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Scottish Court of Session Decisions


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> County Council of Renfrew-Shire v. Binnie and Others [1895] ScotLR 33_138 (22 November 1895)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1895/33SLR0138.html
Cite as: [1895] ScotLR 33_138, [1895] SLR 33_138

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SCOTTISH_SLR_Court_of_Session

Page: 138

Court of Session Inner House First Division.

Friday, November 22 1895.

33 SLR 138

County Council of Renfrew-Shire

v.

Binnie and Others.

Subject_1Process
Subject_2Special Case
Subject_3Court of Session Act 1868, sec. 63
Subject_4Competency.
Facts:

A Special Case which discloses no true lis or controversy between the parties is incompetent.

Headnote:

This Special Case was presented by the County Council of Renfrewshire, first parties, and Robert Binnie and others, trustees for the Orphan Homes of Scotland for Destitute Children, second parties, to determine a question of assessment.

Page: 139

The Special Case stated that the second parties were, as trustees foresaid, heritably vested in certain subjects in Kilmalcolm parish, known as “The Orphan Homes of Scotland for Destitute Children.” These subjects are entered in the Valuation Roll for the current year at a cumulo rental of £1950, and, with one or two trifling exceptions, are entered in the said roll as occupied by “trustees for managers and children,” the proprietor being described as “The Orphan Homes of Scotland, per Wm. Quarrier here.” (Stat. 7) … “The whole premises and the whole contributions received, which constitute the entire income of the Homes, are exclusively devoted to the gratuitous education and maintenance of children of the poorest classes whose natural guardians have either died or have abandoned or neglected them.”

Mr Quarrier, as representing the second parties, appealed against the consolidated rates assessed on them by the County Council in respect of the ownership and occupancy of said property, and maintained that the whole of the consolidated rates should be discharged in respect that the subjects were owned and occupied solely for charitable and religious purposes. (Stat. 9)—“The Rates Appeal Committee of the County Council, before whom Mr Quarrier was heard in support of the appeal, were mot aware of any authority for giving relief from the rates unless possibly that contained in the Sunday and Ragged Schools (Exemption from Rating) Act 1869, but being desirous as far as possible to give effect to the appeal, they gave him the benefit of any doubt that might exist on the terms ‘Ragged School,’ and held it to extend not only to the subjects entered in the valuation roll under the description of ‘school,’ but to all the subjects assessed except the superintendent's house, and they accordingly discharged the occupier's rates on the whole subjects (except that house), amounting to £58, Os. 7d., and refused the appeal so far as regards the proprietor's rates, amounting to £81, 6s. 11 1 2d.” (Stat. 10)—“Mr Quarrier being dissatisfied with the decision of the Rates Appeal Committee, appealed to the County Council, and at a meeting of County Council held at Paisley on 14th March 1895 he was heard in support of his appeal.… The County Council could not accept the interpretation put upon the Act of 1869 by Mr Quarrier, and a motion was proposed that the appeal be refused, to which an amendment was proposed and carried that ‘a Special Case be submitted to the Court of Session by the Council and the appellant, in order to ascertain the extent, if any, to which the Council have power to relieve the property referred to of assessments, and that after the decision of the Court has been got, the appeal be dealt with by the Council, and relief given to that extent.’ Mr Quarrier stated that he acquiesced in this course.”

The following questions were accordingly submitted for the judgment of the Court:—“1. Have the County Council, as a rating authority, any power, statutory or otherwise, to relieve the property referred to, or any part thereof, of the whole or part of the consolidated rates levied by them? 2. If they have such power, to what extent may relief be given—(a) From the consolidated rates levied in respect of the ownership of the subjects? and ( b) From the consolidated rates levied in respect of the occupancy of the subjects?”

The Sunday and Ragged Schools (Exemption from Rating) Act 1869 (32 and 33 Vict. c. 40), section 1, enacts that “Every authority having power to impose or levy any rate upon the occupier of any building or part of a building used exclusively as a Sunday school or ragged school may exempt such building or part of a building from any rate for any purpose whatever which such authority has power to impose or levy.” Section 2 defines “Sunday school” and “ragged school.”

The Court having at the outset of the discussion raised the question of the competency of this Special Case, the second parties craved leave to amend the case by substituting the two following questions for those which, as above set forth, originally appeared in the case:—“(1) Are the subjects assessed a Sunday school and ragged school, or a Sunday school, or a ragged school, within the meaning of the Act? (2) If so, have the first parties, as a rating authority, power to relieve the said subjects or any part thereof—(a) From the consolidated rates levied in respect of the ownership of the subjects? or ( b) From the consolidated rates levied in respect of the occupancy of the subjects? ”

Argued for the second parties—This case was competent. The test of competency was that one of the parties should be entitled to declarator; and here the second parties would be entitled to declarator, the conclusions being (1) that these subjects were Sunday schools, or ragged schools, or both; (2) that the County Council had power to exempt; and (3) that the County Council must apply its mind to the question of exemption. A declarator of the meaning of a particular Act of Parliament was not incompetent, wherever the pursuer wished and had an interest to have that meaning declared— Edinburgh and Glasgow Radway Company v. Meek, November 23, 1849, 12 D. 153; Leith Police Commissioners v. Campbell, December 21, 1866, 5 Macph. 247; Hogg v. Parochial Board of Auchtermuchty, June 22, 1880, 7 R. 986.

Counsel for the first parties were not called upon.

At advising—

Judgment:

Lord President—The shape of the special case as it stands in type was such that it was announced at the outset that the parties proposed to substitute certain queries for those which are in the original case. We have before us this proposed amendment, and we have to consider whether it renders the case one which we can entertain. The first question is, “Are the subjects assessed a ragged school and a Sunday school, or a ragged school, or a

Page: 140

Sunday school within the meaning of the Act of 1869?” Now upon that query, the first question is, Who are the disputants? There are none; because, instead of dispute, there is practical agreement. The County Council have not on this question joined issue with Mr Quarrier, and they contend—and the special case defines their contention and its grounds for our consideration—nothing which is negative of the first query. On the contrary, I think the fair reading of their case is, that their desire is that that question should be affirmed. Now, it will not do for this Court, in questions of assessments, to give an answer to a query where there is no dispute, and no parties who take opposite views. Therefore I think that that question will not do. Then, as Lord Adam has pointed out, the second question is entirely dependent upon our answering the first in the affirmative. For it begins, “If so,” &c. That seems to form a short and conclusive objection to our entertaining this second query. But I must go on to observe that I do not think the parties here have arrived at any stage at which there is such a lis or controversy that the Court is entitled to step in. If the County Council had disposed of Mr Quarrier's appeal in a way adverse to him, I can understand his challenging the legality of their decision in this form, or in a declarator. If it appeared, for instance, that the County Council had refused to consider some question on which a right to exemption depended, it is not too bold to say that the remedy might have been found. But they have not done so; and for aught that appears, they might exempt Mr Quarrier.

Lord Adam—I agree with what has been said. No doubt a special case is a very valuable and quick and cheap way of getting the opinion of the Court on matters appropriate for that purpose. But it appears to me that in this case the form of a special case has been used where there is no dispute between the parties. About the first question there is no dispute. Mr Quarrier maintains that his is a ragged school. It is set forth in this case that the County Council admit that it is a ragged school. That is not a proper lis or a proper case to bring before the Court in the shape of a special case. Then look at the other question. One would naturally suppose that the County Council would be the parties who were maintaining that they had the power of exemption. It is not likely that a board of any sort would be willing to deny that they had a right to exercise a certain discretion; yet here it is Mr Quarrier who wants to insist that his opponents have it, and his opponents, as I understand, are supposed to say that they have not got it. I do not think that is a fair question. Supposing we did decide these questions, our judgment would come to nothing if the County Council chose to say, we will exercise our discretion either way.

Lord Kinnear—I am of the same opinion.

I do not say that it would not be possible to obtain a judgment upon some of the questions indicated by Mr Clyde in the course of his argument as being those questions upon which the judgment of the Court is desired, and I do not say that it would be impossible to obtain those judgments in the form of a special case. But I agree with your Lordships that this case cannot be entertained because it discloses no controversy between the parties. Neither in its form nor in its substance does it appear to me to raise any question on which the parties are opposed. The proper mode of stating a special case is, to set out in the first place an articulate statement of the facts on which the parties are agreed, and then to set out, as clearly and articulately, the opposing pleas of the parties. Here we have no opposing contentions. We may gather that different views of the statute may be maintained, but we have no statement of opposing pleas by the parties to the case. I therefore agree with your Lordships that this case as it now stands cannot be entertained.

Lord M'Laren was absent.

The Court refused the motion of the second parties for leave to amend, and dismissed the special case

Counsel:

Counsel for First Parties— Dundas— R. Monteith Smith— R. S. Brown. Agent— F. J. Martin, W.S.

Counsel for Second Parties— Balfour, Q.C.— Clyde. Agents— Dove, Lockhart, & Smart, S.S.C.

1895


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URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1895/33SLR0138.html