High Court dealing with apportionment of fault and substitute for the same an apportionment of 35% to the respondent and 65% to the appellant.
Roy Moran v Sιan Fogarty
