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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Wemyss v Earl of Morton [1838] CS 16_332 (18 June 1838)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1838/016SS0332.html
Cite as: [1838] CS 16_332

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SCOTTISH_Court_of_Session_Shaw

Page: 332

016SS0332

Wemyss

v.

Earl of Morton

No.83.

Court of Session

2d Division

June 18 1838

Ld. Moncreiff. T., Lord Justice-Clerk, Lord Glenlee, Lord Medwyn, Lord Meadowbank

Robert Wemyss,     Advocator.— Counsel:
Marshall.
Earl of Morton and Others,     Respondents.— Counsel:
Sol.-Gen. Rutherfurd — Whigham.

Subject_Church —Prescription.— Headnote:

Where there had been no judicial division of the area of a parish church on its being rebuilt, and there was no division “by agreement” among the heritors alleged, but merely a certain possession of particular seats had, by the respective heritors, for a period of upwards of 40 years,—Held that such use of possession did not establish a prescriptive right in any of the heritors to a particular pew, so as to exclude a judicial division according to legal rules.


Facts:

The parish church of Aberdour was rebuilt about the year 1790. No judicial division of the area took place, but certain portions of it were possessed by the different heritors down to the year 1832, when an application was made to the Sheriff of Fife, on the part of the respondents, the Earl of Morton and others, heritors of the parish, to have the area regularly divided. The advocator Wemyss, who ranked sixth in order among the heritors in point of valuation, had, ever since the church was built, occupied a particular pew as his family seat. This pew, in the selection of family seats by the several heritors in the process of division, was chosen for the heritor who ranked third in order of valuation, and who consequently had the third choice. When it came to the turn of Wemyss to choose, he selected another pew, but under protest and objection to the division, and that he was entitled to retain the pew hitherto occupied by him. The Sheriff having confirmed the division, Wemyss brought the present advocation, in which, while he admitted that there had been no judicial division, and that there was no written evidence of any division by agreement among the heritors, he averred generally that when the church was completed, “the area thereof was divided among the different heritors of the parish,” and “a certain portion of the area of the church which was then apportioned to each of the heritors has since been possessed by them respectively, and their successors and their tenants;” and he pleaded,—

By virtue of his estate in the parish the advocator has a sufficient title to a share in the area of the church, and it is not pretended that the pew hitherto occupied by him exceeds the extent to which he is entitled. He has possessed that pew, however, for more than forty years, as the pew belonging to his property, and, as he alleges, on a division among the heritors immediately after the church was built, adhered to till 1832. It is not essentially necessary that the division of a church should be by judicial authority. The heritors may undoubtedly divide it by agreement among themselves, and although there be no writing, a prescriptive use of possession is sufficient proof of a division, and a sanction of the allotment enjoyed. 1 The present is not the case of a party claiming right to a portion of the area of a church without any title, for the advocator's estate affords a sufficient title, the use being merely referred to as designating the particular portion allotted to him.

To this it was answered—

In all the cases in which the existing possession was maintained without direct evidence of a judicial division, there has either been sufficient ground to presume such division, or there has been a division by agreement among the heritors. Here, it is admitted, there was no judicial division, and it is not alleged that there was any division by agreement. The averment is in substance that there was a division by each heritor taking possession of a portion; but this is not a division which could afford any title of possession to any particular pew so as to exclude a regular judicial division, when demanded, according to legal rules. 2

The Lord Ordinary repelled the reasons of advocation, and remitted simpliciter with expenses, adding the subjoined note. *

_________________ Footnote _________________

1 Cathcart (Greenock), Nov. 24, 1785 (M. 7928); Sinclair (Kinghorn), Feb. 6, 1761 (M. 7918); Smith (Dairy), June 22, 1826 (ante, IV. 738).

2 Ersk. 2, 6, 11.

*Note.—It is very clear to the Lord Ordinary, that in the present case there is no room for the presumption which was acted on in the cases quoted of Greenock, Kinghorn, and Sinclair; the last is a perfect contrast to this case. Here there is not only no positive allegation of any regular division, but it is quite clear, as matter of fact, that no such division ever did or could have taken place; and it is not even averred that there was any division by agreement of the parties. All the fact averred, and at last admitted, is, that because there was no division, any body took possession of any seat which he was allowed to occupy, and that the advocator has occupied the Heat in question for above forty years. Taking this to be the fact, the Lord Ordinary is of opinion that, where there is no previous special right of property averred, as in some of the cases cited, such mere occupancy, against the clear evidence that no division ever took place, can give no permanent right. As it is not at all averred, that the advocator or his predecessor could have had any right to a seat in the ratio assumed, according to his valuation, it is manifest that his possession not being founded on any decree of division, is a mere possession without title, on which no prescriptive right can ever be founded.

“The general rule is, that where a church has never been regularly divided, any heritor may require this to be done. Special rights of property, as in the case of North Leith, may be established, and when made out, must be regarded in the division. But the advocator pretends no such special rights, and alleges nothing but an avowed usurpation by tolerance, and it is very clear that if his plea were sustained, it would overset and prevent the division altogether.”

Wemyss reclaimed.

Lord Justice-Clerk.—I consider the rule of law to be accurately stated by Erskine in the passage referred to. In the Greenock case there was a written agreement; and when there has been immemorial possession following on such agreement, the law will be as was there held. So in the Kinghorn case, and that of Dairy. I cannot assimilate the present to these cases, or hold that it ought to be regulated by the principles fixed in them; and I think the Lord Ordinary has decided it on a clear principle, which appears to me to be applicable,—that there being no evidence of a legal division having taken place, possession during the years of prescription cannot avail. I am, therefore, not for disturbing the Sheriff's division.

Lord Glenlee.—I am of the same opinion. The general right of the heritors to a proportion of the area of the church in proportion to their valued rent can be converted into a special one, either by the legal division of the Sheriff, or by a formal agreement among the heritors. But how without any title the advocator can demand that mere possession should confer such right, I cannot see. No doubt there may be cases, where, although there be no evidence of a formal agreement, there may be grounds for presuming such agreement. But how can I presume it here, looking to the situation of these parties? Supposing the advocator and the other heritors to have taken possession of certain seats after the church was built, is that exclusive of the right of the heritors to have a subsequent division gone into? Can I hold that a complete and perfect title has been thereby given to the advocator?

Lord Medwyn.—I am aware that this is a question of eligibility. Although there should be no evidence of a written agreement, yet I think, notwithstanding, there may have been an agreement without writing; and then the whole question would be, whether there has been sufficient length of time to give right to a party who at the opening of the church had received possession of a particular seat. In the present case the advocator has occupied no larger portion of the area than he was entitled to from his valuation, and the question is whether he is to be turned out of the seat so occupied by him. I agree that no possession would secure him in a larger share of sitting-room than in proportion to his valuation. I agree with Lord Glenlee that there is a general right in the heritors to have a part of the area of the church in proportion to their valued rent, and which may be converted into a special right by a judicial division or a formal agreement. But when the heritors arrange among themselves to take certain seats, there may easily have been no written agreement.

Lord Meadowbank was absent.

The Court adhered to the interlocutor, reserving to the advocator his claim for any expense which may have been incurred in ornamenting the seat.

Solicitors: Thomson, Elder, and Burn, W. S.— Davidsons and Syme, W. S.—Agents.

SS 16 SS 332 1838


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