Jersey Unreported Judgments

Care order - application by the Minister for an interim care order.

[2015]JRC261

Royal Court

(Family)

17 December 2015

Before     :		J. A. Clyde-Smith, Esq., Commissioner and Jurats Nicolle and Sparrow
Between	The Minister for Health and Social Services		Applicant
And	A (the mother)		First Respondent
And	B (the father)		Second Respondent

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILDREN (JERSEY) LAW 2002

AND IN THE MATTER OF MARIA (INTERIM CARE ORDER)

Advocate S. L. Brace for the Applicant.

Advocate C. G. Hillier for the First Respondent.

Advocate A. T. H. English for the Second Respondent, not present.

judgment

the commissioner:

1.        The Minister applies for an interim care order and for the approval of a care plan for the immediate removal of Maria (this is not her real name), a baby of some 12 weeks, from the mother to be placed with foster carers.  Such a step has been described in the case law as draconian and only to be sanctioned where the child's safety demands it (see In the matter of J [2011] JRC 147).  Sadly in this case the point has been reached where that step must now be taken. 

2.        The Minister first applied for an interim care order and for the child's removal into foster care on 7^th October when the child was still in the maternity hospital.  The background to the matter and a summary of the Minister's concerns is set out in the Court's judgment for file and parties only of 7^th October, 2015, which we will repeat:-

"6       It is the case that as recently as the 29th September, 2015, the Children's Service were planning for the child to return home with the mother under a robust care plan involving six visits every week.  However, the events of the 29th September and 2nd October, and in particular an admitted call she made to the father against the clear advice of the Children's Service, tipped the balance to a point where the Children's Service no longer feel able to trust the mother to protect the child from harm. 

7         Whilst acknowledging the problems of the past, the mother has made great strides in that she is abstinent from alcohol from last December, and the father says he has been abstinent for at least 15 months.  She has engaged well with the Alcohol and Drugs Service, complying with her programme for subutex.  She and the father say that the relationship is now over, although we have to say that we do have reservations about that. 

8         What is clear however is that the mother has shown herself to be perfectly capable of looking after the child since the child's birth.  She is prepared to do anything she can reasonably do in order to keep the child but, in particular, has undertaken to go with the child to live at the Women's Refuge tomorrow where she can stay for eight weeks, and will give undertakings designed to ensure no contact between her and the father and the child and the father.  The Women's Refuge have confirmed that she can go there. 

9         We are satisfied from the evidence we have heard that the threshold for an interim care order is met, and that we therefore have jurisdiction as a Court, but, notwithstanding the concerns of the Children's Service, which we fully understand, and in the light of the undertakings given by the mother, we are not satisfied that the child's removal now is necessary for her safety.  We have to apply the test as we see the position today, which we have done and we acknowledge that there may well be issues at the end of the eight-week period unless the Children's Service can then agree on a plan for the mother to return to her home with support. 

10       As a consequence we do not approve the care plan and cannot therefore make an interim care order.  Having considered the welfare checklist and a no order principle, what we can do however is to impose an interim supervision order with suitable undertakings which we think will give the Children's Service the necessary locus to monitor the child's welfare."

3.        The undertakings given by the mother directly to the Court included the following:-

(i)        To go with the child to live at the Women's Refuge tomorrow and to remain there for eight weeks unless otherwise agreed by the Children's Service;

(ii)       Not to have any contact with the father of any kind, directly or indirectly; and

(iii)      Not to permit the child to have any contact of any kind with the father. 

4.        Unfortunately the ability of the Women's Refuge to take the mother had not been fully explored and they declined to take her and the child on the basis that the mother did not meet the criteria for admission from a domestic/violence perspective.  The child remained in the maternity hospital and the Minister applied again on 13^th October, 2015, for an interim care order and for the child's removal into foster care.  The Court again refused that application for reasons that were to be set out in a written judgment, which has yet to be issued and which is now somewhat overtaken but, in summary:-

(i)        As mentioned above, the Children's Service had, until very shortly before the child's birth, proposed that the child would live with the mother under a very robust care plan;

(ii)       It was, in effect, one call between the mother and the father, and we interpose to say we understood it to be only one call, that had tipped the balance in favour of removal;

(iii)      The progress the mother had apparently made in being abstinent from alcohol;

(iv)      Her protestations that the relationship with the father was completely over, a relationship that had been marked by domestic violence and abuse of alcohol and drugs; and

(v)       The undertakings that she had given solemnly and directly to the Court. 

5.        In essence the evidence was just insufficient to justify so draconian an order so shortly after the child's birth, a view which was shared by the guardian.  The interim supervision order was reaffirmed and the undertakings, save that in respect of the Women's Refuge, were renewed.  The child was discharged from the maternity hospital to the care of the mother. 

6.        On 11^th December, 2015, the Minister applied for an emergency protection order.  The Bailiff felt unable to grant such an order on the basis of the evidence then before him but recommended that the matter be considered more fully at an application for an interim care order, which has now been made before us.  We note from his judgment that the Bailiff found the mother's judgment to be extremely poor and her evidence not very convincing. 

7.        Shortly prior to the hearing before us, the Minister produced evidence of many phone calls made by the mother to the father on the 8^th and 9^th December in direct breach of the undertakings given to the Court, and that would seem to have been the catalyst for Advocate Hillier informing the Court that the mother did not now contest or oppose the granting of an interim care order on the basis of the care plan for removal, a clearly difficult and distressing decision for the mother to have made. 

8.        During the course of the hearing further evidence was produced from the police showing extensive calls from September 23^rd to 5^th October, 2015, between the mother and the father, casting serious doubt as to the veracity of her evidence to the Court on 6^th and 13^th October. 

9.        The grounds for applying for the emergency protection order and now an interim care order are summarised in Advocate Grace's skeleton argument at paragraph 9 as follows:-

"a)       Continued telephone contact between the mother and the father in contravention of the restraining order and the undertakings given by the mother;

b)        The mother having resumed alcohol use and this in the context of her history of dependent/chaotic alcohol misuse;

c)        The mother's allegation that the father attended her home uninvited on 9^th December, 2015, and physically assaulted her whilst the child was in her arms;

d)        The father's denial of the assault or even presence in the home, and the Minister's inability to safeguard the child given such diametrically opposed accounts;

e)        The mother allowing males known to be substance-misusers into her home whilst the child is present;

f)         The mother's failure to volunteer information herself unless the Minister is made aware of concerns from other sources and can specifically challenge her e.g. ongoing telephone contact with the father, resuming drinking, not notifying the police or the Children's Service of the alleged assault on 9^th December; and

g)        Concern that the child shows little reaction to her mother's heightened emotional reaction suggesting that this is a regular occurrence for her."

10.      In a statement of 16^th December, 2015, Mrs Susan Terry, the mother's keyworker at the Alcohol and Drugs Service, highlighted what she described as several real and major risks to the child's wellbeing and quoting from paragraph 12 of her report she set those out as follows:-

"a)       The mother relapsing to drug and alcohol misuse.  I understand Children's Services and her health visitor that the mother has admitted use of alcohol.  As a previously dependent/chaotic drinker it is highly unlikely that the mother would be able to control her use of alcohol over a period of time.  The mother is aware of my concerns.  Further use of alcohol may lead to disinhibition and at these times the mother would be more likely to make contact with other substance misusers or the father.

b)        Possible escalation of both drug or alcohol abuse will increase risk of overdose/death and will seriously impair the mother's ability to care for and safeguard the child.

c)        Despite a Child Protection Plan being in place the mother has continued to invite/allow substance misusers into her home.  The mother is fully aware of the history of her acquaintances and therefore the risks they may pose to the child.  It does not appear that the mother is prioritising the child's wellbeing over her own need for company.

d)        The mother has not followed the safety plan which is in place i.e. keep doors locked (not an unreasonable request in any home), desist from contact with the father and failed to contact police following alleged incident on the 10/11/2015.  On discussion with the mother on 10/12/2015 she externalised all responsibility to keep herself and the child safe and showed no insight into the risk she was placing her child in.  As the mother did not perceive a risk there is little reason that she will feel the need to safeguard the child in the future."

11.      Mr Jonathan Collins, the social worker, in his report and in evidence before us, says that in light of what has transpired, the current interim supervision order cannot adequately protect the child who is at continuing risk of significant harm.  We agree with that assessment as does the guardian.  The mother has not worked openly with the Children's Service, she has breached solemn undertakings given directly to the Court, she has resumed alcohol intake and, in our view, has exposed the child to direct risk of harm if not actual psychological harm.  As the guardian said, the point has been reached when the Children's Service can no longer rely on agreements with the mother.  She has concealed significant parts of her life from the Children's Service and the Court and the child is therefore at risk. 

12.      Mr Collins took the Court through the options available to the Court and we agree that an interim care order is now the only order we can make in order to ensure the child's safety and we approve the care plan for her removal into foster care.  The interim supervision order will be discharged. 

13.      In terms of contact, the mother is understandably very anxious to maintain a relationship with the child whom she has been caring for alone since the child was discharged from the maternity hospital.  The care plan provides for supervised contact three times a week and two hours on each occasion.  The mother wants more involvement than this, although she is not applying for any actual order to be made.  Advocate Hillier asks us to give judicial encouragement to the Children's Service to involve the mother more than currently planned.  Under Article 27 of the Children's Law the Minister has a duty to allow reasonable contact between the mother and a child and it is clear from the evidence of Mr Collins that he is willing to be flexible but, as he says, it is a question of balance and we are content to leave the matter in the hands of the Minister. 

14.      The Court would like to commend Mr Collins for what we feel has been the very professional and balanced way he has undertaken his work on this case and Advocate Hillier we would like to commend to your client the words of the Bailiff at the end of the emergency protection order and am sure she has been given a copy of that.  Perhaps you could take her through it and, as Mr Collins said, that is very wise advice which may be of assistance to her in these very difficult circumstances. 

Authorities

In the matter of J [2011] JRC 147.

Children's (Jersey) Law 2002.