Scottish Court of Session Decisions

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^* “The real question now at issue is a question of law. The pursuer's first plea in law in the record is expressed too generally. But taking it with reference to the Second conclusion of the summons, and as explained in the debate, and by the specification, her claim distinctly is, to a right of selection from all the furniture in Cul-dees House, of articles of every description sufficient to furnish an entire house, which has been arbitrarily estimated as of the nature and dimensions of some one of the houses in Stafford Street, Edinburgh. It was accordingly stated by the pursuer's counsel, that the specification now lodged, was made up on this principle, by a person to whom a corresponding instruction was given. On the other hand, the defender's counsel seemed to admit, that, if this principle of choice were sustained, the specification would not be materially excessive. The parties are therefore at issue on the principle.

“It is a general principle of construction, which has been applied in numerous adjudged cases, to deeds and writings of various descriptions, assignations, discharges, submissions, legacies, that, where there is a specification of particulars, and then some general words are added, especially if such general words would, with-out the connecting words, have comprehended the particulars specified, such general words must be understood not only as referring only to things ejusdem generis, but as not intended to carry rights, or impose obligations of greater extent and value than the specified articles with which they stand in connexion. The first rule of all is, that the whole instrument must be considered together; and the principle just mentioned is but an application of that rule.

“In looking at the missive here claimed upon, it will be seen that it first mentions a few articles of an ornamental kind, and a piano-forte, which appear to have been in the drawing-room. Then it specifies the whole furniture in the pursuer's own bedroom, with the general clause added. That is followed by the carriage and harness; and then comes a very specific enumeration of silver and plated articles. And it concludes with the whole of the bed and table linen, and two particular feather beds described as made by the pursuer, and all the books.

“Now, the first impression which the perusal of such a document must make, is, that it could not possibly be intended as a bequest of the entire furniture in the house of Culdees. A legacy of that magnitude would scarcely have been left to stand on such a writing, and it is very improbable that it should not have been alluded to in the regular deed of settlement subsequently executed, except under the general reference to memorandums, &c. But the anxious specification of particulars, demonstrates that this could not be meant. Some of the particular articles, no doubt, might have required specification. But this would have been done in a very different form, if such had been the intention. Accordingly, the pursuer does not maintain that there is a bequest of the whole furniture.

“The point, then, on which the question turns is, that the pursuer insists that the words ‘and any other she may choose for furnishing her house,’ must be taken as proving that the object was to enable her, by means of this bequest, completely to furnish a house; and that, therefore, the meaning was, that she should have what would be sufficient for that purpose. The words ‘for furnishing her house’ can-not be read, simply as in connexion with the words immediately preceding them. They are connected equally with the first part of the sentence, ‘the whole of the furniture of her own bed-room, and any other,’ &c. When it is said, therefore, that the intention was to give her sufficient furniture for furnishing a house, and this, in her own selection, it must be asked what meaning there could be in first specifying the whole furniture of her own bedroom? ‘Any furniture she may choose,’ &c., would have comprehended all that in her own bedroom with the rest. Then a few trilling articles in the drawingroom, and the pianoforte are mentioned, most of which the general words would have comprehended. And, after putting in the general words, the testator goes on to enumerate particulars, some of which, at least (the plated articles, perhaps the linen, and certainly the two feather beds), would have been carried as furniture. How, then, can a court of law or equity say, that by the two or three words put in the middle of the instrument, the testator meant to render superfluous and absurd the anxious specification of particulars, by a clause which would override nearly them all, and enable the party to take ten times as much, whether in one room, or of one kind or another?

“The Lord Ordinary can find no principle on which he can so construe this letter, and, particularly, he cannot so construe it as to render the specification of the furniture of the pursuer's bedroom absolutely nugatory. If the object of furnishing an entire house be assumed, and the words ‘any other she may choose’ be taken alone, no doubt they may bear that meaning. But then the previous words must be rejected as useless; and the question is, whether, upon the whole words, giving effect to them all, it appears that that was the object. The Lord Ordinary thinks that it does not so appear; and that the principle already explained directly applies, that the general words can only be construed as giving a bequest of things of similar nature, extent, and value, with the special legacy with which they stand inseparably connected. The case of M'Nab, above referred to, is in point to the application of the principle to such a case.

“Apart from legal discussions, the probability seems to be, that General Drum-mond meant to give the pursuer a number of particular articles which he thought might be useful to her in furnishing a house; and that, having specified the furniture of her own room, without more minute definition, the idea had occurred to him, that he would not absolutely confine her to that, but give her a liberty of choosing something more. He may have meant any other room, but whether he did so or not, the addition cannot be supposed to have been intended to be of far greater extent and importance than the things specified; and, at all events, the Lord Ordinary has no conception, that he intended in such a form to give the entire furniture of any house; or that he intended to give any thing like the extensive range of selection which is taken by this specification,”