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Scottish Court of Session Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Mackenzie v. Ewart and Others [1891] ScotLR 28_718 (13 June 1891) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1891/28SLR0718.html Cite as: [1891] SLR 28_718, [1891] ScotLR 28_718 |
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The Bankruptcy and Cessio (Scotland) Act 1881 provides by section 9 that “If the debtor fail to appear in obedience to the citation under a process of cessio bonorum at any meeting to which he has been cited, and if the sheriff shall be satisfied that such failure is wilful, he may in the debtor's absence pronounce decree of cessio bonorum.”
Held ( aff. Lord Kincairney) that citation anew of a debtor to an adjourned diet, where the adjournment had been made on the motion of his agent, was unnecessary.
Held ( rev. Lord Kincairney— diss. Lord Trayner) that a decree of cessio pronounced in absence fell to be reduced where the Sheriff in his interlocutor had given as his ground for granting such decree that the debtor had failed to satisfy him that his absence was not wilful.
Question—Whether it is necessary for the Sheriff to state in his interlocutor pronouncing decree of cessio in absence that he is satisfied the debtor's absence is wilful.
Upon 18th March 1890 the Sheriff-Substitute ( Mackenzie) at Dornoch pronounced the first deliverance upon a petition for cessio at the instance of William Ewart, butcher, Alness, and Alexander John Dallas, solicitor, Tain, against James Mackenzie, farmer, Walkerdale, Rosehall, and appointed 15th April for the public examination of the bankrupt.
On 15th April, upon the application of the debtor's agent, the proceedings were adjourned to 6th May. The debtor received no fresh citation, and failed to appear upon that date. His agent, however, was present, and explained to the Sheriff-Substitute the cause of his absence.
Thereupon the Sheriff-Substitute pronounced the following interlocutor:—“Having heard parties' procurators in respect the debtor has failed to appear at this diet for examination as ordered by last interlocutor, and has not taken means to satisfy the Sheriff-Substitute that his absence was not wilful, Decerns the debtor James Mackenzie … to execute a disposition omnium bonorum to and in favour of Robert Munro, writer, Tain, who is hereby appointed trustee for behoof of the creditors of the said debtor.” …
The Bankruptcy and Cessio (Scotland) Act 1881 (44 and 45 Vict. c. 22), provides by section 9 that “If the debtor fail to appear in obedience to the citation under a process of cessio bonorum at any meeting to which he has been cited, and if the Sheriff shall be satisfied that such failure is wilful, he may in the debtor's absence pronounce decree of cessio bonorum.”
In December 1890 James Mackenzie brought an action in the Court of Session against William Ewart, A. J. Dallas, and Robert Munro for reduction of the said decree of cessio, and for damages against the first two defenders for applying for and obtaining said decree. He made certain averments intended to show that Dallas had throughout acted towards him in a malicious, oppressive, and nimious manner; that he was solvent at the date of the decree; and that in consequence of the decree having been pronounced he had suffered greatly in health and position.
He pleaded, inter alia—“(1) The decree of cessio is illegal, unwarrantable, and invalid, and ought to be reduced, in respect… (c) that the pursuer was not notour bankrupt, or wilfully absent from the diet of 6th May in the sense of the Cessio Acts. … (3) The defenders having, jointly and severally or severally, by the malicious, wrongful, and oppressive proceedings complained of, injured the pursuer in his feelings, health, and estate, repute and credit, in the manner condescended on, are liable to him in damages and solatium as concluded for.”
On 24th February 1891 the Lord Ordinary ( Kincairney) found the pursuer's averments irrelevant to infer the conclusions of the summons, and assoilzied the defenders.
“ Opinion.—… . The decree of cessio was challenged because it was pronounced in the pursuer's absence at a diet to which he was not cited. There is no provision in the Debtors. Act 1880 as to granting decree of cessio in absence of the debtor, and the power of the Sheriff to do so seems to depend on section 9 of the Cessio Act 1881, which provides that ‘If the debtor fail to appear in obedience to the citation under a process of cessio bonorum at any meeting to which he has been cited, and if the Sheriff shall be satisfied that such failure is wilful, he may in the debtor's absence pronounce decree of cessio bonorum.’
In Reid v. Somerville & Company, June 6, 1889, 16 R. 751, a decree of cessio pronounced at an adjourned diet was reduced on the ground that the debtor had not been cited to that diet. That case would have been in point, and conclusive in the pursuer's favour, but for one distinction which seems vital. In that case the diet was continued on the crave of the petitioner, the adjourned diet was not intimated to the debtor, and he was not present or represented at it. In this case the pursuer avers that the diet was adjourned on the motion of his own agent, who attended at the adjourned diet. It is not pretended that the pursuer did not know of the adjourned diet. In these circumstances I cannot hold the case of Reid applicable, or the want of citation to this adjourned diet fatal.
It was objected that the decree of
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cessio was disconform to the requirements of the statute. The statute authorises a decree in absence when the Sheriff is satisfied that the debtor's absence is wilful. In this case the Sheriff did not find this expressly, but found in effect that he was not satisfied that the debtor's absence was not wilful. It was represented that this clumsy use of the double negative expressed only that the Sheriff was not satisfied either way, and did not know whether the absence was wilful or not. If it were necessary to adopt that construction, the decreet would be bad. The interlocutor is very strangely and unfortunately expressed, but I construe it as meaning that he was satisfied that the pursuer's absence from the meeting, which had been fixed on the motion of his own agent, was wilful, because not satisfactorily explained, and that the Sheriff-Substitute was therefore in a position to pronounce decree. Whether his opinion that the absence was wilful was well founded or the reverse, I cannot consider. I must accept the interlocutor as correct. On the whole, although the interlocutor is open to obvious criticism, I do not think that the decree is reducible on the ground of the irregularity of the proceedings.” …. At advising—
Another question was raised whether the Sheriff is required to state in his interlocutor granting decree in absence that he is satisfied that the absence of the debtor is wilful. Upon that question I give no definite opinion at all. It is not necessary in this case to consider that question at all, because the Sheriff has in fact stated in his interlocutor his reasons for pronouncing decree in absence. That interlocutor is now be fore us, and we must take his deliverance as we find it. The difficulty here is that he has not found in express terms that the debtor's absence was wilful, but only that he “has not taken means to satisfy the Sheriff-Substitute that his absence was not wilful.” Now, can that be taken as an expression of opinion by the Sheriff-Substitute that his absence was wilful? I am inclined to hold that it cannot. To find that a man has failed to prove that he did not do something is a totally different thing from finding that he did something. I am therefore of opinion that the decree is bad.
That brings me to the next question. Has the pursuer stated a relevant case for an action of damages? I am clearly of opinion that he has not, and that although the Lord Ordinary's judgment fails on the first ground, the action should be dismissed. The result will therefore be the same.
To sum up, whether or not the Sheriff is required in his interlocutor to state that a debtor's absence is wilful before pronouncing decree in absence, I am satisfied that where he does state his grounds for pronouncing decree, and these grounds do not necessarily imply that he was satisfied that the absence was wilful, the decree will fall to be reduced.
I agree with Lord Rutherfurd Clark in thinking that it might be advisable for the Sheriff when he is granting decree of cessio in the absence of a debtor to find in his interlocutor granting decree that the debtor's absence was wilful.
I do not think, however, that the want of such a finding by him would afford any ground for impugning the regularity of the procedure.
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The statute requires that the Sheriff-Substitute shall be satisfied that the debtor's absence is wilful, but does not require in terms that he shall say so. But if the Sheriff pronounces a decree in absence of the debtor I should hold that he had satisfied himself of what was antecedently necessary before he could pronounce decree, viz., that the debtor's absence was wilful.
The difficulty here arises not from silence on the part of the Sheriff-Substitute as to the debtor's absence being wilful, but from the fact that what is said on that subject by the Sheriff-Substitute leaves it open to doubt whether he was satisfied that the absence was wilful, or was not satisfied that it was not.
I agree with the Lord Ordinary in thinking that the interlocutor is open to criticism, but I also think with him that the fair reading of the interlocutor is that the debtor's absence was held to be wilful because he had not explained his absence so as to satisfy the Sheriff-Substitute that it was other than wilful. I should on these grounds be prepared to hold that the Sheriff's proceedings were in accordance with the statutory requirements, and that the decree of cessio should not be set aside. But assuming I am wrong on this point I concur in thinking that the pursuer has failed to set forth any relevant ground on which he can maintain the conclusion for damages.
The Court reduced the decree of cessio, but assoilzied the defenders.
Counsel for the Pursuer and Reclaimer— M'Kechnie— Crabb Watt. Agents— A. P. Purves & Aitken, W.S.
Counsel for the Defenders and Respondents— Dickson— Salvesen. Agent— Alexander Ross, S.S.C.