

be allowed to proceed, though they erred; because there was a remedy by suspension and reduction if they did wrong. Others contended, That the Lords were the great consistory of the nation, above them, and might advocate or remit as they pleased, either simply, or with directions and instructions to the Commissaries how to proceed, as has been several times done; and though the Lords cannot confirm testaments, yet in the case of Calder of Muirton, and Monro of Foulis\*, they gave directions to the Commissaries how to proceed in a competition of executors seeking to be preferred to the office; and, therefore, seeing Grange had been several years married, and had children, and was long in the possession, undisturbed and unquestioned by this Stirling's claim; and that it was dissonant to the common principles of law, to prove her marriage by her own nearest relations only; therefore they advocated the cause from the Commissaries only *quoad* that point of the ability of the witnesses, but prejudice to go on as to the other parts of the process, that being the single point complained on; which is somewhat extraordinary, to advocate as to one part and not *in totum*; but the reason of this was, that they are judges in such cases *privative*, in the first instance, except in so far as they commit iniquity. (See WITNESS.)

*Fol. Dic. v. 1. p. 27. Fount. v. 2. p. 236.*

1706. June 26.

JOHN and ANDREW MULLIKENS, and their Masters, Supplicants, *against* JOHN SHARP of Hoddam, and WILLIAM COPLAND of Colistoun, and JOHN M'NAUGHT, Bailie of the Regality of Terregles.

JOHN and ANDREW MULLIKENS gave in a petition, complaining against Sharp of Hoddam, and Copland of Colistoun, for proceeding to crave a decret, and John M'Naught, bailie of the regality of Terregles, for decerning in a removing against the complainers, 12th January 1706, notwithstanding of an advocacy at their instance, with a subscribed signature upon the margin, bearing that the same was, upon the 19th of May 1705, produced and admitted by the clerk.

*Answered*: No regard to the marginal signature, which bears not that the advocacy was judicially produced; and though it did, could only prejudice the clerk, as being but his own assertion, and not the Judge, or any other body who knew nothing of it. Nor was there any depending process the time the advocacy is alleged to have been produced and admitted.

*Replied*: The marginal signature subscribed by the clerk, is *probatio probata*, that the advocacy was judicially produced in a depending process: Seeing such signatures used not to be subscribed by the Judge, but only by the clerk. And if he has malversed, the judge may pursue him as accords; but being a person of public trust, his judicial signature must make faith, and be probative. Besides, it were dangerous to oblige the complainer, in such a case, to instruct, either

No 16.

Found to be contempt of authority, to proceed in a process, after the clerk had marked on the margin of the advocacy, that it was produced. The clerk's signature is *probatio probata* of the dependence of the process at the time.

\* Fount. v. 1. p. 781. See JURISDICTION.

No 16. that there was a depending process, or that it was a court-day when the advocacy was produced; for the pursuers might destroy and abstract their processes; and it would be hard to recover the diets of court from a clerk, where the Judge of the court is concerned, that the thing should not be proved.

THE LORDS found Hoddam and Colistoun guilty of contempt of their Lordships authority; and decerned them to pay 100 merks of fine.

*Fol. Dic. v. 1. p. 27. Forbes, p. 112.*

1741. June 23.

PROCURATOR FISCAL of the JUSTICES of PEACE of Haddington, *against* FORREST and Others.

No 17.

FOUND that the pursuer might advocate his own cause on the head of incompetency.

The like had lately been found before; Hamilton of Ladyland against Boyd and others, skippers in Irvine.

*Fol. Dic. v. 3. p. 20. Kilkerran, (ADVOCATION.) p. 21.*

1750. July 26.

BUCHANAN *against* URE.

No 18.

A cause below L. 12 cannot be remitted with instructions. See No 21.

A bill of advocacy, from the Sheriff of Stirling, of a cause under L. 12 Sterling, being, by the Ordinary, remitted with an instruction, one of the parties thinking himself aggrieved, in point of law, reclaimed by petition; which the LORDS appointed to be answered, for no other reason but that the bill of advocacy might be simply refused; being of opinion there could be no instruction given in a cause below L. 12 Sterling.

And, accordingly, the LORDS, on advising petition and answers, 'remitted to the Sheriff to do as he should see cause.'

*Fol. Dic. v. 3. p. 20. Kilkerran, (JURISDICTION of the LORDS of SESSION) p. 320.*

No 19.

Forfeiture of a dog and gun being concluded for in an action, otherwise below L. 12, advocacy competent, because the value of these articles uncertain.

1761. February 11.

Marquis of LOTHIAN *against* OLIVER & FAIR.

AN action being brought before the Sheriff, on the act 1707, against some persons, for hunting without a qualification, concluding for the penalty of L. 20 Scots, and forfeiture of the dog and gun; the Sheriff fined each in L. 5 Scots.

THE LORD ORDINARY refused advocacy, in respect the value of the cause did not exceed L. 12 Sterling.—THE LORDS, on a reclaiming petition, remitted to pass the bill, as the value of the dog and gun was uncertain, and might exceed L. 12 Sterling.

*Fol. Dic. v. 3. p. 20.*