Adair v FD Exchange Limited trading as... [2010] NIIT 05790

THE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNALS

CASE REF: 5790/09

CLAIMANT: Scott Adair

RESPONDENT: FD Exchange Limited trading as CEX

DECISION

The unanimous decision of the tribunal is that the claimant did suffer disability discrimination from the respondent and is entitled to the compensation set out in the Schedule hereto.-

Constitution of Tribunal:

Chairman: Mr P Cross

Panel Members: Mr I O’Hea

Mr G Hunter

Appearances:

The claimant was represented by Mr G Grainger, Barrister-at-Law, instructed by the Equality Commission.

The respondent was represented by Mr I Randall of Peninsula Business Services Limited.

Findings of Fact

1. The claimant who was born on 24 October 1988, suffered all his life and will continue to suffer from dyslexia. This had first been diagnosed whilst the claimant was at school and was confirmed to the tribunal by a medical report from Mr John Eakin a Chartered Educational Psychologist.

2. The claimant took up employment with the respondent on 2 February 2009 as a store assistant. Although the claimant, in evidence, stated that he informed the persons who interviewed him for the post, that he suffered from dyslexia, the tribunal find as a fact that this only became known to Mr Stuart Dixon, the managing director of the respondent, when he spoke on the telephone to the claimant’s mother on 16 February and the claimant confirmed it to him on the next day. Although the claimant’s representative, Mr Grainger, made reference to the absence of witness evidence or notes from the interview process, the tribunal were persuaded that no reference was made to dyslexia by the claimant during that interview for the reasons set out below.

3. In the middle of February the claimant became disillusioned with his employment for a number of reasons, which he set out in a letter to the respondent. This letter dated 16 February was composed by the claimant with the help of his father. In the letter, which made no reference to the disability suffered by the claimant, he asked for particulars of his contract of employment and how the overtime rules worked. In this connection the claimant said in the letter that he had worked unpaid periods of compulsory overtime. He also complained of harassment and threats of dismissal if he did not work the required overtime. He complained that the rota system had not been explained to him. The tribunal find that had the claimant already raised the issue of dyslexia at interview it would have been alluded to in that letter. No such reference was made in the letter.

4. On receipt of this letter and, as the claimant was not at work on the day it arrived, Mr Dixon telephoned to the claimant’s home to arrange a meeting with the claimant to discuss the letter. He spoke to the claimant’s mother, who discussed the dyslexia issue with Mr Dixon and said that she would send some literature concerning the disability to him. No literature was sent but the tribunal find that this is the day that the respondent’s managing director became aware of the claimant’s disability.

5. The next day the claimant had a meeting with Mr Dixon at which they went through the letter of 16 February point by point. The letter had ended by the claimant stating that he wanted it to be treated as a formal grievance notification. However, at the end of the meeting between the two men, the claimant said that he was content with the explanation of Mr Dixon and that he did not wish to proceed with the formal grievance. In his evidence the claimant confirmed that a two hour meeting had taken place with Mr. Adair and that a shorter meeting took place on the shop floor on the same day at which he was given an explanation of the duties required of him.

6. At the longer of the two meetings, Mr Dixon gave the claimant the staff hand book, which he explained to the claimant. He also explained the respondent’s intranet system which contained important information about the respondent’s employment procedures regarding pay and other matters. At the meeting, the claimant completed a form called a “New Starter Form”, which all employees were supposed to complete when they took up employment with the respondent. This form mentioned any disability that was suffered by an employee. The claimant, before he signed the form on that day, asked Mr Dixon to insert, in that section, the fact that he suffered from dyslexia. The claimant was asked by Mr Dixon whether he had much difficulty with his dyslexia in the work context and the claimant replied, that it did not affect him in his work, Mr Dixon was aware of this issue as a consequence of his discussion with the claimant’s mother the day before.

7. Although the claimant denies that the meeting covered the above matters, the tribunal find that it is inconceivable that, on the day after receipt of the letter of

16 February, a two hour meeting took place which did not cover these matters. The tribunal accepts Mr. Dixon’s evidence that he spent much longer with the claimant than he did with other employees at this “induction” meeting and that he made ticks on the letter of 16February to confirm the points covered at that meeting.

8. One of the rules in the employment handbook, that was explained to the claimant by Mr Dixon at that meeting, was the rule that an employee who was going to take a day off because of sickness should ring in to the shop and not merely text a message to a line manager. The reason for this was that the manager might himself be away from the business that day and the message needed to be received by the shop in order that other arrangements could be made.

9. Indeed an example of this problem occurred two weeks later on 3 March when the claimant was ill and sent a text, saying that he would be unavailable for work, to Mr Dixon, who, as it happened, was in London at a conference that day. Mr Dixon was unable to respond until later in the day. This matter was subsequently mentioned as a breach of the employment rules, when the claimant attended the Probation Review Meeting.

10. The tribunal find that the claimant was at work on the following day 4 March. On

6 March Mr Dixon was obliged to make a late amendment to the rota for manning the shop on the following day, a Saturday. As a result of this, the claimant, who was to have been off the following day, was required, under the new rota to come in to work. The claimant gave evidence that, as a result of his disability, which made it difficult for him to assimilate information from written documents, he did not understand that the new rota obliged him to work on the following day. Accordingly he did not come into the shop the next morning.
The tribunal find that the claimant only became aware that he was due to be on the Saturday, when the first rota was posted at some time on the 6 March. The tribunal did not accept the evidence of the claimant that he was given a contract which required him only to work on Monday to Friday, with every weekend off. The tribunal preferred the evidence of Mr Dixon and Mr McCrum, that no such contracts had been issued to anyone. Persuasive evidence to support this was the reference by both parties to a previous Saturday shift which the claimant had sought to change, as he had made other arrangements for that day.

11. A fellow employee of the claimant, Mr McCrum, gave evidence, that he was standing beside the claimant when the new rota was posted, late on the Friday afternoon and that from the discussion that they had, Mr McCrum was certain that the claimant was quite aware that the rota was changed to show the claimant working on the Saturday. The tribunal was impressed by the evidence of Mr McCrum and accept his evidence of this incident.

12. Mr Grainger, on behalf of the claimant, raised an objection to a question put to
Mr McCrum by a member of the tribunal. The tribunal find that the matter raised had been referred to during cross examination of the claimant by Mr Randall. As however nothing turns on this point the tribunal did not take the question or the witness’ response into account in arriving at its decision. The question referred to the claimant’s reaction to the news that he was on duty the next day.

13. When the claimant failed to come to work on the following day he was contacted by Mr Dixon. The claimant explained that he would come in straight away but this was not accepted by Mr Dixon.

14. On 8 March the respondent held what it called a Probationary Review Meeting. This was partly an investigatory meeting into certain disciplinary allegations against the claimant and partly a disciplinary meeting.

15. While the tribunal noted that the respondent’s Employee Handbook confirmed that the disciplinary procedure would not apply during a probationary period, the tribunal concluded that, as a disciplinary outcome was a potential, it should be regarded as such a meeting.

16. The tribunal did not accept the evidence of Mr Dixon that he approached this meeting with an open mind. The tribunal find that at that stage he was anxious to dismiss the claimant.

17. A letter was sent to the claimant stating that the meeting was to be held and setting out the three incidents to be discussed. These were, the reporting of the sickness absence by text message, the failure to work on the Saturday when the rota was changed and a failure to follow rules about stock purchase. The claimant was informed that he could bring a fellow employee or Trade Union official with him to the meeting. When the meeting took place the claimant brought with him a Miss Young who, although a member of a trade union, was not an official and had no means of identifying herself as a member of a trade union. Mr Dixon who was conducting the meeting took advice from his Human Resources advisors Peninsula and as a consequence rescheduled the meeting for 16 March.

18. A further letter rescheduling the meeting, was sent to the claimant, along the lines of the previous letter. On 16 March Mr Dixon received a telephone call from Mr Mark Adair. Mr Adair introduced himself as the claimant’s brother and a solicitor and barrister from Australia. He said that he would be accompanying the claimant to the meeting scheduled for later that day; however he wanted, as a matter of courtesy, to appraise the respondent company of his interest in the matter and of his qualification. Mr Adair also told Mr Dixon that he would be attending as the claimant’s dyslexic advocate. He mentioned the British Dyslexic Guidelines. Mr Dixon again took advice from Peninsula and when the meeting commenced, he told Mr Mark Adair, that as he was neither a trade union official nor a fellow employee, he could not attend the meeting with his brother.

19. The tribunal find that Mr Adair did state to the meeting that he was there, not in his capacity as a lawyer, but as a dyslexic advocate. However, as will be explained below, the tribunal find as a fact, that his demeanour at this meeting was somewhat aggressive. Mr Dixon, acting on advice, was clear in his decision, that as Mr Adair was not a colleague or trade union official he could not stay. The tribunal find that Mr Dixon was concerned that Mr Adair was a lawyer and failed to appreciate that the presence of a dyslexic advisor would be advisable. In any event, the meeting ended at that stage, so far as the Adair brothers were concerned, as Mr Mark Adair advised his brother to leave and they both did leave. Mr Dixon and his fellow director Mr Finlay then continued the meeting in their absence. At this point, and indeed from the 16 February, the respondents were clearly aware that the claimant was dyslexic and, having obtained advice on the conduct of and representation at the Probationary Review Meeting, ought reasonably to have concluded that consideration of reasonable adjustments would be required.

20. The tribunal find that the respondents erred in proceeding with the Probationary Review Meeting at this stage. The tribunal also find that the respondent made an effort to correct this error at the appeal stage as detailed below.

21. At the continued meeting the directors considered the matters that had been alleged against the claimant and found them all substantiated. The respondent decided to terminate the claimant’s probationary employment contract on the grounds of his suitability. A letter to this effect was hand delivered to the claimant on 17 March. The claimant was offered an appeal which offer he accepted. He asked that the appeal should be conducted in writing. He wrote to the respondent mentioning the fact that he had not been allowed to have a dyslexic advocate with him at the disciplinary hearing and asking for copies of the information that was considered in his absence at the hearing.

22. The respondent replied with copies of the information and asked the claimant what assistance his lawyer could have provided that could not have been provided by a permitted person. Mr Dixon stated that he was not happy to conduct the disciplinary hearing with the claimant represented by a lawyer, as such a meeting would be unbalanced. He ended the letter however inviting the claimant to say what adjustments he required to be made for the appeal hearing.

23. The claimant wrote a long letter to the respondent setting out his grounds of appeal. This was signed by both the Adair brothers. The letter of appeal was unusual in that after setting out the points of appeal and dealing with the problems created for the claimant by his disability, which, the letter stated at some length were ignored by the respondent, it went on to suggest that if the claimant was not reinstated that the respondent should pay to the claimant a sum of £90,000.00, which the claimant described as a reasonable sum for damages for injury to feelings and for loss of his employment and for infringement of statutory rights. At the hearing it was explained to the tribunal that the sum should have been £9,000.00 and the greater sum was a misprint. The tribunal find this hard to understand in the context of such a carefully drafted and technical letter which cited statute and European law as well as case law and had clearly been considered at some length before being sent to the respondent. The tribunal find the tone of the letter reinforces its view, that Mr Mark Adair approached this whole matter in a very confrontational way and leads the tribunal to accept the evidence of Mr Dixon that the conduct of Mr Mark Adair at the meeting which he attended, was unlikely to aid a harmonious meeting. He behaved, in the view of the tribunal, more as an aggressive lawyer than as a dyslexic advocate.

24. The appeal, which was dismissed, was conducted by Mr Finlay on his own, he had been on the disciplinary committee with Mr Dixon when the claimant was dismissed. The decision of the appeal was to uphold the dismissal of the claimant on one ground only, namely the failure to attend for his shift on Saturday 7 March. The allegations concerning the other two offences dealt with at the disciplinary hearing were not upheld.

The Law

25. The Disability Discrimination Act 1995, as amended, (hereinafter called “the 1995 Act) defines Disability Discrimination and harassment as follows:-

Meaning of "discrimination"

3A. - (1) For the purposes of this Part, a person discriminates against a disabled person if -

(a) for a reason which relates to the disabled person's disability, he treats him less favourably than he treats or would treat others to whom that reason does not or would not apply, and

(b) he cannot show that the treatment in question is justified.

(2) For the purposes of this Part, a person also discriminates against a disabled person if he fails to comply with a duty to make reasonable adjustments imposed on him in relation to the disabled person.

…………………. [Further sub sections not relevant to this case]

Meaning of "harassment"

3B. - (1) For the purposes of this Part, a person subjects a disabled person to harassment where, for a reason which relates to the disabled person's disability, he engages in unwanted conduct which has the purpose or effect of -

(a) violating the disabled person's dignity, or

(b) creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for him.

(2) Conduct shall be regarded as having the effect referred to in paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection (1) only if, having regard to all the circumstances, including in particular the perception of the disabled person, it should reasonably be considered as having that effect."

" Employment “

Employers: discrimination and harassment

4. - (1) It is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against a disabled person -

(a) in the arrangements which he makes for the purpose of determining to whom he should offer employment;

(b) in the terms on which he offers that person employment; or

(c) by refusing to offer, or deliberately not offering, him employment.

(2) It is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against a disabled person whom he employs -

(a) in the terms of employment which he affords him;

(b) in the opportunities which he affords him for promotion, a transfer, training or receiving any other benefit;

(c) by refusing to afford him, or deliberately not affording him, any such opportunity; or

(d) by dismissing him, or subjecting him to any other detriment.

(3) It is also unlawful for an employer, in relation to employment by him, to subject to harassment -

(a) a disabled person whom he employs; or

(b) a disabled person who has applied to him for employment.

(4)………………..

(5) The reference in subsection (2)(d) to the dismissal of a person includes a reference -

(a) to the termination of that person's employment by the expiration of any period (including a period expiring by reference to an event or circumstance), not being a termination immediately after which the employment is renewed on the same terms; and

(b) to the termination of that person's employment by any act of his (including the giving of notice) in circumstances such that he is entitled to terminate it without notice by reason of the conduct of the employer.

(6) This section applies only in relation to employment at an establishment in Northern Ireland.

Employers: duty to make adjustments

4A. - (1) Where -

(a) a provision, criterion or practice applied by or on behalf of an employer, or

(b) …………………

places the disabled person concerned at a substantial disadvantage in comparison with persons who are not disabled, it is the duty of the employer to take such steps as it is reasonable, in all the circumstances of the case, for him to have to take in order to prevent the provision, criterion or practice, or feature, having that effect.

(2) In subsection (1), "the disabled person concerned" means -

(a) in the case of a provision, criterion or practice for determining to whom employment should be offered, any disabled person who is, or has notified the employer that he may be, an applicant for that employment;

(b) in any other case, a disabled person who is -

(i) an applicant for the employment concerned, or

(ii) an employee of the employer concerned.

(3) ………………………………….

Reasonable adjustments: supplementary

18B. - (1) In determining whether it is reasonable for a person to have to take a particular step in order to comply with a duty to make reasonable adjustments, regard shall be had, in particular, to -

(a) the extent to which taking the step would prevent the effect in relation to which the duty is imposed;

(b) the extent to which it is practicable for him to take the step;

(c) the financial and other costs which would be incurred by him in taking the step and the extent to which taking it would disrupt any of his activities;

(d) the extent of his financial and other resources;

(e) the availability to him of financial or other assistance with respect to taking the step;

(f) the nature of his activities and the size of his undertaking;

(g) …………………………

(2) The following are examples of steps which a person may need to take in relation to a disabled person in order to comply with a duty to make reasonable adjustments -

(a) making adjustments to premises;

(b) allocating some of the disabled person's duties to another person;

(c) transferring him to fill an existing vacancy;

(d) altering his hours of working or training;

(e) assigning him to a different place of work or training;

(f) allowing him to be absent during working or training hours for rehabilitation, assessment or treatment;

(g) giving, or arranging for, training or mentoring (whether for the disabled person or any other person);

(h) acquiring or modifying equipment;

(i) modifying instructions or reference manuals;

(j) modifying procedures for testing or assessment;

(k) providing a reader or interpreter;

(l) providing supervision or other support.

26. In considering a complaint of disability discrimination a tribunal must apply the rule laid down in Section 17A of the 1995 Act. This states that where a claimant complains that an employer has discriminated against him on the grounds of disability, then:-

(1C) Where, on the hearing of a complaint under subsection (1), the complainant proves facts from which the tribunal could, apart from this subsection, conclude in the absence of an adequate explanation that the respondent has acted in a way which is unlawful under this Part, the tribunal shall uphold the complaint unless the respondent proves that he did not so act.

27. Certain dismissals are declared by statute to be automatically unfair. One such is where the employer fails to comply with the terms of Article 130A of the Employment Rights (Northern Ireland) Order 1996, (the 1996 Order). This states that a dismissal is to be regarded as unfair, if one of the procedures set out in Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the Employment (Northern Ireland) Order 2003 (“the 2003 Order”), has not been complied with and the non compliance is wholly or mainly attributable to the failure of the employer/ respondent. The procedure referred to in Schedule 1 of the 2003 Order provides for the employer to give written information to the employee as to its reason for wishing to terminate the employment of the employee and to invite the employee to a meeting to discuss the matter. The meeting must take place before the action of dismissal is implemented and if the employee is still intent on dismissing the employee it must give the employee a right of appeal. If it fails to carry out this procedure then the subsequent dismissal is automatically unfair. This is known as a failure to follow the statutory dismissal procedure.

28. If the tribunal is satisfied that the procedures laid down by the 2003 Order have been breached, it must increase the award of compensation that it makes by 10 per cent, (Article 17 of the 2003 Order). The tribunal also has power, under the same Article, to increase the award by a further percentage, up to 50 per cent, if the tribunal considers it just and equitable so to do.

Decision

29. The tribunal hold that the respondent did realise that the claimant was suffering from a disability by 16 February 2009, when the claimant’s mother had the telephone discussion with Mr Dixon. This is reaffirmed by the respondent’s undated letter to the claimant, offering him an appeal against the decision not to confirm his probationary period. In that letter Mr Dixon asked the claimant what adjustments he required at the appeal hearing. In the event the appeal was conducted by correspondence and no hearing took place, however it shows that the respondent did admit that the claimant suffered from a disability. The tribunal hold that the medical reports clearly show that the claimant did so suffer.

30. The tribunal find that the claimant did know about the change of duty on Saturday

7 March. He also understood that it was important to either be at the shop, in accordance with the rota, or make arrangements to get cover if he was unavailable, as he had done this a few weeks before. The tribunal therefore hold that the disability did not have any bearing on the incident of the changed rota on 7 March. The only occasion, during his employment with the respondent, on which the claimant’s disability, became an issue, in the view of the tribunal, is at the two Probationary Review meetings, The tribunal find that the first meeting which was attended by Miss Young, was correctly rescheduled as Miss Young was not a trade union official and not a work colleague. The respondent company, being a new business, was not experienced in these matters and Mr Dixon wanted to take advice. The tribunal do however find that the respondent did have a duty to make reasonable adjustments under Section 3A (2) of the 1995 Act. The type of adjustments are listed in Section 18B of the Act and in the Disability Code of Practice issued by the Northern Ireland Equality Commission, which in Paragraph 8.26 recommended that a disabled person should be allowed some relaxation of the respondent’s rules concerning who should accompany him at a disciplinary meeting, this being a reasonable adjustment. Such an adjustment was not made by the respondent in this case.

31. The tribunal find that the respondent was not unreasonable in refusing to allow Mr Mark Adair to accompany his brother as a dyslexia advocate. Mark Adair is a lawyer and his presence would have unbalanced the meeting and would not have been reasonable or appropriate at such an employment meeting. The tribunal did consider the argument that Mark Adair was the person who was best qualified to act as the dyslexia advocate. But the fact, that that would have resulted in the presence of a lawyer at a routine employment meeting, in the opinion of the tribunal, outweighs any advantage of Mark Adair acting in the dyslexia advocate role. The tribunal hold that an adjustment should have been made to the rules as to who could attend the disciplinary meeting, to allow some other person, to act as the advocate. The meeting could have been postponed again to allow such an outcome. This would have been a reasonable adjustment and the respondent, having listened to Mr Mark Adair discuss the matter at some length, on his visit to the office for the Probationary Review meeting, must have realised that the advocate was of importance to a dyslexic person. In any event the facility was offered at the appeal and so should have been offered at the first hearing.

32. The failure of the respondent to allow a dyslexia advocate at the meeting was a failure to provide a reasonable adjustment which put the claimant at a substantial disadvantage, in that he was expected to put his case to a panel of two directors of the respondent company, on his own, with no support. The tribunal hold that the respondent was in breach of Section 4 (2) (d) of the 1995 Act in dismissing the claimant without having made the reasonable adjustment to allow him to be accompanied at the first meeting. The tribunal find that it would have been reasonable, as laid down by Section 18B (2) of the 1995 Act, for the respondent to have relaxed its rules on who could accompany a disabled person.

33. The tribunal, having examined the other incidents referred to it and, bearing in mind the rules concerning the burden of proof, find that the claimant has not shown any other incident that would shift the burden of proof onto the respondent. This is the only adjustment that was not made by the respondent for the claimant during his short period of employment with the company. The tribunal hold that Mr Dixon took more than usual time to go through the claimant’s employment conditions and the company’s operating procedures. The tribunal find that the respondent did its best to integrate the claimant into its staff, and even if the burden of proof did shift to the respondent, it has discharged the onus of showing that, save for the failure to allow the dyslexic advocate to attend the meeting, it has discharged that burden.

34. This being the case the tribunal considered the matter of compensation for this failure to make reasonable adjustments at the disciplinary meeting. The claimant was working on a probationary period during which the employer and employee could decide whether the employment was what each party wanted and whether the employee would fit in to the employer’s team. The tribunal hold, that in this case the claimant was not, in all likelihood, going to be retained by the respondent. The respondent had reached a conclusion, that the claimant was unreliable in relation to the all important work rotas and had no future in the company. The tribunal hold, that even if the claimant had been accompanied by a dyslexia advocate, there was a 33 per cent possibility that he would have been dismissed in any event. Following the English Court of Appeal decision in Chugger v Abbey National plc [2010] ICR 397, the tribunal consider this claim for loss of earnings, resulting from his dismissal, should be reduced by 33 per cent.

35. The tribunal considered the Statutory Disciplinary and Dismissal procedures referred to above and the effect of these procedures in this case. The respondent’s failure to allow the claimant to be accompanied by a dyslexia advocate falls foul of the Code referred to above. The respondent suggests that the failure of the parties to comply with these procedures was the fault of the claimant who refused to attend the adjourned meeting. The tribunal however find that this was in fact the fault of the respondent which did not allow the claimant to have an advocate with him in breach of the Code However the amount of the increase in compensation is, in the view of the tribunal, to be kept to the minimum 10 per cent, as the conduct of the claimant in trying to have a lawyer as an advocate in those circumstances was unwise and unreasonable and the tone of the claimant’s correspondence with the respondent both before and after the abortive postponed meeting was very confrontational and not appropriate to an employment situation of this nature.

36. The tribunal then considered the claim for injury to feelings. The claimant had been employed for a relatively short period. He had been well treated by the respondent company and appeared to be fitting in to the team. There was an allegation of harassment in that the claimant was caused embarrassment by being asked by a colleague to prepare an alphabetical list of DVDs but the tribunal find that that was a minor matter resulting from a misunderstanding. The tribunal hold that there was no evidence of harassment by the respondent, or by its employees, that would be actionable under the 1995 Act. The tribunal is however aware of the unsuccessful efforts that the claimant made, to request that the respondent allow him to be accompanied by a dyslexia advocate and have borne this in mind in reaching its decision on the sum to be awarded. The tribunal find that the compensation for injury to feelings should be at the middle of the lower end of the scale set out in the case of Vento v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2003] IRLR 102. The tribunal award a sum of £3,000.00.

37. The calculation of compensation is set out in the Schedule below.

Schedule

Outstanding wages. The claimant was not paid for 4 March 2009

8 hours 15 minutes @ £4.77 per hour £39.35

Compensatory award

Gross lost earnings from 17 March 2009 to 29 March 2010

when the claimant’s income from new employment became

equal to his income from the respondent. £9,015.30

Less JobSeekers Allowance 26 March 2009

-30 June 2009 (14 weeks @ £47.95 per week) £ 671.30

Less income from employment 30 June 2009

-29 March 2010 (39 weeks x £187.20) £7,300.80

Total income over the period £7,972.10

Net loss of earnings £1,043.20

Less 33% deduction £ 344.25

£ 698.95

Compensation for Injury to feelings £3,000.00

Total compensation subject to 10% uplift £3,698.95

£ 369.89

£4,068.84

Add unpaid wages £ 39.35

Grand Total £4,108.19

38. This is a relevant decision for the purposes of the Industrial Tribunals (Interest) Order (Northern Ireland) 1990

Chairman:

Date and place of hearing: 7 – 9 July 2010, Belfast

Date decision recorded in register and issued to parties:

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Industrial Tribunals Northern Ireland Decisions