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High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland Queen's Bench Division Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland Queen's Bench Division Decisions >> Vainauskas v Republic of France [2019] NIQB 105 (23 December 2019) URL: http://www.bailii.org/nie/cases/NIHC/QB/2019/105.html Cite as: [2019] NIQB 105 |
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Ref: McC11147
Neutral Citation No: [2019] NIQB 105
Judgment: approved by the Court for handing down
(subject to editorial corrections)*
Delivered: 23/12/2019
Between:
Appellant;
Respondent.
McCloskey LJ (delivering the judgment of the court)
"Prosecution Department of the Republics Attorney in Rennes."
The "decision on which the warrant is based" is formulated in these terms:
"Arrest warrant ...issued by [the] Vice President in charge of the investigation at the Rennes High Court."
(i) The learned judge erred in finding that the EAW was properly issued in accordance with Article 1 and Article 6 of the Framework Decision 2002/584** with regard to whether the Deputy Public Prosecutor of Rennes is an 'issuing judicial authority'. (**Hereinafter the "Framework decision")
(ii) The learned judge erred in finding that the extradition of the Appellant would not breach Article 5 ECHR, contrary to section 21A of the Extradition Act 2003, as the Deputy Public Prosecutor of Rennes is not a "competent legal authority" for the purposes of Article 5 ECHR.
"The European Arrest Warrant is a judicial decision issued by a Member State …"
[Our emphasis]
Article 6(1) provides:
"The issuing judicial authority shall be the judicial authority of the issuing Member State which is competent to issue a European Arrest Warrant by virtue of the law of that State."
Article 6(2) regulates the executing judicial authority in precisely the same terms. Article 6(3) states:
"Each Member State shall inform the General Secretariat of the Council of the competent judicial authority under its law."
Recital (8) is worthy of note:
"Decisions on the execution of the European Arrest Warrant must be subject to sufficient controls which means that a judicial authority of the Member State where the requested person has been arrested will have to take the decision on his or her surrender."
As is Recital (10):
"The mechanism of the European Arrest Warrant is based on a high level of confidence between Member States."
And Recital (12):
"This Framework Decision respects fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised by Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union and reflected in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in particular Chapter VI thereof…."
Also Recital (13):
"No person should be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."
"(1) If the judge is required to proceed under this section (by virtue of section 11), the judge must decide both of the following questions in respect of the extradition of the person ("D")—
(a) whether the extradition would be compatible with the Convention rights within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998;
(b) whether the extradition would be disproportionate.
(2) In deciding whether the extradition would be disproportionate, the judge must take into account the specified matters relating to proportionality (so far as the judge thinks it appropriate to do so); but the judge must not take any other matters into account.
(3) These are the specified matters relating to proportionality—
(a) the seriousness of the conduct alleged to constitute the extradition offence;
(b) the likely penalty that would be imposed if D was found guilty of the extradition offence;
(c) the possibility of the relevant foreign authorities taking measures that would be less coercive than the extradition of D.
(4) The judge must order D's discharge if the judge makes one or both of these decisions—
(a) that the extradition would not be compatible with the Convention rights;
(b) that the extradition would be disproportionate.
(5) The judge must order D to be extradited to the category 1 territory in which the warrant was issued if the judge makes both of these decisions—
(a) that the extradition would be compatible with the Convention rights;
(b) that the extradition would not be disproportionate.
(6) If the judge makes an order under subsection (5) he must remand the person in custody or on bail to wait for extradition to the category 1 territory.
(7) If the person is remanded in custody, the appropriate judge may later grant bail."
(8) In this section 'relevant foreign authorities' means the authorities in the territory to which D would be extradited if the extradition went ahead."
[Our emphasis]
The highlighted words are the critical ones. The corresponding provisions of section 21 are in the same terms.
"1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of the person. None shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: …
(c) The lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so …
(f) The lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition."
No other provision of Article 5 featured in this appeal.
"Article 5 ECHR is applicable to the judicial decision to issue EAW given that it is a decision which interferes with the liberty of the subject of the EAW and it is a decision which should only be made by a 'competent legal authority', which does not include a public prosecutor. Given that the EAW in this case was issued by a deputy public prosecutor, it is respectfully submitted that it was issued in breach of Article 5 ECHR with the effect that extradition is, therefore, barred pursuant to section 21 of the Extradition Act 2003."
Mr Stephen Ritchie (of counsel) representing the requesting State, responds in equally concise terms in his skeleton argument:
"A competent legal authority is defined in Article 5(3) as a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power before whom a person arrested must be brought promptly. It is submitted that the competent legal authority will be the investigating magistrate, not the prosecutor."
"The European Court of Human Rights held in Medvedyev v France that the French Public Prosecutor is not a competent legal authority for the purposes of the Convention. This is of little relevance to this case. The court is concerned with the meaning of 'issuing judicial authority' as set out in the Framework Directive and as interpreted by the CJEU and not the meaning of 'competent legal authority' as set out in the Convention and as interpreted by the ECtHR. The Convention requires anyone arrested to be brought before a competent legal authority without delay. The requested person after he was arrested in Northern Ireland was brought without delay before this court, a recognised competent legal authority, and has been detained by order of this court. Should he surrender to France there is adequate evidence that he will be produced before a judge in Rennes, another competent legal authority. His Convention rights have therefore been respected and will continue to be respected after surrender."
"…. place the detention under the supervision of a judicial authority ... [adding]…
It is true, as the government pointed out, that measures taken under the [applicable French law] are taken under the supervision of the public prosecutor …
It must be acknowledged, however, that the public prosecutor is not a 'competent legal authority' within the meaning of the Court's case law given to that notion: as the applicants pointed out, he lacks the independence in respect of the executive to qualify as such …."
A violation of Article 5(1) ECHR was found accordingly.
"Miss Rose submitted that this line of authority conclusively established the meaning of "judicial authority" in the Framework Decision. This was coupled with the submission that those two words had to be given the same meaning wherever they appeared in the Decision. I consider that both submissions are unsound. The article 5 authorities apply to the stage of pre-trial proceedings at which the suspect has to be afforded the opportunity to challenge his detention. They have direct application to the stage of the execution of an EAW for which articles 14, 15 and 19 of the Framework Decision make provision. At this stage the "competent judicial authority" must have the characteristics identified in the Strasbourg decisions relied upon. Those decisions do not, however, apply to the stage at which a request is made by the issuing State for the surrender, or as the English statute incorrectly describes it, the extradition, of the fugitive. That is not a stage at which there is any adversarial process between the parties. It is a stage at which one of the parties takes an essentially administrative step in the process. That is a step that it is appropriate for a prosecutor to take."
Mr O'Keefe criticised Lord Phillips' characterisation of the EAW issuing decision as an essentially "administrative" step. We would observe that the Assange appeal was decided by a majority of five to two, Lord Phillips delivering the main judgment of the majority and is binding on this court. Our decision does not turn on this passage in any event.
Soering v United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 439 at para 91 –
"In sum, the decision by a Contracting State to extradite a fugitive may give rise to an issue under Article 3, and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the Convention, where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if extradited, faces a real risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the requesting country."
R (Ullah) v Special Adjudicator [2004] 2 AC 323 at para 24 –
"While the Strasbourg jurisprudence does not preclude reliance on articles other than article 3 as a ground for resisting extradition or expulsion, it makes it quite clear that successful reliance demands presentation of a very strong case. In relation to article 3, it is necessary to show strong grounds for believing that the person, if returned, faces a real risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."
HH [2012] 3 WLR 90 at para [87]:
"Hence it is likely that the public interest in extradition will outweigh the article 8 rights of the family unless the consequences of the interference with family life will be exceptionally severe."
"While the Strasbourg jurisprudence does not preclude reliance on Articles other than art 3 as a ground for resisting extradition or expulsion, it makes it quite clear that successful reliance demands presentation of a very strong case. In relation to art 3, it is necessary to show strong grounds for believing that the person, if returned, faces a real risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment: Soering, para 91; Cruz Varas, para 69; Vilvarajah, para 103. In Dehwari, para 61 (see para 13 above) the Commission doubted whether a real risk was enough to resist removal under art 2, suggesting that the loss of life must be shown to be a "near-certainty". Where reliance is placed on art 6 it must be shown that a person has suffered or risks suffering a flagrant denial of a fair trial in the receiving state: Soering, para 113 (see para 10 above); Drodz, para 110; Einhorn, para 32; Razaghi v Sweden; Tomic v United Kingdom. Successful reliance on art 5 would have to meet no less exacting a test. The lack of success of applicants relying on arts 2, 5 and 6 before the Strasbourg court highlights the difficulty of meeting the stringent test which that court imposes. This difficulty will not be less where reliance is placed on articles such as 8 or 9, which provide for the striking of a balance between the right of the individual and the wider interests of the community even in a case where a serious interference is shown. This is not a balance which the Strasbourg court ought ordinarily to strike in the first instance, nor is it a balance which that court is well placed to assess in the absence of representations by the receiving state whose laws, institutions or practices are the subject of criticism. On the other hand, the removing state will always have what will usually be strong grounds for justifying its own conduct: the great importance of operating firm and orderly immigration control in an expulsion case; the great desirability of honouring extradition treaties made with other states."
[our emphasis]