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High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland Queen's Bench Division Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland Queen's Bench Division Decisions >> Clarke, In the Matter of [2000] NIQB 64 (21st December, 2000) URL: http://www.bailii.org/nie/cases/NIHC/QB/2000/64.html Cite as: [2000] NIQB 64 |
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1. In
these proceedings Mrs Josephine Clarke challenges decisions of the Northern
Ireland Housing Executive and the Chief Constable. She claims that NIHE has
wrongly refused to accord her A1 Priority Status (Intimidation) in relation to
her application to be rehoused. She also challenges the decision of the Royal
Ulster Constabulary whereby it concluded that she was not at risk of sectarian
or terrorist attack.
2. Mrs
Clarke is Catholic. She is married to a Protestant. Some six years ago they
lived with their children at Glen Road, Belfast. Two children are registered
blind. According to Mrs Clarke, while they lived in Glen Road, her husband was
intimidated at his place of employment. This intimidation occurred, Mrs Clarke
claims, because of her husband’s religion. She further claims that,
because of it, she was forced to move to 80 Woodside View, Poleglass. Her
husband did not join her there because they feared further intimidation. Mrs
Clarke still lives in Poleglass. Her husband lives elsewhere.
3. Mrs
Clarke claims that from the time that she moved to Poleglass she has been
intimidated by the same people who had threatened her husband. In October
1998, during a visit to a social club, she and her husband were attacked by a
man who, according to Mrs Clarke, had paramilitary connections. The following
day the same man was seen in the vicinity of her house and the morning after
that she discovered that two of the windows of the house had been smashed. On
16 September 1999 Mrs Clarke was due to give evidence in relation to an assault
that had occurred in the Republic of Ireland. The defendant in that case, a
woman, was the mother of sons who, according to Mrs Clarke, had paramilitary
connections. Before the trial date Mrs Clarke had received threatening
telephone calls. On the morning that she was due to give evidence, she was
stopped by police and told that the Samaritans had received a telephone call
that a bomb had been placed under her car. Other incidents of a similar nature
had also occurred.
4. The
house at 80 Woodside View is let to Mrs Clarke by NIHE under a secure tenancy.
She has applied for re-housing elsewhere because of the problems that she has
encountered. In November 1998 she was deemed to be A1 status for re-housing
purposes. Allocation of houses to the Executive’s tenants is carried out
in accordance with the Housing Selection Scheme, a statutory scheme devised by
the Executive and approved under Article 22 of the Housing (Northern Ireland)
Order 1981. The Scheme provides that where a dwelling house becomes available
for letting it will be offered to whomever of the “relevant
applicants” is at the head of the queue. An applicant’s place in
the housing queue depends on his/her grouping within the Scheme. The two top
groupings in order of priority are: -
5. At
present fewer than one per cent of all applicants have A1(I) status whereas
more than 12% have A1 status. A1(I) is described by NIHE as “a kind of
super-priority status”. The criteria for the award of this status are
set out in paragraph 4.1.9 of the Scheme as follows: -
6. Mrs
Clarke was awarded A1 priority status in November 1998 but she claims that she
is entitled to A1 (Intimidation) status. To investigate this claim NIHE
contacted RUC and correspondence passed between Mr Stephen Graham of NIHE and
various police officers on the topic of the attacks on Mrs Graham’s home
and members of her family. NIHE has been consistently advised by RUC that,
while Mrs Clarke and her family have been the subject of intimidation, there is
no reason to suppose that this is part of a sectarian or terrorist campaign.
7. For
the applicant it was contended that NIHE had relied exclusively on the evidence
supplied by RUC in deciding whether to award her A1 (I) status. It was
accepted by the applicant that NIHE was “largely dependent” on
information supplied by police but it was submitted that there was ample
evidence from other sources that Mrs Clarke had been the victim of
terrorist/sectarian attack.
8. The
applicant also argued that NIHE had wrongly applied paragraph 4.1.9 of the
Scheme in dealing with her claim to be entitled to A1 (I) status. Counsel for
the applicant contended that it was sufficient to show that the requirements of
that paragraph were satisfied if it could be shown that Mrs Clarke and her
family had been put in fear. He referred to the definition of terrorism in
section 20 (1) of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989
and in Article 2(2) of the Criminal Injuries to Persons (Compensation)
(Northern Ireland) Order 1988. These definitions contemplated the use of
violence for non-political ends. A similar approach ought to have been adopted
in the present case, he argued.
9. Finally,
it was suggested that NIHE, in failing to award Mrs Clarke A1 (I) status, had
contravened her rights under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights.
10. In
relation to the Chief Constable, counsel for the applicant suggested that the
police ought to have looked at the cumulative effect of the various incidents
rather than assessing each individually, as they had done. It was claimed
that, viewed realistically, the incidents had their origins in sectarianism.
The type of attacks that had been perpetrated on the Clarke family obviously
had either been sanctioned or tolerated by paramilitary elements that
controlled the areas in which they took place.
11. For
NIHE it was argued that it had not relied solely on police information. Mr
Graham had stated that he had considered and taken into account the various
letters which had been received from the applicant or which had been submitted
on her behalf. The decision that Mrs Clarke did not qualify for A1 (I) status
did not depend solely on police advice. All of the information available to it
had been considered by the Executive before reaching its decision.
12. Counsel
for NIHE also submitted that the criteria contained in paragraph 4.1.9 of the
Scheme clearly required that there be a terrorist or sectarian dimension to the
attacks on the home of an applicant before A1 (I) status could be awarded.
Analogies with the Criminal Injuries Order and the Prevention of Terrorism
legislation were, he suggested, inappropriate. The Executive was entitled to
approach the definition of “terrorist” and “sectarian”
by applying the conventional connotation to these terms.
13. Finally,
it was submitted for NIHE that they had taken into account the need to provide
Mrs Clarke with housing where she could be accommodated with her family. She
had applied to be re-housed in an area where many other applications had been
made. The denial of A1 (I) status had nothing whatever to do with the
applicant’s Article 8 rights. The Executive remained willing to re-house
the applicant and her family in the area of her choice as soon as accommodation
in that area became available. In any event, counsel pointed out, the
application made by the applicant for re-housing had not included her husband
as part of the household.
14. For
the Chief Constable it was claimed that the matter had been approached
globally. All of the incidents concerned had been evaluated for their
cumulative effect and the advice of Special Branch had been obtained. It was
not accepted that the attacks on Mrs Clarke and her family must have been
approved by terrorists or paramilitaries. While paramilitary organisations
seek to demonstrate their control over certain areas for political ends, it did
not follow that all of the criminal activities within such areas were approved
by paramilitary groups. Many criminal enterprises, including the use of
intimidation and violence, were carried out without the approval or involvement
of such groups.
15. It
was accepted that the RUC had not adopted the wider connotation of
“terrorism” contended for by the applicant but it was also argued
for the Chief Constable that this was neither necessary nor appropriate.
Nothing in the information available to the police supported the proposition
that the attacks were sectarian or terrorist in the normal meaning of those
expressions.
16. It
was not disputed that NIHE was entitled to devise a policy for the allocation
of its housing stock amongst those who applied to be housed. The Executive is
not only authorised but is required by the Housing Order to devise such a
scheme. The central issue, therefore, is whether the Executive has properly
applied its own criteria for determining the applicant’s priority status.
17. I
am satisfied that NIHE was entitled to confine the availability of A1 (I)
status to those whose homes had been or were in imminent danger of being
destroyed or seriously damaged by terrorist or sectarian attack. I am also
satisfied that the Executive was entitled to approach the question of what was
meant by terrorist or sectarian attack on the basis of what was conventionally
understood by those terms rather than by reference to any statutory definition.
The definitions contained in the Prevention of Terrorism Act and the Criminal
Injuries legislation were enacted for the specific purpose of those provisions.
There is no legal principle which requires their importation into the quite
distinct area of housing. The Executive was entitled to apply its own criteria
to the allocation of houses drawing on its experience of the various
circumstances in which re-housing was needed. It was not required of the
Executive, therefore, that it admit to A1 (I) status any person who had been
put in fear, unless it was satisfied that this arose because of terrorism or
sectarianism.
18. Since
the Executive had been consistently informed by the RUC that there was no
evidence that the attacks on Mrs Clarke’s property and on her family were
terrorist-related or sectarian, it was entitled to conclude that she did not
qualify for A1 (I) status. I am satisfied that NIHE did not conclude that this
was so simply because of the information from the police, however. Mr Graham
has said that all the information supplied to the Executive was taken into
account. I have no reason to doubt the correctness of this statement.
19. The
applicant claimed that the conclusion reached by police that there was no
evidence pointing to a terrorist or sectarian element in the attacks on Mrs
Clarke was insupportable. It was also suggested that the police had made
separate assessments of the various incidents individually and failed to
consider their cumulative effect.
20. These
assertions are not supported by the evidence. I am satisfied that all of the
material available to police was properly considered by them before final
advice was given to NIHE. It is a sad truth that many individuals now engage
in the type of squalid attack that has taken place in this case for a variety
of the most egregious reasons. These may include terrorist or sectarian
motives but that is not always the case. Superintendent Hunter has averred
that simply because attacks of this type occur in areas where there are
paramilitary elements, it does not follow that the attacks have been sanctioned
by those organisations. I have no reason to doubt the correctness of that
statement.
21. I
cannot accept, therefore, the argument advanced on behalf of the applicant that
the only explanation for the attacks is that they were terrorist or sectarian.
The decision of the RUC cannot be impugned on that account, therefore.
22. As
I have already observed there is no evidence to support the claim that the
attacks on the applicant and her family were considered individually and in
isolation one from the other. On the contrary, the case made on behalf of the
Chief Constable is that the overall effect of the various incidents has been
assessed. The applicant’s claim on this aspect of the case has not been
made out, therefore.
23. The
applicant’s claim that the decision of the Executive breached her Article
8 rights must be considered in light of the willingness of NIHE to re-house her
and her family as soon as a dwelling in the area(s) chosen by her becomes
available. In essence the applicant’s complaint against NIHE is that it
has failed to accord sufficient priority to her claim. It is clear that the
Executive must devise a system of allocation of houses which caters for all the
demands on its housing stock. Provided the policy which it has devised is fair
and is operated equitably, NIHE cannot be faulted if in an individual case, a
tenant’s aspirations cannot be satisfied immediately.
24. For
understandable reasons, Mrs Clarke fervently believes that her particular
circumstances call for the most urgent remedy. The Executive has to deal with
enormous demands on its resources, not least in the area of re-housing. I am
satisfied that the policy which it has devised to deal with this vexed problem
is fair and that it has been properly implemented in the case of Mrs Clarke.
25. Although
I have great sympathy with Mrs Clarke and deplore the attacks that she and her
family have had to endure, I am driven to the conclusion that none of the
grounds of challenge to the decisions of NIHE or the Chief Constable has been
made out and the application for judicial review must therefore be dismissed.