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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Wright v. Moncrieff Mitchell. (M'Gregor, Buchan & Co's. Trustee) [1871] ScotLR 8_351 (10 February 1871)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1871/08SLR0351.html
Cite as: [1871] SLR 8_351, [1871] ScotLR 8_351

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SCOTTISH_SLR_Court_of_Session

Page: 351

Court of Session Inner House First Division.

Friday, February 10. 1871.

8 SLR 351

Wright

v.

Moncrieff Mitchell. (M'Gregor, Buchan & Co's. Trustee).

Subject_1Sale
Subject_2Condition
Subject_3Rejection
Subject_4Bankrupt — Statute 1696, c. 5.
Facts:

Where the seller undertook to ship goods at Liverpool for Montreal, and accordingly took the bill of lading in the purchasers' name, and consigned the goods to the purchasers' agent at Montreal, and afterwards sent the bill of lading to the purchasers themselves in Glasgow, along with a bill at four months for the price, which was not accepted by the purchasers, who shortly thereafter became insolvent— Held that delivery was complete on the goods being shipped, and the bill of lading handed to the purchasers; that the signing of the bill of exchange for the price was not a condition suspensive of the sale, but, in the circumstances, only an ordinary mercantile custom in sales on credit; and that a delivery order signed by the purchasers in favour of the seller, while the goods were on their passage out to Montreal, did not, and could not, operate as a rejection on the part of the purchasers—delivery having been given and accepted; but that, being within sixty days of bankruptcy, the transference thereby attempted was struck at by the Act 1696, c. 5.

Headnote:

This was an appeal from the judgment of the Sheriff of Lanarkshire, in an action raised before him at the instance of Moncrieff Mitchell, C.A., the trustee under a trust-disposition and assignation, for behoof of creditors, of Messrs M'Gregor, Buchan & Co., grain merchants, Glasgow, against John Wright, tea merchant there. The summons sought to have the defender ordained to return or deliver to the pursuer, as trustee foresaid, forty-six half-chests of tea, or alternatively to pay the value of the same, on the grounds, that by means of a delivery order, granted by P. C. M'Gregor in name of the firm, dated 28th March 1867, and addressed to James Smellie, Montreal, to whom the said teas had been consigned by M'Gregor, Buchan & Co. for sale on their account, the defender had obtained transference and delivery of the said teas at a time when he was a creditor of the firm of M'Gregor, Buchan & Co., which was rendered not our brankrupt upon 12th April 1867; that said transference and delivery bad been made for the defender's farther satisfaction and security, in preference to the other creditors of the said firm, and bad been fraudulently taken by the defender in the knowledge of the firm's insolvency; and were therefore null and void in terms of the Act 1696, c. 5.

The pursuer stated, “that on or about the 2d day of March 1867, the said M'Gregor, Buchan & Co. bought from defender forty-six half-chests Hyson tea, ex ‘Onsuri,’ containing 2352 lbs., at 1s. 5 1 2d. per lb., or at a slump price of £171, 10s., as per invoice. The tea was at the date of sale in London, and the conditions of the sale were, that it should be delivered free on board at Liverpool for Montreal, and that the price should be payable in four months thereafter; that shortly after the

Page: 352

date of the said purchase, the said defender, as agreed on at the time of sale, forwarded the tea from London to Liverpool, and on or about the 13tlr March 1867 delivered the said tea, by order and on account of. the said M'Gregor, Buchan & Co., on board of the ship or vessel ‘Nestorian,’ then about to sail from Liverpool to Portland, United States of America; and by the directions of the said M'Gregor, Buchan & Co. he took bills of lading from the master of the said ship or vessel in favour of James Smellie, commission-merchant in Montreal, to whom M'Gregor, Buchan & Co. meant to send the tea, to be disposed of on their account. The defender sent the bills of lading so made out to the said M'Gregor, Buchan & Co., and they forwarded them to Smellie for the purpose of enabling him to receive and dispose of the tea on their account upon its arrival. The tea went to Montreal in the said vessel, which sailed from Liverpool on the 14th March 1867. The ‘Nestorian’ arrived at Portland on 25th March 1867, and on or about that date the tea was forwarded by the shipmaster or ship's agents at Portland by railway to Montreal, where it was received by the said James Smellie, and entered in bond by him in his own name on 9th April 1867. That soon after the said sale the said M'Gregor, Buchan & Co. unexpectedly found themselves obliged to suspend payments; and the defender, on calling at their office to ask them for a bill he had drawn on them at four months for the price of the tea, was informed by them that they had been obliged to suspend payment. Upon learning this the defender, on or about the 22d March 1867, wrote to Allan Brothers & Co., Liverpool, the agents of the ‘Nestorian,’ desiring them to request their agents at Portland to detain the tea, or to prevent it getting into Smellie's hands. He added, that if necessary he would instruct them to telegraph on his account on Monday. On the 25th he wrote them again, stating that he did not think he need be at the expense of a telegram, adding, ‘I am getting the senders here to give me an order on Smellie for them (the chests of tea);’ and on 28th March he again wrote Messrs Allan Brothers & Co. that since writing them last he had succeeded in getting from Messrs M'Gregor, Buchan & Co. an order on Smellie, Montreal, for the forty-six half-chests tea; so ‘as this puts all right,’ he requests them to undo the order previously sent as to holding them at Portland. In point of fact, the defender, on or about the said 28th March 1867, induced the said M'Gregor, Buchan & Co., or rather the said Peter Comrie M'Gregor, to grant, and the said Peter Comrie M'Gregor did accordingly, on or about the said date, grant and deliver to the defender, an order signed by him in the firm's name, and addressed to the said James Smellie, Montreal, desiring Smellie to deliver the said forty-six half-chests of tea to the defender. This order was given and received with the intention that the tea should be received by the defender in acquittal and satisfaction or in security of his claim against the firm for the price of the tea.”

That the tea having been received by Smellie before the delivery order had been given to the defender, or at any rate before any intimation of it had been made to Smellie, was upon presentation of the said delivery order, upon 6th May 1867, removed from bond, and delivered over to the defender or some one on his behalf, and disposed of on his account. That M'Gregor, Buchan & Co were rendered not our bankrupt upon 12th April 1867. That they were insolvent at the time the said delivery order was granted to the defender. That he was aware of this, and fraudulently obtained said order, and got back the tea in payment and satisfaction of the price thereof due by M'Gregor, Buchan & Co. to him, and in farther security of the same, to the prejudice of the other creditors.

The pursuer pleaded, inter alia,—“The said delivery-order having been granted by M'Gregor, Buchan, & Company, or by the said Peter Comrie M'Gregor, to the defender, then a creditor of the firm, and the tea having been transferred and delivered by them or the said Peter Comrie M'Gregor to defender, directly or indirectly, for his satisfaction or further security, in preference to the other creditors of the said firm, at or after their becoming bankrupt, or in the space of sixty days before the date of their bankruptcy, the said delivery-order and the said transference and delivery of the tea were illegal and null and void, in terms of the Act 1696, c. 5; and the pursuer is entitled to re-delivery of the tea, or to payment of the value thereof, as concluded for. Farther (1) The defender has stated no relevant case of stoppage in transitu. (2) The defender's attempt to stop was too late. (8) The competency of stoppage by the vendor, and rejection by the vendee, depend on the same principles, and are exerciseable only within the same limits; and as the defender was too late to stop, the insolvents were too late to reject. (9) The sale was so far completed by delivery, and the property so vested in the vendees, that the seller had no longer right to stop, and the insolvents had no more power to give the seller security or satisfaction or other benefit from these goods than from any other in their possession.”

The defender pleaded—“(2) It having been a condition of the sale of the tea by the defender to M'Gregor, Buchan, & Company that the defender should receive an accepted bill of exchange by the vendees in return for the bill of lading for the tea, and the vendees having failed to perform this condition, the contract of sale was never completed. (3) The vendees being in insolvent circumstances at the date of the intended sale, or at all events at the date of the transmission to them of the bill of lading, and being aware of their inability to pay the price of the tea, they were justified in granting, before actual bankruptcy, the order in the defender's favour referred to in the proceedings.”

In support of these pleas, while admitting most of the facts stated above, the defender alleged that the condition of the sale of tea on March 2d, with respect to payment, was that the price was to be paid by bill at four months' date, in exchange for the bill of lading; that the defender sent the bill of lading to M'Gregor, Buchan, & Co., accompanied by a bill of exchange, payable at four months' date, for the price, and a letter, in which he requested that the bill of exchange should be returned to him accepted “in course,” meaning thereby in course of that day; that, not having received back the bill of exchange accepted in due course, he called next day, and repeatedly for several days afterwards at the office of Messrs M'Gregor, Buchan, & Co., but did not succeed in finding either of the partners there; that, becoming doubtful of M'Gregor, Buchan, & Co.'s circumstances, he wrote on 22d March to the agents of the ship ‘Nestorian,’ stopping delivery of the tea in transitu; that, on or about 24th March, he met Mr M'Gregor, the senior partner of the firm of

Page: 353

M'Gregor, Buchan, & Co., for the first time after the tea was shipped, and Mr M'Gregor then stated that he had sent the bill of lading to Smellie, but that, as his firm had suspended payments, he did not consider himself justified in accepting the bill of exchange or in claiming the tea. He gave to the defender an order upon the consignee for the delivery of the tea, and lie returned the bill of exchange unaccepted, stating at the same time that he had not considered the transaction concluded. When the defender received the order on Smellie as above-mentioned, the tea was still in transitu. The order was transmitted to Montreal on or about the 28th day of March, and was intimated to Smellie early in April; and the tea, which had in the interval been landed by Smellie, was there-upon delivered to the defender.

The Sheriff-Substitute ( Galbraith) found for the pursuer, and the Sheriff ( Glassford Bell), upon appeal, adhered to his Substitute's interlocutor, and found in point of law—“(1) That the Sheriff-Substitute has correctly held that there are no sufficient grounds for believing that, as regards the purchase of teas on 2d March, fraus dedit causam contractus, or that the vendees knew themselves to be in such circumstances that they would be unable to pay the price, it being, on the contrary, shown that they were at said date carrying on their business as usual, that they believed themselves to be solvent, and that they met their liabilities on that and one or two subsequent days; (2) That it is not proved that the acceptance of a bill of exchange for the price was a condition suspensive of the sale, it being not even satisfactorily established that anything was said about a bill at all, or that the terms were other than four months' credit; but even if it was understood that an acceptance was to be given, there is no evidence that this was to be done unico contextu with delivery of the bills of lading, and as a condition of receiving them, for all the defender himself depones on the subject is, that ‘the tea was sold at four months' bill from date,’ and it is proved that in a previous transaction he had with the same vendees they did not grant their acceptance till ‘a few days after the bill of lading was got;’ (3) That the power of rejecting the goods, or of giving an order for their re-delivery to the vendor, could not exist after the goods ceased to be in transitu; and (4) That the transitus was at an end as soon as the teas were shipped at Liverpool in the vendees' name, and bills of lading taken for them as shipped, which bills of lading were handed over to and accepted by them, the teas being then entirely under the control of the vendees, to whom they had been constructively delivered, and by whom they were forwarded to the Canadian market, with a view to their disposal there for their behoof.”

Against this interlocutor the defender appealed to the Court of Session.

Hall for him.

J. M'Laren for the (respondent) pursuer.

At advising—

Judgment:

Lord President—There were only two pleas in this case maintained by the defender. The first founded upon an alleged condition said to have been attached to the contract. The second, upon an alleged rejection of the goods by the purchasers at a time when they were in a position to reject. These defences are stated in an action in which the trustee for the purchasers' creditors is the pursuer, with the concurrence of the said creditors. Now, with regard to the first of these defences, I think that there is no foundation for it whatever in point of fact. In one sense of the word every sale is conditional—conditional, namely, on the payment of the price. The seller undertakes to deliver on condition of receiving payment. The buyer undertakes to pay on condition of receiving delivery. Delivery and payment are the two counter obligations, and it does not matter that a stipulation is introduced to the effect that the price is to be paid, or delivery given in any particular way. But the fact that these are the conditions of the contract of sale in no way suspends its operation. If it is intended to render the contract conditional, to the effect of introducing a suspensive condition, it is perfectly easy to do it in writing, though very difficult to effect in a verbal agreement. But no such condition was ever intended to be introduced here. The transaction was simply the sale of a certain quantity of tea by Wright to M'Gregor, Buchan, & Co., upon four months' credit, (which we may take as the usual credit in such cases), and according to the practice of merchants, a bill was expected to be granted by the one party, and would have been granted by the other, as is always done in all cases of sales on credit, had not circumstances intervened. But this was no condition suspensive of the sale, and it clearly appears from the evidence that it never was intended to be so.

The defender's second plea is also bad for another reason, namely, that the goods at the time of redelivery to the defender not only were in the possession and under the control of the vendees, but had been so since they were shipped at Liverpool, and therefore they were not in a position to reject either at the time of signing the delivery order or at the time of actual delivery. In order to enable a vendee to reject in such circumstances as the present, it is necessary that he have not taken possession. We had lately an excellent illustration of that principle in the case of Milne v. Booker & Co. (December 20, 1870, vide supra, p. 239), where rejection was held to have taken place. Now, how does the matter stand here. The goods were sold upon March 2d. At that time the vendees were in a position to enter into a valid contract such as this. They were not at that time at all aware of their approaching insolvency. Even the first meeting of their creditors was not decisive of their bankruptcy. They thought, and apparently reasonably thought, that they had resources which would carry them over their difficulties. The object of the sale was that the teas purchased should be sent to Montreal, and disposed of there by the purchasers' agents for their behoof; and the teas lying at the time in London. Wright the defender undertook to ship them in such a way that they should go straight to the purchasers' agent in Montreal without coming actually into the purchasers' own hands at all. The teas were accordingly shipped at Liverpool—the bill of lading was taken in the name of the purchasers, and sent to them at Glasgow by the defender. Now, the bill of lading might have been taken in such a way as to have shown that the defender was the shipper, and in that case it would have been necessary for him to indorse it to the purchasers in order to their getting possession of the goods. If this had been done there is no doubt that stoppage in transitu might have been effected. But it was not done, and we may presume that it was not intended by the parties that it should be done. The goods, then, being shipped

Page: 354

for M'Gregor, Buchan, & Co., and consigned to their agents, and the bill of lading being taken in their name, Mr Wright has no standing upon the bill of lading at all. He had no right to it or under it, unless he acquired it subsequently for value. Then Wright having taken the bill of lading in the purchasers' names, sent it to them, and they received it in fulfilment of the contract of sale. From that point delivery was complete. The goods were at sea passing from the vendees to their agents at Montreal, and not awaiting delivery. The bill of lading was the title to the property of the goods in the hands of M'Gregor, Buchan, & Co. until they transferred it to the defender. When, then, did the redelivery alleged take place? The goods arrived in port, and ultimately arrived and were taken possession of by the purchasers' agent at Montreal. It was not till after that that the delivery order came out, and delivery was made to the defender or some one on his behalf. That proceeding is justified on the ground that there was in the granting of the delivery order rejection on the part of the purchaser. But rejection must take place before delivery in order to its having any effect here. Now, not only has delivery been given in this case, hut it was so in this country before the goods sailed. I think, therefore, that both the defender's pleas are bad, and that the Sheriff has disposed very satisfactorily of the case.

The other Judges concurred.

Appeal dismissed.

Solicitors: Agents for the Appellant— Maconochie & Hare, W.S.

Agent for the Respondent— A. R. Morison, S.S.C.

1871


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