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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland Decisions >> Wright, Re Application for Judicial Review [2007] NICA 24 (28 June 2007) URL: http://www.bailii.org/nie/cases/NICA/2007/24.html Cite as: [2007] NICA 24 |
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Ref: KERF5884
KERR LCJ
Introduction
[1] This is an appeal from the judgment of Deeny J whereby he granted judicial review of the decision of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland acceding to the request of the panel which is conducting the inquiry into the death of Billy Wright that the inquiry be converted from one to be carried out under the Prison Act (Northern Ireland) 1953 to an inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005. [2] In broad outline the Secretary of State appeals on the grounds that the learned judge erred in concluding that the independence of such an inquiry was compromised by the existence of section 14 (1) (b) of the 2005 Act (which permits the Secretary of State to bring the inquiry to an end). It is also argued that that the judge was wrong to conclude that the Secretary of State had been incorrectly advised that an equivalent power existed under the Prison Act. Finally, it is claimed that the judge was in error in concluding that the Secretary of State had been advised (and accepted the advice) that there was a presumption in favour of acceding to the request of the inquiry.Factual background
[3] The respondent to this appeal is David Wright, the father of Billy Wright deceased. Billy Wright was shot dead on 27 December 1997 while a prisoner at Her Majesty's Prison the Maze. On 21 October 1998 three other prisoners who were members of the Irish National Liberation Army were convicted of his murder. The Government appointed the Honourable Peter Cory, a retired judge of the Canadian Supreme Court, to investigate allegations of collusion relating to the murder of Billy Wright and other controversial murders. In his report which was published on 1 April 2004 Judge Cory recommended that a public inquiry be held into the circumstances of Mr Wright's death. The then Secretary of State, Rt Hon Paul Murphy MP, announced that an inquiry into the death of Billy Wright would be established under the Prison Act. [4] In December 2004 the solicitors for David Wright wrote to the Secretary of State asking whether there were any plans for the Billy Wright Inquiry to be converted into an inquiry under the Inquiries Act which was at the time proceeding through Parliament. They were informed that "there are no plans for the inquiry into the death of Billy Wright to be converted into one under the Inquiries Bill and that it will continue to be held under section 7 of the Prison Act (Northern Ireland) 1953." On 19 January 2005 in the House of Lords, the Government spokesperson Baroness Ashton confirmed that there were no plans to convert the inquiry. [5] The Inquiries Act 2005 became law on 7 April 2005. Later that month the solicitor to the Inquiry informed the solicitor for Mr Wright that the inquiry panel would be considering if there was a need to apply to the Secretary of State to convert the inquiry into one under the Inquiries Act 2005. In June 2005 the solicitor to the Inquiry wrote to Mr Wright's solicitor stating that the chairman and panel were of the clear view that the inquiry should be converted into one under the 2005 Act. At a preliminary hearing held in Belfast on 25 June 2005 Lord MacLean, the chairman, announced that he proposed to ask the Secretary of State to convert the inquiry to one under the Inquiries Act "as the list of issues required examination of matters that go beyond the provisions of the Prison Act." This request was formally made on 13 July 2005. Representations were made by Mr Wright's solicitors together with other human rights bodies to the chairman of the inquiry and to the Secretary of State, objecting to the conversion of the inquiry into one under the Inquiries Act. A meeting was held on 13 October 2005 between Mr Wright, his solicitor, his Member of Parliament, representatives of human rights groups and the Secretary of State and his officials. We shall deal with these various events somewhat more fully later in this judgment. [6] On 23 November 2005 the Secretary of State issued his decision to convert the Billy Wright Inquiry into an inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005 stating:[7] That decision was challenged by Mr Wright by way of judicial review. The compatibility of the Inquiries Act 2005 with article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights was also challenged. Deeny J held that the applicant was not entitled to mount the latter challenge as Billy Wright had died before the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force on 2 October 2000. He concluded, however, that the decision of the Secretary of State to convert the inquiry from one under the Prison Act into an inquiry under the Inquiries Act was unlawful and he made a declaration to that effect."I have considered your representations, and those made by other parties very carefully and have sought to take all of the relevant factors into account in order to arrive at a fully informed and reasoned decision. My concern throughout has been to ensure that the Billy Wright Inquiry should be able to carry out its work both as fully and as effectively as possible. In light of this and taking into account both Lord MacLean's case for conversion and the representations which have been made against it, I have decided to grant the request of the Billy Wright Inquiry to be converted to the Inquiries Act 2005."
The relevant statutory provisions
[8] Section 7 of the Prison Act provides: -"(1) The Minister may cause an inquiry to be held where it appears to him advisable to do so in connection with any matter arising under this Act or otherwise in relation to any prison.
(2) For the purposes of such inquiry the provisions of section 65 of and the 7th Schedule to the Health Services Act (Northern Ireland) 1948 (which relate to inquiries) shall have effect for the purposes of this Act in like manner as they have effect for the purposes of that Act."
[9] The 1948 Act was repealed by the Health Services (Northern Ireland) Act 1971 and from 1972, the applicable regulatory provisions became those contained in Schedule 8 to the Health and Personal Social Services (Northern Ireland) Order 1972. The relevant parts of paragraphs 1 and 2 of these are: -
"The Ministry shall appoint a person to hold the inquiry and to report thereon to the Ministry
[10] Paragraph 3 empowered the chairman to require any person by notice to provide information or documents or to give evidence " relating to any matter in question at the inquiry ". Paragraph 4 permitted evidence to be given on oath. Under paragraph 5 the sanction for non-compliance with a paragraph 3 requirement was summary prosecution. [11] By virtue of Section 47 of the Inquiries Act 2005, which substitutes a new Section 23 of the Interpretation Act (NI) 1954, the new regulatory provisions for Northern Ireland inquiries held other than under the 2005 Act are those contained in Schedule A1, with effect from 7 June 2005. [12] Section 1 (1) of the 2005 Act provides: -Notification shall be sent to any persons appearing to the Ministry or the person appointed to hold the inquiry to be interested of the time when, and the place where, the inquiry is to be held"
"(1) A Minister may cause an inquiry to be held under this Act in relation to a case where it appears to him that -
(a) particular events have caused, or are capable of causing, public concern, or
[13] By section 13 the Minister is empowered to suspend an inquiry for a period. Section 14 provides: -(b) there is public concern that particular events may have occurred."
"(1) For the purposes of this Act an inquiry comes to an end
(a) on the date, after the delivery of the report of the inquiry, on which the chairman notifies the Minister that the inquiry has fulfilled its terms of reference, or
(b) on any earlier date specified in a notice given to the chairman by the Minister.
(2) The date specified in a notice under subsection (1) (b) may not be earlier than the date on which the notice is sent.
(3) Before exercising his power under subsection (1) (b) the Minister must consult the chairman.
(4) Where the Minister gives a notice under subsection (1) (b) he must
(a) set out in the notice his reasons for bringing the inquiry to an end;
[14] Section 15 empowers a Minister to convert an already established inquiry into "an inquiry under this Act". This power is exercisable in the same circumstances as warrant the establishment of an inquiry under section 1 viz " where it appears to the Minister that (a) particular events have caused, or are capable of causing, public concern, or (b) there is public concern that particular events may have occurred" - section 15 (2). The procedural requirements are that the Minister first consults the inquiry chairman - section 15 (3); that the person who caused the original inquiry to be held consents - section 15(1) (c); and notice of conversion is given - Section 15 (1) (b). [15] Section 17 deals with the procedure to be followed in inquiries held under the Act. It is in the following terms: -(b) lay a copy of the notice, as soon as is reasonably practicable, before the relevant Parliament or Assembly."
"(1) Subject to any provision of this Act or of rules under Section 41, the procedure and conduct of an inquiry are to be such as the chairman of the inquiry may direct.
(2) In particular, the chairman may take evidence on oath and for that purpose may administer oaths.
[16] Section 19 is concerned with restrictions on the reporting or disclosure of evidence given or documents supplied to an inquiry. The material provisions are: -(3) In making any decision as to the procedure or conduct of an inquiry, the chairman must act with fairness and with regard also to the need to avoid any unnecessary cost (whether to public funds or to witnesses or others)."
"(1) (b) Restrictions may be imposed on disclosure or publication of any evidence or documents given, produced or provided to an inquiry.
[Such restrictions may be imposed in the following manner (as outlined in subsection (2))]
(a) by being specified in a notice (a restriction notice) given by the Minister to the chairman at any time before the end of the inquiry;
(b) by being specified in an order (a restriction order) made by the chairman during the course of the inquiry.
(3) A restriction notice or restriction order must specify only such restrictions
(a) as are required by any statutory provision, enforceable Community obligation or rule of law, or
(b) as the Minister or chairman considers to be conducive to the inquiry fulfilling its terms of reference or to be necessary in the public interest, having regard in particular to the matters mentioned in subsection (4).
(4) Those matters are
(a) the extent to which any restriction on attendance, disclosure or publication might inhibit the allaying of public concern;
(b) any risk of harm or damage that could be avoided or reduced by any such restriction;
(c) any conditions as to confidentiality subject to which a person acquired information that he is to give, or has given, to the inquiry;
(d) the extent to which not imposing any particular restriction would be likely
(i) to cause delay or to impair the efficiency or effectiveness of the inquiry, or
(ii) otherwise to result in additional costs (whether to public funds or to witnesses or others)."
The reasons for the request to convert
[17] In a letter of 20 June 2005 the Inquiry solicitor stated: -"The Inquiry has now considered the matter more fully and the Chairman and Panel are of the clear view that the Inquiry should be converted to one under the 2005 Act
The Chairman and Panel are of the view that for the Inquiry properly to be able to examine all the matters in the List of Issues, it is necessary for the Inquiry to be established on a wider footing and the only vehicle for this now is the Inquiries Act 2005."
[18] In his opening statement on 22 June 2005 Lord MacLean adverted to the importance of independence and the breadth of the inquiry's terms of reference. Having referred to the statutory basis of the inquiry as originally constituted, he continued: -
"We are, however, to consider matters other than those arising solely in relation to a prison. We are to inquire into the conduct, not only of the prison authorities, but also of other State agencies which did not normally have any jurisdiction in respect of prison matters outwith the prison setting and unrelated to prison administration
In my view, the Inquiries Act 2005 provides a clearer basis on which this Inquiry can proceed. Further, I consider that that Act provides a better and clearer framework in which to conduct both our investigations and the public hearings
I would hope and expect that there will be full disclosure of all relevant and material evidence from those agencies which hold it or have access to it
This Inquiry will act wholly independent of government. Issues of public interest immunity for documentation or in relation to witnesses may require to be resolved in public proceedings before a court. Equally, any exercise by government of powers seeking to restrict public access or dissemination of information must also be exercised publicly, but, importantly, under the 2005 Act could only be exercised after the evidence has been given, provided or produced to the Inquiry
I consider therefore that the Inquiries Act 2005 provides the best means of ensuring both the thorough investigation that this case demands and the fullest possible exposure of our work. That, together with the requirements of Article 2 of the [Convention] should, I believe, enhance the confidence of all
The conduct and procedure of the Inquiry is a matter for the chairman. Whereas there are no formal rules, the Inquiry will follow closely rules which would apply to civil court proceedings
[19] In a document entitled, 'List of Issues for consideration by the Inquiry' a record of the matters that were to be examined was set out. Paragraph 1 of this document is in the following terms: -I cannot rule out - at this stage - the fact that there may be a need to allow some evidence to be heard in private/in camera or anonymously, because of e.g., security reasons or the vulnerability of witnesses "
"The Inquiry will consider all of the facts and circumstances relevant to the death of Billy Wright in the Maze Prison on 27 December 1997 with a view to determining whether any intentional act or failure to act, or any reckless or negligent act or omission by or within the prison authorities in Northern Ireland or by or within other state agencies facilitated, or amounted to an attempt to facilitate, the death of Billy Wright.
[20] By letter of 23 June 2005 the panel indicated its willingness to consider representations from interested parties on the question of whether the inquiry should be converted to one under the 2005 Act. The letter pointed out that the list of issues contained a number of items that did not relate to the operation of a prison. As we have noted above, representations were made by the representatives for Mr Wright and other interested groups but on 13 July 2005 Lord MacLean wrote to the Secretary of State, confirming that he was " still firmly of the view that the Inquiries Act is the most appropriate legislation for this Inquiry to proceed" and accordingly he asked that the Secretary of State should exercise his power under section 15 to convert the inquiry to one under the 2005 Act. [21] The representations made on behalf of Mr Wright and by Amnesty International and British Irish Rights Watch prompted Lord MacLean to issue a formal response on 12 July 2005. In it he said this about an inquiry under the 1953 Act and about what he perceived to be the advantages of an inquiry under the 2005 Act: -In determining whether any intentional act or omission facilitated the death, or attempted to do so, or whether any reckless or negligent act or omission facilitated it, the Inquiry will consider the political context in Northern Ireland at the relevant time and the significance, if any, of the death of Billy Wright in that context."
" an inquiry [under the 1953 Act] could have been prevented from seeing materials by claims for [public interest immunity] [which] would have been determined by the court and, if upheld, the documents would never have been seen by the Inquiry. The benefit of the 2005 Act is that all documents are seen. In my view the power in Section 19 to restrict disclosure or public hearings on such evidence is designed to protect the sensitivity of certain types of material rather than interfere with the independence of the Inquiry as suggested.
I consider the 2005 Act provides the best means of ensuring both the thorough investigation that this Inquiry demands and the fullest possible exposure of our work. That, together with the requirements of Article 2 (though not a strict legal obligation) should, I believe, enhance the confidence of all that this will not only be a full and open public inquiry but will also be, and will be seen to be, fully independent in its outlook and approach."
The process preceding the decision to convert
[22] By letter of 8 August 2005 the Northern Ireland Office informed the solicitor to the Inquiry that they were in principle content to recommend to the Secretary of State that the Inquiry should be converted but it was pointed out that Mr Wright's solicitors had asked to be allowed to make representations to the Secretary of State before he takes a decision on the request. NIO therefore informed the inquiry that when all the representations had been received, they would be relayed to Lord MacLean to inquire whether they contained "any issues of substance that would make him wish to reconsider his request to seek conversion under the Inquiries Act". It was made clear that the Secretary of State would consider all representations before making a final decision. [23] The representations received from Mr. Wright's solicitors, the Committee for the Administration of Justice, Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission and British Irish Rights Watch were forwarded to the inquiry by NIO. On 31 August 2005 the Inquiry solicitor wrote to confirm that the chairman had considered all of these but remained firmly of the view that conversion to the Inquiries Act 2005 was the proper course. [24] On 13 October 2005, the Secretary of State held a meeting attended by Mr. Wright, his solicitor and others. At the outset he informed Mr Wright that he had not made a final decision on the question of conversion. He gave an assurance that he would not withhold material from the inquiry nor would he limit its scope. He stated that there was no current intention to issue a restriction notice (under section 19 of the Act). The Secretary of State referred to Lord MacLean's view that a public interest immunity claim could result in documents being withheld from the inquiry. He said that while this was correct, his officials did not agree that the inquiry was not empowered to adjudicate on such a claim. [25] Before deciding whether to accede to the request to convert, the Secretary of State considered a comprehensive submission from various interested parties including the respondent's solicitors, British Irish Rights Watch and others. All the representations generated in connection with the conversion request were brought to his attention and the submission prepared by officials appended a summary of the representations that had been made that conversion should not take place. [26] On 23 November 2005 the Secretary of State wrote to Mr Wright informing him that he had decided to accede to the request that the inquiry be converted to one under the 2005 Act.The judge's decision
[27] The decision of the learned judge to grant a declaration that the Secretary of State should not have agreed to convert the inquiry is conveniently summarised in paragraph 67 (b) of his judgment where he said: -"As the Secretary of State failed to take into account the important and relevant consideration that the independence of such an inquiry was compromised by the existence of Section 14 of the 2005 Act and as he was wrongly advised that an equivalent power existed under the Prisons Act and as he was advised and appeared to take the view that there was a presumption in favour of acceding to the request of the inquiry, I find that the decision was unlawful."
[28] As Mr McCloskey QC for the Secretary of State submitted, this conclusion comprises a number of interlinked determinations about the nature of the decision under challenge and the implications arising from it. The first of these was that the independence of the inquiry had been compromised by section 14 of the 2005 Act. Secondly, it was concluded that this was an important and relevant consideration that the Secretary of State was required to but failed to - take into account. Thirdly, the judge decided that no equivalent power existed under the Prison Act and that the Secretary of State had been wrongly advised that there was such a power. Finally, it was determined that the Secretary of State had been given mistaken guidance that there was a presumption in favour of accepting the recommendation of the inquiry panel and that he had erroneously accepted that advice.
Does section 14 compromise the independence of the inquiry?
[29] This question is inevitably connected to the third issue (viz whether an equivalent power to bring an inquiry to an end existed under the 1953 legislation) but it also has a freestanding dimension. If the Secretary of State has power to bring an inquiry to an end, does that ineluctably compromise its independence? We do not believe that it does. The opportunity to stop the inquiry does not have a direct impact on its independence. It may affect its usefulness in that it halts the investigation on which the inquiry is embarked but it does not alter the autonomy of the inquiry while it is taking place. [30] Of perhaps greater moment, however, is the consideration that, in this context, independence is, at most, a relative concept. The impact that the prospect of its being brought to an end by the Secretary of State will have on the inquiry's freedom of action has to be contrasted with what the inquiry panel conceived to be the greater scope for its investigation of the circumstances surrounding Billy Wright's death if the inquiry was one conducted under the 2005 legislation. The learned judge's conclusion that the Secretary of State failed to have regard to the curb on the inquiry's independence that conversion would bring about presupposes that there can be no debate on that issue. We do not believe that it can be so regarded. [31] If it is open to question whether the inquiry's independence is curtailed if it is conducted under the 2005 Act, the Secretary of State cannot be obliged to proceed on the assumption that it will be. Certainly, his decision to accede to the request to convert cannot be vitiated because he did not espouse the claim that there would be a circumscription of the inquiry's independence if he did, where there is room for valid disagreement that this would be the consequence. The chairman of the inquiry panel clearly believed that the 2005 Act would give the inquiry access to enlarged powers of investigation. Unless the Secretary of State could properly conclude that he was plainly wrong in that view and that, contrary to the chairman's belief, the effect of conversion would be to restrict the inquiry's independence, he cannot be faulted for accepting the recommendation made to him. [32] We have concluded that there is - at least - room for validly differing views on whether the inquiry will have greater independence if it is conducted as a 2005 Act inquiry. The Secretary of State was not obliged to take up a parti pris position on this issue. Indeed, to have done so would have introduced an impermissible fetter on his discretion. The avowed circumscription on the inquiry's independence by its being converted to a 2005 Act inquiry cannot be a consideration that he was obliged to take into account, therefore.Is there power to terminate an inquiry under the Prison Act?
[33] A distinction is to be drawn between mandatory inquiries (required by statute before some decision or action is taken) and a discretionary inquiry (a statute conferring discretion on the administrator whether to hold an inquiry). Within the category of mandatory inquiries there are two distinct categories of inquiry those which are established by a minister and those which are not. The former qualify as statutory inquiries within section 16(1) of the Tribunal and Inquiries Act 1992 and as such fall under the supervision of the Council on Tribunals. An example of that form of inquiry is an inquiry into objections to compulsory purchase orders. The latter category does not qualify as a statutory inquiry and is not subject to such supervision. An example of such an inquiry is one conducted by the Boundaries Commission into local objections to propose alterations in constituency boundaries. [34] Section 16(1) of the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1992 does not cover discretionary inquiries although the Lord Chancellor is empowered by statutory instrument to designate as a statutory inquiry any inquiry or hearing held by or on behalf of a minister in pursuance of a statutory power as distinct from a duty. Such a designation brings the discretionary inquiry within the provisions of 1992 Act as applied to statutory inquiries. The Tribunals and Inquiries (Discretionary Inquiries) Order 1975 SI 1975/1379lists a large number of discretionary inquiries which fall to be treated as statutory inquiries. This list does not include inquiries under Section 7 of the Prison Act. [35] Where a public inquiry is required to be held by statute no question of terminating it arises. A failure to convene and complete such an inquiry could be the subject of a mandamus application. Where a discretionary inquiry may be established by a minister, as a general proposition the minister could not be compelled to establish such an inquiry. (Special considerations may arise in the context of a situation in which there are Article 2 issues in play). If a minister considers that it is advisable to establish an inquiry on foot of a statutory power two questions arise. Firstly, has he power to terminate the inquiry or once established has he effectively conferred exclusively on the inquiry inspector or panel the decision whether to bring it to an end? Secondly, if he has a power of termination, is that power more limited or restricted than the power conferred on the minister under Section 14 of the 2005 Act. [36] A discretionary inquiry established under section 7 of the Prison Act confers powers as set out in the Schedule to the 1972 Order (substituted for the powers originally contained in the 1948 Act). These additional powers are given to enable the inquiry to carry out its function. That function is an investigatory and fact finding one and, before establishing an inquiry, the minister must consider that it is "advisable" that it be held. [37] The power of a minister to decide on the advisability of an inquiry must be one that he can keep under review. Circumstances may change that would lead him to conclude that it is no longer advisable or necessary to have the inquiry. If he could not, in such circumstances, bring the inquiry to an end the unacceptable result would be that he was obliged to maintain an inquiry at public expense which it was no longer advisable to hold. It appears to us, therefore, that, by necessary implication, the minister must have power under the Prison Act to bring an inquiry established under that Act to a conclusion. [38] One must then consider whether the power to bring an inquiry under the Prison Act to an end is more restricted than the power to terminate under section 14 of the 2005 Act. The minister's decision to terminate an inquiry under the 1953 Act would be subject to judicial review and the power would have to be exercised for a proper purpose. In our opinion the same would hold true for a decision to bring to an end and inquiry established under the 2005 Act. Under the 2005 Act the minister has to give reasons and inform Parliament of his decision and the reasons for it. No such duty arises under the Prison Act. If anything, the power to bring an inquiry under the 1953 Act to an end is greater than that under the 2005 legislation. It follows that we do not consider that it was wrong to advise the Secretary of State that an equivalent power to terminate existed under the 1953 Act and for that reason also we reject the argument that the independence of the inquiry has been curtailed by its being converted to an inquiry under the 2005 Act.A presumption in favour of granting the conversion?
[39] In the submission prepared by officials to advise the Secretary of State, the following statement is made: -" we consider that the presumption should be in favour of the wish of the inquiry, which they have repeated strongly and frequently in the face of the representations made. You will also wish to take account of the consequences that refusing the inquiry's request could have."
[40] At paragraph [56] of his judgment the learned trial judge reminded himself of the statement of Sir Thomas Bingham MR in Clarke Homes v Secretary of State [1993] 66 PCR 263, 272 that a document should be read in its entirety and "without excessive legalism or exegetical sophistication" and observed that he might therefore have rejected this ground of challenge were it not for a passage in the letter of the Secretary of State to Lord McLean informing him of the decision. In his letter of 14 November 2005 the Secretary of State said: -
"It is my wish and yours that the full facts in relation to the murder of Billy Wright should be established and, in view of your belief that conversion is necessary for your inquiry to be as thorough and effective as possible, I am content to give my consent for the Inquiry to be converted to the Inquiries Act."
[41] The judge considered that the language used in this passage "of being content in the light of the other's belief does lend itself to the view that there was thought to be a presumption of sorts in favour of the inquiry's wish for conversion". [42] Mr McCloskey submitted that the words from the submission required to be considered in their full context and the background preceding events, which included a series of letters and written representations from various quarters. He drew our attention specifically to the letter from Mr Sweeney of NIO to the inquiry of 8 August 2005 where he said that the they were content 'in principle' to recommend that the inquiry be converted but that the Secretary of State required to consider the representations of Mr Wright's solicitors and others (see paragraph [22] above). [43] We are satisfied that, if the words are considered in their proper context, they do not suggest that there is a legal presumption in favour of converting the inquiry. Properly understood, they do no more than reflect the weight of the representations of the inquiry. It had been urgently contended by the panel chairman that conversion would allow the inquiry to be conducted with maximum efficiency and effectiveness. The Secretary of State's reply was in similar vein. We find that we cannot agree with the learned trial judge's interpretation of the letter. Its terms were prompted by the strength of the representations made by Lord MacLean. They do not betoken a view that there was a legal presumption in favour of conversion.
Conclusions
[44] We have reached the view that the independence of the inquiry could not be said to have been compromised by section 14 of the 2005 Act. This was not a consideration that the Secretary of State was required to take into account. We are of the opinion that a power to terminate an inquiry established under the Prison Act must, by necessary implication, exist and that this is at least as extensive as that expressly conferred by section 14 of the Inquiries Act. Finally, we have concluded that the Secretary of State was not advised that there was a presumption in favour of the grant of the request to convert. [45] The inquiry panel appealed against the judge's finding that the panel was mistaken in considering that the Prison Act provided a less suitable framework for the inquiry. For the reasons that we have given, we consider that there is no absolute answer to be given as to whether an inquiry under the Prison Act is superior or more independent than one under the 2005 Act. As Mr Larkin QC for the inquiry submitted, it is not without significance that no party had argued before Deeny J in favour of the positive merits of the Prison Act as a vehicle for the inquiry into Billy Wright's murder. The applicant's submissions focused on what were perceived as the inadequacies of the Inquiries Act 2005. The inquiry's view that it could conduct a much more meaningful and effective investigation if conversion was granted is, in our opinion, an entirely tenable one. [46] The appeal will be allowed and the application for judicial review dismissed.
