Jersey Unreported Judgments

Jurisdiction - application by the Plaintiff to adjourn the summons of the Defendant challenging the Court's jurisdiction.

[2019]JRC174

Royal Court

(Samedi)

11 September 2019

Before     :

T. J. Le Cocq, Esq., Deputy Bailiff, sitting alone

 

Advocate W. A. F. Redgrave for the Plaintiff.

Advocate D. S. Steenson for the Defendant.

judgment

the deputy bailiff:

1.        This is an application by BNP Paribas Jersey Trust Corporation Limited ("the Plaintiff") to adjourn the summons of Camilla de Bourbon des Deux Siciles ("the Defendant") challenging the jurisdiction of this Court from the dates presently fixed for them (being 19^th and 20^th September 2019) to 25^th and 26^th November 2019. 

2.        On 29^th March, 2019 I signed an Order of Justice presented ex parte in which the Plaintiff obtained interim orders against the Defendant regarding the Defendant's assets worldwide.  The basis of the claim an alleged conspiracy by the Defendant acting with another to breach a pre-trial worldwide freezing order made by the Court on 4^th August, 2016, and various other alleged failures.  That Order of Justice was supported by an affidavit of Lynne Catherine Gregory of 28^th March, 2019 and by the submissions of counsel made in the ex parte application to me in chambers. 

3.        By summons dated 17^th May, 2019, and returnable, as I have indicated above, on 19^th September, 2019 the Defendant sought orders setting aside the Order of Justice and the injunctions contained within it on the basis that there was no good arguable case or serious issue to be tried; that the courts in Curaçao are already seized of the jurisdiction in this matter and accordingly Jersey is not a suitable forum; and the requirements of Rule 7(f) of the Service of Process (Jersey) Rules 1994 have not been satisfied. 

4.        At the time that the Order of Justice was signed by me, the Plaintiff already had already started proceedings in Curaçao which were similar, although not identical, to the cause of action pleaded in the Order of Justice.  The existence of the proceedings in Curaçao were referred to in Ms Gregory's affidavit under the heading "Full and Frank Disclosure" although were not referred to expressly in the skeleton argument filed by the Plaintiff nor in submissions made by counsel in chambers. 

5.        In the time leading up to 19^th September a number of procedural steps are to be taken and documents are to be lodged. 

6.        Since the Order of Justice was signed, the Defendant has confirmed unequivocally that she would accept the jurisdiction of the courts of Curaçao to deal with the case there pleaded against her. 

7.        The application before me is to adjourn the dates currently set aside for, in brief, the following reasons:-

(i)        The Plaintiff intends to amend its proceedings in Curaçao to include the Jersey allegations to the extent that they are different from the allegations already made in the pleadings in Curaçao;

(ii)       If the Defendant unequivocally accepts that those matters can also be dealt with in Curaçao then the Plaintiff would withdraw the proceedings in Jersey;

(iii)      Accordingly, as the position in Curaçao would be clarified within a relatively short period (and in any event very shortly prior to the dates currently scheduled for the hearing in Jersey), the steps taken leading up to the Jersey hearing may be wasted in the event that the Plaintiff withdraws its claims in this jurisdiction in order to progress its claim in Curaçao;

(iv)      In the light of the fact that postponement is relatively short (some two months), it would make sense from a case management and costs saving point of view to adjourn that hearing to enable the position to become clear and, possibly (but not certainly) proceedings to end in Jersey and be continued in an amended form in Curaçao;

(v)       The Plaintiff does not wish to withdraw until the jurisdictional position is known in Curaçao. 

8.        This application is contested by the Defendant.  The Defendant alleges a substantial inadequacy in the documentation placed before me when I granted the Order of Justice, specifically insufficient reference to and concentration on the already existing proceedings in Curaçao.  The Defendant argues that the statements made by the Plaintiff or on its behalf in connection with the Curaçao proceedings did not emphasise the fact that they were, in effect, in almost identical terms to the Jersey proceedings and the Plaintiff had already thereby indicated it was satisfied that the courts of Curaçao could deal with this matter.  This should have been front and centre of the Plaintiff's submissions to the Court and not, so the Defendant would characterise it, inadequately referred to in two paragraphs of the accompanying affidavit. 

9.        Furthermore, so the Defendant argues, the Court has granted what might be termed a draconian order and it is an entitlement of the Defendant to seek to have that order discharged at the earliest reasonable opportunity.  The claim in Jersey could have been pleaded in Curaçao. 

10.      The Plaintiff, in reply, disputes that the reference to the Curaçao proceedings was inadequate but in any event points out that information is coming out of the proceedings in Curaçao which would affect the pleadings and, as I have already mentioned, that the jurisdictional position taken by the Defendant was only revealed after the proceedings in Jersey had commenced. 

11.      I can, of course, recognise the practical force in the Plaintiff's submission that once the position is clarified in Curaçao, it may be that the Jersey proceedings will come to an end and that, on normal principles, it might well be expedient for a court to manage the proceedings in a way in which minimises both costs and the wasting of time. 

12.      That being said, however, the Court was moved to grant a very wide order on an ex parte basis and it is well understood that anyone who successfully obtained such an order must be prepared to have it challenged at short notice and make themselves available to meet any such challenge. 

13.      In my judgment, the justice of the case requires that the Defendant is given the opportunity to challenge the jurisdiction of the Court at the earliest opportunity should she wish to do so, and I do not, accordingly, grant to the Plaintiff's application to adjourn

Authorities

Service of Process (Jersey) Rules 1994.