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Scottish Court of Session Decisions


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Harvey v. Dyce [1876] ScotLR 14_178 (23 December 1876)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1876/14SLR0178.html
Cite as: [1876] ScotLR 14_178, [1876] SLR 14_178

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SCOTTISH_SLR_Court_of_Session

Page: 178

Court of Session Inner House First Division.

[Sheriff of Lanarkshire.

Saturday, December 23.

14 SLR 178

Harvey

v.

Dyce.

Subject_1Jurisdiction
Subject_2Slander
Subject_3Privilege
Subject_4Damages — Judge — Sheriff.
Facts:

Held that a Judge has absolute protection for words spoken by him in his judicial capacity against an action for damages.

Observed ( per Lord President) that no Judge is irresponsible, but no Judge is responsible in an action of damages.

Headnote:

John Harvey, writer in Lanark, and procurator in the Sheriff Court there, raised this action against the Sheriff-Substitute of Lanarkshire, residing in Lanark, concluding for £1000 of damages and solatium due to him in consequence of the defender having slandered him while debating a case in the Sheriff Court. The expressions complained of were “that the pursuer was an insane man,” and “that he was a juggler,” and further, “that he was a liar.”

The defender admitted that on the occasion referred to he had occasion to observe on the manner in which the pursuer was conducting the debate before him; but pleaded—“(1) The action is incompetent in the Sheriff Court of Lanarkshire, or any other inferior Court. (2) There being no case stated by the pursuer relevant to infer that the defender acted in the matter complained of extrajudicially, beyond his powers or competency as a Judge, the action is not maintainable to any effect. (3) The defender, having in the matter complained of acted regularly in the exercise of his judicial functions, in good faith and with probable cause, and the contrary not being relevantly or competently averred, the action is untenable. (4) Generally, the action being raised against a judicial functionary in respect of matter occurring in the course of his judicial functions, and for alleged damage said in consequence to arise, is an incompetent action, and the statements thereof are not relevant to infer the conclusions.”

The Sheriff of the county remitted the case to another of his Substitutes ( Galbraith) who sustained the 1st, 2d, and 3d pleas, and assoilzied the defender. In a note annexed to his judgment he assigned as his ground of judgment the incompetency of dealing with an action such as the present in the Sheriff Court. On the general ground of incompetency he gave no opinion.

The Sheriff ( Dickson) adhered, but added the following note:—

“Note—The Sheriff-Substitute bases his judgment on the ground of his not having jurisdiction to entertain the action, supposing (for the sake of argument) that it were competent in another Court. The Sheriff is not prepared to adopt this view, for which, so far as he knows, there is no authority. He prefers to reserve his opinion upon it as involving a question of difficulty which it is not necessary to decide, seeing that he has no doubt that, upon the authorities quoted by the Sheriff-Substitute, as well as upon principle, the action is incompetent either in this Court or in any other Court.”

The pursuer reclaimed, and argued—The case of Haggart's Trustees v. Lord President Hope, quoted against him, had no application to an inferior Judge. If the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to entertain this action, what remedy was there? Besides, although a Judge might be protected by his judicial functions to a certain extent, in using the language alleged he ipso facto laid down his judicial position and its privileges.

The defender argued—This case is altogether incompetent. The law is, that a Judge on the judgment-seat has an absolute immunity against actions of damages.

Authorities— Haggart's Trs., June 1, 1821, 1 S. 46, and H. of L. 2 Shaws Appeals 125; Hamilton v. Anderson, June 18, 1858, 3 Macq. 363; Scott v. Stansfield, 3 Law Reports (Exchequer) 220 (CB. Kelly's opinion).

At advising—

Judgment:

Lord President—I am of opinion that this action is not maintainable. The allegation of the pursuer is that on the 4th of April the defender, “while he was sitting in judgment as Sheriff-Substitute in the Court at Lanark, and hearing the pursuer in a debate on an action at his instance against James Lindsay, missionary, Lanark, and before and in presence of William B. Allan, Sheriff—Clerk-Depute,” and various other persons, did slander the pursuer. It has been settled by a series of judgments both in this country and in England that against an action so laid the privilege of a Judge is absolute. No Judge is irresponsible;

Page: 179

but no Judge is responsible in an action of damages. I entirely concur in the opinion of the present Chief-Baron that has been quoted to us. It is, I think, a very sound and a very sensible opinion.

I apprehend that the plea that must be sustained here is the fourth. The other pleas may be of more doubtful relevancy.

Lord Deas—I agree with your Lordship, and I also think that the proper course is to sustain the defender's fourth plea. The first plea might raise a very important and a very difficult question. It certainly seems to me that it would be anomalous if there could be an action of damages brought before one inferior Judge for what was said or done before another, particularly when the one is a Substitute appointed by the other. But before that question can be raised your Lordships will have to hold that this action is competent in the Supreme Court; but if, as I think, it is incompetent here, it is certainly incompetent before the Sheriff.

Lord Mure—I agree with your Lordships. The fourth plea-in-law should be sustained, as it seems to meet the facts of the case most fully.

I think the Sheriff exercised a wise discretion in not dealing with this case.

Lord Shand—I am of opinion that on grounds of public policy a Judge must have absolute protection for words spoken in the course of judicial proceeding. Now, the case here raises that point. The pursuer was speaking in a cause before the defender, sitting in judgment as Sheriff-Substitute in the Court at Lanark, when these words were used. I therefore agree with your Lordships that the fourth plea for the defender must be sustained.

The Court pronounced the following interlocutor:—

“Recal the interlocutors of the Sheriff-Substitute and the Sheriff, dated respectively the 20th May and 13th June 1876: Sustain the fourth plea-in-law stated for the defender: Assoilzie the defender from the conclusions of the summons, and decern: Find the pursuer (appellant) liable in expenses in the Inferior Court and this Court; allow accounts thereof to be given in, and remit the same when lodged to the Auditor to tax and report.”

Counsel:

Counsel and Agent for Pursuer— Party.

Counsel for Defender— Balfour—Mackintosh. Agents— J. W. & J. Mackenzie, W.S.

1876


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URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1876/14SLR0178.html