Neutral Citation no. (2001) NIQB 39
Ref:     
KERA3131

 
Judgment: approved by the Court for handing down
Delivered:
05.11.2001
(subject to editorial corrections)

 
 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE IN NORTHERN IRELAND
 
QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION (CROWN SIDE)
 
--------
 
IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BY PETER ROBINSON FOR LEAVE TO APPLY FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
 
--------
 
KERR J
 
            This is an application by Peter Robinson, a Member of Parliament and a Member of the Legislative Assembly, for leave to apply for judicial review.  Mr Robinson applies 
firstly for a declaration that the Secretary of State is under an obligation to propose a date for the poll for the election of the next Assembly.  That obligation, it is said, derives from Section 32 sub-section 3 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998.  A second declaration is sought that any purported election of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister after November 2nd 2001 is unlawful and without force or legal effect.  (As Mr Maguire, on behalf of the Secretary of State, has pointed out neither in the text of the 1998 Act nor otherwise is any power reposed in the Secretary of State to intervene in the proceedings of the Assembly in the manner suggested by paragraph 2 sub-paragraph (b) of the Order 53 Statement).  The third application seeks an Order of Mandamus to direct the Secretary of State to propose a date for the poll for the election of the next Assembly.  
As I have observed in the course of exchanges with counsel, the essential underpinning of the applicant’s case for leave to apply for judicial review is that the Secretary of State does not propose to discharge the function provided for in Section 32 sub-section 3.  On his behalf Mr Maguire of Counsel has informed me that the Secretary of State accepts that, in the events that have occurred, he is under an obligation, by virtue of Section 32 sub-section 3, to propose a date for the poll for the election of the next Assembly.  Mr Maguire has, however, also submitted (and in my view correctly submitted) that the Secretary of State is not fixed with a time limit within which to make that proposal.  It is entirely unsurprising that he should wish to have a period within which to reflect and to take account of political considerations before making that proposal.  Mr Maguire on his behalf further argues that the Secretary of State enjoys a discretion as to the date to be selected for the proposal under Section 32 sub-section 3.  
I cannot ignore the unambiguous statement made on behalf of the Secretary of State to this Court that he accepts that he is under a duty to make a proposal for a new election and that he intends to do so.  It seems to me that, in light of that statement and in particular its unequivocal terms, the entire basis for the application for leave to apply for judicial review falls away.  As I have already observed, its essential underpinning depends upon the premise that the Secretary of State does not conceive himself to be under an obligation to make the proposal provided for in sub-section 3.  He has now publicly stated in this court that he accepts that he is under such an obligation.  In my judgment therefore there is no basis for the grant of leave to apply for Judicial Review and the application is therefore dismissed.