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Jersey Unreported Judgments |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Jersey Unreported Judgments >> Umurzokov v AG [2023] JRC 100 (21 June 2023) URL: http://www.bailii.org/je/cases/UR/2023/2023_100.html Cite as: [2023] JRC 100 |
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Before : |
Sir Timothy Le Cocq, Bailiff, and Jurats Crill, Austin-Vautier, Averty, Le Cornu and Le Heuzé |
Muhiddin Umurzokov
-v-
The Attorney General
The Appellant appeared in person.
D. Hopwood Esq., Crown Advocate.
Advocate F. J. Littler, Amicus Curiae.
JUDGMENT
THE BAILIFF:
1. On 1 December 2022, we dismissed the appeal of Muhiddin Umurzokov ("the Appellant") who had sought leave to appeal against the sentence imposed upon him on 25 April 2022 by the Royal Court (MacRae, Deputy Bailiff, assisted by Jurats Ronge and Pitman) (AG v Umurzokov and Ors [2022] JRC 101). At the same time, the Appellant applied for an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal and against his recommendation for deportation passed by the Royal Court on the same occasion. He also applied for leave to call further evidence, namely information provided by his sister.
2. In order to deal with the appeal in the round, the Court granted the extension of time and gave leave to the Appellant to place further information before the Court which he accordingly did. At the end of the hearing, the Court granted leave to appeal and dismissed the appeal. These are our reasons.
3. The Appellant had pleaded guilty to all of the charges against him, namely seven counts of converting criminal property contrary to Article 31(1)(c) of the Proceeds of Crime (Jersey) Law 1999 ('the 1999 Law'); three counts of attempting to convert criminal property contrary to Article 1(1) of the Criminal Offences (Jersey) Law 2009 ('the 2009 Law') and Article 31(1)(c) of the 1999 Law and three counts of possessing criminal property contrary to Article 31(1)(c) of the 1999 Law.
4. The Appellant was charged with two Co-Defendants who, it appears, had worked together to launder approximately £60,000 in Jersey bank notes on behalf of an organised crime group. This was done during two trips to Jersey.
5. On the first trip, the Appellant visited Jersey on his own. He converted £7,000 into US Dollars at the Post Office and paid £2,000 into a UK account controlled by him but in the name of another person. On the second trip to Jersey he, together with his Co-Defendants, made a series of visits to banks, the Post Office, car dealerships and shops making 13 further conversions in the total sum of approximately £36,000 by purchasing mobile telephones and other devices and they attempted, unsuccessfully, to convert £38,000 cash into UK currency.
6. In its conclusions, the Crown moved for 3 years and 9 months imprisonment concurrent on all counts. In its judgment the Court, from a starting point of 6 years imprisonment, imposed sentences of 4 years imprisonment concurrent on all counts.
7. The Appellant's Notice of Appeal sought not only to appeal against sentence but, as we have indicated above, to appeal against the recommendation for deportation which was made by the Royal Court on the same occasion. However, no argument was advanced before us in that regard, the Appellant's more substantial written arguments did not touch upon that aspect, and we were notified by Counsel for the Crown that the Appellant's Counsel conceded the matter of deportation when before the Royal Court. In those circumstances we do not consider the issue of deportation further, although see no basis to question in any way the Royal Court's determination in that regard.
8. The Appellant does not speak fluent English and we were assisted throughout by an interpreter for which we are grateful. The Appellant placed before us documentation making assertions, criticisms of the judgment of the Royal Court, and interspersed with documentary exhibits which formed the entirety of his case.
9. Because of the difficulties inherent in dealing with the Appellant's appeal, we sought the assistance of an Amicus Curiae and we are grateful to Advocate Frances Littler for her help in that capacity.
10. The Appellant had been legally represented before the sentencing court but was not represented before us. The Amicus had the opportunity of meeting with the Appellant with the assistance of an interpreter through the Russian language (the Appellant's second language) and subsequently with the assistance of an Uzbek interpreter (Uzbek being the Appellant's first language).
11. The Amicus' contentions, accordingly, were as informed as is reasonably possible by the case that the Appellant wished to place before us and we are grateful for her written submissions stating the matter clearly.
12. The test on appeal against sentence has been set out in Harrison v AG [2004] JLR 111 in which Nutting JA said, at paragraph 31:
13. It is fair to say that the predicate offence was not identified and the Appellant who had pleaded guilty did so on a factual basis, namely that he laundered the money on behalf of another criminal group and he did not know the exact nature of the underlying criminal offending. That is the basis on which he was sentenced and characterised the factual basis of the offending. The travel and accommodation had been paid by the organised crime group for whom the Appellant, among others, was laundering money. The Appellant himself had taken two separate trips to Jersey for that purpose (his Co-Defendants only participating in the second trip) and he was the organiser of much of what went on. He personally laundered a substantial amount of the money involved.
14. The court stated that it gave all of the Defendants credit for their guilty pleas. In terms of previous convictions or credit for good character, the court observed that the Appellant, although he had no previous convictions, had already been laundering money for the same organised crime group and therefore did not allow him credit for good character.
15. The court then went on to conclude that the offences were so serious that only a custodial sentence could be justified and made reference to the case of AG v Rae and Spinola [2017] JRC 080 in which in respect of a similar sum of cash, the court accepted a starting point of between 6 and 7 years imprisonment.
16. The court then made reference to AG v Goodwin [2016 ]JRC 165, citing the following excerpts:
17. The sentencing court then stated it was not impossible to identify the predicate offence but took that as a neutral factor and then made the observation that the Appellant was trusted by the organised crime group to transfer cash from one place to another and to attempt to launder that cash which he had done so successfully some days before. The sentencing court went through the factors set out in Goodwin referring to the offending as a well-planned money-laundering operation and saying that an aggravating feature of the offending was that the Jersey bank notes were brought to the Island for the express purpose of being laundered here. It appears on our reading of the judgment that the sentencing court applied those principles appropriately, making appropriate reference to the interests of Jersey as a finance centre, as justifying an element of deterrence. The sentencing court said:
18. We agree with those observations to which we add our express endorsement. The courts will not hesitate to send out a message in the form of the sentences that it will impose to discourage money being laundered through its banking system and commercial businesses.
19. The Appellant's grounds of appeal raise a number of statements/questions which are his own and which, as we have indicated above, are interspersed with documentary evidence that he wishes to put before us.
20. The Amicus Curiae in her written submissions, breaks down the Appellant's grounds to essential grounds with which analysis we agree. Those grounds are:
(i) that the court failed to take into account that the Appellant was acting on instructions and under pressure/threat of harm to his sister;
(ii) that the sentence was passed on a mistaken factual basis; namely, that the Appellant received financial benefit for the offending;
(iii) that the overall sentence imposed is manifestly excessive having regard to comparable cases;
(iv) that his convictions can, and should be, distinguished from drugs cases.
21. Dealing first with the threats to the Appellant's sister, the sentencing court did, in its judgment consider this aspect. His sister's letter dated 18 March 2022 was handed up and in that she asserted that gold and diamonds were wrongfully confiscated from her in 2011 and carpets in 2019 and she therefore borrowed substantial money as a result of which she was under threat. She had sought to come to the United Kingdom and her visa had been issued on 1 October 2021 and she says that she had "arrived in London straight away".
22. The sentencing court in its remarks said:
23. The new material put before the court does not undermine this assessment and the travel documentation appears to us to give the Appellant's sister's date of arrival as 8 October. This pre-dated by a small margin the commission of the first of the offences by the Appellant.
24. It is right to say, also, that threats of violence are often a part of involvement with criminal gangs and they do not generally afford substantial mitigation.
25. As we have indicated, the predicate offence could not be identified and it cannot therefore be assumed that it relates to drug trafficking, if, indeed, it did. In AG v Goodwin [2016] JRC 165 at paragraph 11, in referring to the significance of threats, the court gave two policy reasons as to why such mitigation carried little weight. The first related to drug trafficking and the environment in which that occurred but the second was expressed in the following terms:
26. This appears to us to apply equally to cases of this nature as to drug trafficking cases and we cannot fault the approach of the Royal Court to this aspect of the case advanced by the Appellant.
27. In terms of the financial benefit received by the Appellant, the sentencing court commented as follows:
28. The Appellant's position that he did not financially benefit was argued before the sentencing court by his advocate. In his appeal contentions, the Appellant produces copy documents which, he asserts, establish that he and his Co-Defendants paid for the hotel, ferry and other expenses.
29. We do not view those documents as in any way conclusive or persuasive. Whoever may have made the initial payment, it seems unlikely in the extreme that payment for these elements would not have ultimately been made by the organised crime group in order for the offences to take place.
30. In any event, although this was a factor mentioned by the Royal Court, it was not in our view a particularly substantial factor nor, in the circumstances of the case, was it other than a conclusion that the sentencing court was entitled to draw.
31. The Appellant's assertion that the group's travel expenses were paid for by himself and one of his co-accused and not the criminal gang for whom they were acting was also at odds with the submission made on his behalf at sentencing by his Counsel. We had no evidence before us from his Counsel accounting for such a discrepancy.
32. The Appellant's submission that he was to reimburse his Co-Defendants is unlikely, in our view. As the Crown observes in its contentions, he was at the time an undischarged bankrupt and it seems more probable that such expenses were paid by the criminal gang for whom he was working.
33. The sentencing court expressly applied the factors set out in Goodwin cited above. The financial benefit received by the Appellant is not among the factors listed and does not accordingly appear to be a significant part of the sentencing conclusions.
34. The third main thrust of the Appellant's claim is that his case in comparison to others attracted an unduly high sentence.
35. As this court has said on many occasions, direct comparisons between one sentencing case and another, unless those cases are guideline cases, are seldom of assistance as each case turns on its own facts and merits. Not all of the factors necessarily appear in the judgment and it is accordingly not always possible to identify with precision why one case attracts a particular sentence whilst another which is apparently similar, attracts a lesser or greater sentence. The Appellant appears to submit that drugs cases, which form some of the comparator cases that have been put before us, are more serious. He relies upon AG v Rae and Spinola [2017] JRC 080 which attracted a sentence of 3 years 9 months and of AG v Fish and Hinds [2016] JRC 181A which, for a single transaction of £3,880, attracted a sentence of 12 months imprisonment. Those cases were before the sentencing court. In addition, the Appellant relies on AG v Brennan [2016] JRC 234 which attracted a sentence of 12 months for a single transaction as a courier; and Hagin v AG [2020] JCA 247 which, in addition to a drugs sentence in that case, attracted a sentence of 3 years for the money laundering elements and AG v Cornick [2022] JRC 079 where a cannabis dealer laundering his own proceeds was sentenced to 12 months concurrent.
36. We set out reference to these cases because they have been referred to us but in our view such cases could be of relevance only to show the general area within which sentencing may be placed and not in any sense as prescribing what sentences should be imposed by the court.
37. As we have indicated, the court characterised the actions of the Appellant and his Co-Defendants as being a sophisticated money laundering operation. The Appellant had laundered money, or had attempted to do so, in Jersey on two separate occasions, and the amount was substantial. He was, even at a low level, one of the organisers of this exercise and sought to make extensive use of businesses in Jersey for the laundering activity.
38. There was some assertion in the Appellant's contentions that there was nothing unlawful about his trip to Turkey in 2020 when he was found carrying £30,000 in cash. In our view, this assertion appears to be based on a misunderstanding, as explained by the Crown, that it had been the Crown's case that the £30,000 had been laundered at Stansted airport in 2020. In fact, so the Crown informs us, the point was that the sale of the same car had been used to explain both the £30,000 cash he exported to Turkey in 2020 and the £25,000 in Jersey notes that the group presented to the Jersey Post Office in 2021.
39. In paragraph 9 of the judgment, the Sentencing Court dealt with this matter in the following terms:
40. It is clear that the sentencing court understood that this explanation had been used at least twice and was not making any finding or determination as to the money being used by the Appellant in Turkey.
41. We have read carefully the Appellant's contentions and the further evidence that he has sought to adduce. We have also carefully considered how his contentions have been set out by the Amicus Curiae for whose assistance, as we have said, we are grateful.
42. We cannot see that the Inferior Number proceeded on either the wrong factual basis or took anything improperly into account. It appears to us that they applied the correct principles identified from authority and that the sentence imposed was well within that range of sentences that the court might reasonably impose for serious offending such as this.
43. In our view, the court did not err in determining either the starting point or the final sentence which paid full regard to the mitigation by way of guilty plea available to the Appellant. A sentence of 4 years imprisonment was neither manifestly excessive nor, in the circumstances of this case, do we consider it surprising in any way. Accordingly, we gave leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal.
