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Scottish Court of Session Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Jardine v. The Stonefield Laundry Co. and Another [1887] ScotLR 24_599 (24 June 1887) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1887/24SLR0599.html Cite as: [1887] ScotLR 24_599, [1887] SLR 24_599 |
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Page: 599↓
[Sheriff-Substitute, Paisley.
A person alighted from a tramway-car when it stopped, upon the left side, and in crossing to the pavement, was knocked down by a van which was passing the car on that side. In an action of damages against the owners of the van on the ground that the van had been carelessly driven, and that the driver had infringed the rule of the road, the defenders were assoilzied.
Per the Lord President—That it is the duty of the driver of a vehicle to pass a tramway—car upon the left side, and that the old rule of the road has been altered in this case.
This was an action in the Sheriff Court of Lanarkshire at the instance of George F. Jardine, tailor, Cathcart Street, Glasgow, against the Stonefield Laundry Company and William Phillips for damages for personal injuries.
The facts of the case were that on 1st September 1886 the pursuer travelled in a tramway-car from Nelson Street to Kinning Park; that at the corner of Kinning Place and Paisley Road the car stopped to let passengers alight; that he stepped off on the left side (the one nearest the pavement, and the only one available, the other side being railed off); that he walked one or two steps from the car towards the pavement, when be was knocked down by a horse driven in a van belonging to the defenders, which was passing the car on the left side.
The pursuer averred that there was negligence on the part of the driver, and also that by passing on the left-hand side he had infringed the rule of the road.
On 17th December 1886 the Sheriff-Substitute ( Cowan) found that the pursuer had failed to prove that the injuries he had sustained were occasioned by the fault of the defenders' servant, and that the defenders were therefore entitled to absolvitor.
“ Note.—In the opinion of the Sheriff-Substitute the evidence establishes that on the day in question the defenders' van was overtaking the tram-car, and was about to pass it, when the latter pulled up to stop. Immediately the vanman pulled up, but being close behind the tram-car his horse passed the end of the car, and the pursuer, who in stepping off the car had not looked behind to see that the way was clear, was knocked down and injured. Fault on the part of the van-man there was none. He was on the proper side of the road, he was within his rights when he sought to pass the tram-car, and he did what he was bound to do—pulled up to stop when the tram-car stopped. What more could he be asked to do? The slightest and most ordinary care on the part of the unfortunate pursuer would have saved him from what happened.”
The pursuer appealed to the Court of Session, and argued that there was fault on the part of the driver.
Counsel for the respondents was not called on.
At advising—
The pursuer was travelling in a tram-car, and on leaving he had descended and taken two steps in the direction of the pavement when he was struck by the shaft of the defenders' van, which was being driven in the same direction.
The striking features of the case are to be found in two passages of the pursuer's evidence. There he says—“I had made three steps towards the pavement when I was knocked down by the right shaft of a van proceeding in the same direction as the tramway-car. I had no idea of its coming, and first became aware of the van being there by being knocked down and again—“I cannot say whether the way was clear behind the car, as I did not look before stepping off. I fell between the van and the tramway.” Now, I take it to be perfectly clear that the duty of anyone using a car, and about to step off, is
Page: 600↓
That being the state of the facts, there can be no doubt that the fault was entirely with the appellant, who has no one to blame for this unfortunate accident but himself.
The Court refused the appeal.
Counsel for the Appellant— Glegg. Agent— A. Sutherland, W.S.
Counsel for the Respondents— James Reid. Agents— Mill & Bonnar, W.S.