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Cite as: [1838] CS 16_353

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SCOTTISH_Court_of_Session_Shaw

Page: 353

016SS0353

Dickie

v.

Brash

No. 91

Court of Session

1st Division D.

Jun. 25 1838

Cookburn, Lord Gillies, Lord Mackenzie, Lord Corehouse, Lord President.

John Dickie,     Pursuer. Mrs Isabella Brash or Dalgleish and Husband,     Defenders.

Subject_Agent and Client—Implied Mandate—Expenses.— Headnote:

A party having a substantial interest in maintaining defences against an action which was directed against another party, obtained from that other party the copy-summons served on him, and instructed an agent (to whom he delivered the service-copy, but explained how matters really stood) to put in defences in name of the nominal defender: Held that, in the circumstances, the agent was fully certiorated that his sole employer was the party having the substantial interest in defending, and that he had no claim for his account against the nominal party.


Facts:

Isabella Brash, servant of a farmer in Berwickshire, was the grand-daughter of Robert Brash, who was the owner of some small houses at Moodiesburn. Mrs Stark, wife of Alexander Stark, innkeeper at Moodiesburn, held a heritable bond over these subjects; and as Isabella Brash was the heir of her grandfather, Robert Brash, she agreed, after his death, to convey her whole right and interest in his succession to Mrs Stark and her husband, for an onerous consideration. On the other hand, Mrs Stark and her husband bound themselves to free and relieve her of all debts for which Robert Brash was liable. Afterwards James Martin, toll-keeper, Glasgow, raised an action against Isabella Brash, as representing her grandfather, for payment of a sum of £27, 10s. 6d., and certain interest, contained in a holograph obligation granted by him. Brash notified this action to Mrs Stark and her husband, as being bound to relieve her, and she put into their hands the service-copy of the summons and citation which had been left with her. Mrs Stark and husband then applied to John Sommerville, formerly writer in Edinburgh, to conduct a defence in the name of Brash against Martin's action, and they put into his hands the service-copy of the summons and citation. They stated to him that the country agent in the case was John M. Steel, writer, Glasgow. Sommerville was not entitled to practise before the Court of Session, but he put the copy-summons and citation into the hands of John Dickie, W.S., Edinburgh, who entered appearance in the name of Brash, and conducted a defence in her name. It was explained, both to Sommerville and Dickie, at the commencement of their employment, that Mr and Mrs Stark were the parties interested in the defence, being liable to relieve Isabella Brash of the debt, if due. No instruction whatever was given by Brash to Sommerville or Dickie; their whole communication was with Mrs Stark and her husband, or with the country agent pointed out by them.

Martin, after some litigation, obtained decree against Brash, with modified expenses. During the dependence of this action, John M. Steel raised an action for payment of the expenses incurred to him as country agent. The action was directed against Mrs Stark and her husband, and against Isabella Brash. The summons was served on Brash personally. Defences were lodged in name of Mrs Stark and husband, but decree in absence was taken against Brash, against which a reclaiming note was presented in her name, and she was reponed. Statements were made in her name in that action, which implied an acknowledgment of her liability to Dickie, W.S., for his account of expenses in Martin's action. But Brash had not given any authority for appearance in that action, more than in the action at Martin's instance.

Dickie, W.S., received from Mrs Stark and husband several payments to account of the expenses incurred in defending against Martin's action, amounting in all to £15. And he raised an action for the balance of his account, amounting to £33, 10s., against Mrs Stark and husband, and against Isabella Brash, now spouse of William Dalgleish, residing at Portobello. The summons set forth that, in Martin's action, Sommerville “was applied to, on the part of the said Isabella Brash, by Mrs Margaret Morison or Stark, and Alexander Stark, innkeeper at Mudiesburn, her husband, who requested the said John Sommerville to conduct the defence against the said action, in name and for behoof of the said Isabella Brash:” And farther, that Mrs Stark and husband had become bound to pay the debts of the grandfather of Brash, and therefore “had a substantial interest in the issue of the said action.” The summons concluded against the defenders as jointly and severally liable. Decree was taken against Mrs Stark and husband, who lodged no defences. Defences were lodged for Mrs Brash or Dalgleish and husband, who went abroad during the discussion, but left a mandatory to defend them. They pleaded that this was a case of special circumstances, which clearly instructed that Dickie was never employed by Mrs Brash or Dalgleish, but solely by Mrs Stork and husband. They were the only persons with whom Sommerville had communicated. Though they had the custody of the service-copy of citation against Mrs Brash, in Martin's action, yet it was explained to Sommerville, at the outset, how this came into their hands, as being the parties truly interested in defending against the action, and bound to relieve Mrs Brash against it. Sommerville explained this to Dickie at the commencement of his employment; and thus any presumption which might otherwise have arisen from the possession of the service-copy, as if it were an authority by Brash to employ an agent for her, was effectually destroyed. And, apart from that circumstance, there was nothing on which to rest a claim against Brash as having ever employed Sommerville or Dickie, the whole payments to account being made by Mrs Stark and husband; and the statements which were made in Steel's action, being made not by authority of Brash, who never authorized appearance in that action, but by Mrs Stark and husband, who alone were interested in it, or caused any defences to be lodged in it Dickie answered that as Mrs Brash put the service-copy of citation into the hands of Mrs Stark and husband, she empowered them to employ an agent for her, and to bind her thereby, because an agent was entitled to rely on her as an employer, if she either directly put such service-copy into his hands, with a request to defend her, or put it into the hands of another party, who delivered it to the agent with a similar request. And although it was explained that Mrs Stark and husband were liable to relieve Mrs Brash, that did not take away her right and interest to defend, if she chose to do so; because, unless she defended, she would be made primarily liable, and she might be doubtful as to her power of operating effectual relief. Since Mrs Brash, therefore, put her service-copy into the hands of Mrs Stark and husband, she must be liable to the pursuer for his account of expenses, though she would have a good claim of relief against them, if they had misapplied the service-copy, and employed an agent for her, contrary to her intentions. And her liability was the more obvious, considering her connexion with the action at Steel's instance, and the statements made therein.

During the discussion, the pursuer recovered payment of the account sued for, from Mrs Stark and husband, and the only question remaining was as to the expenses of the present action, which, however, involved the consideration of the merits of the defence maintained by Mrs Brash.

The Lord Ordinary “having considered the process, and heard parties on the pursuer's claim for expenses, against Isabella Dalgleish and her husband, which is the only part of the case which now requires to be settled, found them liable in expenses, appoints an account thereof to be given in, and, when lodged, remits the same to the auditor to tax, and to report.” *

Mrs Brash and husband reclaimed.

Lord Gillies.—My first impression was in favour of the interlocutor, but on more mature consideration I think it is erroneous. The first action was directed against Mrs Brash alone. When the summons was served on her, she knew that Mrs Stark and her husband were bound to relieve her, and she just did what any body in her situation would have done, she sent her service-copy to Mrs Stark and husband, and notified to them that it was their affair to attend to the action, and not hers. All this is clearly established. Then the Starks carried this to Sommerville,

_________________ Footnote _________________

* “Note.—It is settled that the employment by a client of a country agent to conduct litigation at Edinburgh, is a virtual authority to him to employ an Edinburgh agent. It has not been settled, however, that an Edinburgh agent (or a person supposed to be one), on being employed to do Edinburgh business, is entitled, without consulting the client, to devolve the employment upon another Edinburgh agent, and therefore if the present case had depended purely on this point, it might have been attended with difficulty; but it does not. The whole circumstances must be taken into view, and when they are, their import is, that the defender, Isabella Dalgleish, knew that the litigation was conducting by the pursuer, and that if she did not directly approve of this, and take the benefit of it, she at least sanctioned it by silence.”

who gave it to the pursuer, Dickie; and it is expressly admitted by Dickie, that, when he received this service-copy, it was explained to him that the Starks were liable to relieve Mrs Brash of the debt sued for. The Starks never disputed that they were liable to relieve her, and they were the only parties who gave instructions to Sommerville for getting defences lodged. In the special circumstances of the case, therefore, I think it sufficiently proved that the Starks, and not Brash, were the sole employers of Dickie. It may be the general rule, that if a party transmits to an agent, either directly or through the medium of another, the service-copy of a summons against him, that will make him liable as the employer of the agent in defending against the action. But that rule will not apply here. For, in this case, the party on whom the summons was served, sent the service-copy to a third party, as being truly and properly interested in lodging defences, if any defences were to be lodged; and that third party, in taking steps for his own interest to get defences lodged, explained the true state of the fact to the agent whom he employed to lodge defences. In these circumstances, the agent acted solely on the employment of the party properly interested, and cannot be allowed to implicate any body else. In regard to the second action by Steel, which was directed both against the Starks and Mrs Brash, it does not appear to me, that, in the circumstances, the defences of Mrs Brash in this action can be compromised by any statement which was therein made.

Lord Mackenzie.—I am of the same opinion, and it has been my opinion all along. The summons itself, in stating that the action was raised by Martin against Brash, adds that the employment to lodge defences came immediately from the Starks, and through them alone. The libel runs thus, that Sommerville “was applied to, on the part of the said Isabella Brash, by Mrs Margaret Morison or Stark, and Alexander Stark, innkeeper at Moodiesburn, her husband, who requested the said John Sommerville to conduct the defence against the said action, in name and for behoof of the said Isabella Brash.” And the summons then adds, that, the Starks being liable for the debt, “had a substantial interest in the issue of the said action.” And the pursuer admits that Sommerville explained the situation of matters at the date when Dickie's employment commenced. As the Starks were solvent, Dickie was thus certiorated that the substantial interest to defend against the action was not in Brash, but was in the Starks, who accordingly were looking after the defence, as it was they who employed Sommerville. In these circumstances, it is not necessary to consider what might have been the right of Martin, the opposite litigant, in claiming his expenses against Brash, the party whose name was used in conducting a defence against him. That is not the question before us. The question here is exclusively between an agent and his own employer; and if an agent knows, that, in whatever name proceedings are conducted, the nominal party is not his true employer, and that the proceedings are conducted by him for behoof of another, he must look to that other alone for his reimbursement, and not to the nominal party. The agent in this case never once communicated with the nominal party, but always with the real party, the Starks; and in the whole circumstances, I think the pursuer must have understood that he was acting in the employment of the Starks alone. He knew well that they were liable to him, and accordingly he brought this action against them, as well as against Brash. And he has got decree against them in this action, under which, payment of his account has actually been recovered; so that the only question remaining is as to the expenses of the present action. I am of opinion that the pursuer ought not to have directed his action against Brash at all, and that she ought to be assoilzied with expenses.

Lord Corehouse.—I have formed the same opinion, and my opinion is very decided. This is not a case involving the interests of an opposite litigant, who has got decree for expenses against a party whose name has been used in the legal proceedings against him. Had it been Martin who was suing Brash for the expenses incurred by him in his action, in which her service-copy of the summons had been placed in the hands of the agent who conducted the proceedings in her name, I apprehend he could not have been barred from recovering expenses against her, by any disclaimer she might make. But this is a question between agent and client alone, and the case of Cowan 1 and others, which has been referred to by the parties, was entirely different from this. In this case Brash sent her service-copy to the Starks, the parties having the true interest to defend. The Starks placed it in the hands of the pursuer, Dickie, through the medium of Sommerville, and Dickie was, from the first, made aware of the true state of matters. There was nothing to amount to an employment of him by Brash, or to authorize him to understand he was so employed. Brash merely acted as was natural for a person in her situation, and Dickie, who never had the slightest communication with her, has produced no evidence to show that she ever employed him; and he knew all along that the Starks were the proper party. As to the statements made in name of Brash in the action at Steel's instance, they were the statements of the Starks and not of Brash, and do not affect this question.

Lord President.—At first I had formed a pretty decided opinion in favour of the interlocutor under review. That opinion is now very much shaken, and I incline to think the interlocutor should be altered. But I cannot refrain from observing that Brash acted in a very rash manner. When she put her service-copy of citation into the hands of the Starks, if they had employed their agent without giving him such explanations as were given to Sommerville and the pursuer, I rather think that such agent would have had a good claim against her for his account, leaving her to claim relief against the parties who had put the service-copy, without due explanation, into the agent's hands. And even in the special circumstances of this case, it is not without hesitation that I assent to the alteration of the interlocutor of the Lord Ordinary.

The Court then altered the interlocutor of the Lord Ordinary, and assoilzied Brash with expenses.

Solicitors: J. Dickie, W. S.— A. Scott, W. S.—Agents.

_________________ Footnote _________________

1March 4, 1836 (ante, XIV., 634.)

SS 16 SS 353 1983


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