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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Jersey Unreported Judgments >> Representation of Standish and Milsom re Ablyazov [2013] JRC 150 (30 July 2013) URL: http://www.bailii.org/je/cases/UR/2013/2013_150.html Cite as: [2013] JRC 150 |
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Before : |
Sir Michael Birt, Kt., Bailiff, and Jurats Kerley and Milner. |
IN THE MATTER OF THE FIFTH REPRESENTATION OF DAVID STANDISH AND JOHN MILSOM, RECEIVERS OF THE ASSETS OF MUKHTAR ABLYAZOV.
Advocate A. J. N. Dessain and Advocate E. B. Drummond for the Representors.
judgment
the bailiff:
1. This is a further application by the representors in their capacity as receivers of the assets of Mr Ablyazov. On this occasion, they seek permission to disclose documents and information they have obtained in Jersey to the plaintiff in the proceedings in England which gave rise to their appointment in the first place.
2. The background to this matter appears in the judgment of this Court dated 23rd December, 2011, reported at [2012] (1) JLR 44 ("the December judgment"), which gave the Court's reasons for making an order on 30th November, 2011, recognising the appointment of the receivers in Jersey. In short, JSC BTA Bank ("the Bank"), which is incorporated in Kazakhstan, has brought proceedings against Mr Ablyazov and others in the High Court in London. It is alleged that, whilst he was chairman of the Bank, Mr Ablyazov misappropriated the Bank's funds.
3. The Bank obtained a freezing order against Mr Ablyazov in those proceedings. Subsequently, it was concluded by the High Court that Mr Ablyazov had failed to make proper disclosure pursuant to the freezing order and the Court appointed the receivers as receivers over various assets which were said ultimately to belong to Mr Ablyazov. It is that appointment which was recognised by this Court in the December judgment.
4. Since then there have been further proceedings in Jersey. On 7th March, 2012, (for reasons described in a judgment dated 29th March, 2012, ([2012] JRC 072) the Court made specific orders for disclosure against Nautilus Trust Company Limited ("Nautilus") and Eurasia Logistics Limited ("Eurasia Logistics"), a Jersey company administered by Nautilus. Eurasia Logistics was said to belong to Mr Ablyazov as ultimate beneficial owner. On 31st May, 2013, this Court recognised amendments to the receivership order made by the High Court on 17th May, 2013, which had the effect of appointing the receivers as managers of Eurasia Logistics. Finally, on 5th July, 2013, this Court noted that Mr Jeremy Outen, who had been one of the original receivers, had ceased to so act following his departure from KPMG in England and released him from the undertakings which the receivers had given this Court when their appointment was originally recognised. It follows that the representors are the two remaining receivers appointed by the High Court.
5. Pursuant to the orders of this Court, the receivers have obtained various documents and information from Nautilus in respect of Eurasia Logistics. Documents and information have also been obtained from Deloitte LLP, former advisers to Eurasia Logistics.
6. As stated in the December judgment, the receivers are officers of the High Court appointed to safeguard the assets pending resolution of the Bank's claim. They do not act for the Bank.
7. Mr Ablyazov has absented himself from the English proceedings. A sentence of 22 months' imprisonment has been imposed by the High Court for his contempt of court and he has been barred from defending various of the claims because of his continuing contempt. The Bank has now obtained judgments in the sum of approximately US$3.7 billion in respect of its claims.
8. As a consequence of obtaining judgment, the Bank applied in the High Court for an order varying the receivership order, so that the receivers would be directed to provide to the Bank's English solicitors all documents (other than privileged documents) produced to them during the receivership (a) by Mr Ablyazov and/or those acting on his behalf and (b) by corporate service providers, registered agents and/or banks in respect of the companies and assets covered by the receivership order. This covers the documents obtained by the receivers in Jersey in respect of Eurasia Logistics.
9. Popplewell J granted the variation on 5th July, 2013. His judgment ([2013] EWHC (1979) (Comm) was in clear terms. He began by describing the position of Mr Ablyazov as follows at paragraph 9:-
10. He went on as follows to explain why he was granting the application:-
11. It is in these circumstances that the receivers now apply to this Court for leave to disclose the documents obtained in Jersey to the Bank's solicitors pursuant to the variation of the receivership order made by Popplewell J and described above.
12. Advocate Dessain submits that, arguably, an order from this Court is not required for the receivers to be able to make such disclosure to the Bank's solicitors. That argument arises in the following way. Paragraph 2 of the order of this Court dated 30th November, 2011, recognising the receivership order is in the following terms:-
"Order that the Receivership Order in its current form or as it may be amended from time to time by order of the English High Court, is hereby recognised by the Royal Court; provided that any further order of the English High Court and/or amendment of the Receivership Order which results in the Receivers being appointed as receivers of assets of which they are not presently receivers shall not be so recognised without the further order of the Royal Court ...". [Emphasis added]
Thus, it is said that the amendment of 5th July, 2013, by Popplewell J has automatically been recognised.
13. As to the undertakings given by the receivers at the time of the original recognition order in this jurisdiction, the relevant one was as follows:-
"Not to use any information and documentation obtained pursuant to the Order, or any other order of the Royal Court, other than for the purposes of the Receivership, by order of the English Court or for the purpose of obtaining recognition of the Receivership Order in other jurisdictions, save with leave of the Royal Court."
14. At the time that undertaking was given, paragraph 27 of the receivership order stated that:-
"The Receivers shall be permitted to use and/or disclose all information that has come, or will come, in to their possession for the purposes of the receivership ..."
15. As part of the decision to direct disclosure to the Bank's solicitors, the 5th July, 2013, order of Popplewell J introduced a new para 27C into the receivership order which states:-
"Complying with any order of the Court in relation to the disclosure of documents is deemed to be a purpose of the receivership."
16. Advocate Dessain therefore raises the point that this Court has in effect already authorised the receivers to make disclosure to the Bank because that is what the receivership order now provides and such disclosure would not be in breach of the undertaking because it would be "for the purposes of the receivership" (as now defined at para 27C) and also "by order of the English Court."
17. Advocate Dessain has gone on to make it clear that, whatever the technical arguments, the receivers realise that there may be room for doubt and for this Court to feel that information is now to be disclosed in a manner very different from that envisaged at the time of the recognition order. They have accordingly made this application.
18. In our judgment, the receivers were quite correct to do so. What is now proposed is very different from what was envisaged at the time the undertaking was given.
19. In Re AG (Manchester) Limited [2005] JRC 035D, the liquidator of an English company obtained an order from this Court that a Jersey trustee disclose certain documents and information to the liquidator. The liquidator gave an undertaking to the Court that the documents and information disclosed by the trustee would only be used "for the purposes of the company's liquidation." He had not however disclosed that, as an English liquidator, he had a statutory duty to assist the Official Receiver and the Secretary of State, pursuant to the Insolvency Act 1986 and the Company Director's Disqualification Act 1986 respectively, by supplying them with information obtained during the liquidation nor that he had already received a request for such assistance. He now wished to make such disclosure and applied to amend his undertaking.
20. The Court agreed to the requested variation but gave a strong warning about the importance of undertakings. At paragraph 3 of the judgment, Bailhache B said this:-
The Court went on to emphasise the importance of giving adequate consideration to the precise terms of any undertaking.
21. We entirely agree with the observations of Bailhache B. Furthermore, an undertaking must be read in the context of the information provided at the time. When the receivers gave their undertaking in this case, one of the key factors relied upon (and referred to in the judgment) was that they were not agents of the Bank; they were officers of the High Court. The purpose of the receivership was emphasised as being merely to preserve assets pending the outcome of the litigation. It was clearly not envisaged at the time that the information and documents would be supplied to the Bank as plaintiff. This is shown by the comment of the Court at paragraph 18(v) of the March judgment when it said:-
22. We find therefore that it was entirely correct for the receivers to revert to this Court to seek a specific variation notwithstanding any technical argument to the contrary. In retrospect, we think that the undertaking was worded in an unnecessarily wide way and that, in future cases, greater protection should be built in as to the use to which documents and information obtained under compulsion in Jersey can be put. The wording of the order and undertakings in this case does raise the possibility of documents and information being used for a purpose never envisaged by this Court at the time.
23. Having made these preliminary observations, we are in no doubt that the Court should permit the receivers to disclose the documents and information obtained in Jersey to the Bank. As Popplewell J made clear, the whole purpose of the receivership was to safeguard assets pending resolution of the proceedings brought by the Bank. Now that the Bank has succeeded in those proceedings and become a judgment creditor, it is clearly appropriate that documents and information in the possession of the receivers should be handed over to the Bank, so that it may pursue such steps as it thinks fit to enforce its judgment.
24. However, paragraph 27D of the receivership order as amended on 5th July, 2013, specified two purposes in connection with which the Bank can use the documents and information supplied by the receivers, namely (a) the proceedings listed in the schedule to the order of Mr Justice Teare dated 29th February, 2012, and (b) the enforcement of the Bank's judgments against Mr Ablyazov and/or his assets. We require the Bank to provide an undertaking to this Court that it will not use the documents and information which are to be disclosed to it by the receivers pursuant to our decision for any purpose other than the two purposes referred to at (a) and (b) above without further order of this Court. The receivers may not disclose any documents and information which they have obtained in Jersey prior to receipt of such undertaking from the Bank.
25. We should add that we have not thought it necessary for these proceedings formally to be served on Mr Ablyazov or on Nautilus, Eurasia Logistics or Deloitte LLP. However, we note that the receivers provided a copy of the fifth representation and the receivership order as amended on 5th July, 2013, (redacted in places for reasons of confidentiality) by way of notice of the hearing to Mr Ablyazov (via his English solicitors), to Eurasia Logistics and Nautilus (via Carey Olsen) and to Deloitte LLP. None of them have appeared. Nevertheless, we give those parties liberty to apply, although in the case of Mr Ablyazov, we can envisage that the Court may wish to be addressed on whether it should hear him given his flagrant contempt of the High Court. We also give the Bank liberty to apply, for example if it wishes to vary the undertaking referred to above.