

No 11.

A person accepted a bill subjoining the words 'as cautioner.' Being pursued, he objected, that a cautionary obligation could not be constituted by bill. The objection repelled.

1753. November 27.

DAVID GIBSON *against* JAMES CAMPBELL.

DAVID GIBSON, merchant in Inverary, signed, as drawer, a bill addressed in the following terms: 'To Archibald Campbell tackfman of Succoth principal, and James Campbell of Rashoily cautioner, conjunctly and severally.' Both these persons accepted; but Archibald subjoined principal, and James cautioner to his acceptance. Archibald, who received the value of the bill, became bankrupt; and Gibson pursued James Campbell for payment.

James Campbell judicially acknowledged, that both the bill and its address were written by himself; and that he had agreed to become surety for the sum contained in the bill: he *contended*, nevertheless, that he was not liable in payment; for that a cautionary obligation may not be constituted in form of a bill: and he *pleaded*, that the law holds bills, when used as the vehicles of commerce, to be equal to ready money, and therefore exempts them from the solemnities requisite in other probative writings: in them the subscription of the party constitutes the obligation, and renders them probative; but whenever they deviate from their proper form, their nature is understood to be changed; they cease to be bills, and are deprived of these extraordinary privileges. According to these principles, the writing, on which this action is brought, cannot be considered as a bill; for that a bill presumes value received by the acceptor: now this cannot be applied to a cautioner, who receives not value himself, but becomes bound for the debt of another person. If a cautionary obligation could be constituted by a bill, the principal would be bound to relieve the cautioner, and the cautioner would have the benefit of the septennial prescription; and these things are equally inconsistent with the nature, and foreign to the purpose, of bills: neither is the case altered by these words *conjunctly and severally*, which are added to the address: it is the acceptance, not the address, which constitutes the obligation; the term *cautioner* qualifies the acceptance; and as the pursuer founds on this writing, he must found on it with all its qualities.

Answered for the pursuer, The question is not, whether the defender became cautioner by his acceptance of the bill? but whether his qualified acceptance as cautioner be sufficient to withdraw him from that obligation to which his simple acceptance would, in terms of the address, have subjected him? The bill is drawn on him and his co-obligant Archibald Campbell, conjunctly and severally: they both accept: they are therefore conjunctly and severally liable; more especially as the underwriting of a bill, in what form soever, is, by the custom of merchants, held sufficient to bind the underwriter. But although it should appear, that in fact the defender meant not to be bound as co-obligant, and that in law he cannot be bound as cautioner, yet must he still be liable. It appears from his own judicial acknowledgement, that he agreed to become cautioner for the sum in the bill; and as he thereby induced the pursuer to rely on his security, and to ad-

vance the money, he will not in equity be permitted, under the pretext of legal nullities, to render his engagements ineffectual.

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THE LORDS repelled the objections against payment of the bill.

Ad. J. Erskine.

Alt. A. Lookhart.

Clerk, Gibson.

Fol. Dic. v. 3. p. 74. Fac. Col. No 93. p. 141.

1762. February 24.

SCOU GAL against KER.

IN one particular a bill of exchange differs widely from a bond. Lent money is intended to remain with the borrower for his behoof, as well as that of the lender, till the one chuse to pay, or the other to demand payment. The rule does not apply *quod dies interpellat pro homine*; for a term of payment is added not to bind the borrower to pay it at the day, but only to empower the lender to make a demand at any time after that day. The debtor is not *in mora* by not paying, until a demand be made by the creditor. But where a money transaction is established by a bill, prompt payment is expected. In this case *dies interpellat pro homine*. The acceptor is not to wait for a demand, but ought to offer the money, at the term of payment, and a place is added where he is to offer the money. The whole steps necessary in negotiating a bill, depend on the foregoing principle. Where a bill is drawn payable to a third party, it is incumbent upon that third party to present the bill for acceptance, at or before the term of payment, without which the money cannot be paid at the time. If the acceptor offer not the money at the term, or within the days of grace, it is in him a sort of bankruptcy, which requires a protest by the porteur for not payment, and a notification by him to the drawer, of the dishonour of the bill: And if any of these steps be neglected, the risk of the acceptor's insolvency is justly laid upon the porteur. From these premises it follows, that if a bond be assigned to a creditor, it is understood to be in security only. The assignee who comes in place of the cedent, has the same privilege with the cedent to demand payment, or to continue the sum upon interest. But the nature of a bill is not changed by being indorsed to a creditor; and therefore he is bound to the same strict negotiation that a porteur is who purchases a bill with ready money. From the same premises it follows, that a bill, before the term of payment, is considered as a bag of money, to pass from hand to hand without obstruction. But as the acceptor has broke his engagement, if he suffer the term of payment to elapse without offering payment, a bill, after the term of payment, can no longer be considered as a bag of money. It degenerates into an ordinary security, resembling a bond after the debtor has suffered a denunciation to pass against him. No man will take such a bill in expectation of prompt payment, more than an assignment of a bond; and therefore every exception competent in the one case, ought to be equally competent in the other. For this reason, against a bill of L. 16 Sterling, accepted as the price of cattle, and claimed upon by an indorsee, for value, 18 months after the

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The privilege of summary execution, and of barring compensation, held to go together; the one being lost, so must the other.