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Scottish Court of Session Decisions


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Louson's Trustees v. Dicksons [1886] ScotLR 23_722 (19 June 1886)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1886/23SLR0722.html
Cite as: [1886] SLR 23_722, [1886] ScotLR 23_722

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SCOTTISH_SLR_Court_of_Session

Page: 722

Court of Session Inner House Second Division.

Saturday, June 19. 1886.

23 SLR 722

Louson's Trustees

v.

Dicksons.

Subject_1Husband and Wife
Subject_2Succession
Subject_3Exclusion of Jus mariti
Subject_4Payment.
Facts:

A truster directed his trustees to invest one-half of the residue of his estate for behoof of one of his daughters, who was at the date of his will married and aged twenty, in liferent only, and her children in fee, exclusive of the jus mariti of her present or of any future husband. After she had reached the age of sixty she and her husband and whole surviving children called upon the trustees to pay over her share of residue. The Court ( dub. Lord Craighill) authorised payment.

Headnote:

David Louson of Springfield, town-clerk of Arbroath, died on 11th December 1858, survived by two children, Mary Ann Louson and Mary Duncan Louson. He left a trust-disposition and settlement executed shortly after the marriage of his daughter Mary Duncan in 1844, as after stated, in the fifth purpose of which he directed his trustees to invest on good security a sum of £1000 for behoof of his daughter Mary Duncan, and for which he had become bound in his marriage contract—“Taking the rights and securities therefor payable to themselves, in trust for behoof of the said Mary Duncan Louson in liferent, but for her liferent use allenarly, and to the child or children to be lawfully procreated of her body, equally among such children, if more than one, share and share alike, in fee, but failing of such child or children lawfully to be procreated of her body, then to her own heirs or assignees whomsover; but under this express condition and declaration, that the interest or annual produce of the said sum of £4000 so to be invested as aforesaid shall be payable to herself, the said Mary Duncan Louson alone, exclusive of the jus mariti of her present or any future husband: and that no part of the said sum of £4000, nor the interest nor annual produce thereof, shall on any account be affectable by the debts or deeds, legal or voluntary, of the present husband or of any future husband of the said Mary Duncan Louson, nor by the diligence of his creditors, his right of administration in respect of the said sum of £4000, and the interest or produce thereof, being hereby expressly excluded and debarred.” By the eighth purpose he directed them—“If any balance or residue of my means and estate, after being realised, shall remain after the sums above mentioned are invested, then I hereby order and direct such balance or residue to be invested for behoof of my said daughters, equally in liferent, and their children in fee, exclusive of their husbands’ jus mariti, in the terms and under the conditions particularly above expressed.”

Mary Ann Louson married a Mr Macdougall, and died on 3d June 1885. Mary Duncan Louson married James Anderson Dickson on 24th December 1844. At the date of this Special Case she was over sixty years of age, and her surviving children, one daughter and four sons, were all over twenty-one years of age, the only other children having died unmarried and intestate.

Mr and Mrs Dickson and their children maintained that they were entitled, as being the whole parties interested therein, to immediate payment of the one-half of the residue of the means and estate of the deceased David Louson provided to Mrs Dickson and her children in liferent and fee respectively, in terms of the testamentary writings, and they called on the trustees to pay over the amount to them (other than Mr Dickson), or to their nominees. The trustees maintained that they were bound to retain the amount until the death of Mrs Dickson.

In order to settle that question this Special Case was presented to the Court by the trustees of the first part, and by Mr and Mrs Anderson Dickson and their whole surviving children of the second part.

The question for the opinion of the Court was—“Are the parties of the first part bound, upon the demand of the parties of the second part, forthwith to pay over the said half of residue to the parties of the second part, or to their nominees?”

Argued for first parties—The truster had most carefully provided that his daughter's share of residue should be exclusive of the jus mariti of any husband she might marry. Mrs Dickson was only sixty years old. Her husband might die, and if she married again then the exclusion of her husband's jus mariti would have to be given effect. The truster evidently had this contingency in view. The following authorities— Kippen v. Kippen's Trs., Nov. 24, 1871, 10 Macph. 134; Bow v. Kilgour's Trs., Jan. 31, 1877, 4 R. 403; M-Lean's Trs. v. M'Lean, Feb. 23, 1878, 5 R. 679—were no doubt cases in which a wife in similar circumstances, as being the only person interested in the fund, had been held entitled to get it. But the principle had never been carried further than the case of a marriage-contract. They must then retain the fund till Mrs Dickson's death. Reference was also made to Martin v. Bannatyne, &c., March 8, 1861, 23 D. 705; Massey v. Scott's Trs., Dec. 5, 1872, 11 Macph. 173; Allan's Trs. v. Allan and Others, Dec. 12, 1872, 11 Macph. 216.

Argued for second parties—-They were entitled to get the funds now, inasmuch as they were the only persons interested. The contingency of Mr Dickson dying and Mrs Dickson marrying again at the age of sixty was farfetched. The Court would not sanction what was only protracting the operation of the trust without good ground, and against the beneficiary's wish. In Menzies v. Murray, March 5, 1875, 2 R. 507, the case was on all fours with this, except that there the Court dealt with a marriage-contract and not a trust-deed— Anderson v. Buchanan, June 2, 1837, 45 S. 1073; Hope, &c., March 15, 1870. 8 Macph. 699; Smith and Campbell, May 30, 1873, 11 Macph. 639; White's Trs. v. Whyte, June 1, 1877, 4 R. 786—were also referred to.

Judgment:

At advising—

Lord Young—I have no difficulty here. When I read the case I came to the conclusion that it was one in which the trustees had no doubt of the propriety of paying this money if they legally could. I have no doubt whatever of the propriety, and none of the law.

Lord Craighill—But for authority I should have come to a different conclusion. I think that when regard is had to the wishes of the testator, there can be no doubt that he intended that income which he left to his daughter Mary, afterwards Mrs Dickson, should in no case be paid to anyone but herself—it was expressly to be payable exclusive of the jus mariti of her present or any future husband. I do not think that this is a case in which anyone will suffer any hardship by the estate not being dealt with differently from what the testator directs. If I had been quite satisfied that a literal compliance with these directions would result in the trust being kept up for a number of years, perhaps for no purpose whatever, and that the testator himself would have made a different arrangement if he had been alive or had contemplated the present position of affairs, then what the second parties here propose might have been sanctioned. But it appears to me that there is still a purpose for which this trust should be kept up. The testator's daughter, Mrs Dickson, is married, but her husband may predecease her and she may marry again, and this, I think, was obviously one of the things which the testator had in view. On this ground accordingly, had it not been for authority, I should not have been a consenting party to that which is here proposed. A distinction—the grounds of which I myself have not been able clearly to discover—has apparently been drawn on this question between testamentary deeds and marriage-contracts. But in respect of these cases, and solely out of respect to them, I concur in the judgment which I understand your Lordships are to pronounce.

Lord Rutherfurd Clark—I concur with Lord Young. I think the case very clear in point of propriety, and quite concluded by authority.

Lord Justice-Clerk—I entirely concur with the majority of your Lordships. It appears to me impossible to say that the testator who made his settlement in 1844, when his daughter was only twenty, should have had in his mind the state of affairs which actually exists, now that his daughter has reached the age of sixty. I am clear that we should answer the question put to us in this case in the affirmative.

The Court answered the question in the affirmative.

Counsel:

Counsel for First Parties— Dickson. Agents— Webster, Will, & Ritchie, S.S.C.

Counsel for Second Parties— Gardner. Agents— Melville & Lindesay, W.S.

1886


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