Supreme Court of Ireland Decisions

Between/

“17. What, then, was the nature and effect of the stay? It was in truth a form of public law injunction restraining the District Court from taking any further steps in the matter. There are, of course, certain subtle differences between the grant of a stay and an injunction both in terms of the criteria governing the grant of these reliefs, their respective scope of operation and the addressees of such relief. As it happens, many of these matters were explored by Clarke J. in his comprehensive judgment for the Supreme Court on this issue in Okanunde v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2012] IESC 49.

18. But whatever the differences between a stay and injunction for other purposes, these differences have no bearing on the present case. What matters here is the effect of the stay and the general coercive effect of such an order cannot be in doubt. The order stayed the criminal proceedings then pending against the accused in the District Court. This means that the District Court was not entitled to take any further steps adverse to the applicant for so long as that order was in force. Of course, the existence of the stay did not mean that the District Court would not have been entitled to make no order or even to adjourn the criminal proceedings to a named date. A step of that kind is essentially neutral in nature: it is not inconsistent with a stay order to maintain the status quo pending further order from the High Court.

19. For so long as the stay was in force in the form in which it was, the District Court was not, however, entitled to make the order which was actually made, i.e., an order remanding the applicant in custody, even if there was consent to bail and even if the applicant had been previously so remanded in custody. A remand order of that kind was positively inconsistent with the nature of the stay which had been granted by Birmingham J., even if- as I am absolutely certain was the case- Judge Brennan acted perfectly bona fide and honourably in a difficult situation. The fact remains, however, that he had no jurisdiction to make the order which he did having regard to the terms of the stay.

Conclusions

20. In these circumstances, it is plain that the order of the District Court remanding the applicant in custody until 5th July was invalid. It follows in turn that there was no proper legal basis for detaining the applicant on 4th July, 2012. While the Court's task in an Article 40.4.2 inquiry is confined to determining the legality of the detention, in these special circumstances I will simply declare that the applicant was entitled to have been released from custody on 4th July, 2012.”

“(i) Excluding from evidence the underlying Judicial Review proceedings in which the stay of the 25th day of June, 2012, was granted on the grounds that the terms of the stay sought as disclosed by the reliefs and grounds in the said proceedings was irrelevant.

(ii) Having identified that the purpose of a stay in Judicial Review proceedings was to maintain as far as practicable the status quo, the learned Trial Judge erred in law in holding that the order of the District Court of the 28th of June, 2012, failed to do so.

(iii) In holding that the effect of the stay granted by order of the 25th day of June, 2012, was to preclude the District Court from making an order further remanding the Respondent in custody, notwithstanding that there was consent to bail and/or that the Respondent had so previously been remanded in custody.

(iv) In holding that the District Court Order of the 28th of June, 2012, was not neutral in nature and/or was inconsistent with maintaining the status quo in relation to the parties in circumstances where there was no application seeking to vary the status of the Applicant/Respondent before the High Court on the 25th day of June, 2012 or on any other date or otherwise.

(v) In holding that an order remanding the Respondent in criminal

proceedings on the same terms and conditions as had previously existed, where such conditions did not form part of any application for judicial review, was inconsistent with the terms of the stay and/or failed to maintain the status quo and/or was an adverse step in the proceedings.

(vi) In holding that the detention of the Respondent had no legal basis where the District Court had remanded the Respondent in custody with consent to bail until the 5th day of July, 2012.”

Moot?
26. On behalf of the appellant it was submitted that the Court has a discretion as to whether to hear an appeal from an Article 40.4.2° inquiry when the applicant has been released. It was submitted that where the matter is one of real concern to the State, the Court may exercise its discretion in favour of determining the matter. Reference was made to the ex tempore judgment handed down in Malony v. Member in Charge Terenure Garda Station [Unreported, Supreme Court, 18th May, 2004] and Dunne v. The Governor of Cloverhill Prison [2009] IESC 43.

27. The appellant submitted that the Court should exercise its discretion to hear the appeal on the following grounds:-

(i) There is no cross appeal by the respondent.

(ii) Should the appellant succeed the respondent can be re-charged. The effect of the judgment and order of the High Court would appear to be that any attempt to re-charge the respondent would be unlawful while the judicial review is pending. There is therefore a potentially live issue between the parties as to whether or not the respondent can be re-charged.

(iii) There are recognised exceptions to the mootness rule which should be applied in this case.

(iv) The Court should hear the appeal on the grounds that to do otherwise would be “declining to exercise its proper appellate jurisdiction” See Re Zwann [1981] I.R. 395, 401 per O'Higgins C.J.

(v) The effect of the order and judgment of the High Court is to fundamentally alter the status of the accused and to cast into abeyance the underlying criminal proceedings in circumstances where the appellant has not been heard in relation to the application for a stay.

(vi) The issues raised are of real concern to the appellant. They potentially affect a significant number of cases in relation not merely to the refusal of legal aid, but also to the injunction of prosecutions on grounds of prejudice and/or delay where the granting of a general ‘stay’ has the effect of precluding the continued remanding of an accused in custody in the District or Circuit Court in circumstances where such continuing remands do not appear to be the gravamen of an applicant’s case or matters which the judge granting leave was asked to consider. It was stated that remand prisoners are imprisoned pending trial only if they are likely to abscond, interfere with witnesses or commit and serious offence and consequently any change in their status on an effectively ex parte basis is of real concern to the appellant.

29. Counsel for the respondent referred to Dunne v. Governor of Cloverhill Prison [2009] IESC 43, which was an appeal against an order of Peart J. directing the release of the applicant following his arrest and recharge immediately after being released by Edwards J. in the first set of proceedings. In that case the appeal was dismissed, and it was stated:-

“The applicant is no longer in custody on foot of the new charge. That charge is inoperative. In relation to the new charge there is no live issue remaining between the parties. In the circumstances the issue of the new charge is not justiciable and scarce judicial resources should not be used to advance an academic analysis.”

31. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent:-

(i) The fact that no cross appeal was brought in respect of the findings of the learned trial judge does not alter the reality that the issue is moot and that this Honourable Court must exercise its own discretion whether to entertain the appeal or not.

(ii) The ruling on mootness in the High Court did not, by definition, address the question whether the Supreme Court should entertain an appeal which has long since become moot, particularly because of the scarcity of judicial resources and the realities presented by over burdened lists at the appellate tier.

(iii) The appellant submitted that the respondent could have taken judicial review proceedings to challenge the order remanding him in custody. However, the Constitution provides a remedy which the respondent availed of. Any speculation as to what may have happened, had he sought judicial review of his incarceration, is irrelevant to the case before this Honourable Court.

(iv) It was argued that the appellant had submitted that a failure to entertain this appeal would be to “decline to exercise its proper appellate function”. In particular, the appellant submitted that the respondent, by seeking judicial review in which leave and a stay were granted on an ex parte basis, has apparently deprived the State of an opportunity to be heard. It was argued that this ignored the reality that the appellant could have sought to vary or set aside the stay, a procedure provided for under the Rules of the Superior Courts. It was submitted that it is telling that this course of action was not followed in this case.

(v) The stay granted in this case was concerned with the “criminal proceedings”, not the criminal trial. If the appellant had general concerns in relation to the form of a stay granted in ex parte proceedings, it is open to the appellant to challenge that form of stay. This case cannot be separated from the specific and special language of the stay sought and granted by Birmingham J. An infinite variety of qualifications can be placed upon a stay so as to determine its ambit.

(vi) The issues raised in this case are not of such general application as to warrant this Honourable Court departing from its policy of declining to hear appeals that are plainly moot.

Discretion
34. However, the Court has a discretion which it may exercise as to whether or not it will hear and determine a moot appeal. This has been considered recently by the Court in W v. Health Service Executive [2014] IESC 8, and in Lofinmakin (a minor) & Ors v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2013] IESC 49.

35. Applying the law well established by cases of this Court, including those referenced above and G v. Collins [2005] 1 ILRM 1, Irwin v. Deasy [2011] 2 IR 752 O’Brien v. PIAB (No. 2) [2007] 1 IR 328, Okunade v. The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform & Ors [2013] 1 ILRM 1, I would hear the appeal.

36. The reasons why I would hear this moot appeal include the following:-

(i) the decision to grant a stay was made on an ex parte application, and the appellant had no opportunity to address the issue, or terms, of a stay;

(ii) the decision has an effect on criminal proceedings which are of real and reasonable concern to the appellant;

(iii) such an issue arises in circumstances which would escape review if the Court did not exercise a discretion to hear the appeal;

(iv) the decision potentially affects many criminal cases in the District Court;

(v) the decision has a systemic relevance to cases before the courts, where an application for judicial review has been granted.

Submissions on behalf of the Appellant
38. On this substantive issue written and oral submissions were made on behalf of the appellant and the respondent.

39. On behalf of the appellant it was submitted, inter alia, that the purpose of a stay in judicial review proceedings is to preserve the status quo in relation to the decision under challenge. It was submitted that the reliefs sought in the judicial review were to restrain the prosecution of the respondent unless he was afforded legal representation to enable him defend the criminal charges.

40. It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that the failure of the learned High Court judge to have regard to the meaning and effect of the stay granted by the High Court in the context of the judicial review proceedings was wrong in law and had the effect of excluding matters relevant to the effect of the stay granted by Birmingham J.

41. Further, it was submitted that the relief sought was directed towards the trial of the respondent, rather than any remand in the District Court.

42. It was submitted that the learned High Court judge erred in finding that the maintenance of the respondent’s status by the District Court, by remanding him on the same terms and conditions, was not preserving the status quo.

43. It was submitted that the learned High Court judge erred in holding that the effect of the stay was to preclude the District Court from making an order remanding the respondent in custody, notwithstanding that there was consent to bail and that the respondent had previously been remanded in custody. It was submitted that where a person has previously been remanded by a court of trial, the terms and conditions in relation to bail or custodial status of the person so remanded remain valid unless that order is impugned, and is the subject of the reliefs sought.

44. It was submitted that there was no evidence that Birmingham J. had ever been addressed, or asked to consider the issue of bail in relation to the stay. It was submitted that the consequence of the order of Hogan J. is that two distinct positions on a stay application now arise depending on whether a person is in custody or not:-

(i) in the event of a stay being granted a person on bail has the status quo preserved in that he is further remanded in the same terms and conditions as previously by the District Court;

(ii) while a person in custody on foot of a valid order is now no longer subject to such conditions.

45. It was submitted also that the High Court erred in finding that an order remanding the respondent on the same terms and conditions was an adverse step in the proceedings. A further remand on the same terms and conditions was not an adverse step, but rather preserved the situation.

Submissions on behalf of the Respondent
46. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that the issue which arose before Hogan J. was not the merits, rights or wrongs, of how the order of Birmingham J. staying the proceedings came into existence, but rather the issue was what effect did the order of Birmingham J. have on the proceedings in Trim District Court.

47. It was submitted that the order of Birmingham J. stayed the proceedings, that it was in force on the 25th June, 2012, that it bound the District Court, and that Hogan J. could not look behind it or re-evaluate its merits.

48. It was submitted that if a respondent in judicial review proceedings takes issue with the form of a stay, they can challenge the grant of the stay.

49. Reference was made to McDonnell v. Brady [2001] 3 IR 588 , where the respondents challenged a stay granted in judicial review proceedings. Keane C.J. stated obiter, that:-

“There is no reason in logic why the applicant, where the grant of a stay is subsequently challenged, should not be under an onus to satisfy the Court that it is an appropriate case in which to grant such a stay.”

50. It was submitted that owing to the strict time limits established in law, when the respondent was produced in Trim District Court on the 28th June, 2012, he was not a person who was remanded in custody. The remand warrant requiring his production in Trim District Court on the 28th June, 2012, expired that day. He could only be further remanded in custody by a new order of the District Court. A new order would have to be made with reference to all the circumstances.

51. It was submitted that remanding a person in custody requires the invocation of the Court’s jurisdiction and as such a step in the proceedings which is prohibited by the order staying the proceedings.

52. It was submitted that incarcerating a person in pre-trial custody is not neutral, it is not maintaining the status quo.

53. It was submitted that when a Court grants leave to seek judicial review, a stay may be requested by an applicant. Order 84, rule 20 (8) (b) of the Rules of the Superior Courts, as amended by S.I. no. 691 of 2011: Rules of the Superior Courts (Judicial Review) 2011, sets out that where either certiorari or prohibition is sought then the proceedings may be stayed, by order, until the determination of the application for judicial review, and that without any further clarification a stay operates as a complete suspension of the proceedings.

54. Further, that any order invoking the jurisdiction of a Court is a step in the proceedings. It was submitted that the order in Trim District Court on the 28th June, 2012, was a step in the proceedings. Thus, in this case, the order of Birmingham J. stayed the proceedings, and the order of Trim District Court contravened that order.

Decision
55. Order 84 r 20 (8) (b) of the Rules of the Superior Courts, as inserted by the Rules of the Superior Courts (Judicial Review) 2011, S.I. 691 of 2011, provides that when the High Court grants leave to apply for judicial review the Court may:-

“… (b) where the relief sought is an order of prohibition or certiorari, make an order staying the proceedings, order or decision to which the application relates until the determination of the application for judicial review or until the Court otherwise orders.”

[emphasis added]

Key words are “staying the proceedings”.

57. The reliefs sought included inter alia:-

(i) An order of prohibition … restraining the DPP from prosecuting the respondent on criminal charges on foot of charge sheet numbers 12720972, 12720923, and 12720931 currently pending before Trim District Court, unless and until he is afforded legal aid, to include solicitor and counsel, together with a suitably appointed mentor to assist him at trial.

(ii) An order of certiorari … quashing the decision of Judge Mahon refusing the respondent legal aid on the 7th June, 2012.

(iii) An order of certiorari … quashing the decision of Judge McMahon refusing to assign the [respondent] a mentor on the 7th June, 2012, and to provide for same as part of a legal aid certificate.

59. Thus, the proceedings stayed in this case are specifically identified, and the issue then arises as to the effect on the proceedings of the stay order.

60. Black’s Law Dictionary, Ninth Edition, p. 1548, defines a stay as:-

“1. The postponement or halting of a proceeding, judgment or the like.

2. An order to suspend all or part of a judicial proceeding or a judgment arising from that proceeding.”

“The suspension of proceedings by a court eg (a) where the proceedings are vexatious or frivolous, (b) where there is a risk of an unfair trial due to prejudicial pre-trial publicity, or (c) where legal proceedings are instituted contrary to an arbitration agreement; or (d) where no reasonable cause of action is shown; or (e) on acceptance of a lodgement ; or (f) where a preliminary issue of law is to be decided.”

“A stay in a claim is a suspension of the claim or part of the proceedings as the court directs. The term is widely used in a number of contexts. […]”

62. It is clear, therefore, that a stay does not have the effect of terminating proceedings. Rather a stay leaves the proceedings in being but prevents the proceedings from progressing in any significant way. To the extent that it might be suggested that it was appropriate that some progress might be made in the proceedings, notwithstanding a stay, then that is a matter to be addressed to the judge granting the stay. An application can be made to that judge to make the stay subject to terms which would permit whatever progress might be considered desirable. In the absence of such terms, a stay will prevent the proceedings from significantly progressing. That does not, however, mean that any orders necessary to allow the proceedings to continue in being, albeit in a “holding pattern”, cannot be made.

Thus the real question is as to whether any order sought to be made is one which is consistent with or contrary to the fact that the proceedings are stayed. Orders which are a necessary part of keeping the proceedings in being are entirely consistent with a stay for they do not progress the proceedings in any material way but simply allow the proceedings to continue in their holding pattern. On the other hand different types of orders which would have the effect of materially progressing the proceedings are contrary to a stay and cannot be made in the absence of a specific provision in the stay order qualifying the terms of the stay in such a way as to permit orders of the type in question to be made.

63. However, the granting of leave to apply for judicial review, and a stay pending the determination of the application for review, do not terminate the underlying proceedings the subject of the judicial review. The underlying proceedings are suspended pending the review.

64. Any other interpretation would have the effect that, on an ex parte application for leave to apply for judicial review where the DPP was not on notice or a party to the application, the prosecution process would be effectively terminated.

65. Consequently, the granting of a stay by the High Court on an application for judicial review postpones or suspends the proceedings relating to the criminal trial, the subject of an application for Judicial Review, but it does not terminate the proceedings, or mean that a District Court Judge could not continue to make orders while the proceedings are suspended, such as to remand an accused in the circumstances, provided that any such orders are required to maintain the proceedings in being and are not contrary to the stay. Thus, the District Court continued to have jurisdiction to make such an order, pending the determination of the application for Judicial Review.

66. Consequently, I would allow the appeal.

Judgment delivered on the 10th of April, 2014, by O’Donnell J.

1 I respectfully agree with the judgment of the Chief Justice that the stay granted by Birmingham J. did not prevent the District Court making an order remanding the applicant on the 28th of June 2012. I also agree that even if the proceedings are technically moot, this is an appropriate case to hear the appeal because of the systemic importance of the effect of a stay order granted in judicial review proceedings. However, in addition to the foregoing, I consider that the appeal is not truly moot in any sense, and wish briefly to set out my reasons for so concluding.

2 The remedy of Article 40.4 is the great remedy available to citizens and all persons with access to the jurisdiction of these courts. Its strength is its simplicity and its speed. It is meant to address – forthwith – the question of the lawfulness of the custody or detention of any individual. The order which the Court makes at the conclusion of the inquiry is either to order the release of the person, or not. The urgency with which the courts are obliged to, and do, treat such applications is itself an illustration of the importance of the Constitution attached to this remedy as a foundation of liberty within the State itself and essential component in the constitutional order created by the Constitution. Liberty, in the full meaning of the word is fundamental to both the exercise and enjoyment of the rights identified in the Constitution and the functioning of the democratic structure created by it. But the fact that such matters must be dealt with speedily by the High Court, and where necessary on appeal by this Court, can also mean that the law can develop in a staccato fashion with each individual case no more than an illustration of the reasons why the remedy was granted or refused in that case. Much of the case law has been gathered, and valuably analysed in Dr Kevin Costello’s impressive work The Law of Habeas Corpus in Ireland (Dublin; Four Courts Press; 2006), but that exercise in scholarship only illustrates the desirability of more comprehensive review by reference to principle and authority.

3 The timeline in this case is relatively simple. The applicant was in custody on other offences but due to be released on the 4th of July 2012. Separately he was charged with road traffic offences in respect of which he was remanded in the District Court from time to time, with consent to his own bail of €300 and an independent surety in the same amount. On the 25th of June 2012 an ex parte application was made to the High Court for judicial review seeking in effect, the provision of legal aid for the defence of the Road Traffic Act proceedings. Birmingham J. granted leave to seek judicial view, and as is normal in such cases, granted the stay on proceedings in the District Court. This was only logical since the applicant’s complaint was that if the trial on the Road Traffic Act offences was to proceed without legal aid it would be a breach of his constitutional rights. The terms of the stay are entirely standard, and are set out in the judgment of the Chief Justice.

4 The 28th of June is the critical day in these proceedings. The Road Traffic Act proceedings were once again before the District Court. It was now however contended on behalf of the applicant that the court could simply make no further order remanding the applicant in custody even with consent to bail because, or so it was contended, the proceedings had been stayed by the High Court. The learned District Court Judge disagreed and made an order remanding the applicant until the 5th of July. On the 4th of July his sentence on the other offences expired and an immediate application was made for an inquiry under Article 40 giving rise to these proceedings. On the 5th of July the matter came before the District Court again which made no further order with the effect that the applicant was released from custody on that day. The urgency had now been removed from the proceedings and the High Court proceedings could proceed at a more appropriate pace. The full inquiry came on for hearing on the 15th of October and the learned High Court judge delivered a judgment on the 19th of that month holding first, that the proceedings were not moot, and second, that the District Court had no jurisdiction to make any order on the 28th of June. However, the court was no longer in a position to make the order contemplated under Article 40.4 directing the release of the applicant, and accordingly made a declaration that the applicant was entitled to have been released from custody on the 4th of July 2012.

5 From that decision, the appellant appeals to this court. It is however contended that the appeal is moot. That is a claim which in these proceedings the court is required to scrutinise with some care.

6 The liberty of the citizen is vital to the constitutional order and something which the courts and every other institution are bound to vindicate without fear or favour but it should be said, that in practical terms the liberty of this citizen could have been achieved without the drama of these proceedings. First, he had been remanded in custody it is true, but with consent to bail in the sum of €300 and an independent surety in the same amount. It was not suggested that securing of this bail posed any insuperable difficulty for him and there was ample time to have any surety approved before the expiry of the sentence so that he would not have to be remanded in custody in these proceedings. Accordingly, the applicant could, with the assistance of his representatives, have secured his own release by the 4th of July and before the swiftest lawyer could have brought proceedings and the most conscientious judge made any order. Second, while the focus of this case has been the validity of the order of the District Court of the 28th of June, the key to that validity lay in the interpretation of the order granted by the High Court on the 25th. If there was real doubt or controversy as to what was meant by that order it could have been addressed with the High Court before the launching of an inquiry under Article 40. There can be little doubt that the High Court did not intend that the granting of a stay should bring the proceedings to an end, but that could have been clarified if thought necessary, by a variation of the stay. Third, any possible mootness affecting these proceedings arose from the fact that the applicant had been released from custody on the 5th of July. If such mootness existed, this frailty affected the High Court proceedings just as much as these proceedings. Once the High Court Judge decided to proceed with the hearing, then as a matter of both justice and common sense, there could be no objection to an appeal from the correctness of that determination. If it were not for the curiosity that it was the appellant who had sought to insist that the case was heard in the High Court, mootness could just as easily have been a ground of appeal as a ground for seeking to resist it. Finally, it may be that a distinction should be made between the effect of release on appeals by applicants and those by respondents. An applicant who has been released may have difficulty in explaining why it is necessary to hear an appeal in proceedings specifically directed to ordering his or her release. However mootness by reason of the fact that the applicant has now been released from custody may be an inappropriate ground to resist a respondent’s appeal under Article 40.4. Because it is considered that neither the High Court nor this Court has power to grant any stay on an order directing the release of a person there would be no way of avoiding mootness. If the release from custody rendered an appeal automatically moot then no appeal would be possible from a decision to release, no matter how erroneous. The decision would moreover remain uncorrected and available as a precedent in future cases, which if they followed the same course would themselves become unappealable on grounds of mootness. That complication does not necessarily arise here, but, in the circumstances of this case, once the hearing was embarked upon in the High Court there was no good reason not to hear the appeal, even if technically moot, and many good reasons to do so.

7 However, it seems to me that the appeal was not moot in any real sense of the word. Mootness is an issue which can arise in Article 40 inquiries when for various reasons the applicant is at liberty. There is, to put it as it lowest, some difficulty about making orders for release or non release under Article 40 of a person who has long since left custody. However here, the fact that the release had occurred before the High Court hearing meant that the court could not make any such order, and instead made a declaration that the applicant was entitled to have been released on the 4th of July. Assuming for the moment that such an order could validly be made under an Article 40 inquiry, that declaration together with a consequential order for the costs of the initial application and for 80% of the costs of the hearing of the inquiry, remains in place. It is a declaration of the legal position between the parties, which is binding upon them. As long as it remains in place, and is in any way capable of affecting the rights and obligations of the parties (and moreover providing a legal basis and justification for the order for costs) I consider that the respondent was entitled to appeal it as of right and the proceedings could not be said to be moot. If however, this is too narrow a view, I also express my agreement with the Chief Justice, that even if the appeal is considered to be moot, it is one that the court should hear and determine.

8 On the substance of the appeal, I also agree that once it was conceded that the High Court stay was not absolute, and did permit the District Court to do some things, it could not be maintained that it was not in a position to make one further remand in custody with consent to bail, which maintained the status quo. This is a conclusion I reach with some relief, since otherwise a High Court judge hearing an ex parte application for judicial review might be slower to grant a stay than might otherwise be the case, or might have to routinely require argument at which the respondent would be present, on the terms of any stay. Such a course may be necessary in cases of any complexity but it would be undesirable to have this additional time and cost incurred in routine cases.

9 Finally, I note that the argument in the High Court and this court proceeded on a shared assumption that if the stay in the High Court was to be interpreted as preventing any order being made in the District Court (and even if that went further than the High Court may have intended), the District Court would lack all jurisdiction to make any order for detention of the accused, so that the order of the District Court would not be a valid return to an Article 40 inquiry. Since that matter was not explored in argument, and is I hope unlikely to arise in practice, I express no view upon it.