

and that it was not necessary that it should be so for the solution of the only question which it was the object of the former process to get settled."

The defender reclaimed.

MAIR (with him GORDON) was heard for the defender in support of the reclaiming-note. He cited *Huntly v. Nicoll*, 9th Jan. 1858, 20 D. 374; *Anderson v. Gill*, 22d Dec. 1860, 23 D. 250; and *National Exchange Company v. Drew*, 12th July 1861, 23 D. 1278.

GIFFORD and WATSON, for the pursuer, were not called upon.

The LORD PRESIDENT—The right of property was not in question in the former action. It was a case of interdict, and only embraced a portion of the ground, which is the subject of contention in this action. There was no question of property raised, and the Lord Ordinary did not find anything in regard to a right of property. His Lordship said that all he was dealing with was a question of possession, and so he proceeded to deny to the suspender a portion of the remedy which he was asking. But why should that prevent a declarator being raised for which there were no *termini habiles* in the suspension? I therefore think there is no case of *res judicata* here.

LORD CURRIEHILL—I concur.

LORD DEAS—A suspension and interdict is in its own nature a possessory action, and the result of it is generally regulated by the state of possession for the last seven years. I cannot see that this suspension was treated by the parties on any other footing. I should not wish to be understood as laying it down that a question of property can never be decided in an action of suspension and interdict. It is not necessary to decide that here; for apart from that, the great bulk of the ground embraced in this action was not embraced in the other action. All that was there referred to was 18 inches along the line of the mutual gable. Here there are 56½ square yards. The plea is not put that as to these 18 inches there is *res judicata*, but it is stated in regard to the whole ground. It is totally out of the question to maintain that. I don't wish to suggest that had the plea been so limited, it would have been good, because I rather think that even to that extent it is ill-founded.

LORD ARDMILLAN concurred with the Lord President.

The reclaiming-note for the defender was therefore refused.

The Lord Ordinary also reported the case on the motion of the pursuer that the evidence in the cause should be taken on commission, in terms of sec. 49 of the Court of Session Act, which motion the defender objected to on the ground that the case should be sent to a jury.

The Court, in respect the question was chiefly one of law, depending on the construction of titles, explained, it might be, by the possession which had followed, remitted to the Lord Ordinary to allow the parties before answer a proof of their averments, and to appoint the evidence to be taken on commission.

Agents for Pursuer—Morton, Whitehead, & Greig, W.S.

Agents for Defender—Scott, Moncreiff, & Dalgety, W.S.

SECOND DIVISION

GARDNER *v.* KEDDIE OR M'GAGHAN.

(*Ante* p. 6.)

New Trial. Held that a cause in which a trial had taken place before the Lord Ordinary and

a jury, and in which the Court had afterwards upset the verdict as contrary to evidence, and granted a new trial, was in dependence before the Lord Ordinary, and not the Inner House, and therefore that a motion to have a day fixed for the new trial could be competently made only in the Outer House.

This case was tried last session before Lord Jarvis-woode and a jury, and resulted in a verdict for the pursuer. Thereafter the defender moved for a new trial, and obtained a rule on the pursuer to show cause why it should not take place. The rule was at the commencement of this session made absolute. The case was then enrolled before the Lord Ordinary to have a day for trial fixed. His Lordship, however, expressed doubts whether he could entertain such a motion, as, in the interlocutor of the Inner House granting a new trial, there was no remit of the case to the Lord Ordinary. A note was accordingly boxed to the Second Division, praying the Court to remit the case that a day for trial might be fixed.

W. A. BROWN, in support of the note, argued—Under the Court of Session Act of 1850 the practice of the Court was divided in regard to reports from the Lord Ordinary on cases upon issues. In the one Division a remit was made to the Lord Ordinary after issues were adjusted, and in the other the cause was retained in the Inner House. In consequence of this unequal practice the Distribution of Business Act of 1857 provided, in sec. 8, that a remit should be made. That Act was declaratory of the law. The present case falls under the same principle that determined the provision of the Act of 1857. When a case is before the Inner House on a motion for a new trial it is there for a temporary purpose, just as a case is before the Court for a temporary purpose when issues are adjusted. This is *casus improvisus*, under the 8th section of the Act of 1857, and therefore the remit should be made.

No appearance for the pursuer.

The Court were unanimously of opinion that the case was in dependence before the Lord Ordinary, and not the Inner House. The Lord Justice-Clerk remarked that although he had no difficulty on the point, he was glad the question had been raised, as it was desirable that it should be authoritatively ruled. In considering a motion for a new trial, nothing was before the Court but what took place at the trial, the Judge's notes and the verdict of the jury, just as in dealing with a Bill of Exceptions, nothing but these and the exceptions were before the Court. The Court could not, in that case, look to the process, and he did not see that in a motion for a new trial the case was different. There was no foundation for the argument that the analogy of the practice of the Court, in reports from the Lord Ordinary upon issues, applied under the Act of 1857, or for the notion that the case was *casus improvisus* under that Act. The motion for a new trial was made under the Act of William of 1830.

The other Judges concurred.

Agent for Defender—James Bell, S.S.C.

JURY TRIAL.

(Before Lord Kinloch.)

CAIRD *v.* INNES.

Proof—Admissibility of Evidence—Judicial Confession in a Criminal Trial. In the trial of an action of damages for assault, held (per Lord Kinloch) that a judicial confession by the de-

fender in a criminal trial that he had committed the assault in question was competent evidence against him.

In this case James Caird, hotel keeper, Cullen, was pursuer; and Alexander Innes, Excise officer, Cullen, was defender; and the issue sent to trial was as follows:—

“Whether, on or about the 18th day of October 1865, and at a place on or near the turnpike road leading from Cullen to Portsoy, about 100 yards on the north side of the Cullen toll-bar, the defender assaulted the pursuer—to his loss, injury, and damage?”

“Damages laid at £500.”

At the trial,

SHAND and THOMSON for the pursuer proposed to put in evidence, for the admission which it contained, a conviction obtained against the defender on his own confession on 10th November 1865 when he was tried criminally for the assault in question before the Sheriff of Banffshire.

CLARK and LANCASTER for the defender objected to the competency of the proposed evidence. The conviction applied to the defender, but he had pleaded guilty as the quietest way of avoiding the publicity of a criminal trial. It had been decided that a prisoner's declaration could not be used against him as evidence in a civil case (*Little v. Smith*, 9 D. 737). A conviction obtained after a trial on a plea of not guilty would not be admissible as evidence; and there is no real difference in the case of a conviction obtained on a person's confession.

The pursuer cited the following authorities in support of the admissibility of the evidence:—Taylor on Evidence, S. 1506; Starkie on Evidence, p. 362; Dickson on Evidence, S. 1085; Bell's Principles, S. 2216; Grierson, M. 14,021; Bontein, M. 14,043; Lord Arran, M. 14,023; Mackie, 3 Murray 25; Cairns, 12 D. 921; Ivory's Ersk., p. 986, note 95.

Lord KINLOCH admitted the evidence, and the defender excepted.

The jury found for the pursuer—damages, £40.

Agent for Pursuer—Alex. Morison, S.S.C.

Agents for Defender—H. & A. Inglis, W.S.

Thursday, June 21.

FIRST DIVISION.

M'KINNON *v.* HAMILTON.

Diligence—Poinding—Suspension. Note of suspension of a poinding passed on the ground that the amount of effects poinded was excessive:

Question—Whether it is necessary in a warrant of sale under a poinding to name the hour of sale.

This was a suspension of a poinding and warrant of sale granted by the Sheriff of Buteshire. The grounds of suspension were, *inter alia*, that the warrant of sale did not specify the hour as well as the day on which the sale was to take place, and that the respondent had poinded and had obtained warrant to sell all the complainer's moveable property, the appraised value of which was £72, 9s., for a debt the amount of which was only £13. The complainer offered consignment.

The Lord Ordinary (Mure) passed the note, and continued an interim interdict which had been granted. He observed in his note—“The poinding of effects of an appraised value upwards of five times the amount of the debt sought to

be recovered is, in the opinion of the Lord Ordinary, of itself a very questionable proceeding. And when that is followed by a warrant of sale, in which no restriction is imposed upon the creditor as to the quantity of the effects which may be sold, and no precise time of sale is fixed—inasmuch as the hour of sale is left in the creditor's discretion—(Bell Com. on Statute, p. 22)—it appears to the Lord Ordinary that so much doubt is raised as to the legality of the diligence in the present case as to entitle the complainer to have the note passed upon the consignment offered being made. Kewley, March 8, 1843.”

The respondent reclaimed.

BURNET for him argued—The Personal Diligence Act only requires that the time of sale should be fixed by the Sheriff. That was done in this case, because the day was named. It was not essential that he should fix the hour of the day. But the hour of sale was duly advertised and intimated to the debtor six days before the day fixed. In regard to the amount of effects poinded, that was explained by the fact that the expenses of executing the diligence were considerable, and besides the debtor was in arrear to his landlord, whose agent had intimated that he intended to interdict the sale in order to protect his hypothec. It was therefore necessary to point as much as would enable the creditor to take the landlord's objection out of the way, and also to pay his own debt and the expenses. *Hunter v. North of England Bank*, 12 D. 65.

THOMS, for the suspender, was not called on.

The Court adhered, on the ground that the poinding was excessive. In this case the creditor may have proceeded in good faith, but if what had been done were sanctioned, great oppression and injustice might be committed. No opinion was expressed as to whether it was fatal to the diligence that the hour of the sale was not mentioned in the warrant of sale.

Agent for Suspender—Wm. Officer, S.S.C.

Agent for Respondent—John Thomson, S.S.C.

SECOND DIVISION.

M'TAGGART *v.* M'DOUALL.

Property—Foreshore—Right of Ware—Boundaries

—*Bay.* Held that the principle to be applied in fixing the boundaries of two adjacent properties situated on a bay, with reference to the exercise of the right of sea-ware on the foreshore, is to take an average line of coast, and drop a perpendicular upon it from the termination of the land march between the properties.

This is a question of boundaries between two adjacent proprietors on the Bay of Luce. The pursuer seeks for declarator that, as proprietor of the lands of Ardwell, in the parish of Stoneykirk, and county of Wigtown, he has the “sole and exclusive right to the wrack, ware, and waith, whether growing or drifted, upon the shores adjacent to and *ex adverso* of his lands,” which extend along the west side of the Bay of Luce, up to a certain boundary, or to another alternative boundary line. The defender, whose lands are situated to the south of the pursuer's, claims a different line of boundary, extending across the foreshore in a direction further north, and cutting off a part of the shore opposite the pursuer's lands. Both parties relying upon possession, as well as their legal right, a proof was taken. The Lord Ordinary (Kinloch) held that it was impos-