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Scottish Court of Session Decisions


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Paterson v. Kidd and Another [1896] ScotLR 33_568 (21 May 1896)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1896/33SLR0568.html
Cite as: [1896] ScotLR 33_568, [1896] SLR 33_568

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SCOTTISH_SLR_Court_of_Session

Page: 568

Court of Session Inner House First Division.

[Sheriff of the Lothians and Peebles.

Thursday, May 21 1896.

33 SLR 568

Paterson

v.

Kidd and Another.

Subject_1Process
Subject_2Appeal
Subject_3Competency
Subject_4Judicature Act (6 George IV. cap. 120), sec. 40 — Interlocutor of Sheriff Allowing Proof “of Consent.”
Facts:

In an action of damages raised in the Sheriff Court in which the defender pleaded that the pursuer's averments were irrelevant, the Sheriff “of consent before answer” allowed a proof.

An appeal by the pursuer to the Court of Session for jury trial under the Judicature Act (6 George IV. cap. 120), sec. 40, dismissed as incompetent ( dub. Lord M'Laren), in respect that the interlocutor appealed against, being pronounced “of consent, before answer, set forth a contract between the parties as to the procedure to be followed in the litigation by which both were bound.

Headnote:

Alexander S. Paterson, plumber, Musselburgh, raised an action in the Sheriff Court of the Lothians and Peebles against Alexander Kidd and John Alexander Morris Amour, trustees of the late William Kidd, sometime farmer at Pinkiehill Farm, concluding for payment of £500 as damages for injuries caused to the pursuer through the fault or negligence of the defenders.

The defenders pleaded, inter alia, that the pursuer's averments were irrelevant.

On 27th March 1896 the Sheriff-Substitute ( Hamilton) pronounced the following interlocutor:—“The Sheriff-Substitute closes the record on the petition and defences: Of consent, before answer, allows the pursuer a proof of his averments on record, and to the defenders a conjunct probation,” &c.

The pursuer appealed to the Court of Session for jury trial.

The Judicature Act (6 George IV. cap. 120), sec. 40, provides “that in all cases originating in the inferior courts in which the claim is in amount above forty pounds, as soon as an order or interlocutor allowing a proof has been pronounced in the inferior courts (unless it be an interlocutor allowing a proof to lie in retentis, or granting diligence for the recovery and production of papers), it shall be competent to either of the parties, or who may conceive that the cause ought to be tried by jury, to remove the process into the Court of Session by bill of advocation, which shall be passed at once without discussion and without caution.”

On the pursuer moving the Court to order issues, the defender opposed the motion, and argued—The appeal was incompetent in respect the interlocutor allowing a proof before answer was pronounced of consent. The pursuer and the defenders had agreed to have the facts investigated by the Sheriff before the question of relevancy was discussed, and the pursuer was not now entitled to withdraw from that contract. The pursuer was as much bound as if he himself had moved for a proof—See the Evidence Act 1866 (29 and 30 Vict. cap. 112), sec. 4; and Cadzow v. Lockhart, July 10, 1875, 2 R. 928. [ Per curiam—But how could a pursuer ever appeal a case to the Court of Session for jury trial on your showing? Is not the Sheriff's interlocutor allowing a proof necessarily pronounced on the pursuer's motion?] No; for by the Sheriff Courts Act 1876 (39 and 40 Vict. cap. 70), sec. 23, the Sheriff is directed to appoint a diet of proof on his own initiative when probation is not renounced, and “when proof seems necessary.”

Argued for pursuer—The appeal was competent. The mere fact of consenting did not bar the pursuer from claiming issues, nor in any way take the case out of the provisions of the Judicature Act.

At advising—

Judgment:

Lord President—There does not appear to be any reason why the interlocutor appealed from should not be construed according to its natural and legal import. So read, it sets forth a contract between the parties to the litigation as to the procedure to be followed. This becomes more clear when we attend to the state of the pleadings when the interlocutor was pronounced. The defenders had on record a plea to relevancy, and according to the

Page: 569

ordinary course, the Sheriff would have had first of all to hear parties on this plea and then dispose of it. From the interlocutor it appears that the parties agreed that the facts should first be ascertained by way of proof before this plea was determined. The present appeal is intended to upset this arrangement, for the pursuer now asks us to settle an issue and send the case to a jury. I do not see how the defender could be allowed to appeal (as is sometimes done under the 40th section) in order to have the action thrown out on relevancy without a breach of the arrangement that the evidence should be led before this question was determined, and both parties must be free, or neither.

I hope I have made it plain that my judgment rests on the words in the interlocutor, “of consent, before answer.” I am for dismissing the appeal.

Lord Adam—I concur.

Lord M'Laren—My first impression was that no apparent distinction could be taken between an interlocutor proceeding upon a consent and an interlocutor proceeding merely upon the motion of one of the parties. But your Lordship's opinion is clear to the effect which has been stated, and as this is merely a question of practice, I have not such confidence in my opinion as to lead me to dissent.

Lord Kinnear—I concur with your Lordship in the chair.

The Court dismissed the appeal with expenses.

Counsel:

Counsel for the Pursuer— T. B. Morison. Agent— Marcus J. Brown, S.S.C.

Counsel for the Defenders— A. S. D. Thomson. Agents— Finlay & Wilson, S.S.C.

1896


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