

a horning, arrestment, comprising, or other lawful mean to affect the dyvor's land or estate; and that horning is not such a diligence as does affect, being only personal execution against the debtor; and that the said debt of Stewarts was many years contracted by the rebel after the said horning; and that the said Stewarts residing in Ireland, and their bond being conceived after the stile of English bonds, did not fall under Sanderfon the creditor's escheat.

No 127.

Whereunto it was *answered*, That by the said act of Parliament, bankrupts, after they are at the horn, cannot make any voluntary right or payment to gratify or prefer other creditors; so that there is no necessity to debate whether horning doth affect or not; and yet the truth is, horning is such a diligence as doth affect, seeing thereby all the escheatable goods are affected, and do belong to the King, and to the creditor at whose instance the horning is, who is preferable to the King, and has an interest in the said goods; and that whatever belongs to a rebel, whether the time of the rebellion, or at any time how long so ever thereafter during the rebellion, the same accrues to the King, and consequently to the creditor in the horning; and that *nomina debitorum* and debts *non habent situm*, but are personal interests, and *sequuntur personam creditoris*; and if they be moveable, do fall under his escheat, which is a legal assignation, as said is.

THE LORDS inclined to prefer Vietch. But because some of the Lords in voting were *non liquet*, the business was delayed. See Sect. 8. of this Division. See ESCHSAT.

November 10. 1673.—THE LORDS having resumed the debate, and it appearing upon trial, that the common debtor Sanderfon, the time of the granting the assignation in *anno* 1662 in favours of Ker and Brown, was not only rebel, but was in effect *fallitus & lapsus*; they preferred Vietch to Pallat.

Dirleton, No 249. 255. & 296. p. 118. 123. & 145.

1709. July 9.

MARGARET DALGLISH, Lady Riccarton, against THOMAS GIBSON, Writer in Edinburgh.

THOMAS GIBSON, factor appointed by the Lords for the estate of Riccarton, having obtained a decret before the Sheriff of Edinburgh against Robert Cleghorn one of the tenants, for his rent of the crop 1703, and in time coming, the terms of payment being first come and bygone: In November 1704 he charged and denounced thereon: In December thereafter the Lady Riccarton denounced this Robert Cleghorn, who was her debtor; and about September 1705, Mr Gibson took a disposition from him to the corns then on the ground for payment of three years rent, viz. For the crops 1703, 1704, and 1705, and by virtue thereof recovered payment.

No 128.

A landlord obtained from his tenant, a disposition for payment of arrears of rent, not falling under the hypothec, after the tenant had been denounced, by another creditor.

No 128.

The landlord found not bound to repeat, more than if he had poided; although, in a competition, the creditor who had first done diligence would have been preferred.

The Lady raised reduction of the said disposition against Mr Gibson, upon the second part of the act of Parliament 1621, as made to him in prejudice of the pursuer's lawful and more timely diligence; and craved, that in the terms of that statute, he might be ordained to make furthcoming to her what was voluntarily paid to him, by the common debtor's partial favour, for the crop 1704; which neither the decret obtained by the defender before it fell due, nor his hypothec, for the subsequent year could warrant the payment of.

Answered for the defender: He having received payment of his own rent out of the product of the ground, by virtue of the disposition taken for preventing the expence of poiding, had noways contravened the act of Parliament 1621; whereof the grand design was only to prevent fraudulent dispositions, in prejudice of anterior lawful diligence used by others. For albeit it mentions that the doer of the diligence has action to recover what was voluntarily paid, in prejudice thereof, by the debtor to his creditor; no instance can be given where ever the law took effect as to that clause: Seeing, as a person under diligence can, for the favour of commerce, sell and dispone of his moveables for what price he pleaseth to a creditor as well as to another; so he may likewise sell and dispone them to his creditors in order to be sold and applied for their payment. And it were out of measure hard if a master, who for security of his rent takes a disposition from his tenant, should ly open to the tenant's creditors, who having simple obligations, are in a capacity to do more timely diligence; especially considering, that the radical right of all the product of the ground is in the master for his rent, and the tenant has only the exercise *pro cultura et cura*. Though our law allows the master a hypothec but for one year's rent, yet he has such an interest in his tenant's goods even for other years rents, as may always exclude his taking a disposition for payment from the construction of fraud.

Replied for the pursuer: Albeit in a competition, a donatar of escheat, (who is preferable to an assignee obtaining right *stante rebellione*.) could not repeat from a creditor getting payment in that interval; yet in the case of dispositions granted by bankrupts, (which are most unfavourable) there is no distinction betwixt a competition and repetition, 11th November 1675, No 127. p. 1029. Vietch *contra* Pallet; 14th November 1679, No 16. p. 890. Pollock *contra* Kirk Session of Leith; 10th February 1685, Brown *contra* Watson and Drummond, No 18. p. 892. Nor doth it alter the case, that the disposition here was by a tenant to his master; for a master (who hath a hypthec but for one year) suffering more years rent to ly unuplifted in the tenant's hand, is considered *quoad* these only as another common creditor; and any voluntary right granted to him in security thereof, falls under the act of Parliament 1621. If masters were preferable for the rents of precedent years, the credit of all tenants would be quite ruined; for nobody would deal with or trust them, as not knowing what rents may be owing to their master: Nor doth the factor's *bona fides* in accepting the disposition avail him; because, that might be pretended by any other creditor, *qui suum recipiendo nulli videtur fraudem facere*, and law, without regard thereto, preferreth the anterior diligence of another creditor, *qui sibi vigilavit*.

Duplied for the defender: He is not pleading upon his right of hypothec, but upon his disposition which he lawfully took, and disposed of the subject, by virtue thereof, for payment of his rent, without any trouble or interpellation from the pursuer. The dispositions mentioned in the decisions cited by her, were not granted by tenants to their masters; and the subjects disposed were still extant unlifted.

THE LORDS found, That in the case of a master obtaining a disposition from his tenant, though in a competition another creditor doing diligence might be preferred; yet the master having obtained payment *bona fide* by virtue of the disposition, he cannot be liable to repeat what he received, more than if he had pointed.

Fol. Dic. v. 1. p. 77. Herbes, p. 344.

1715. June 7. ALEXANDER TWEEDIE *against* JOHN DIN, and OTHERS.

ALEXANDER TWEEDIE having sold a stock of sheep to John Din, for which he got his bond; he registered him at the horn, and a few months thereafter, endeavouring to point, he found the sheep disposed upon to some neighbours; and having arrested in their hands, and pursuing a furthcoming, they deponed, they had got the goods, but that they had bought them, for payment of debts due to them by the common debtor, or wherein they were cautioners for him: But for these their debts, no diligence save registrations of their bonds was used, and the common debtor still continued to trade in buying and selling sheep, &c.

Tweedie now insisting upon the latter clause of the act of Parliament 1621, and *alleging*, That he was in the precise words thereof; because he had used diligence to affect his debtor's goods, by a register against a bankrupt and dyvour; and that the other creditors had obtained payment (by the partial favour of the debtor) though posterior to him in diligence; and therefore he had good action to recover what was thus voluntarily paid.

And the co-creditors defenders, having *alleged*, *imo*, That there was a difference betwixt bankrupt and insolvent, and that the law was only to be understood of the first; and here the common debtor was not bankrupt. *2do*, Betwixt creditors partakers of the fraud, and those who are not. *3tio*, Betwixt those who had got payment, and such who only were competing for preference, on a subject yet outstanding.

Answered for the pursuer, *imo*, That there is a difference betwixt bankrupt by the act 1696, so to operate the effect of that law, and bankrupt by the act 1621, to afford the benefit of that act: That less is requisite to make one bankrupt by the latter than the former; because the effect of the act 1621, is nothing so general as of the act 1696. So that with respect to the benefit of the act 1621, it was sufficient that a horning was registered against the common debtor. And this was so found 11th December 1691, the Creditors of Langtoun competing, *voce* COMPE-

No 128.

No 129.
Denunciation with insolvency not sufficient foundation to reduce posterior payments made by the common debtor, unless at the same time he had been commonly reputed bankrupt, or the receiver were *particeps fraudis*.