price? and, by a majority, we found not. President and Arniston found great fault with the first interlocutor, and that this right of pre-emption was not affectable by creditors, and the son's right of consequence not reducible by them: 2dly, That we could not take the discharge out of the son's pocket, nor consequently out of his agent's, and deliver it. This was on the 15th, and the creditors having reclaimed, and offered to prove that the son was under back-bond to the father, which clearly made at least this money the father's, and craved diligence to recover it, and upon recovery to alter the former interlocutor; yet we refused their bill upon the second reason, me quidem inter alios renit. I had indeed some doubt as to the filling up the blanks; but since that was ordered by the Ordinary, and acquiesced in without reclaiming, I thought we could order delivery; and I also thought the first interlocutor right, though there had been no back-bond.

No. 18. 1744, Dec. 20. ROBERTSON against Young.

A BOND signed by a woman who could not write, but her hand led, unanimously found void and null.

No. 19. 1745, June 17. BIRREL against MOFFAT.

A DISPOSITION signed with initial letters, and also by two notaries and four witnesses, sustained, albeit the first notary's attestation did not bear de mandato, in respect that the body of the deed, which was all written by that notary, expressly mentioned the notary's signing at the party's command, 19th February 1744. But on a reclaiming bill this was altered, and the disposition found null, 18th June 1744, quod vide. (infra.)

A disposition by a man to his wife, signed by notaries, found null, in respect the first notary's attestation bare not de mandato, albeit the whole paper was written by a notary, and the doquet bore that it was signed by notaries for him, at his command, because he could not write, and was also signed by initials; but that was not mentioned in the doquet, but only that he signed by notaries, 18th June 1745. I was in the Outer-House.

No. 20. 1745, July 30. Andrew Trail against Christie.

These parties were before us formerly, in July 1743, upon a question on the stamp act. (No. 15.) The question now was, Whether a general discharge of all bills could be taken off by a proof by witnesses that this bill of L.160 was not intended to be included? which the Ordinary found it could not. The President and I were very clear it could not; but Tinwald and Kilkerran being strongly impressed with the proof that the Ordinary had taken before answer, were for making an exception of this case from the rule. But after long reasoning, we all agreed to take the suspender Andrew Trail's examination in presence (23d July); and after examining him, the 30th, we adhered.—30th July, A discharge being granted of two bills that had been lost, and of all bills or bonds that ever had been granted preceding the date of the discharge, and which discharge was written by the granter himself, the granter offered to prove by witnesses that a bill of L.160 Scots, which was payable some little time before the date of that discharge, (and which the debtor averred he had actually paid, and in particular, that he had paid a balance of