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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> The Wemyss Coal Co. Ltd v. Peggie [1909] ScotLR 149 (08 December 1909) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1909/47SLR0149.html Cite as: [1909] ScotLR 149, [1909] SLR 149 |
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Page: 149↓
[Sheriff Court at Cupar.
The Workmen's Compensation Act 1906, sec. 2 (1), enacts that proceedings for the recovery of compensation shall not be maintainable unless the claim for compensation has been made “within six months of the occurrence of the accident.”
A workman was injured during the course of his employment at 11·30 a.m. on 24th November 1908. No claim for compensation was made by him till 24th May 1909, when two claims were lodged on his behalf, the first at 5.30 p.m., the second at 11 p.m.
Held that the claim was timeously made.
The Workmen's Compensation Act 1906 (6 Edw. VII, cap. 58), sec. 2 (1), enacts—“Proceedings for the recovery under this Act of compensation for an injury shall not be maintainable unless notice of the accident has been given as soon as practicable after the happening thereof … and unless the claim for compensation in respect of such accident has been made within six months from the occurrence of the accident causing the injury, or in case of death, within six months from the time of death.…”
David Peggie, miner, West Wemyss, claimed compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1906 from The Wemyss Coal Company, Limited, and they being dissatisfied with an award of the Sheriff-Substitute of Fife and Kinross ( Armour), acting as arbiter under the Act, appealed by way of stated case.
The case stated—“The claimant claimed compensation from the respondents for injuries sustained by him through an accident which occurred to him while in the employment of the respondents as a pit-head worker at their Victoria Pit, East Wemyss, at 11·30 a.m. on 24th November 1908. No claim for compensation was made
Page: 150↓
by him till 24th May 1909, when two claims were lodged on his behalf, the first being dropped into the letter-box at the respondents' office after the office closed for business about 5·30 p.m., the second being handed to a porter in the respondents' employment, and when he was upon their premises, about 11 p.m. I held that the six months within which the claim must be made began at midnight on 24th November 1908 and ended at midnight on 24th May following, and that the claim was timeously lodged. I accordingly found the claimant entitled to compensation at the rate of 11s. 0 d. per week from 24th November 1908, with expenses on the higher scale.” 1 2 The question of law for the opinion of the Court is—“Was the claim timeously made within six months from the occurrence of the accident within the meaning of section 2 (1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act 1906.”
Argued for the appellants—The time within which the claim must be made was within six months from the “occurrence” of the accident, and accordingly the six months commenced to run immediately after the occurrence, i.e., 11·30 a.m. on November 24, 1908, and terminated at that hour of day six months afterwards, i.e., 11.30 a.m. 24th May 1909. As the starting point from which the six months ran was an occurrence and not a day or date, the rule applicable to days—of which Simpson v. Marshall, January 25, 1900, 2 F. 447, 37 S.L.R. 315, and Frew v. Morris, March 12, 1897, 24 R. (J.) 50, 34 S.L.R. 527, were examples—that the period ran from midnight of the first day—did not apply. Reference was also made to In re North, 1895, 11 T.L.R. 417. (The Lord President referred to Parish Council of Cavers v. Parish Council of Smailholm, 1909 S.C. 195, 46 S.L.R. 170).
Counsel for the respondent were not called upon.
Now the accident here happened on the 24th November 1908, and a claim was made on 24th May 1909. Prima facie that would seem to be timeous, because the 24th May is the twenty-fourth day of the sixth month after November. But it has been argued to us that the claim was not made timeously, because as a matter of fact the accident happened at 11·30 a.m., whereas the claim was not made till either 5·30 or 11 p.m.—there seem to have been two claims put in.
I adhere to what I said in the recent case of Parish Council of Cavers v. Parish Council of Smailholm ( 1909 Session Cases 195), where, in dealing with the computation of a period, I said this—“I do not think that the Court will ever be concerned with the question of what happens inside a day—that is to say, I do not think that it will go into an inquiry as to the particular hour of the day at which the period commences and at which it ends; and in that sense the maxim dies inceptus pro completo habetur is applicable.” I think that remark is borne out by the whole of the decided cases, and I see no reason why the remark should not apply also to this case. The truth is, that you must, in one sense, take rather a rough and ready manner when you come to a computation of time which is not prescribed in days but is prescribed in months, because a month is not a stable unit of time. It has long ago been decided that the meaning of the Legislature in speaking of a “month” or “six months” is “calendar month” or “months.” But these calendar months are not units of time; and the practical and obvious conclusion has been come to, that when a period of six months or twelve months is spoken of, the corresponding day in the sixth or twelfth month thereafter is to be taken as the termination of the period. That is not scientifically accurate, because the place which a particular day occupies in a month is not the same in every month; for instance, the 24th May bears a different relation to the fractional parts of the month that are behind it and in front of it from that which the 24th June bears to the corresponding fractional parts of its month, because there are thirty-one days in the one month and thirty in the other—but for practical purposes the rule has been established.
I think, therefore, that the claim here was timeously made, that the Sheriff-Substitute has rightly decided the matter, and that the question ought to be answered in the affirmative.
Page: 151↓
The Court answered the question of law in the affirmative.
Counsel for the Appellants— Horne— Carmont. Agents— W. & J. Burness, W.S.
Counsel for the Respondent— Jameson. Agent— D. R. Tullo, S.S.C.