tors; and then the rule was that laid down in the latter part of the Act, viz. the valuation of the respective lands or properties of the heritors. 3tio, After that was done, each proprietor was to divide the share allocated to him, with those servitude men who derived their right from him or his authors; and in that case the rule is that laid down in the middle of the Act, viz. the value of the several rights and interests of the persons concerned; that is to say, the Lords were to estimate what the value of the servitude was, and give off a part of the property equal to it. No fourth part was allowed to the proprietor by way of præcipuum, but he was to have all that remained, after deducing the value of the servitude.

N.B.—Several of the Lords had a doubt whether a division could be pursued at the instance of any of those having only servitudes.

1739. June 19. MR Lyon against Miss Blair.

THE question here was about the construction of the clause of a tailyie; whether, by the eldest daughter or heir-female to be procreate of the marriage, was meant the immediate daughter of the marriage, in whose right Mr Lyon claimed, or the heir at law, viz. the daughter of the son of the marriage, Miss Blair.

The Lords found, That the legal meaning of the term heir-female, which in this tailyie is used to explain eldest daughter, is so fixed and appropriated in our law to denote the female heir at law, that nothing less than the express will of the tailyier, declared in so many words, can alter the signification of it: that here there is no such express will: that the words, eldest daughter, seem to have been inserted to establish a right of primogeniture among the daughters: that, in the case of Bargeny, there was a daughter living at the time of making the entail, whom it may be supposed that the tailyier, out of particular love and favour, called to the succession, to the exclusion of his heir at law; but that was not the case here, where all the persons were unborn. Therefore found, nemine contradicente, that Miss Blair, the granddaughter of the marriage, and heir at law, was called to the succession.

1739. June 19. Strathorn against Cunningham.

[Kilk., No. 2, Prescription.]

I MENTION this case only because an incidental point was determined in it which seemed to be of some consequence; whether the prescription in favour of tenants, introduced by Act 9, Parl. 2, Sess. 1, Chas. II. takes place when the

estate is sold, and so the landlord is changed, or only in the case of the removal of the tenant, according to the words of the Act.

The Lords found, that, this being a correctory statute, the words of it could

not be extended. Dissent. Arniston.

1789. June 19. ABCHIBALD THOMSON against HARRY HILL, &c.

[C. Home, No. 119.]

This was a process at the instance of the Kirk-session of ——— against two of their elders, who had joined Ebenezer Askine, in order to oblige them to give up into their box some money which they had collected at Ebenezer's meetings, and which they pretended to dispose of.

The Lords assoilvied from the pursuit, on account of the manifest will of the contributors. *Iterum* Dissent. Arniston. In this question, two or three of the Lords declared it to be their opinion, that the elders, in conjunction with the heritors, had the disposal of the charities of the parish, not the elders alone.

1739. June 23. FERGUSON against M'GEORGE.

[Elch., No. 5, Fiar; Kilk. No. 1, ibid.]

This was the case of a bond taken to a man and his wife, the longest liver of them two, and their heirs. The wife survives, and, by virtue of this destination, claims the fee of the sum contained in the bond. On the other side, the husband's heirs pretend it belongs to them. The Lords were considerably divided about this question. Some were of opinion, that the husband was sole fiar and the wife only liferenter, in the same manner as in lands or heritable bonds; see Stair, Title Liferent Infeft. 1. 10; and this opinion was supported by the authority of Craig and Nisbet. Arniston was of opinion, that, by the import of the words, the husband and wife were conjunct fiars, each for the half; that the longest liver was sole liferenter; the heirs of the marriage, heirs of provision to both; and in case of no heirs of the marriage, the husband's heir had one half, and the wife's heirs the other.

The President and the majority found, that, in respect of the conception of the clause, and the presumed intention of parties, the survivor was sole fiar. There were two circumstances in this case, which, perhaps, might have had some influence, 1mo, The bond was writ by no man of skill; 2do, There were some presumptions that the money in the bond came by the wife. July 8th,